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INTRODUCTION
The states and their political subdivisions play a significant, perhaps
essential, role in the administration and enforcement of many national
statutes. The states administer national rate design and service stan-
dards for electric utilities;' they formulate and enforce plans to reduce
the emission of air pollutants from motor vehicles in order to meet na-
tional ambient air quality standards;' they enforce minimum national
environmental standards for surface mining;3 they manage national
price regulations for natural gas;4 and they enforce a national prohibi-
tion on the use of natural gas in decorative outdoor lights.5 Congress'
power to employ the states as agents of the nation 6 in implementing
each of these programs has been attacked.7 States' rights proponents
contend that statutes providing for state administration and enforce-
ment of national law reduce the states to "puppets of a ventriloquist
Congress"8 and threaten an independent role for the states in our fed-
eral system.
Although states' rights is no longer primarily a refuge for scoun-
drels,9 it is often difficult to discern whether states' rights proponents
I. See infra text accompanying notes 610-91.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 486-88 & 693-704.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 559-80.
4. See infra note 564.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 705-13.
6. Professor Holcombe coined the phrase "states as agents of the nation" to describe the
employment of "[sitate officers in the execution of federal powers." Holcombe, The States as
Agents afthe Nation, I S.W. POL. Sm. Q. 307, 309 (1921).
7. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982) (state adminis-
tration of national rate design and service standards for electric utilities); Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981)
(state implementation of national environmental standards for surface mining); Atlanta Gas Light
Co. v. Department of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359 (1lth Cir. 1982) (state administration of national
standards for the use of natural gas in outdoor decorative lights); Oklahoma v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981) (state implementation of national price regula-
tions governing intrastate and interstate sales of natural gas), ajt'g, 494 F. Supp. 636 (w.D. Okl.
1980), cert. deniedsub nom. Texas v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 2902 (1982);
United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980) (state enforcement
of national motor vehicle air pollution restrictions), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981); Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050
(1981); Pacific Legal Found. v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
914 (1981).
8. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), on remand,
566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977).
9. States' rights has, until recently, often been the veil for opposition to civil rights for racial
minorities. Senator Thurmond's proposal to repeal the Voting Rights Act of 1965 or to frustrate
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are motivated by some principle of federalism or whether they use
states' rights as a convenient legal mantle for objections to substantive
national policies.'" Regardless of motive, states' rights advocates draw
political support from popular frustration with "big government" and
the probably ill-founded expectation that state regulation would be less
intrusive and more efficient than the national regulation." They draw
their legal theory from the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery (NLC 12 which upset the easy, then-settled
assumption that the only checks on Congress' power to control the
states' relationship with the nation were political and substituted a
vague concept of judicially enforceable federalism restraints.
NLC did not address directly the question of Congress' power to em-
ploy the states as its agents to regulate private activity. It addressed a
related question of intergovernmental immunity--Congress' power to
effective administration of the Act by expanding its application to include states that have no
history of racial discrimination in voting suggests that the states' rights theory still serves this
purpose. Pear, Congress Begins Fight over Extension of Voting Act, N.Y. Times, April 18, 1981, at
10, col. 2 (national ed.); Rule, Blacks and States' Rights: President's Revival of Concept has Upset
Those Who Associate Term with Past Discrimination, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1981, at 14, col. 4
(national ed.).
10. "[The proponents of states' rights sought to have it both ways. When their interests were
being served by national action, no voice asserting states' rights was to be heard. Only when a
national program seemed to them harmful to their interests was the challenge made." R. LEACH,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 36-38 (1970). Most states' rights challenges to national statutes are
brought by private parties and not by the states themselves. Although the paucity of state suits is
in large part explained by limitations on state standing, the prevalence of private parties' claims of
states' rights suggests that states' rights is often a legal vehicle for objections to national policy.
See Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Re-
view, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1577-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dispensability of Judicial Review].
11. Governor Bruce Babbitt of Arizona is a proponent of the "new" states' rights:
The concept of states' rights has a bad name, because the flag of states' rights over the
last three or four decades has been waved by reactionaries, by people who were resisting
civil rights, who were against addressing social concerns, a functioning welfare system
and who did not want any level of government to address issues of medical care. My
experience as governor has brought me to understand that the issue of states' rights
shouldn't be identified with those people. There are a lot of us who view ourselves as
progressives, who really believe that states ought to pick up responsibilities and address
issues. We've been frustrated in trying to do that by the enormous, unyielding, unre-
sponsive federal presence that pervades everything from A to Z.
Notable and Quotable, Wall. St. J., Oct. 24, 1980, at 34, col. 4 (facsimile ed.).
For an argument that state regulations will fill the void created by national deregulation and
that the result of deregulation at the national level may well be that private activity is regulated
more thoroughly and completely by the states than it was ever controlled by the national govern-
ment, see Noam, The Interaction of Federal Deregulation and State Regulation, 9 HoFSTRA L. REV.
195 (1980).
12. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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regulate the states and their political subdivisions.' 3 The Supreme
Court, unfortunately, failed to articulate any neutral principle 14 ade-
quate to support the holding that most state and local government em-
ployees are immune from the minimum wage and overtime
requirements of the national Fair Labor Standards Act.' 5 Notwith-
standing this widely deplored theoretical inadequacy,' 6 most courts
and commentators have been content to apply one or more of three
sterile approaches to intergovernmental regulatory immunity that NLC
seemingly invited: federalism restraints are found to apply to statutes
enacted under the commerce power but not to statutes enacted under
other powers; 17 an aspect of state activity or government is labeled
"traditional" or "integral" and held immune from national control;' 8
or the scope of national power is determined by balancing state and
national interests.' 9 Although a few scholars have essayed more
thoughtful and original analyses of intergovernmental regulatory im-
munity in the wake of NLC,20 no one has advanced a theory that will
permit effective implementation of national policy and preserve the
states as essential components of our federal system.
The absence of any coherent theory of Congress' power to regulate
the states and to use the states as its agents in implementing national
policy has, as yet, had little immediate effect on the allocation of power
between the states and the nation. Although the NLC decision has in-
spired many challenges to Congress' power, most courts have found
13. The issue in NLC was whether Congress had the power to apply the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local government employees.
The case did not raise any question of Congress' power to employ the states in applying these
requirements to private employers.
14. "Neutral principles" are, as Professor Herbert Wechsler originally intended and as Pro-
fessor Greenawalt has emphasized, "reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result;" that is, principles that judges will apply to every situation that they reach
regardless of the result. Greenawalt, The Enduring Signficance of Neutral Prncoples, 78 COLLIM.
L. REV. 982, 985-90 (1978); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional La, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 19 (1959). Professor Wechsler found that the question of a neutral principle for "the
limits put on the Congress as against the states" was "intriguing." Wechsler, supra, at 23-24. This
Article develops a principle of political accountability as an answer to his intriguing question.
15. 426 U.S. at 852.
16. E.g., Cox, Federalism andIndividualRights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 1,
22-25 (1978); Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1871, 1878-84 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Municipal Bankruptcy].
17. See infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 118-20.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 731-802.
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wanting federalism objections to national regulation of state and local
government and to state implementation of national programs.21 How-
ever, the Supreme Court's NLC decision, with its attendant ambiguity,
has made Congress more cautious. Congress has been reluctant in re-
cent years to regulate the states and their political subdivisions22 and
has expressed doubts about its power to use the states as agents of the
nation.23
The Court recently has limited the reach of NLC by sustaining Con-
gress' power to employ the states as its agents to implement national
21. Arguments that national statutes intrude impermissibly on state autonomy and are un-
constitutional under NLC have been raised in over 200 reported cases. Apart from cases follow-
ing NLC directly and holding that the FLSA is unconstitutional as applied to particular state and
local government employees, see infra note 115, only a handful of courts has ever held a national
statute unconstitutional under NLC, and most of these decisions were subsequently reversed or
discredited. As of June 1, 1982, there are only two outstanding judgments that a national statute is
unconstitutional under NLC. District courts in Wyoming and Montana have held, contrary to the
great weight of authority, that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is unconstitutional as
applied to a state employee. Taylor v. Department of Fish & Game, 523 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mont.
1981); EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 198 1), prob.juris. noted, 102 S. Ct. 996
(1982) (No. 81-554). See infra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
22. Congress' failure to enact a statute providing collective bargaining rights for state and
local government employees similar to the rights of private employees under the National Labor
Relations Act is, at least in part, attributable to doubts, inspired by NLC, about the constitutional-
ity of such legislation. See Chanin, Can a Federal Collective Bargaining Statutefor Public Employ-
ees Meet the Requirements of National League of Cities v. Usery. A Union Perspective, 6 J.L. &
EDuc. 493 (1977); Jascourt, Can a Federal Collective Bargaining Lawfor Public Employees Meet
the Requirements of National League of Cities v. Usery: An Introduction, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 491
(1977); Weil & Manas, Can a Federal Collective Bargaining Statutefor Public Employees Meet the
Requirements of National League of Cities v. Usery?": A Management Perspective, 6 J.L. & EDUC.
515 (1977); Note, Constitutional Implications ofa Federal Collective Bargaining Lawfor State and
Local Government Employees, I1 CREIGHTON L. REV. 863 (1978).
Congress drafted the 1978 Amendments to the municipal bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-
946 (Supp. IV 1980), with a wary eye on NLC. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 110-11
(1978); H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 262-64, 394-95, 398 (1977). Bills that would impose
the registration and disclosure requirements of national securities laws on municipal issuers have
also produced congressional analysis of the reach of NLC. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereigny; The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 848 n.8 (1979).
23. Congress altered the mechanism for obtaining state enforcement of national restrictions
on motor vehicle air pollution in response to NLC. See infra text accompanying notes 693-704.
Proposals for state administration of national workers' compensation standards may have failed in
part because of doubts about Congress' power to use the states as its agents. See Hearings on S.
3060 Be/ore the Subcomm on Labor ofthe Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2, 51 (1978); Hearings on S 2018 Before the Subcomm. on Labor ofthe Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Wel/are, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 751-58 (1976) (testimony of Professor Arthur
Larson); Solomons, Workers' Compensationfor Occupational Disease Victims: Federal Standards
and Threshold Problems, 41 ALBANY L. REV. 195, 237-38 (1977).
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standards for electric utilities,' to administer national environmental
standards for surface mining,25 and to apply national labor relations
policies to the employees of a state-owned commuter railroad.2 6 The
Court did not, however, refine the NLC concept of state autonomy.
Absent principled criteria governing Congress' power to regulate the
states and to use them as the nation's agents, NLCs vague concept of
state autonomy remains an open invitation to litigation. It also creates
a significant risk that a series of ad hoc decisions will impose unprinci-
pled and impractical restraints on national power in the name of states'
rights and will inhibit effective government of the nation. This unfor-
tunate result can be avoided if the Court: (1) determines the states' role
in the federal system; (2) identifies the effects on the states of Congress'
power to regulate private activity, to regulate the states themselves, and
to require the affirmative exercise of state authority over private activ-
ity in the administration and enforcement of national law; (3) and eval-
uates the extent to which the national political process both justifies
and limits national political authority over the states.
The framers intended that the states, like the nation, would be polit-
ical communities with the power to make decisions about government:
political decisions about substantive rules for private conduct, the
structure and organization of their decisionmaking processes, the pack-
age of goods and services to be provided collectively, and the allocation
of governmental resources. These powers, which make the states self-
governing, political decisionmaking units, are then state interests that
merit some protection if the states' role in the federal system is to be
preserved. In creating a second political community-the nation-the
framers recognized that state exercise of these powers would not be
completely independent; however, apart from a very broad outline,
they did not determine the extent to which one political decisionmak-
ing unit (the states) would be subject to the control of another, larger
political community (the nation). Thus, the question created by the
establishment of two political communities in a single constitutional
system is whether there is any rule for giving preference to the larger,
24. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). See infra text
accompanying notes 610-91.
25. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 559-80.





national political community consistent with the states' role as political
decisionmaking units.
A rule of preference between political choices of the states and the
nation can be found in the operation of the national political process.
When national political decisions are the product of a national major-
ity, preference for the political choice of the nation over the political
choices of subnational majorities serves the framer's intentions that the
national political process would be an alternative to parochial state
political processes and that the actual allocation of political authority
in the federal system would be determined by the electorate. National
political decisions are the product of a national majority when Con-
gress is politically accountable or answerable to the national electorate.
The political accountability of Congress turns on political checks inher-
ent in the national political process. These political checks are simply
the impact of national policy on private activity and the imposition of
the administrative and financial costs of enforcing national policies on
the national electorate. To the extent that political checks make Con-
gress politically accountable, they ensure that national political deci-
sions are the product of a national majority and justify national
authority to intrude on state autonomy. Political checks also limit in-
trusions on the states' interests in independent political decisionmak-
ing. Thus, political checks and Congress' political accountab1ity, and
not simply the representation of state interests in Congress by repre-
sentatives elected from the states, are the political safeguards of feder-
alism;27 they justify judicial deference to the national political process
and protect the states' role as political communities in the federal sys-
tem. When political checks make Congress politically accountable, in-
trusion on the independence of state political decisionmaking is
permissible; that is, the political safeguards of federalism are sufficient.
Conversely, when Congress is not politically accountable, courts should
protect state interests in political decisionmaking.
This Article first develops the framers' understanding that both the
nation and the states would be political communities with significant
27. Professor Herbert Wechsler first stated the theory that there are safeguards of state inter-
ests inherent in the national political process and that these safeguards are adequate to protect our
federal system of government. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543
(1954). His explanation of the political safeguards of federalism and the elaboration of political
accountability as the safeguard of the states' role in the federal system is developed infra at notes
803-11 & 829-49.
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political decisionmaking powers and that the actual allocation of polit-
ical authority would turn on the electorate's preference between the
states and the nation. It explains how Congress' power to regulate pri-
vate activity, to regulate the states, and to require the affirmative exer-
cise of state authority over private activity diminishes the states'
autonomy in making political decisions. It then analyzes the concept of
state autonomy announced in NLC and reviews lower court efforts to
determine the extent to which state autonomy limits Congress' author-
ity under the war, spending, Civil War Amendment enforcement, com-
merce, and tax powers to regulate both private activity and the states
and to employ the states as the nation's agents in regulating private
activity. Since these lower court decisions provide a comprehensive
overview of Congress' power to control the allocation of political au-
thority in the federal system, they establish the ful range of national
and state relations to be explained by any principled theory of federal-
ism. With this background, the Article then advances a theory of polit-
ical accountability as both a justification for and a limitation on
Congress' power over the states, and it defines the scope of Congress'
power to control the allocation of political authority in the federal
system.2
8
28. This Article addresses all but two areas of federalism limits on Congress' power. The first
omission is the question of Congress' power to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity
to suit in federal courts. The Supreme Court has recognized Congress' power to abrogate the
states' eleventh amendment immunity under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The
Supreme Court has not yet settled the question of Congress' article I powers to abrogate state
* eleventh amendment immunity, but most lower courts have recognized this power. E.g., Peel v.
Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (war power); Mills Music, Inc. V. Arizona,
591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (copyright and patent power); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ.,
589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1979) (war power), cert. denied 441 U.S. 967 (1979). Apart from the light
they shed on the general issue of states' rights restraints on Congress' powers, cases raising elev-
enth amendment issues are not discussed directly because these issues have already been thor-
oughly and brilliantly analyzed. See Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sopereign
Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1978); Field, The Eleventh Anendmrent and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 1203 (1978).
Congress' power to control state courts is the only other aspect of federalism limits on the na-
tional legislature that is not discussed in this Article. The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Na-
tional League of Cities has revived old, and largely unsettled, questions of national power over
state courts. Eg., In re Marriage of Lopp, 268 Ind. 690, 378 N.E.2d 414 (1978) (Congress' power
to prescribe rules of evidence for state courts), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Thiboutot v.
Maine, 405 A.2d 230 (1979) (Congress' power to abrogate state common law sovereign immunity
when a state is sued in state court), a'd 448 U.S. 1 (1980); People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 431
N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d 897 (1980) (Congress' power to prescribe rules of evidence for state
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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The theory of political accountability advanced here is largely con-
sistent with the existing pattern of national and state relations, although
it supplies a new explanation for the results. It permits a wide range of
national and state cooperation. Thus, it is consistent with a workable
system of government. Moreover, it provides some protection for the
states as political decisionmaking units by limiting the means that Con-
gress can use to regulate the states and to employ the states as its
agents. Most importantly, reliance on the political process to determine
the allocation of political power between the states and the nation
reduces the risk of substituting judicial policy for congressional policy
because it provides a modest, principled basis for judicial superinten-
dence of our federal system of government.
I. THE STATES' ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
A. Original Understanding. The States as Political
Decisionmaking Units
The commonplace observation that the framers of the Constitution
did not define clearly the role of the states in our federal system con-
fuses two separate questions: whether the framers had a sharp concept
of the states' role, and whether they determined precisely the allocation
courts); Sharp v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. Commw. 607, 372 A.2d 59 (1976) (Congress' power to
abrogate state common law sovereign immunity when a state is sued in state court). Nevertheless,
the breadth of these issues and the clear historical understanding that state courts would hear
federal cases if Congress neglected to create inferior federal courts or to vest them with full juris-
diction over cases within the article III judicial power, see infra note 995 and accompanying text,
requires separate analysis of the question of national control of state courts. The author hopes to
undertake this task elsewhere.
In addition to these two areas of federalism restraints on Congress, this Article also defers con-
sideration of states' rights limits on the powers of the federal courts. Even before NLC, the
Supreme Court began to restrict federal court interference with state court proceedings and to
limit review of state court judgments on habeas corpus. Eg., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). These restrictions on federal court interference
with state court proceedings and judgments have been augmented since NLC was decided and
have been carefully analyzed. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976); Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalisn Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035 (1977); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977). NLC has generated other broad ques-
tions of federalism limits on the powers of federal courts. Eg., New York State Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980) (federal court power to compel a state
officer to act in excess of or contrary to his state law authority); Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617
F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal common law); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (implied
constitutional cause of action against a state for damages), vacated, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), modyied
on remand, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979). Questions of states' rights limits on federal courts will be
explored in a subsequent article.
Washington University Open Scholarship
790 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:779
of power between the states and the national government. Contrary to
received wisdom, there is an historical answer to the first question: the
framers understood that the states, like the nation, would be political
communities or political decisionmaking units. 9 Recognition of this
basic concept of the states' role is in turn the first step in answering the
allocation of power question, which the framers, in large measure, left
open.
The most elementary and perhaps the only indisputable characteris-
tic of the federal form of government established by the Constitution is
that it provides for two governments-national and state.30 The Con-
stitution that established a national government assumed the continued
existence of state governments. 3' This assumption is the key to the
framers' understanding of the states' role because a government
presumes an underlying political community or society. In maintain-
ing state governments in the constitutional system, the framers recog-
nized the continued existence of the states as political communities 32
29. See infra text accompanying notes 30-39.
30. The Constitution established neither a pure federal government or confederacy, in which
"the central body is entirely dependent legally upon [the] will of associated states retain[ing] all
the sovereign power" over individuals, nor a national or unitary government with complete sover-
eignty; instead it created a "compound" of these two forms of government (which we now com-
monly style "federal") in which both the states and the national government exercise "some
portion of the whole governing power." Diamond, The Federalist's lew afFederation, in ESSAYS
IN FEDERALiSM 21, 22, 37 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Diamond]; Diamond, The Federalist on
Federalsi" "Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both'; 86 YALE
LJ. 1273 (1977).
The retention of a measure of the whole governing power in the states was, as Professor Herbert
Wechsler observed, hardly a point on which there was any choice, and the principle of two gov-
ernments was the clearest point of consensus among the drafters of the Constitution. Wechsler,
supra note 27, at 543. See S. DAvis, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 114 (1978); R. LEACH-, supra note
10, at 8.
31. The Constitution explicitly recognizes state government in the guarantee to each state of
a republican form of government. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. Implicit recognition of state govern-
ment is provided by references to the organs of state government. Eg.., U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl.l
(state legislature); art. I, § 2, cl.4 (state executive); art. I, § 3, cl.l,2 (state legislature); art. I, § 3, cl.2
(state legislature and state executive); art. I, § 4, cl.l (state legislature); art. I, § 8, cl.17 (same); art.
II, § I, cL.2 (same); art. IV, § 1 (state judiciary); art. IV, § 2, cl.2 (state executive); art. IV, § 3, cl.
(state legislature); art. IV, § 4 (state legislature and state executive); art. V (state legislature); art.
VI, cl.2 (state judiciary); art. VI, cl.3 (state legislature, executive, and judiciary).
32. The tenth amendment's reservation of powers, not delegated to the United States nor
prohibited by the Constitution, "to the States respectively, or to the people" provides clear textual
support for the concept of the state as a political community. U.S. CONsT. amend. X, The use of
the disjunctive "or" equates the state with its people and suggests that the people of the state will
determine whether and how the reserved powers will be executed through state government. See
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essen.
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that would have the power to make decisions about the government of
their own communities. The power to make decisions about govern-
ment clearly includes the power to structure and organize the processes
of government.3 3 Unless we are to construe this power to make polit-
ical decisions34 as an empty vessel, it also necessarily includes the
power of the political community organized in a government to regu-
late private conduct, to determine the package of goods and services
financed through taxes and provided collectively, and to allocate gov-
ernmental (executive, legislative, and judicial) resources.
The framers clearly did not intend, however, that the states would be
completely independent in the exercise of these political decisionmak-
ing powers. The Constitution directly imposes significant, specific re-
straints36 and duties37 on the states. Most importantly, in the same
tia Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1067 n.17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Unraveling
NLCI. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 869 n.9 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (language of tenth amendment differentiates people and states). Other provisions of the Con-
stitution also suggest that the framers viewed the states as political communities that would have a
government. The guarantee of a republican form of government is obviously made to the people
of a state and not to some abstract, formal institution. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 721
(1869); U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4. Congress' power to submit amendments to the Constitution to
either state legislatures or conventions in the states recognizes a distinction between the state as a
government and the state as a political community. U.S. CONST. art. V. In Texas v. White, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720-21 (1869), Chief Justice Chase said that the term "state" was used in the
Constitution to designate "the combined idea of people, territory, and government," and he con-
cluded the principal concept was that a state was a "political community."
33. Although the Constitution assumed that each state's government would include an execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branch, see supra note 31, it did not, apart from the general guarantee
of a republican form of government, control the form or operation of state government. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4.
34. A "political decision" is by definition one about government and public policy. OxFoiD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford University Press 1971).
35. These categories of state political decisionmaking powers are consistent with the well-
settled concept that the states have broad "police" powers and enjoy all possible governmental
powers, except those denied to any government or allocated to the national government. See
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1943); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1876); New
Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836). Other commentators have attributed
similar basic powers to the states as political communities. Kaden, supra note 22, at 849-53. Cf.
Michelman, States'Rights and States'Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166-73 (similar list of state powers inherent in sovereignty
was implicitly rejected by the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court in NLC) [hereinafter cited
as Permutations of Sovereignty].
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
37. The Constitution requires the states to participate in the national political process by
electing members of the Congress, by appointing presidential electors, and by passing on proposed
amendments. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2-4; art. II, § 1; art. V; amends. XII, XVII. The Constitution
also imposes duties on states in their dealings with other states. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 (full faith
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instrument that recognized the states as political communities, the
framers established a government for the nation and thus recognized a
different, larger political community38 with major political decision-
making powers.39 The existence of two political communities necessar-
ily created the potential for competition and conflict in the exercise of
political decisionmaking powers, and to the extent that the nation
predominated, the states' role as political decisionmaking units would
be reduced.
Although the founding fathers recognized the conflict inherent in es-
tablishing two political decisionmaking units in a single constitutional
system, they did not resolve it.4" In the Constitution and the debate
and credit to state judicial proceedings); art. IV, § 2, cl.2 (rendition of fugitives fromjustice). The
Court emasculated the duty to extradite fugitives from justice in Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 66 (1861), much as it earlier emasculated the duty to return fugitive slaves in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). See infra text accompanying notes 1009-20 & 1026-32.
38. In Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 721 (1869), the Supreme Court expressly noted
the existence of two political communities in our federal system:
A state, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is apolitical communito of free citi-
zens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under a government
sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the consent of the
governed. It is the union of such states, under a common constitution, which forms the
distinct and greaterpoliical unit, which that Constitution designates as the United States,
and makes of the people and states which compose it one people and one country.
Id (emphasis added). Professor Kaden also identifies the states as political communities, but he
does not explicitly recognize that both the states and the nation are political communities. See
Kaden, supra note 22, at 849-53.
39. The Constitution divides national political powers between the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of the government that it establishes. The principal heads of legislative power
are: art. I, § 4 (time, plan, and manner of congressional elections); art. I, § 8 (e.g., taxes, spending,
commerce); art. IV, § I (full faith and credit to state acts and judicial proceedings); and art. IV,
§ 3, cl.2 (rules and regulations for United States territories and property). Subsequent amend-
ments extended these legislative powers to other subjects. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII (slavery),
XIV (privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection), XV (voting), XVI (income tax),
XIX (women's suffrage), XX (presidential election and succession), XXIII (national representation
of the District of Columbia), XXIV (poll tax), and XXVI (minors' suffrage). Political decision-
making powers are conferred on the executive and the judiciary by article II, sections 2-3, and
article III, section 2, respectively.
40. S. DAvis, supra note 30, at 95; R. LEACH, supra note 10, at 8-10. The whole debate over
the adoption of the Constitution between the federalists and the antifederalists focused on the
question of the extent to which political power would be centralized in the national government,
and the price of adoption was ambiguity. Diamond, supra note 30, at 42-51.
Although the framers did not define precisely the scope of an individual state's political powers
with respect to the nation, they did provide a mechanism to prevent the states from combining to
expand their political powers at the expense of the nation. The compact clause prevents the states
from entering an agreement or compact that expands their political powers in relation to the
national government without the consent of Congress. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl.3. See United
States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'rs, 434 U.S. 452 (1978); Frankfurter & Landis, The
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over its adoption, the framers carefully sidestepped questions about the
division of the governing power between the two political communities
and the extent to which one political decisionmaking unit (the states)
would be subject to the control of the other political decisionmaking
unit (the nation). The Constitution does impose some specific re-
straints on the political power allocated to the nation and it does con-
fine the national political community to the exercise of the enumerated
powers. The specific restraints, however, do little more than assure the
formal existence of the states4' or protect particular exercises42 of state
political decisionmaking authority. The restriction of the national
political community to enumerated powers,43 even bolstered by the
tenth amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers,44 could protect
the states' role only if the enumerated powers were narrowly defined
and construed because the Constitution provides for the supremacy of
Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 693-95
(1925).
41. The Constitution obligates the United States to guarantee every state a republican form
of government and to protect the states against invasion and domestic violence. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 4. It prohibits alteration of state boundaries and reduction of state representation in the
Senate without the consent of the state's legislature. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; art. V. On the
question of the power of the courts and Congress to enforce the guarantee of a republican form of
government, see infra note 441. The prohibition against any national action giving a preference to
the ports of one state over those of another indirectly protects the formal existence of the states.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.6.
42. The Constitution explicitly protects state power to determine the qualifications of voters
(art. I, § 2, cl.l; amend. XVII), to appoint the officers of the militia (art. I, § 8, cl. 16), and to
regulate liquor (amend. XXI). State power to levy property taxes is indirectly protected by the
apportionment clause, which makes a national property tax administratively difficult. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.4; Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 289 (1977).
The Constitution protected the states' power to control the importation of slaves until 1808. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cll.
43. THE FEDERALIST argued that the jurisdiction of the national government was limited to
certain enumerated objects only, and the power of the national government has always been so
understood. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 86 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Eg., McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
44. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. The tenth amendment has always been read merely to confirm
the basic principles that the national government is confined to the exercise of the delegated pow-
ers and that the states are free to exercise powers not prohibited by the Constitution. It does not
limit or explain the nature or extent of the powers delegated to the national government. United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,406-07
(1819). The history of the adoption of the tenth amendment confirms this interpretation. Dispen.
sabiliti of Judicial Revie, supra note 10, at 1611-13, and sources cited therein. Even when the
Supreme Court revived state sovereignty as a limit on Congress' powers in National League of
Cities, it read the tenth amendment only as a declaration of a broader constitutional policy and
not as a specific limit on the powers of the national government. See infra notes 94-96 and accom-
panying text.
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valid national law.45 Although the proponents of the Constitution ar-
gued that the enumerated powers were limited in number and scope,46
others (the antifederalists) argued that these powers, especially when
coupled with a broad provision of power to execute them,47 could sig-
nificantly diminish the states' role.48 The Constitution, which contains
no standard to confine the interpretation of the national political pow-
ers, provides no answer to these conflicting interpretations. 49 More im-
portantly, apart from a minimum guarantee of formal existence and
provision for a few particular state powers,50 the Constitution provides
no specific protection for the states' role as political decisionmaking
units. The proponents of the Constitution were forced to argue that the
states and nation could coexist as political communities and that the
states would be the predominate political unit because the people
would prefer state government over the national government. 5'
The framers' intention that the states would be an integral part of
our federal form of government and their understanding that the states,
like the nation, would function as political decisionmaking units may
45. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."). The supremacy clause does not speak to the question of what powers are
delegated to the national government; it provides simply that when the national government acts
within its powers, it is supreme. Although reliance on the supremacy clause to answer the ques-
tion of the proper subjects and scope of national powers begs the question, the Supreme Court has
occasionally committed this error. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947) (question of Con-
gress' power to compel a state court to enforce a penal statute answered in part by asserting
supremacy of national law); see infra text accompanying notes 644-46.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("The powers delegated
by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are
to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite"). Madison also suggested that
the powers of the states and the national government were distinct and separate. Id No. 14, at 86;
No. 45, at 313; No. 46, at 315 ("The Federal and State Governments are . . . instituted with
different powers, and designated for different purposes"). This line of argument gave rise to the
theory of dual federalism. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18 ("necessary and proper" clause).
48. Scheiber, Federalism and The Constitution: The Original Understanding, in AMERICAN
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 95-96 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber, eds. 1978).
49. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("the question respecting
the extent of powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as
long as our system shall exist.").
50. See supra notes 41 & 42.
51. Diamond, smpra note 30, at 42-51; Scheiber, supra note 48, at 91. See W. MURPHY, THE
TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM 403-04 (1967).
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seem trivial in light of their failure to determine the extent to which this
state role would be preserved and how it would be protected against the
power of the national political community. Although the Constitution
does not determine the extent to which one political decisionmaking
unit (the states) is subject to the control of another political decision-
making unit (the nation), identification of the states' role is nonetheless
significant because it teaches that contests between the states and na-
tion are contests of political decisionmaking power between political
communities. It also suggests that the resolution of such contests lies in
the determination of a principle for giving preference to one political
process over the otherl 2 -a suggestion that is strongly bolstered by the
argument in The Federalist that popular support would determine
whether the nation or the states would predominate.
B. National Power to Control the Allocation of Political Authority
Between the States and the Nation
In the absence of any precise determination of the extent to which
the states would be politically subordinate to the larger political com-
munity of the nation, it was theoretically possible that the states would
have significant political power to make decisions about the substantive
rules for individual behavior, the structure and organization of their
decisionmaking processes, the package of goods and services financed
through taxes and provided collectively, and the allocation of their ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial resources. It was, however, also theo-
retically possible that the states' political decisionmaking powers would
be significantly diminished by the exercise of national political powers
to regulate private activity, to regulate the states, and to control the
"affirmative exercise of state authority" over private activity.5 4
52. Cf. Permutations of Sovereignty, supra note 35, at 1171 ("no firm ground for preferring
the 'integrity' of state and local politics to that of national politics").
53. Scheiber, supra note 48, at 89 ("settlement of confficts between the states and Congress
would have to be decided by the informal political process"). THE FEDERALIST argued that the
predominance of the states or the nation would turn on popular loyalty and that the states would
probably prevail; however, the emphasis on the states as centers of political power was an effort to
overcome the antifederalists' fear of a strong central government, and the authors of THE FEDER-
ALIST in fact understood that the national government would probably win the competition for
popular loyalty. Diamond, supra note 30, at 42-56.
54. These three categories of national law that affect the states' role as political decisionmak-
ing units are drawn in part from Professor Hart's analysis of the relation of national substantive
law and state law. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489,
495 (1954). Professor Hart distinguished national substantive law that regulates state authority by
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. State and National Power to Regulate Private Activity
Political power to prescribe substantive rules directly controlling pri-
vate activity can, in theory, be allocated between the states and the na-
tion in a number of ways. Congress may make certain matters
completely subject to national regulation55 or, alternatively, leave them
completely to state statutory and common law.56  State control of a
requiring or prohibiting its exercise and national substantive law that displaces state law and
controls private activity directly. Id at 495, 515-36. A third category of national law is added
here-national substantive law that controls state and local government and activity. While Pro-
fessor Hart focused on the problems of two sources of law, the focus here is the relation of two
political communities and the effect of national law on the political decisionmaking powers of the
states.
55. If Congress has the constitutional power to regulate an activity, the preemption doctrine
determines the extent to which state power to regulate is displaced. This doctrine rests on the
supremacy clause, which provides that the Constitution and laws of the United States shall be the
supreme law of the land. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.2. When Congress states expressly the precise
extent to which state laws must be displaced in order to accomplish constitutionally valid ends
sought by the national legislature, the courts defer to the congressional allocation of governmental
power. When Congress does not declare precisely the extent to which state law is superseded, the
courts have the difficult task of determining whether state law should be invalidated because it
conflicts with a national statute. Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear 'Moratorium" Legislation in the
States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case a/Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 437-45
(1976); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shfting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975). The crucial question, of course, is what matters Congress can
regulate against claims that Congress has intruded unconstitutionally on state autonomy. That
question is addressed below. See infra text accompanying notes 850-73. If Congress does have the
constitutional power to regulate a particular matter, preemption follows automatically if Congress
has made its intent sufficiently clear. Murphy & La Pierre, supra, at 440-45.
56. Individual activity is left completely to state control where Congress has not acted, unless
a court concludes that, even in the absence of national legislation, the mere grant of power to
Congress excludes state legislation. E.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552-60 (1973)
(article I, section 8, clause 8, copyright power does not exclude all state copyright legislation); Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (state requirement of contour mudguards on
trucks invalid under the commerce clause). Congress, however, can remove the barrier of its
dormant or unexercised legislative powers. E.g., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 451 U.S. 648 (1981) (Congress can consent to state regulation of insurance that would
otherwise be invalid under the commerce clause); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
(1946) (same); National Agric. Chems. Ass'n v. Rominger, 500 F. Supp. 465, 470-71 (E.D. Cal.
1980) (Congress can permit state regulation of pesticides that would otherwise be invalid under
the commerce clause). Seegenerally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 270-71, 355-57 (10th ed. 1980). Although there is no definitive rationale for Congress' power
to enact statutes consenting to state laws that would otherwise be inconsistent with the grant of
legislative power to the nation, such statutes can be understood as an example of the principle that
the allocation of political power between the states and the nation is to be determined by the
national political process.
The doctrine of national immunity from state regulation and taxation may prevent the applica-
tion to the national government and its instrumentalities of state law rules for private activity;
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particular private activity is not necessarily synonymous with different,
and perhaps conflicting, substantive rules in other states; an accommo-
dation of state laws is possible. 7 Reciprocal legislation,58 interstate
compacts, 9 and informal cooperation in matters like regional plan-
ning60 may approach the degree of interstate coordination or uniform-
ity achievable by direct national regulation. Between the two extreme
ends of the spectrum, political power to regulate private activity can be
shared by the states and the nation. National law may be interstitial; 61
that is, national control of private activity may be confined to distinct,
discrete areas with the remainder left to the states. A joint role for the
exercise of state and national political decisionmaking powers over pri-
vate activity is also established when national statutes are designed to
enforce state law,62 when national and state substantive rules are com-
plementary,63 when both governments adopt identical standards,' and
however, Congress can provide for complete state control of a particular subject matter by waiv-
ing national immunity. Compare First Agric. Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339
(1968) (national bank immune from state taxation) and Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920)
(requirement that employee of Post Office have a state driver's license invalid) with Hancock v.
Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (national installations must comply with state air pollution standards
applicable to similar private facilities, but national installations do not have to comply with state
permit requirements unless Congress states such an intention clearly) and 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (1976)
(real and tangible personal property of national credit unions subject to nondiscriminatory state
and local taxation).
57. Hart, supra note 54, at 536. See generally Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation Under
the Constitution, 36 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1938).
58. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted over 100
acts and codes, and many of them have been widely adopted. See generally U.L.A. (Master
Edition).
59. E.g., 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1976) (consent to agreements or compacts for the prevention of
crime and criminal law enforcement); 33 U.S.C. § 1253(b) (1976) (consent to compacts for the
control of pollution). Both reciprocal legislation and formal agreements are subject to the re-
straints of the compact clause. See supra note 40.
60. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (encourage interstate cooperation in air pollu-
tion control).
61. Hart, supra note 54, at 498.
62. E.g., United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) (national statute pro-
hibited shipment of gambling devices into any state except those which acted to exempt them-
selves from the statute); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937)
(national statute prohibited shipment of convict-made goods into any state that prohibited the
receipt, sale, or possession of such goods).
63. When national and state statutes regulate the same aspects of individual behavior, the
state law may be preempted if Congress has expressly stated its intention that the national regula-
tion displaces state law or if the state law conflicts with the national statute. See supra note 55. If,
on the other hand, the national and state statutes are complementary, both sets of regulations can
be enforced. E.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (liability
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when the national government and the states cooperate in enforcing
their laws. 5
When Congress exercises its political power to regulate some aspect
of private activity, there is a significant effect on the states as political
decisionmaking units. For example, in the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (FLSA), Congress established minimum wage and maximum
hour requirements for employees engaged in commerce or in the pro-
under national statutes for costs to national government of cleaning up oil spills in the ocean and
liability under state law for damages to the state or private persons).
National and state environmental quality acts are a prominent example of duplicate legislation.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976), requires the
preparation of environmental impact statements evaluating the costs and benefits of any "major
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id § 4332(2)(C).
Approximately half of the states have statutes imposing similar requirements, and when a project
is within the terms of NEPA and the state environmental quality acts, two different, but often
similar environmental impact statements must be filed. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,986-87 (1978); 40
C.F.R. § 1506.2 (1981) (provisions to eliminate duplication between NEPA and comparable state
requirements).
64. When state law voluntarily adopts national standards or a national law incorporates state
standards, uniformity can be achieved without any intrusion on the substantive policy for private
activity determined by the state political process. For example, during World War II, many state
and local governments enacted statutes and ordinances making violations of national Office of
Price Administration regulations a state or local offense. Mermin, "Cooperative Federalism"
A4gain: State and Municpal Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Re-
quirements, (pts. 1-2), 57 YALE L.J. 1, 201 (1947); Note, State Legislation in Support of the
N.LRA., 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1077 (1934) (state statutes adopting provisions of national codes as
standards of fair competition). Informal cooperation that respects state political decisions can also
be accomplished by statutes incorporating state law. For example, the national Assimilative
Crimes Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act both incorporate state law standards for individual
behavior. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). National tax, copyright and bank-
ruptcy law also may incorporate state law. E.g., Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 (1944).
65. The states, for example, have assisted in enforcing treaty regulations governing salmon
fishing, the national Prohibition laws, and draft regulations. See infra notes 945, 952 & 1032.
Interstate cooperation, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text, and informal cooperation
between the states and the national government were thoroughly discussed in the legal literature
of the late 1930's and 1940's because Supreme Court decisions limiting national authority on
states' rights grounds spurred investigation of alternative solutions to pressing national problems
that seemed to be beyond the political or institutional capacity of individual states. See, e.g., J.
CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEw FEDERALISM (1938); J. KALLENBACH, FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH
THE STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1942); Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, 23
IowA L. REV. 455-650 (1938); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 40. Not surprisingly, with the
subsequent recognition of broad national power under the commerce clause, commentators be-
came less interested in the mechanisms of interstate cooperation and informal cooperation be-
tween the states and the national government. The absence of current scholarly analysis belies the
reality of a pervasive pattern of close cooperation between the states and the national government.
State administration of national regulations is thoroughly discussed infra at notes 920-1032.
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duction of goods for interstate commerce.66 The basic decision to con-
trol these aspects of the employer-employee relationship has a
significant impact on the states as political communities: one substan-
tive policy for private activity determined in the national political pro-
cess (wage and hour regulation) is substituted for the substantive policy
choice of the states' political processes (no or different wage and hour
regulation). This particular impact of the FLSA on the states' role as
political decisionmaking units may appear to be de minimus. Viewed
in isolation, the FLSA is an example of interstitial national law-it
controls wages and hours of employment, but all other aspects of the
employment relationship are left to state law.
The FLSA, however, cannot be viewed in isolation if the effect of
direct national regulation of private activity is to be understood. As the
scope of national control over a particular activity is expanded, it be-
comes progressively more difficult to view national law as interstitial
because the political power of the states to prescribe substantive rules
for private conduct is correspondingly diminished. Thus, the states' ac-
tual role in controlling the employer-employee relationship cannot be
evaluated without consideration of many other national statutes which
substitute comprehensive nationally determined employment policies
for the policy choices of the states' political processes.67 Since many
other types of private activity may be or are subject to similarly com-
66. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 6(a), 7(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1062, 1063, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1940). The Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to enact this statute
under the commerce clause in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act is a convenient vehicle for examining the effect of national statutes on state political
decisionmaking powers because subsequent amendments produced two other major Supreme
Court decisions on federalism issues. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
67. Among other things, these statutes: (1) prohibit age discrimination and mandatory retire-
ment, Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980); (2) require equal pay for male and female employees, Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1976); (3) establish workplace safety and health standards, Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); (4) impose collective bargain-
ing responsibilities, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-158, 159-168 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980); (5) regulate pension plans, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1368 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); (6) prohibit discrimination against certain veterans,
Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2014 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980);
(7) require affirmative action to hire and advance qualified handicapped persons by employers
who perform national contract work or who receive national funds, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); and (8) prohibit racial and religious discrimination,
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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prehensive national control,68 national regulation of private activity
substantially diminishes the states' role as political decisionmaking
units.
2 National Power to Regulate the States
Direct national regulation of private activity has a significant effect
on the states as political communities because it displaces the substan-
tive policy choices of the states' political processes. If Congress exer-
cises its national political powers to regulate the states or local
government69 by extending rules for private activity to similar activity
of state and local governments, there is a second, distinct effect on state
political decisionmaking powers-the states' choice of goods and ser-
vices financed through taxes and provided collectively may be altered.
To continue the Fair Labor Standards Act example, when the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour regulations were extended to apply to
most state and local government employees, 70 many states complained
that the cost of government would be increased and that they would
either have to reduce services and benefits or increase taxes. 7' Although
68. For a comprehensive survey of national regulatory programs, see COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL, FEDERAL REGULATORY PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES (1978).
69. National regulation of local government may have two distinct types of effects. First,
local governments, like the states, are political communities, and national regulation of local gov-
ernment may interfere with local autonomy in political decisionmaking in the same ways that it
interferes with state autonomy. Second, national regulation of local government may also affect
the states. Since local government units are creatures of the states, national regulation of local
government may interfere with the states' control of their political subdivisions. The effects of
national regulations on the autonomy of the states and local government in making political deci-
sions are not discussed separately, but it should be noted that the Court has not decided whether
local governments as well as the states enjoy any constitutional immunity from national regula-
tion. See infra notes 130 & 473. National regulation of local government that interferes with the
states' control over the allocation of power to their political subdivisions is discussed infra at notes
257-63.
70. When the Fair Labor Standards Act was first enacted in 1938, it specifically exempted
states and their political subdivisions. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 3(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d) (1940). In 1966, Congress amended the Act and applied the minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour regulations to employees of hospitals, schools, and institutions operated by state and
local governments. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(a)(1),
(b), (c), 80 Stat. 831, 832. The 1966 Amendments were upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968). In 1974, Congress again amended the Act to make the minimum wage and maximum
hour requirements applicable to most employees of state and local governments. Fair Labor Stan-
dards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § (6)(a)(1), (5), (6), 88 Stat. 58-60 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s)(5), (x) (1976)).
71. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845-51 (1976). The Supreme Court
held that the 1974 amendments were an unconstitutional intrusion on state autonomy and over-
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the actual weight of the FLSA on the states can be disputed, the general
effect cannot be denied.72
3. National Power to Require the Affirmative Exercise of State
Authority Over Private Activity
In addition to direct regulation of private activity and the application
of such regulations to the states, national statutes can also affect the
states' role as political decisionmaking units by requiring the affirma-
tive exercise of state authority over private activity.73 When Congress
induces or requires the states to act as agents of the nation in adminis-
tering and enforcing national regulatory or social welfare programs, 74
the states must exercise affirmative authority over private activity. If,
for example, Congress decided to employ the states as its agents in en-
ruled Mary'land v. Wirtz, which had previously upheld Congress' power to apply the requirements
of the FLSA to a limited class of state employees. 426 U.S. at 840, 852, 855. NLC is discussed in
detail infra at notes 85-134.
72. The impact of national regulations on the states is perhaps more readily understood if
one considers that Congress could possibly apply all of the statutes regulating private employers,
seesupra note 67, to the states in their capacities as employers. For an overview of the application
of fair employment laws to public and private employers, see [19811 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH).
73. National law, either statutory or constitutional, may prohibit the exercise of state author-
ity over private activity as well as require the affirmative exercise of state authority over private
activity. Hart, supra note 54, at 517. Three categories of national law that affect the states' role as
political decisionmaking units have been postulated: regulation of private activity, regulation of
the states, and regulations requiring the affirmative exercise of state authority over private activity.
See siura note 54 and accompanying text. No fourth category of national law that prohibits the
exercise of state authority is necessary because a national statutory prohibition of state control
over private activity is in fact nothing more than an alternative description of direct national
regulation of private activity and preemption of conflicting state law. See supra note 55. Thus,
the minimum wage and maximum hour regulations of the FLSA can be viewed alternatively as
direct national regulation of employers preempting state law or as a prohibition of state law gov-
ering these matters. Similarly, if the FLSA standards are applied to the states, the national
statute can be described as one regulating the states as employers or as prohibiting the exercise of
state authority to pay its employees less than the FLSA requires. Although a national statute can
be described alternatively as one regulating directly private or state activity or as one prohibiting
the exercise of state authority, the effect on the state political process is the same-nationally
determined substantive policy is substituted for the policy choice of the states' political processes
and the states' choices of publicly provided goods and services may be altered.
If the Constitution is the source of the prohibition on the exercise of state authority, the effects
on the states as political decisionmaking units are the same, but the restraints are imposed by the
courts and not by Congress. The power of the courts to control the role of the states in our federal
system is a separate and complex topic that the author plans to address elsewhere. See supra note
28.
74. Congress has employed the states as the nation's agents since 1789. See infra text accom-
panying notes 993-1032. The mechanisms employed by Congress to obtain state administration
and enforcement of national regulations are discussed infra at notes 920-92.
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forcing the FLSA minimum wage and maximum hour regulations ap-
plicable to individual, private employers,75 a state legislature might
have to enact a statute that establishes the national standards as state
law and that creates and funds an administrative agency. The state
executive would have to administer and enforce the FLSA require-
ments, and the state courts would have to adjudicate controversies be-
tween employers and employees. The affirmative exercise of state
authority over private activity in implementing the national minimum
wage and maximum hour standards or other national regulations has a
major impact on state autonomy. The states must allocate their legisla-
tive, executive, judicial, and financial resources to satisfy national polit-
ical demands at the expense of implementing state policies and
fulfilling the demands of its own political community.
4. Transfer of Political Decisionmaking Powerfrom the States to
the Nation
As consideration of the Fair Labor Standards Act suggests, the states'
role as political decisionmaking units is reduced to the extent that di-
rect national regulation of private activity is expanded, that these regu-
lations are applied to the states, and that the states are employed as
Congress' agents in implementing national policy. It was, of course,
theoretically possible to maintain a significant role for the states as
political decisionmaking units by leaving most private activity to exclu-
sive state control and by confining national law to a supplementary or
complementary function. For the first 150 years of our constitutional
history, the states exercised significant political decisionmaking pow-
ers.7 6 Today, however, seven years from the bicentennial of the Consti-
tution, there is little dispute that the nation is the predominant political
decisionmaking unit and that the expansion of national powers has
been at the expense of the states. 77 The mere, now trite, observation
that the nation has grown in importance as a political decisionmaking
unit at the expense of the states begs the question of limits on Congress'
75. The Fair Labor Standards Act is administered by the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 204 (1976). Since Congress has provided for state implementa-
tion of many similar national programs, see supra text accompanying notes 1-5, state administra-
tion of the FLSA is a reasonable possibility.
76. See Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contempo-
rary Perspectives 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 619, 622-44 (1978).




power to control the allocation of political authority in the federal
system.
The significant transfer of political power from the states to the na-
tion that has occurred over the past forty years has been tolerated, if
not blessed, by the Supreme Court. Although the Court embraced the
concept of dual federalism for many years and checked Congress'
power to order national and state relations,78 it now acquiesces, for the
most part, in broad assertions of national political authority. Since
1937 the Court has accepted direct national regulation of private activ-
ity not previously regulated by any government and of private activity
historically subject to state control.79 At least before the NLC decision
in 1976, the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity was not a signifi-
cant restraint on Congress' power to regulate the states.8 ' In the ab-
sence of any conclusive challenge to Congress' power to require the
affirmative exercise of state authority over private activity,81 the states
administer and enforce many major national regulatory and benefit
programs.8 2
The lack of judicial interference with the exercise of national polit-
ical power over the last forty years is, at least in effect, a judgment that
the political process provided adequate protection for the states' role as
political decisionmaking units. Questions about the nature of the
states' role in the national system, the manner and extent to which the
political process protects the states, and judicially enforceable restraints
on Congress were not raised as long as the basic patterns of national
and state relations were accepted or at least tolerated. NLC has opened
the door to a reconsideration of these questions. The answers supplied
78. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). The concept of "dual federalism"
embraces the idea that certain state legislative powers are "an independent limitation on national
power" and that "certain subject-matters" are reserved for state legislation and are beyond the
reach of "any valid exercise of national power." Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA.
L REv. 1, 16 (1950) (emphasis in original).
79. Eg., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I1l
(1942).
80. Eg., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 549-58.
82. Although the national government administers many regulatory and benefits programs
directly, it usually "enlist[s] the efforts of other levels of government or the private sector in attain-
ing national objectives." 1 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE
FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMcs OF GROWTH, J Crisis of Confidence
and Competence A-77, at 39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ACIR STUDY].
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by the Supreme Court and elaborated by lower courts and commenta-
tors are uniformly inadequate.
II. NTrONAL LE4GUE OF CITIES AND FEDERALISM LIMITS ON
CONGRESS' POWERS
The plurality decision in National League of Cities Y. Usery"3 is but
one example of the Supreme Court's recent revival of federalism re-
straints on national power. NLC, however, stands apart from the other
cases, which recognized federalism limits on the powers of the federal
courts, 4 because it invoked the doctrine of intergovernmental immu-
nity as a check on Congress' power to order the relationship between
the nation and the states. The Court, unfortunately, did little more
than declare that there are limits on Congress' power to regulate the
states. It did not articulate any clear principle or rationale of intergov-
ernmental regulatory immunity; it failed even to define the precise ex-
tent of state immunity from the statute at issue. In the absence of any
precise holding or clear theory, and in the absence of subsequent clari-
fication from the Court, lower courts and commentators have struggled,
for the most part without notable success, in identifying federalism lim-
its on Congress' power.
A. National League of Cities v. Usery-The Decision
The 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) ap-
plied national minimum wage and maximum hour regulations gov-
erning private employees 5 to most state and local government
employees.8 6 Although the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz had
83. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, in which the Chief
Justice and Justices Powell and Stewart joined, and Justice Blackmun concurred specially. Jus-
tices Brennan and Stevens wrote separate dissents, and Justices White and Marshall joined in the
Brennan dissent.
84. See supra note 28.
85. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
86. The 1974 Amendments extended the coverage of the FLSA by amending the definition of
"employer" to include "a public agency," which was in turn defined to include states and their
political subdivisions. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(l),
(6), 88 Stat. 58-60 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (x) (1976)). Although Congress asserted
the power to regulate all state and local government employees, it exempted some public employ-
ees and limited the application of the wage and hour regulations to certain categories of public
employees. Congress provided exemptions for public employees not subject to state or local civil
service laws, for holders of elective office, and for several types of assistants to elected officials.




upheld the constitutionality of the 1966 Amendments to the FLSA,
which extended minimum wage and maximum hour regulation to a
narrow group of public employees, 7 the issue of intergovernmental im-
munity in NLC was framed in broad terms. The plaintiffs8s sought a
declaratory judgment that the 1974 Amendments were unconstitutional
and not a limited declaration with respect to particular types of public
employees8 9 A three-judge district court rejected the constitutional
claim on the authority of Maryland v. Wirtz,9" but the plaintiffs' broad
attack was eventually rewarded, albeit somewhat ambiguously.
The Supreme Court declined to hold that the 1974 Amendments
were unconstitutional on their face, but the plurality opinion specifi-
cally held that they were beyond Congress' power where they "operate
to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions." 91 Justice Blackmun
cast the deciding vote on his understanding that the plurality had bal-
anced national and state interests and because the states' interest out-
weighed the national interest.92 Although the plurality opinion was
able to capsulize the holding, its theory of intergovernmental immunity
was more elusive than Justice Blackmun suggested, and the lower court
on remand93 faced the difficult task of determining the precise extent to
which state and local governments as employers are immune from the
FLSA.
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion recognized Congress' broad
power under the commerce clause94 to regulate private activity,95 but
Congress also limited the application of the FLSA to employees engaged in law enforcement, fire
protection, and security at correctional facilities. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(c)(1), (2), 88 Stat. 60,
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(k), 213(b)(20) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
87. See supra note 70.
88. The plaintiffs were twenty states, four political subdivisions, the National League of Cit-
ies. and the National Governors' Conference. 426 U.S. at 836 n.7. Two states filed briefs amici
curiae supporting the plaintiffs, and three states filed briefs amici curiae urging the validity of the
1974 amendments. 426 U.S. at 835 n.f.
89. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 827 (D.D.C. 1974) (three-judge
court).
90. Id at 828.
91. 426 U.S. at 852.
92. Id at 856-57.
93. Id at 856.
94. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.3. The FLSA and subsequent amendments to the Act were
enacted under the commerce clause. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
95. Justice Rehnquist's statements that the 1974 Amendments are "not within the authority
granted Congress by art. I, § 8, cl.3" and that the 1966 Amendments "transgress the bounds of
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he found that a concept of state sovereignty, rooted in the states' essen-
tial role in the federal system and expressly declared by the tenth
amendment,9 6 limited the exercise of this power. Although he recog-
nized that national regulation of wages and hours in the private sector
diminishes state sovereignty,97 Justice Rehnquist found that the "States
as States stand on a quite different footing" than private employers.98
States stand on a different footing because determinations about the
wages and hours of public employment are not only an "undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty," 99 but they are also "functions essential
to [the] separate and independent existence" of the states.Iz° On the
basis of the effects of the FLSA on the states, Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that the states' ability to structure the employer-employee rela-
tionship was essential to their "ability to function effectively in the
federal system."10' He found that direct national regulation of the
wages and hours of public employment would increase state and local
authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause" might be read to suggest that he found
limits on Congress' power to regulate local activity under the commerce power. 426 U.S. at 852,
855. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the plurality opinion clearly demonstrates that he did not
intend to confine Congress' broad power under the commerce clause to regulate private activity.
426 U.S. at 836, 840-41, 849.
96. There is some support in Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the view that he read the tenth.
amendment itself as the source of limits on Congress' power to regulate state activity. He drew an
analogy to the limits imposed by the fifth and sixth amendments on Congress' enumerated powers,
and he stated that the tenth amendment is an "express declaration" of the limits on Congress'
powers to override state sovereignty. Id. at 841-42. Nonetheless, he found these limits, not in the
tenth amendment itself, but implicit in the nature of a federal system of government that contem-
plates an essential role for the states. Id. at 844-45, 849. Although Justice Rehnquist did not
develop a careful or comprehensive theory of the states' role, see infra text accompanying notes
125-30, the limits were the product of a structural, and not merely a textual, analysis.
Justice Brennan argued that the plurality opinion had misread the tenth amendment. 426 U.S.
at 861 n.4. He reasoned that the tenth amendment simply declares that all powers not delegated
are reserved and that state sovereignty is protected by confining Congress to the exercise of its
enumerated powers. Id As a matter of linguistics and history, Justice Brennan is undoubtedly
correct. See supra note 44. Nevertheless, his criticism is not responsive to the structural analysis
underlying Justice Rehnquist's invocation of the tenth amendment.
97. National regulation of wages and hours of private employment diminishes state sover-
eignty because it substitutes substantive policy declared by the nation for the substantive policy
choices of the states' political processes. See supra text following note 66. Justice Brennan's dis-
senting opinion made this point expressly. 426 U.S. at 875. Justice Rehnquist apparently ac-
cepted this proposition although he did not identify the manner in which national regulation of
private activity affects the states. See Id. at 845.
98. 426 U.S. at 854.
99. Id at 845.
100. Id
101. Id at 852.
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government costs forcing abandonment of important governmental ac-
tivities °2 and would "[displace] state policies regarding the manner in
which they will structure the delivery of those governmental services
which their citizens require."'' 1 3 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
1974 Amendments to the FLSA were invalid to the extent that they
"directly displace"' 4 or "impermissibly interfere with"'0 5 what he vari-
ously described as the "integral' or "traditional"107 governmental
functions of the states and their political subdivisions in providing pub-
lic services such as "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, parks and recreation"."'° He also concluded that the 1966
Amendments previously upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz were invalid be-
cause of interference with the governmental function of operating
schools and hospitals.'1 9
On remand, the district court expressly refused to hold that the
FLSA is inapplicable to all state and local government employees, and
it read NLC to establish a "traditional governmental functions" test of
state immunity from national regulation." 0 Although its declaratory
102. Justice Rehnquist quoted estimates of the increased costs and cited assertions that the
increased costs of employment would force a reduction in the number of hours of police cadet
training and an abandonment of affirmative action and college internship programs. 426 U.S. at
846-47.
103. Id. at 847. The plurality opinion found that the FLSA would displace state policies for
(1) the hiring of unskilled individuals, part-time employees, and teenagers for summer jobs at less
than the national minimum wage; (2) the work week of policemen and firemen; (3) the use of
compensatory time off as compensation for overtime work; and (4) reliance on volunteers for
services like fire protection. id at 847-51. The displacement of these state employment policies
would in turn interfere with the delivery of governmental services. Although these examples and
the cost estimates, see supra note 102, were accepted as true because the district court had dis-
missed the complaint, the Secretary of Labor contested the plaintiffs' allegations about the impact
of the FLSA. id at 874 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. 426 U.S. at 852.
105. Id at 851.
106. Id
107. Id at 852.
108. Id at 851.
109. Id at 855. The Supreme Court vacated two judgments applying the 1966 Amendments
to state-operated hospitals and schools. Dunlop v. New Jersey, 522 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1975), va-
cated and remanded sub nom. New Jersey v. Usery 427 U.S. 909 (1976); Brennan v. Indiana, 517
F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. Indiana v. Usery, 427 U.S. 909 (1976).
Cf Marshall v. Board of Educ., 575 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1978) (upholding application of the 1966
Amendments to employees of a public school and an award of past wages where the judgment was
not appealed and vacating a prospective injunction to comply with the FLSA because a city board
of education performs a traditional governmental function).
110. National League of Cities v. Marshall, 429 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (D.D.C. 1977) (three-
judge court). The court expressly held that NLC applies only to the minimum wage and maxi-
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judgment simply paraphrased the NLC plurality's formulation of the
holding,"' the district court approved an interpretive rule of the De-
partment of Labor that read NLC to bar application of the FLSA to
public employers engaged in traditional governmental functions and to
permit national wage and hour regulation of public employers per-
forming nontraditional functions." 2 This distinction between tradi-
tional and nontraditional governmental functions as a basis for
determining the immunity of state and local governments from na-
tional wage and hour regulation follows readily from the plurality's
examples of protected activities1 3 and its explicit approval of national
regulation of state activities, such as the operation of a railroad, that
are not "integral parts of their governmental activities."' 1 4
Although the courts have had little difficulty concluding that the
FLSA does not apply to a wide range of state and local government
activity, 5 NLC provides no clear guidance in determining the nature
mum hour provisions of the FLSA and declined to hold that state and local governments are
exempt from other statutes (the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), the Portal to
Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1976), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) that are codified with the FLSA or rely on its
definitions. Id at 704.
111. Compare 429 F. Supp. at 706 with text supra accompanying note 91.
112. 429 F. Supp. at 706-07; 29 C.F.R. §§ 775.2-.3 (1981). The interpretive rule recognized the
difficulty of distinguishing between traditional and nontraditional governmental functions. It pro-
vided that the states and their political subdivisions would be given notice and an opportunity to
comply voluntarily before suit was filed, and it limited the circumstances in which the government
would seek liquidated damages. 29 C.F.R. § 775.2(b)-(d) (1981). Schools, hospitals, fire preven-
tion, police protection, sanitation, public health, parks and recreation were identified as traditional
government functions; operation of a railroad was identified as a nontraditional function. These
categories of traditional and nontraditional governmental activities were drawn directly from the
plurality opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 108 & 109 and infra text accompanying note
114. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor subsequently
added libraries and museums as traditional governmental functions and identified eight addi-
tional nontraditional governmental functions: alcoholic beverage stores; off-track betting corpora-
tions; local mass transit systems; generation and distribution of electric power; provision of
residential and commercial telephone and telegraphic communication; production and sale of or-
ganic fertilizer as a by-product of sewage processing; production, cultivation, growing or harvest-
ing of agricultural commodities for sale to consumers; and repair and maintenance of boats and
marine engines for the general public. 29 C.F.R. §§ 775.3-.4 (1981).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 108 & 109.
114. The plurality opinion expressly approved three cases that had upheld the application of
commerce-power based regulations to state-operated railroads. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
115. The absence of any criteria for distinguishing between traditional and nontraditional
governmental functions has not been a practical problem in determining the immunity of state
and local governments from national minimum wage and maximum hour regulations because the
courts, for the most part, have simply invoked the decision itself or the plurality's formulation of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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and extent of state immunity from other national statutes and regula-
the holding as the basis for their conclusions that state or local government employers are exempt
from the FLSA. EEOC v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d 1220, 1222 n.4 (7th Cir.
1980) (local school district maintenance employees); Weppler v. School Bd., 551 F.2d 1055, 1055
(5th Cir. 1977) (public school teachers); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1977)
(convicts working in a state prison); Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 851 (N.D. Ohio 1978)
(patient workers in a state mental hospital); Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 426 F. Supp. 1272, 1275
n. 1 (D.Del. 1976) (city firemen); Association of Court Reporters v. Superior Court, 424 F. Supp.
90, 93 (D.D.C. 1976) (court reporters because District of Columbia considered a "state"); Bowen
v. Sonnenburg, 411 N.E.2d 390, 393 n.1 (Ind. App. 1980) (patients in institutions for mentally
handicapped and mentally retarded abandoned FLSA claim after NLC decided); Court Fund v.
Cook, 557 P.2d 875, 879 (Okla. 1976) (court bailiff); Townsend v. Clover Bottom Hosp. & School,
560 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tenn.) (inmate employees of a state hospital), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948
(1978).
Before the Court's 1982 decision in United Transportation Union, see infra notes 498-513, only
two courts attempted distinctions between traditional and nontraditional governmental functions.
In holding that a municipality in its capacity as an employer operating an airport or an urban bus
transit system is immune from the FLSA, both courts concluded that the concept of traditional
governmental functions included new services formerly provided by the private sector as well as
time-honored collective services. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979)
(municipal airport); Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (municipal transit
system). The conclusion of the district court that a municipal transit system is a traditional gov-
ernmental function is directly contrary to the position of the Department of Labor. See supra note
112. After the Court's 1982 United Transportation Union decision, upholding Congress' power to
apply national labor relations policies to a state-owned railroad on the ground that operation of a
commuter railroad is not a traditional governmental function, a distinction between traditional
and nontraditional functions will play a more significant role in the resolution of FLSA cases.
Indeed, one court has now broken the ranks and upheld the application of the FLSA to a munici-
pal transit authority on the ground that the operation of a mass transit system is not a traditional
governmental function. See infra note 454.
Although the courts have readily and uniformly held that state and local governments are im-
mune from the FLSA, arguments that NLC bars application of the FLSA to private employers
who receive state funds and who are controlled by the state have proved more troublesome. Two
courts have rejected invitations to extend the constitutional immunity of state government from
the FLSA to state-regulated and state-funded private employers. Williams v. Eastside Mental
Health Center, 669 F.2d 671 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (private not-for-profit corporation that receives state
funds and operates under a contract with the state to provide community mental health services
subject to the FLSA), rev'g, 509 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Bonette v. California Health and
Welfare Agency, 525 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (the state and public assistance recipients are
joint employers of domestic workers where the state makes a grant of state and national funds to
public assistance recipients to hire domestic workers and the state as a joint employer is subject to
the FLSA). One court, however, has held that a private employer is exempted from the FLSA by
virtue of its relation with a state. In Richland County Association v. Marshall, a district court held
that a private nonprofit corporation that receives state and national funds to provide deinstitution-
alized care for developmentally disabled adults is immune from the FLSA because it is perform-
ing a traditional state function. See 660 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit ultimately
entered an opinion reversing the district court's judgment, but it remains in effect because the
government erred in seeking review by the court of appeals rather than direct review by the
Supreme Court. In reviewing the district court's judgment, the Ninth Circuit entered two separate
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tions. The opinions invite at least three different tests of state immunity
from national regulation. One possible interpretation of the plurality
opinion is, as the district court concluded on remand, that traditional
state activity is absolutely immune from all national control. Absolute
immunity from national regulations affecting the delivery of traditional
state and local governmental services is suggested by the plurality's fo-
cus on the type of state activity affected, without any practical assess-
ment of the actual effects." 6  This view is bolstered by the plurality's
almost complete failure to give any weight to the national interests un-
derlying the application of wage and hour regulation to public employ-
ment."17 Put simply, regardless of the actual effect of national
regulations and regardless of the reasons for the regulations, traditional
state activities are immune.
The absolute immunity test must compete with at least two other
equally plausible interpretations of NLC. The decision directly invites
a balancing test to determine state immunity from national regulation
because Justice Blackmun cast his deciding vote on the ground that the
plurality opinion had applied a balancing test permitting the applica-
tion of national regulations to the states when the national interest is
"demonstrably greater."" 8 Although the plurality opinion may have
carved out an area of absolute immunity for traditional governmental
functions, a close reading provides some support for Justice Black-
opinions. In an opinion reported in the advance sheets at 641 F.2d 1361, which was subsequently
withdrawn, the Ninth Circuit at first affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court,
however, vacated this judgment because the right to direct review by the Supreme Court deprived
the court of appeals of jurisdiction. Donovan v. Richiand County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens,
102 S. Ct. 713 (1982). The Supreme Court also disapproved a second opinion and judgment of the
Ninth Circuit reversing the district court's judgment. The second judgment was entered after
notice of appeal from the first judgment had been filed, and the Supreme Court concluded that
"the filing of the notice of appeal clearly divested the Court of Appeals of any jurisdiction that it
otherwise had to decide the merits .... Id at 714 n.3. Given the Ninth Circuit's lack of juris-
diction to enter its judgment either to affirm or reverse the district court and the expiration of the
time to seek direct Supreme Court review of the district court's judgment, the district court's deter-
mination on the merits that a private employer who receives state funds to perform a traditional
state function is immune from the FLSA is the final word in this case.
116. Although the actual costs and effects of the FLSA on the states and their political subdi-
visions were disputed, the plurality explicitly disdained any need to resolve this dispute or for
"particularized assessments of actual impact." 426 U.S. at 846, 851, 874 n.12.
117. Apart from a passing recognition that the overtime requirements would have the "salu-
tary result" of discouraging overtime work and spreading employment, the plurality, as Justice
Brennan noted, did not discuss, much less assess, the national interest in applying minimum wage
and maximum hour regulations to public employees. Id at 847, 872.
118. Id at 856.
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mun's conclusion. The plurality expressly approved the holding in Fry
v. United States "9 that Congress has the power to freeze the salaries
and wages of state and local government employees. In distinguishing
Fry from NLC on the grounds that there was less intrusion on the
states and that the national interest was greater, 20 the plurality opinion
employed a balancing test.
A third test of state immunity is suggested by the plurality's careful
disclaimers about the reach of its decision. The plurality opinion
stressed that it was not deciding any questions of state immunity from
national statutes enacted under the spending power,' 2 1 the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment, 122 or the war power. 123  These
pointed disclaimers, written without any elaboration, suggest that the
states are either not immune or somehow enjoy less immunity from
statutes enacted by Congress under these powers than under the com-
merce power, 2 4
Apart from the immediate question of state immunity from national
wage and hour regulation, the NLC decision provides no clear test of
state immunity from national regulation. This failure to establish a
practical test is a consequence of two deeper, theoretical problems-a
failure to determine the states' role in the federal system, and a failure
119. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
120. Justice Rehnquist found that there was less intrusion on state autonomy in Fry than in
NLC because the wage and salary limitations were imposed only for "a very limited, specific
period of time," "displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations should be struc-
tured," and reduced rather than increased pressures on state budgets. He described severe infla-
tion as a national emergency and as "an extremely serious problem which endangered the well-
being of all the component parts of our federal system and which only collective action by the
National Government might forestall." 426 U.S. at 853. Justice Brennan analyzed the plurality's
distinction of Fry as a balancing process. Id at 872.
121. Id at 852 n.17 ("We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Con-
gress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it
under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl.l, or § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."). Justice Brennan suggested that Congress could achieve the objectives
of the 1974 Amendments to the FLSA under the spending power, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.1, "by
conditioning grants of federal funds upon compliance with federal minimum wage and overtime
standards. . . ." Id at 880.
122. See supra note 121.
123. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18 ("Nothing we say in this opinion addresses the scope of Congress'
authority under its war power."). The plurality opinion also expressly approved a decision up-
holding an exercise of the war power against state sovereignty claims. Id
124. The plurality opinion noted that state sovereignty imposes the same restraints on the
commerce power and the taxing power. Id at 843 n.14. Justice Brennan urged that the states
enjoyed greater immunity from national taxation than from commerce power-based regulations.
Id at 863-64, 869.
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to analyze the capacity of the national political process to protect this
role. The plurality opinion never goes beyond platitudes in describing
the states' role; its analysis amounts to nothing more than repeated in-
vocations that the "States as States"' 25 are different than private citi-
zens with respect to Congress' powers and that the states are essential,
indestructible parts of our federal system.' 26 In the absence of any
specification of the states' role and in the absence of any identification
of state interests that must be protected from national interference, any
theory of state immunity is necessarily opaque.
It is tempting to say that the plurality identified the provision of
traditional governmental services as one state interest essential to the
states' role in the federal system. Nevertheless, this limited specifica-
tion of the states' role cannot withstand close scrutiny. The plurality
did not distinguish the provision of traditional governmental services
from another aspect of state autonomy, regulation of private activity,
recognized as subject to national control.' 27 Moreover, the plurality
suggested that the states' interest in providing governmental services
may be affected by statutes enacted under powers other than the com-
merce power.' 28  The extension of immunity from the FLSA to state
political subdivisions as well as to states themselves demonstrates the
absence of any clear theory of the states' role.' 29 It is not clear whether
political subdivisions enjoy immunity because they share in the states'
role in providing traditional governmental services or because they are
creatures of the states and national regulation intrudes on the alloca-
tion of political power within the states. 130
125. Id at 842, 845, 847, 854.
126. Id at 844, 849. Although the plurality did quote a prior reference to the states as sover-
eign political entities, the concept was not developed. Id at 842.
127. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
129. 426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
130. Although the Constitution contemplates a role for the states in the federal system, see
supra text accompanying notes 30-39, it does not contemplate either explicitly or implicitly any
role for their political subdivisions. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (eleventh
amendment does not prohibit suit against political subdivision of a state in federal court). It
would seem, then, that any immunity enjoyed by state political subdivisions would follow from
the state's interest in controlling the local governments to which it has allocated political authority.
See, eg., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977) (structure of local government and method
or structure of state or local financing are an aspect of state sovereignty). The language of the
plurality opinion supports an inference of immunity for political subdivisions as a consequence of
the states' interest in controlling their local government units. 426 U.S. at 855 n.20 ("local govern-
mental units. . . derive their authority and power from their respective States. . . ."). See City
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The failure of the Court' 3 ' to define the states' role in the federal
system leads, perhaps inevitably, to a second, more fundamental prob-
lem-the absence of any principled explanation for judicial interven-
tion in the national political process. Without a definition of the states'
role, it is, of course, impossible to assess whether and how the national
political process may provide protection for that role or to determine
whether the operation of national political process justifies intrusions
into that role. Since the NLC Court had no definition of the states'
role, it could address the question of judicial deference to the national
political process only superficially. On the one hand, Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the plurality, apparently concluded that because the
application of the FLSA to public employers affected state sovereignty,
the political process had proved inadequate to the task of protecting the
states and judicial intervention was required.'32 On the other hand,
Justice Brennan simply concluded that because the states are repre-
sented in Congress there is no need for judicial intervention to protect
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201 n.l1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). The plurality
opinion may, however, have based its finding that political subdivisions enjoy immunity from the
FLSA on the ground that local government, like state government, provides traditional public
services. 426 U.S. at 855 n.20 ("interference with integral governmental services provided by such
subordinate arms of a state government is therefore beyond the reach of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause just as if such services were provided by the State itself."). See
Association of Court Reporters v. Superior Court, 424 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1976) (FLSA inappli-
cable to the District of Columbia as employer of court reporters because Congress intended that
the District of Columbia would enjoy sovereignty like that of a state with respect to employees in
provision of public services). The question whether NLC protects local government itself or the
states' authority over their political subdivisions continues to divide the Court. See infra note 473.
131. The failure of the plurality opinion to define the states' role in the federal system, see
supra text accompanying notes 125-30, was matched by the failure of any other opinion even to
address this question.
132. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Court had a responsibility to protect the states' role
in the federal system because the political process is not, either in theory or practice, an adequate
means of protecting state interests. 426 U.S. at 841 n.12. The theory that state representation in
Congress protected state interests was undermined by the popular election of Senators which elim-
inated their accountability to state legislators. Even if Congress does represent state interests,
judicial protection for the states is required if the political process has broken down and Congress
has in fact enacted a statute intruding on the states' sovereignty. The Court's responsibility to
protect the states was based on an analogy to two cases in which the Supreme Court had invali-
dated statutes on separation of powers grounds notwithstanding the Chief Executive's power to
protect his prerogatives with his national constituency and veto power. Justice Rehnquist's anal-
ogy, however, is not apt. Although the President has political power to protect his office from
Congress, the interests of the executive branch are not represented in the legislative branch of the
national government; state interests are arguably represented in Congress, and the issue is the
adequacy of that representation.
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the states. 133
Their analyses of the capacity of the national political process to pro-
tect the states and of any corollary need for judicial intervention to
protect state sovereignty are equally superficial. Although Justice
Rehnquist identified a state role in providing traditional public serv-
ices, a role that warrants judicial protection, he failed to consider either
the capacity of the national political process to check national interfer-
ence with this aspect of state autonomy or the question whether the
operation of the national political process justified an intrusion on the
states. Justice Brennan did not identify any particular state role or ex-
plain the manner and extent to which the national political process ac-
tually works to protect the states. Given the long history of judicial
deference to the political process as the principal check on Congress'
power to order national and state relations, 34 a more complete analysis
of the political process is required before state sovereignty is invoked as
a check on Congress' powers. Given legitimate concerns about protect-
ing the states, judicial deference to congressional political decisions af-
fecting the states requires more careful analysis of how the national
political process actually works to protect the states and how national
political decisions intruding on state interests can be justified.
B. The Courts and NLC-An Overview
In the six years since NLC was decided, the Supreme Court has not
addressed, much less resolved, the basic theoretical deficiencies of that
decision. The Court has not defined the states' role in the federal sys-
tem; it has not justified judicial superintendence of national and state
relations by explaining why the national political process either is inca-
pable of protecting the states or provides an insufficient justification for
incursions on particular state interests.13 5
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the Court has established, rather
mechanically and without reasoned analysis, some guidelines for Con-
gress' power to regulate state and local government and activity. On
133. Justice Brennan invoked the theory of political checks on Congress' exercise of the com-
merce power and the representation of state interests in Congress as adequate means to protect
state interests. Id at 857-58, 876-78, 878 n.14. He did not, however, explain how the national
political process works to protect any particular interests or role.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 813-28.
135. The Court has considered the political process as an alternative to judicial protection of
the states in only one case decided after NLC. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444
(1978). See infra note 541.
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the one hand, the Court has held that the states are not immune from
statutes enacted by Congress under its power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments,136 and it has suggested that the states do not enjoy any
immunity from statutes enacted under the spending power, 37 the for-
eign commerce power, 38 or the property clause. 39 On the other hand,
the Court has reaffirmed the rule that Congress' power under the com-
merce clause is subject to federalism limitations, but it has not deter-
mined whether state immunity turns on a distinction between
traditional and nontraditional state functions or on a balancing of state
and national interests.'40 Although the test of state immunity from
136. See infra text accompanying notes 345-53.
137. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed a judgment rejecting the concept of state sover-
eignty recognized in NLC as a limit on Congress' spending power. North Carolina ex rel
Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), a~fdmem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978). Subse-
quently, the Court has refused to review cases raising similar challenges to Congress' spending
power. Eg.. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (Ist Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 806 (1980); Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025
(D.D.C. 1978), qffd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Texas Landowners
Rights Ass'n v. Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); Florida
Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Fla.), af'dper curiam, 585
F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
138. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Court held that a
state property tax was invalid under the dormant foreign commerce power. In dictum, the Court
stated that it has never suggested that Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce could be
limited by the considerations of federalism and state sovereignty recognized in NLC. Id at 448-
49 n.13. See In re Guardianship of D.L.L. & C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980) (tenth
amendment does not limit Congress' power under article I, section 8, clause 3, "to regulate com-
merce ... with the Indian Tribes.").
139. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2, provides:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and noth-
ing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State.
In Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976), which was decided only a week before NLC,
the Court described the property power as "without limitations" and unanimously upheld na-
tional regulation of wild horses and burros on the lands of the United States over state objections
that the statute intruded on its sovereignty. Lower courts have subsequently concluded that the
tenth amendment does not limit Congress' power under the property clause. Nevada ex rel. Ne-
vada State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166, 172 (D. Nev. 1981); National Ass'n of
Property Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223, 1259-61 (D. Minn. 1980), a 'd sub nom.
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1251-53 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1645 (1982).
For an argument that NLC should limit the property power, see Note, The Property Power, Feder-
aim, andthe Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 817, 820-33 (1980). See also Brodie, A
Question ofEnumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership ofthe Public
Lands, 12 PAc. L.J. 693 (1981).
140. In 1980 the Court read NLC to require a balancing test. United States v. Gillock, 445
U.S. 360, 373 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 478-81. A year later the Court approved
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commerce power regulations remains unsettled, the Court has held ex-
plicitly that NLC does not limit Congress' power to regulate private
activity under the commerce clause. 14' The Court also has rejected
arguments that NLC restricts Congress' power to use the states to im-
plement national regulatory standards for electric utilities 42 and sur-
face mining. 143 It has, however, neither explained the relation of NLC
limits on national power to regulate the states to federalism limits on
Congress' power to employ the states as its agents nor stated any princi-
ple justifying such exercises of national political authority.
The basic theoretical deficiences of NLC are, not surprisingly, mir-
rored and magnified in lower court decisions addressing a wide range
of state immunity issues in myriad contexts. Viewed as a whole, these
lower court decisions reach a remarkable near uniformity of result in
rejecting claims of state sovereignty as a limitation on Congress' pow-
ers. Nevertheless, these lower court decisions illustrate the problems
inherent in the tests of state immunity derived from NLC and the ne-
cessity of defining the states' role and evaluating the national political
process as the alternative to judicial intervention.
1. State Autonomy and the Constitutional Source
of Congress' Power
The lower courts have been quick to honor the suggestions in NLC
both balancing and traditional functions tests. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 & n.29 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 446-50. Two years
later the Court in 1982 upheld the application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad
primarily on the ground that the operation of a railroad is not a traditional state function, but the
Court also approved a balancing test. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 102 S. Ct. 1349,
1353-54, 1353 n.9 (1982). See infra text at notes 505-11.
The problems of determining what state functions are sufficiently important to be immunized
from national regulation are suggested by United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I
(1977). In assessing a claim that a state statute was invalid because it impaired the obligation of a
contract contrary to the guarantee of article I, section 10, clause 1, the majority first addressed the
question whether the statute creating the obligation, allegedly impaired by a second statute, was
valid. Invoking the rule that a state cannot "contract away" its police powers and the power of
eminent domain, the Court concluded that the contract created by the statute was valid because a
state "could bind itself in the future exercise of the taxing and spending powers." Id at 23-24
(footnote omitted). As Justice Brennan noted in dissent, there is no clear, underlying concept of
state sovereignty that explains this implicit ordering of state governmental powers. Id at 51 n. 15.
141. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286 (1981). See
infra text accompanying notes 458-64.
142. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). See infra text
accompanying notes 610-91.
143. 452 U.S. at 288-93. See infra text accompanying notes 559-80.
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that its federalism principles do not apply when Congress exercises cer-
tain powers other than the commerce power, 144 and they have consist-
ently concluded that NLC is inapposite to statutes enacted under the
defense powers, 145 the spending power, 146 and the power to enforce the
Civil War Amendments. 47 Although statutes enacted under any of
these three powers may intrude upon the same state interests to the
same extent as statutes enacted under the commerce power, many
courts simply and mechanically cite NLC as full support for the con-
clusion that there is no unconstitutional infringement of state interests.
Some courts, however, have elaborated a theory to support their con-
clusions. Statutes enacted under the spending power are distinguished
on the ground that state acceptance of a national grant and compliance
with the attached conditions are "voluntary"; statutes enacted to en-
force the Civil War Amendments are distinguished on the ground that
the purpose of these amendments was to expand the nation's powers at
the expense of the states. Nonetheless, the failure to confront directly
the states' role in the federal system, to identify the impact of a national
statute on that role, and to evaluate the capacity of the national polit-
ical process to protect the states and to justify particular intrusions
means that these distinctions between the commerce power and Con-
gress' other powers are, at bottom, distinctions without a difference.
Although the formal bounds of state immunity from national statutes
enacted under the defense powers, the spending power, and the power
to enforce the Civil War Amendments are now rather firmly estab-
lished by the decisions of lower courts, the analysis is wooden and the
effort to confine the reach of NLC is transparent.
2 State Autonomy: Immunity for Traditional or Integral Functions
and Balancing Tests
In contrast to the lower courts' mechanical application of the
Supreme Court's suggestions that NLC is inapplicable to statutes en-
acted under the war power, the spending power, or the power to en-
force the Civil War Amendments, they have followed in form only the
144. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
145. The "defense powers" include the power to declare war and the related powers to raise
and to maintain an army and a navy and to make rules for their governance. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl.11-14.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. .
147. U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, § 2; XXIV, § 5; XV, § 2.
Number 31
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rule that NLC limits Congress' power under the commerce clause to
regulate the states. Lower courts, with a few notable and aberrational
exceptions, have upheld statutes enacted under the commerce power on
the ground either that the affected state function is not traditional or
integral or that the national interest outweighs the state interest. These
courts, however, have not stated any workable criteria for distinguish-
ing traditional and nontraditional functions or for balancing competing
state and national interests.
C State Autonomy and the Constitutional Source of Congress'
Power-The Defense Powers
The inadequacy of distinctions based on the power invoked by Con-
gress is clearly illustrated by the decisions rejecting state sovereignty
challenges to statutes enacted under the defense powers. Regardless
whether the statute establishes substantive rules for private activity,
regulates the states in their capacity as employers, or requires the af-
firmative exercise of state authority over individual conduct, the courts
have consistently rejected states' rights challenges to statutes enacted
under the defense powers. In rejecting these challenges, the courts have
frequently invoked a rule that NLC is inapplicable to statutes enacted
under the defense powers, but they have also relied on a distinction
between traditional and nontraditional state functions and on a balanc-
ing of state and national interests.
1. Regulation of Private -4ctivity
In In re Levy, '4 the Second Circuit held that Congress has the power
to provide for the escheat of a veteran's estate to the United States and
that a state estate tax is preempted. Although the national substantive
rule for the escheat of a veteran's estate displaced the state's substantive
rule and reduced the state's tax revenues, the court dismissed the NLC
objection on the grounds that the state's powers of escheat were not
"integral functions" and that the national statute did not interfere "in
the day-to-day affairs of the states."' 49
148. 574 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.), a'dsub not. New York v. United States, 439 U.S. 920 (1978).
Prior to NLC, the Supreme Court upheld a corresponding provision against the claim that devolu-
tion of property is a matter reserved to the states under the tenth amendment. United States v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961).




2. Regulation of the States
The courts also have upheld statutes enacted under Congress' de-
fense powers that provide for regulation of the states in their capacities
as employers. The Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act (VRR)150 re-
quires private employers as well as the states and their political subdi-
visions to reinstate former employees called to active service in the
armed forces and authorizes suit for award of lost wages and benefits
and for reinstatement. Although the VRR Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act both affect the states' ability to structure the employer-
employee relationship, increase the costs of delivering traditional gov-
ernmental services, and displace state policies, the courts have consist-
ently held that the constitutional grant of the defense powers in itself
justifies these intrusions.' 5' For example, in Schaller v. Board of Educa-
tion,5 2 the court held that a state political subdivision was liable for
damages for its failure to reinstate a public school teacher even through
no job was available. The defendant argued that reinstatement would
increase the cost of education, a function recognized as "traditional" in
NLC,153 but the court concluded that states' rights did not limit na-
tional power because principles of federalism have "less significance in
the area of Congress' authority to raise and support armies."' 54
The balancing implicit in this reasoning was employed explicitly in
Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation.155 The Fifth Circuit held
that a state agency performing the traditional governmental function of
transportation regulation was liable for back wages and had to reinstate
a former employee. The employee had interrupted his state employ-
ment for fifty-nine days of active service in the National Guard and
had been fired because state law authorized a maximum of seventeen
150. Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-508, tit. IV,
§ 404(a), 88 Stat. 1594 (current version at 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
151. Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 441 U.S. 967
(1979); Schaller v. Board of Educ., 449 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Peel v. Florida Dep't of
Transp., 443 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Fla. 1977), atf'd, 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979). See Lee v. City of
Pensacola, 634 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1981) (tacit assumption that VRR Act applies to local govern-
ment). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits also held that the eleventh amendment did not bar a suit
against the state for damages or reinstatement. See also Comancho v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 450
F. Supp. 231 (D.P.R. 1978).
152. 449 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
153. See supra text accompanying note 109.
154. 449 F. Supp. at 33.
155. 443 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Fla. 1977), aft'd, 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
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days for military leave.' 56 The Peel court concluded that because the
VRR Act was a valid exercise of Congress' war powers it outweighed
the minor impact of requiring a state to reemploy "a person whom the
state itself had previously hired."' 5 7 The court cautioned that all exer-
cises of the war power would not be "immune from limitations of the
tenth amendment,"'518 but its balancing test suggests reliance on the un-
derlying premise that NLC's concept of state sovereignty does not re-
strain Congress in the exercise of the defense powers. The national side
of the balance was simply the source of Congress' power,'5 9 not the
national interest in raising military forces by guaranteeing reemploy-
ment rights. The court also understated the impact of the VRR Act on
the state. The Peel court noted that there was no interference with the
state's discretion in selecting employees, but the court did not consider
the potential disruption caused by the prolonged absence of an em-
ployee or the frustration of the states' policy for the length of military
leaves.
3. Regulation Requiring the 4ffirmative Exercise of State Authority
Over Private Activity
In addition to the direct regulation of private activity and the appli-
cation of analogous regulations to the states, 60 a court also may have
sustained Congress' authority under the defense powers to require the
affirmative exercise of state authority over private activity. The Veter-
156. 600 F.2d at 1073.
157. Id at 1082-85.
158. Id at 1084 n.16.
159. Id at 1083 ("assess and weigh the source of the congressional power"); id. ("balance the
exercise of Congress' war power against the impact ... on Florida's integral governmental func-
tions"); id. at 1085 ("weighing the legitimate exercise of congressional power against the intrusion
into areas of state sovereignty").
160. The Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act imposes the same obligation on private and
public employers to reinstate former employees who have been absent for military service; how-
ever, a national statute governing retirement pay of military reserve personnel imposes an obliga-
tion solely on public (state and local) employers. This statute prohibits any pension plan
established by law from excluding a period of reserve military service in calculating eligibility or
the amount of benefits. 10 U.S.C. § 1336 (1976). In Cantwell v. County of San Mateo, 631 F.2d
631 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981), the court held that this statute preempted a
provision of the California County Employees Retirement Law that was applied to deny credit in
a pension plan for a period of service in the military reserves. Although the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that this statute and NLC involved the same state interest in the amount of its employees'
compensation, the court quickly concluded that states' rights do not limit the constitutional grant




ans' Administration's (VA) Educational Assistance Programs1 6 1 pro-
vide for direct payments to veterans 162 to assist them in improving their
vocational and educational status. Public and private educational insti-
tutions 63 have a duty to make periodic reports about the enrollment
and attendance of veterans 164 so that the VA can pay benefits only to
eligible veterans who are actually pursuing approved courses by at-
tending classes. Although the VA pays a reporting fee to each educa-
tional institution,165 the duty to participate in the administration of this
educational benefits program is not simply a condition of the grant.
Educational institutions are liable to the United States beyond the
small amount of the reporting fee (seven dollars to eleven dollars per
veteran) for "overpayments" made by the VA to a veteran if they will-
fully or negligently fail to report changes in a veteran's status as a stu-
dent that would require the VA to terminate the veteran's benefits. 66
The Veterans' Educational Assistance Programs also require approval
of the veterans' courses.167 The VA can approve courses itself, but the
statute encourages the governor of each state to establish a "state ap-
proving agency" to perform this responsibility. 68
The State of Colorado established such an approving agency.' 69 In
Colorado v. Veterans Administration,'7 the state and two of its educa-
tional institutions sought a declaratory judgment that the requirement
imposed on the schools to reimburse the United States for overpay-
161. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1698, 1770-1799 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amendedby Veterans' Health
Care, Training, and Small Business Loan Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-72, tit. II, § 201, 95 Stat.
1054; Veterans' Disability Compensation, Housing, and Memorial Benefits Amendments of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-66, tit. VI, § 606, 95 Stat. 1037; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-35, tit. XX, §§ 2003(b), (c), 2004, 2005(b), (d), 95 Stat. 782-83.
162. Id § 1681 (1976), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, tit. XX, § 2003(b)(4), 95 Stat. 782.
163. Id § 1652(c).
164. Id § 1784(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
165. Id § 1784(b).
166. Id § 1785.
167. Id §§ 1683, 1772(a) (1976).
168. Id § 1771.
169. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 23-60-303(2) (1973).
170. 430 F. Supp. 551 (D. Colo. 1977), aft'd with mod~fcation, 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980). The case was decided before the provisions requiring educa-
tional institutions to report the status of veterans and imposing liability for overpayments, supra
notes 164-66, were amended in 1977 and 1980. Act of Nov. 23, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-202, tit. III,
§ 304(a)(1)(2), 91 Stat. 1442; Act of Oct. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-466, tit. III, § 343(a), (b)(1),
§ 344, tit. VI, § 601(e), 94 Stat. 2198-99, 2208. These amendments do not make any significant
changes with respect to the federalism issues raised by the reporting and liability provisions.
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ments made by the VA to veterans was unconstitutional. The state ar-
gued that the required reports on veterans' class attendance interfered
with its "internal procedures for monitoring student class attendance
and progress."''7 It is difficult to determine the precise holding of the
case. The best view is that it was decided on the narrow ground that
the school's duty to report on the veterans' status was established with
the state's consent by contract between the VA and the Colorado ap-
proving agency.172 Nevertheless, the district court also appears to have
sustained Congress' power to use the state colleges to administer a na-
tional benefits program on the broader ground that Congress has the
power to impose a duty to report. The district court found that Con-
gress has the "right to establish a procedure for disbursement of bene-
fits to veterans" under its power to raise and maintain an army and
navy 73 and that placing monetary liability on those schools which
have a duty to report changes in a veteran's educational status is ration-
ally related to a legitimate governmental function. 174 The district court
then applied a balancing test and dismissed claims of interference with
state sovereignty on the ground that the reporting requirement did not
require the schools to restructure substantially the traditional ways in
which they arranged their affairs.' 75 Although the district court did not
address directly any claim that Congress was controlling the exercise of
state authority over private activity by requiring reports, the language
of the opinion is consistent with the proposition that Congress has the
power to compel the states to act as its agents in regulating private
activity.
171. 430 F. Supp. at 555-56.
172. The district court specifically found that the duty to report was created by a contract
between the Colorado approving agency and the VA. 430 F. Supp. at 558. The Tenth Circuit
sustained the district court's rejection of the state sovereignty claim on this ground. 602 F.2d at
927. In his brief in opposition to the state's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Solicitor General
argued that the schools' duty to report was created by the contract, and he did not address the
question of Congress' power absent a contract. Memorandum for Respondents in Opposition at
2-3,5, Colorado v. Veterans' Administration, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980) (No. 79-582). The state argued
that its contract with the VA concerned only the approval of courses and did not bind the state
schools to report on a veteran's educational status. Petition for Certiorari at 5-6, Colorado v.
Veteran's Administration, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980) (No. 79-582).
173. 430 F. Supp. at 558-59.
174. Id at 558.
175. Id at 559. The rejection of federalism limits also rested in part on the district court's




D. State Autonomy and the Constitutional Source of Congress'
Power-The Spending Power
The national spending power is the most significant of all Congress'
powers in terms of its actual impact on the states' role in the federal
system. 176 By attaching conditions to grants, Congress can employ the
spending power to regulate private activity, to regulate the states, and
to require the affirmative exercise of state authority over individual
conduct. Congress can regulate private activity and displace state sub-
stantive policies by direct grants to individuals and organizations.
Conditions attached to such expenditures may require state and local
governments to alter the structure and processes of government or to
exercise affirmatively authority over private conduct. Grants to state
and local governments may have a similar broad impact on state polit-
ical decisionmaking powers. To accept these grants the states may have
to comply with conditions requiring the adoption of nationally deter-
mined substantive policy for private conduct or requiring changes in
the package of goods and services provided collectively. Conditions
attached to these expenditures may affect the structure and organiza-
tion of government or the allocation of political authority within state
government or between the state and its political subdivisions. These
conditions may also require the affirmative exercise of state authority
over private activity.
These effects on the states are not, standing alone, the reason why the
spending power has the greatest actual impact on the states" role in the
federal system. Statutes enacted under other article I, section 8 powers
or under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments may
have identical effects. The impact of the spending power is, instead, a
function of the extent to which Congress exercises this power. In 1978,
there were approximately 182 national income transfer programs rang-
ing from agricultural price supports to traditional welfare programs,
like public housing and disability benefits, that provided over $250 bil-
lion in direct cash and in-kind assistance to individuals and private
organizations. 7 7 National assistance to state and local governments in
1980 exceeded $90 billion in nearly five hundred programs providing
176. G. GUNTHER, supra note 56, at 224.
177. See 3 ACIR STUDY, Public Assistance: The Growth of a Federal Function A-79, supra
note 82, at 1-2. See also I Id, A Crisis of Confidence and Competence A-77, at 49. See generally
W. LAWRENCE & S. LEEDS, AN INVENTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS: FISCAL
YEAR 1977 (1978).
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funds for almost every type of state and local government service, and
these grants constituted about twenty-five percent of all state and local
government expenditures. 7 '
Although statutes enacted under the spending power have the great-
est impact in the aggregate on the states' role, the courts have not made
any distinctions in terms of the recipients of the grants or in terms of
the particular effects on the states, and they have not considered the
combined effect of such statutes. Instead, they have mechanically re-
jected claims that a spending program impermissibly intrudes on state
autonomy by invoking either the NLC Court's apparent disclaimer of
an intention to limit the spending power 179 or the notion that participa-
tion in a spending program and compliance with any and all conditions
are "voluntary."
L Grants to Private ReciFients
Grants to private recipients are invariably made on conditions that
Congress believes will promote the purpose of the expenditure. These
conditions typically apply directly to the recipient, establish eligibility,
and control the use of the funds, but other conditions may apply di-
rectly to the states and require some action as prerequisite to any pay-
ments to a private recipient. When a grant is conditioned upon certain
conduct by a private recipient, the effect is at most to displace state
substantive policy. If the condition applies to the states, the potential
private recipients will resort to the state's political process to demand
whatever action is necessary to make them eligible for the grant. State
compliance with conditions that make private recipients eligible for na-
tional grants may have a substantial impact on state autonomy.
a. Conditions that Regulate Private Activity
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 180 affords an easy example
178. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE SYSTEM SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PER-
MIT GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY STATE LEGISLATURES 1 (1980). For a comprehensive overview
of the role of the national government in providing services traditionally performed by state and
local governments, see generally 5 ACIR STUDY, Intergovernmentalizing the Classroom." Federal
Involvement in Elementary and Secondary Education A-8 1; 6 id, The Evolution of a Problematic
fartnershio: The Feds and Higher Ed A-82; 7 id., Protecting the Environment- Politics, Pollution,
and Federal Policy A-83; 8 id, Federal Involvement in Libraries A-84; 9 Id., The Federal Role in
Local Fire Protection A-85.
179. See supra note 121.
180. Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31.
[Vol. 60:779
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of the effect on the states of most grants to private recipients. This Act
authorized payments to farmers on the condition that they reduce crop
acreage, and it controlled a private activity otherwise subject to state
control to the extent that farmers accepted the payments and complied
with the condition. Although the Supreme Court held this statute un-
constitutional in United States v. Butler,'8 statutes establishing similar
programs are legion today.182 National grants to private recipients may
not only establish a rule for private conduct, but they may also displace
contrary or conflicting state substantive policy. For example, several
national grants provide subsidies for the construction of privately
owned rental housing for low or moderate income families. As a con-
dition of the national subsidy, the landlord must agree to national rent
regulation so that the housing will be provided to the class of persons
whom Congress intended to benefit. In the only case to consider a
NLC challenge of a national grant to a private recipient with condi-
tions directly applicable to the recipient, a federal district court found
that a local rent control regulation was preempted. 8 3 This court easily
rejected the argument that the national program impermissibly inter-
fered with the states' historic power to control landlord-tenant relations
on the basis of the Court's assumption in NLC that state sovereignty
181. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The Court held that the spending power could not be used to regulate
agricultural production because Congress has no such expressly delegated power.
182. See Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1213. See generally S.
REP. No. 126,97th Cong. 1st Sess. reprinted in [19811 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1965. Since
1933, Congress has exercised direct control over farmers' planting and marketing decisions by
authorizing direct cash payments and loans on conditions requiring crop acreage reduction and
diversion of crop land to conservation uses. See, e.g., Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-98, tit VI, § 602, 95 Stat. 1242-47 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1441(i)) (loans, purchases,
and payments to rice farmers who comply with acreage limitations and divert crop land to conser-
vation and wildlife uses).
183. A regulation expressly prohibited the application of state or local rent controls to nation-
ally subsidized housing projects. The district court initially granted a preliminary injunction
against the application of the Boston rent control ordinance to subsidized housing, but it denied a
motion for summary judgment because the question of the degree of conflict between the ordi-
nance and the regulation was unresolved. City of Boston v. Hills, 420 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Mass.
1976). The court subsequently construed the national regulation as an express preemption provi-
sion obviating the need to evaluate the degree of actual conflict and granted the motion for a
summary judgment that the ordinance was invalid under the supremacy clause. City of Boston v.
Harris, 461 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Mass. 1978), aft'd, 619 F.2d 87 (Ist Cir. 1980). In the absence of an
express preemption provision, state regulation of private recipients of national grants may be
valid. See Kargman v. Sullivan, 552 F.2d 2 (1st Cir. 1977) (no implied preemption of Boston rent
control ordinance by one of the nationally subsidized housing programs at issue in Boston v. Har-
ris); supra note 55.
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does not limit Congress' power over private activity.'8 4
Although this reading of NLC may explain the inapplicability of its
concept of state sovereignty to conditions directly imposed on private
recipients of national grants, it cannot, of course, explain the validity of
private grants made with conditions imposed directly on the states.
Such conditions in private grants have been upheld on a different the-
ory. Beginning with the unemployment compensation provisions of the
Social Security Act of 1935, which the Supreme Court upheld in Stew-
ard Machine Co. v. Davis, 5 and through a series of post-NLC cases
challenging the 1976 amendments of the unemployment compensation
program and the National Flood Insurance Program, the courts have
consistently rejected claims of impermissible intrusion on state sover-
eignty on the ground that the states' compliance with the conditions of
a grant is "voluntary".
b. Conditions that Regulate the States and Require the
Affirmative Exercise of State Authority Over Private
Activity
i. State Unemployment Compensation Programs for Private
Employees
The Social Security Act of 1935 combined a tax and credit system
with direct payments to the states to provide for the establishment of
state unemployment compensation programs. 186  The Act imposed a
tax on private employers, but it also provided the taxpayer with a credit
of up to ninety percent of the national tax for taxes paid under a state
184. 420 F. Supp. at 1298. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The First Circuit did
not address the issue of state sovereignty, but a concurring opinion noted that there was no inter-
ference with traditional state regulation because the "landlord-tenant relationships would not exist
but for the federal legislation." 619 F.2d at 97 n.2 (Kunzig, J., concurring).
In addition to City ofBoson v. Harris, one other court has considered the question of federalism
limits on Congress' power to make a grant to a private recipient with conditions directly applica-
ble to the recipient, but the challenge was based solely on the tenth amendment and the court did
not consider the effect of NLC. In Central Fla. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Perry, 406 So.2d Ill (Fla.
App. 1981), a state court held that a state court order appointing a legal services attorney as
counsel for a defendant in a criminal proceeding was invalid because it conflicted with the condi-
tion of a national grant to a private, nonprofit legal services corporation that legal service attor-
neys would provide legal assistance to indigents only in civil matters. Although the national grant
condition interfered with the state's power to regulate the practice of law, the court found on the
basis of pre-NLC authority that the tenth amendment objection was without merit because the
establishment of a legal services program was a valid exercise of the spending power. 1d at 114.
185. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
186. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, tits. III, IX, 49 Stat. 626, 639.
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unemployment compensation plan that conformed to national stan-
dards."t 7 This credit was in effect a grant to a private recipient (the
employer-taxpayer) on a condition directly applicable to the state-the
adoption and implementation of an unemployment compensation plan
meeting national standards. If the state adopted such a plan, the Act
also authorized direct grants to the states to administer their unemploy-
ment compensation programs.' 8 This basic statutory scheme is still in
effect today, although Congress has from time-to-time increased the tax
on private employers, imposed additional standards for approval of
state plans, and provided supplemental benefits. 8 9
187. 301 U.S. at 574-76.
188. Id at 577-78. Under another statute, states with plans meeting the national standards
were also eligible for grants to operate public employment offices. Act of June 6, 1933, ch. 49, 48
Stat. 113 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49k (1976)), amendedb, Omnibus Budget Reconcila-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. VII, § 702, 95 Stat. 521).
189. The tax and credit provisions as amended are now commonly known as the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act and have been reclassified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), amended bi' Omnibus Budget Reconcilation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XIV,
§0 2406(a), 2408(a), 95 Stat. 876, 880; Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, tits.
I, § 124(e)(2)(A), VIII, § 822(a), 95 Stat. 200, 351. The other unemployment compensation provi-
sions of the 1935 Act as amended are now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-1108, 1321-1324
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amendedb, Omnibus Budget Reconcilation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
35, tit. XXIV, § 2407, 95 Stat. 879. For the most part, the amendments to the 1935 Act have
simply increased the tax on private employers in one of three ways: (1) increasing the wage base
on which the tax is laid, (2) increasing the tax rate, or (3) enlarging the category of employees on
whose wages the tax is based. More significant changes were made by a series of amendments
enacted in the 1970's. The Employment Security Amendments of 1970 established three new
requirements for national approval of state unemployment compensation plans. During periods
of high unemployment, the states and the national government each pay 50% of the cost of "ex-
tended benefits" for employees who have exhausted their regular benefits under the state's plan.
Other provisions of the 1970 Amendments require the states to provide unemployment compensa-
tion coverage for employees of nonprofit organizations and employees of state hospitals and
higher education institutions as a condition for national approval of the state's plan, but no tax is
levied on the state or nonprofit organization as employers. Finally, these amendments require the
states to permit local governments to provide coverage for their hospital and higher education
employees. Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 695. A 1974 Amendment established a third level of
"emergency" benefits for workers who had exhausted their regular and extended benefits. The
emergency benefits are funded solely by the national government, but only states with approved
plans can participate. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-572,
88 Stat. 1869. This program has now lapsed. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Exten-
sion Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19, 91 Stat. 39. A second 1974 Amendment provided nationally
financed benefits to workers, including state and local government employees, who were not nor-
mally covered by state and local unemployment compensation plans. Emergency Jobs and Un-
employment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-567, 88 Stat. 1845. This provision for
covering public employees was replaced with a different scheme by the 1976 Amendments discus-
sed infra at notes 198-206. For a concise, thorough description of the unemployment compensa-
tion program prior to the 1976 Amendments, see STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
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By 1937, every state had adopted an unemployment compensation
program in compliance with national standards. 90 The tax and credit
provisions of the 1935 Act were responsible for this success because
they generated strong political pressure on each state to comply with
the condition for the credit or grant to private employers. If the state
did not have any program, the employers would be subject to the na-
tional tax, but the employees would not receive any benefits.' 9 ' If the
state adopted an unemployment compensation program that did not
comply with the national standards, private employers would be sub-
ject to a double tax-the national tax and any state tax necessary to
finance the state's program. Employers could avoid double taxation
and benefits would be available to employees only if the state adopted
an unemployment compensation program meeting the national stan-
dards. Given the obvious political pressure from employers and em-
ployees to adopt a program meeting national standards, the result is
hardly surprising. Although the states retained some significant policy
discretion in designing their unemployment compensation programs 92
and the programs were adopted through each state's political process,
the 1935 Act had a significant effect on the states. It substituted a na-
tionally determined substantive policy for private activity (unemploy-
ment compensation) for state policy (no unemployment compensation),
and it required the states, by taxing employers and distributing benefits
to employees, to exercise affirmative authority over private activity.
Notwithstanding these effects on the states, the Court held in Steward
Machine Co. that the tax and credit in combination are not "weapons
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1976, 1-21 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as MATERIALS ON THE 1976
AMENDMENTS].
190. NATIONAL COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION: FINAL REPORT 10 (1980).
191. The Act as amended has never provided for any national mechanism to distribute unem-
ployment compensation benefits in the event that a state should fail to adopt a plan.
192. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 574-76, 593-94 (1937). The national stan-
dards for approval of state unemployment compensation plans impose general requirements
designed to assure that the taxes collected from private employers are spent to aid needy workers
and to protect these funds by requiring them to be deposited in the national treasury subject to
withdrawal by the state as necessary to pay benefits. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). The national standards, however, leave the states with broad discretion to determine both
eligibility for, and the amounts of, unemployment compensation benefits, and each state is free to
require contributions from employees in addition to the tax on private employers. MATERIALS ON




of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the states."'' 93
Even though the Court recognized that Congress had employed "the
whip of economic pressure" to drive state legislatures to enact unem-
ployment compensation laws, 194 it was unwilling to find impermissible
coercion of the states. The national statute eliminated the problem that
enactment by one state of an unemployment compensation law would
place it in a position of economic disadvantage with its sister, competi-
tor states, and the states were given an opportunity to assist in resolving
the national problems of a severe economic depression. 195 Moreover,
no state complained' 9 6 and each state was free to repeal its unemploy-
ment compensation statute at any time. 197 The heritage of Steward
Machine Co. is that the constitutional test of conditions directly appli-
cable to the states in private spending programs is whether state action
is voluntary or coerced.
ii. Unemployment Compensation Benefits for State and
Local Government Employees
Courts have applied this test in NLC-inspired challenges to a 1976
amendment to the national unemployment compensation statutes and
to the National Flood Insurance Program, which also make grants to
private individuals on conditions directly applicable to state govern-
ment. The Unemployment Compensation Amendments Act of 1976
was enacted in part for the purpose of extending the benefits of unem-
193. 301 U.S. at 586. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 526 (1937).
The Court also held that the national requirements for state unemployment compensation plans
(the conditions for the credit) did not require the states to surrender "powers essential to their
quasi-sovereign existence." 301 U.S. at 593. The Court did not pass on the constitutionality of
Congress' power to make direct grants to the states to administer unemployment compensation
plans, see supra text accompanying note 188, on the condition that the states adopt plans in con-
formity with national standards. Id at 598.
In upholding the validity of the tax and credit scheme, the Court invoked Florida v. Mellon, 273
U.S. 12 (1927), in which it had approved a national estate tax with a credit of up to 80% of the
national tax for taxes paid to a state. The Mellon Court rejected the claim that the national statute
coerced the states to enact inheritance taxes. Id at 13. See Perkins, State Action Under the Fed-
eral Estate Tax Credit Clause, 13 N.C. L. REV. 271 (1935). The concept that conditions of grants
do not infringe state sovereignty because the states are free to accept or reject the grant first ap-
peared as dictum in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
194. 301 U.S. at 587.
195. Id at 587-88.
196. The plaintiff was a private employer, not a state. Id at 589. See Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (state defense of its unemployment compensation law
enacted to conform with the national statute).
197. 301 U.S. at 595-96.
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ployment compensation coverage to state and local government em-
ployees, 98 and these amendments rely on the basic tax and credit
mechanism of the 1935 Act to achieve this end. The 1976 Amendments
made the provision of unemployment compensation benefits to most
state and local government employees' 99 a requirement for national ap-
proval of state unemployment compensation programs.200 The state
programs may provide for state or local coverage of local government
employees, but if the state requires contributions from its political sub-
divisions, the state must give them the option of reimbursing the state
for benefits paid to former employees or contributing on the same basis
as private employers.20' These requirements are in effect additional
conditions imposed directly on the states for the credit or grant to pri-
vate employers who are subject to the national tax.202
The new conditions imposed by the 1976 Amendments increase sub-
stantially the impact of the unemployment compensation statutes on
the states. In addition to the previous displacement of state substantive
policy for private employment,0 3 the states and their political subdivi-
sions in their capacities as employers are subject to the same nationally
determined substantive policy as private employers. 20 4 The end result
198. Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667 (amending scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.). This
Act also increased the amount of wages subject to taxation and the tax rate. Given previous
national coverage of state and local government employees, see supra note 189, the 1976 Amend-
ments shifted the costs of benefits for these employees from the national government to the states
and their political subdivisions. Note, Federal Conditions and Federalism Concerns: Constitutional-
ity of the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, 58 B.U.L. REv. 275, 278 (1978).
199. The states are not required to provide unemployment compensation coverage for elected
officials, temporary employees working in an emergency situation, major policy making employ-
ees, and others. Pub. L. No. 94-566, tit. I, § 115(b), 90 Stat. 2670, 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(3) (1976).
200. Pub. L. No. 94-566, tit. I, § 115(a), (c)(2), 90 Stat. 2670-71, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3304(a)(6)(A),
3309(a)(l)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
201. Pub. L. No. 94-566, tit. V, § 506(a), (b), 90 Stat. 2687, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3304(a)(6)(B),
3309(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Note, supra note 198, at 288 n.97.
202. In part because Congress doubted its constitutional power, no tax is imposed on state and
local governments in their capacities as employers. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3306(c)(7) (1976); Note,
supra note 198, at 278-79. The states are free to fund unemployment compensation for public
employees from any revenue source they choose, but state funds for unemployment compensation
benefits for public employees must be paid over to the national treasury for safe keeping and for
requisition as needed in common with the funds raised by the state tax on private employers. See
26 U.S. §§ 3304(a)(3), (6) (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(4) (1976).
203. See supra text following note 192.
204. Compensation of public employees is generally on the same basis, amount, terms, and
conditions as compensation payable to employees in the private sector. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)
(1976). The states retain broad discretion with regard to these basic aspects of their unemploy-
ment compensation plans. See supra note 192.
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in states that satisfy the conditions for the grant to private employers by
amending state law to provide unemployment compensation benefits
for public employees is, of course, the same as direct regulation of the
states under the commerce power. For example, at least in terms of the
ultimate effects, there is little or no difference between the FLSA and
the 1976 Unemployment Compensation Amendments. Both control
state and local governments in their capacities as employers, increase
the cost of government, and may force either a reduction in goods and
services provided collectively or an increase in taxes.2"5 The 1976
Amendments do, however, affect the states in one fashion that goes be-
yond the impact of the FLSA; the 1976 Amendments control the allo-
cation of political power between the states and their political
subdivisions by denying the states the authority to control the financing
of unemployment compensation by local governments.2 °6
Notwithstanding the effects of the 1976 Unemployment Compensa-
tion Amendments on the states and the opposition of many state and
local government officials and organizations,207 every state except New
205. State and local government opponents of the 1976 Amendments alleged that the annual
cost of financing unemployment compensation benefits for public employees would be between
$385 million and $2 billion. These costs would require a reduction of existing services, loss of new
services and programs, or increased taxes that might be barred by state constitutional or statutory
limits on taxes or deficit spending. State and local governments would be forced to restructure
their personnel policies to avoid staff reductions and to restrict the use of seasonal, temporary, and
part-time employees in order to minimize the costs of unemployment benefits. Joint Brief for
Appellants, County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 631 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
837 (1980). These allegations parallel the claims made in NC. See supra notes 102 & 103 and
accompanying text. The courts' analysis of the constitutionality of the 1976 Amendments did not
require an assessment of their actual impact. See infra text accompanying notes 211-16
206. The state unemployment compensation law must permit political subdivisions to elect to
pay for coverage of their employees by contributions equivalent to the state's payroll tax on pri-
vate employers or by retroactive reimbursement for benefits paid to their employees. See supra
text accompanying note 201.
207. In the hearings on the 1976 Amendments, most state and local government officials and
organizations opposed extension of unemployment compensation coverage to public employees.
See Unemployment Compensation Amendments of.1976: Hearings on H.R 10210 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 55, 59 (1976). After enactment, seven states and over
1200 local government units challenged the constitutionality of the 1976 Amendments. County of
Los Angeles v. Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (D.D.C. 1977), a'd, 631 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980). On appeal from the district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction, an impressive array of local government associations filed a brief in support of the
challenge. 631 F.2d at 767. New Hampshire brought a separate action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the 1976 Amendments. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616
F.2d 240 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert denied, 449 U.S. 806 (1980). Opposition was not
uniform. The state of Michigan filed a brief amicus curiae in support of the 1976 Amendments,
631 F.2d at 767, and prior to the enactment of the 1976 Amendments over half of the states
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Hampshire conformed and enacted statutes amending their unemploy-
ment compensation programs to provide coverage for public employ-
ees.2"8 Although a state's refusal to conform to the conditions of the
1976 Amendments results in the loss of several direct national grants,20 9
Congress' success in obtaining state unemployment compensation cov-
erage for public employees is a tribute to the powerful political pressure
created by conditioning a grant to a private recipient on action by state
government. Testimony from representatives of the states opposed to
public employee unemployment compensation reveals their belief that
they were forced to comply with this national requirement in order to
avoid the loss of the national credit to private employers who would
then be subject to both national and state unemployment taxes.210
State claims of coercion did not, however, persuade the courts that
the new conditions of the unemployment compensation statutes crossed
the limits recognized in Steward Machine Co. or were proscribed by the
concept of state sovereignty recognized in NLC. The First Circuit up-
provided mandatory coverage for state employees and permitted political subdivisions to elect
coverage. MATERI A.S ON THE 1976 AMENDMENTS, supra note 189, at 34.
208. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 246 n.7 (Ist Cir.),
appeal dismissed and cer. denied, 449 U.S. 806 (1980). For an example of a state statute con-
forming to the requirements of the 1976 Amendments, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 891-893
(Purdon Supp. 1965-1981) (state employees), §§ 911-914 (political subdivision employees).
209. Direct grants to the states to administer their unemployment compensation programs and
to operate public employment offices, see supra note 188 and accompanying text, are not available
if the state plan is not approved by the national government. New Hampshire Dep't of Employ-
ment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 242 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 806
(1980). The national government's share of extended benefits, see supra note 189, is also termi-
nated. County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 (D.D.C. 1977), aft'd, 631 F.2d
767, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980).
210. See 616 F.2d at 246; 442 F. Supp. at 1189-91. After New Hampshire initiated its chal-
lenge to the 1976 Amendments, its legislature enacted a statute to conform the state's unemploy-
ment compensation laws to the new national requirements, but the state legislature specifically
claimed that it was coerced "under the threat of costing the businesses of this state loss of their
offset credit against taxes imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act which would amount
to in excess of 40 million dollars, a price which is totally disproportionate to the cost of benefits to
governmental employees. ... 1979 N.H. LAWS ch. 328. This cost would be the consequence of
subjecting private employers to both state and national unemployment taxes without a credit on
the national taxes for taxes paid to the state under a plan conforming to national standards. This
"double-tax" would surely have the effects of discouraging new business from locating in New
Hampshire and of encouraging private employers to leave the state. See County of Los Angeles v.
Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 n.4 (D.D.C. 1977), a'd, 631 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 837 (1980). Although New Hampshire enacted a statute in an effort to conform its unem-
ployment compensation plan with the 1976 Amendments, the First Circuit concluded that the case
challenging these amendments was not moot because the statute alone could not bring the state
into full compliance. 616 F.2d at 243 n.**.
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held Congress' power to require the states to provide unemployment
compensation benefits to public employees as a condition of grants to
private employers on two alternative grounds.2 ' The court first con-
cluded that NLC is limited to statutes based on the commerce power
that impose commands affecting state sovereignty and that NLC does
not impair the authority of Steward Machine Co. because statutes based
on the spending power give states the choice of conforming to national
requirements or refusing to participate.212 Although the 1976 Amend-
ments increased the stakes by imposing an additional condition for the
credit to the private employers, the court found that the basic mecha-
nism of the 1935 Act had not been altered, and it rejected the state's
claim that Congress had coerced compliance "by holding private em-
ployers 'ransom.' "213
On an alternative reading of NLC as barring intrusions on state sov-
ereignty regardless of the source of Congress' power, the court con-
cluded that the 1976 Amendments did not impair state sovereignty.2 t4
Although the cost of government would be increased, the 1976 Amend-
ments were distinguished from the FLSA because there was no na-
tional control of wages and hours and because the state administered
the unemployment compensation program.2" 5 The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia upheld the 1976 Amendments on the basis
of the First Circuit's distinction between voluntary compliance with
spending power programs and mandatory controls under the commerce
power.21
6
211. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir.), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
212. Id at 245. The court noted that the Supreme Court in NC, see supra note 121, had left
open the question "whether the spending power could be unconstitutionally used to impair state
sovereignty ...." Id at 247.
213. Id at 246.
214. Id at 249.
215. Id at 248. Apart from the financial impact, the court did not address the arguments that
the 1976 Amendments would interfere with the states' ability to provide traditional governmental
services and with state personnel policies. See supra note 205.
216. County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977), aI'd, 631 F.2d 767
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980).
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
834 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
iii. National Flood Insurance Program: State
Implementation of National Standards for Private
Land Use
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),21 7 like the national
unemployment compensation program, illustrates Congress' ability to
achieve its regulatory goals through grants to private recipients on con-
ditions directly applicable to the states. The purposes of the NFIP, as
originally established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968,
were to encourage state and local governments to adopt land use con-
trol measures that minimize flood damage and to encourage, landown-
ers in flood-prone areas to purchase flood insurance.218  To achieve
these ends, Congress authorized grants in the form of subsidized flood
insurance2 19 for landowners on the condition that the appropriate pub-
lic body adopt land use control measures consistent with national stan-
dards for reducing flood losses.220 Congress intended that property
owners who wanted subsidized insurance, much like the employers
who wanted a national tax credit for taxes paid under a state unem-
ployment compensation plan, would pressure local government to
adopt land use control measures meeting national standards. The pro-
gram did not work, and by January, 1973, only two thousand commu-
217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amendedby Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. III, subtit. A, pt. 4, § 341, 95 Stat. 418-19. The National
Flood Insurance Program was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, tit. XIII
of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 587, as
amended, and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975, as
amended. For a detailed analysis of the program, see Holmes, Federal Partcipation in Land Use
Decisionmaking at the Water's Edge-lood Plains and Wetlands, 13 NAT. RESOURcES LAW. 351,
359-64 (1980), and sources cited in Note, TowardNew Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Impli-
cations of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 726, 747 n.138 (1977).
218. Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIII, § 1302(a), (c), 82 Stat. 572, 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a), (c) (1976).
219. Prior to -the enactment of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, insurance against
flood losses was not available because private companies determined that flood insurance was not
profitable and feared that catastrophic damages would exceed their reserves. The 1968 Act pro-
vided a national subsidy for flood insurance principally by establishing a fund for reinsuring pri-
vate companies against the risks of extraordinary, excessive losses. Flood insurance policies were
issued directly by an underwriting association through 1977; however, as the Act permitted, the
national government then assumed direct responsibility for issuing flood insurance policies. See
National Flood Insurers Ass'n v. Harris, 444 F. Supp. 969 (D.D.C. 1977); 44 C.F.R. § 62 (1981);
Maloney & Dambly, The National Flood Insurance Program-A Model Ordinance For Implemen-
tation ofIts Land Management Criteria, 16 NAT. RESOURCES . 665, 671-72, 678 (1976); Smith,
Litigation on the National Flood Insurance Program, 1979 INS. L.J. 524, 525-26.
220. Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIII, §§ 1305(c), 1315, 82 Stat. 574, 578 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4012(c), 4022 (1976)).
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nities had adopted flood control measures.22 The failure of the
program established by the 1968 Act has been explained as a function
of the public's low perception of flood risks.2 22 In contrast to the clear
benefit to an employer of a credit against the national unemployment
tax, the benefit to the individual landowner of subsidized flood insur-
ance was simply not sufficient to create a strong demand for state or
local governments to enact the requisite land use control measures.2 23
To remedy this deficiency, Congress amended the NFIP in 1973224
and made all national grants for "construction or acquisition purposes"
in an area with special flood hazards subject to the condition that the
community225 participate in the national flood insurance program by
enacting and enforcing land use control measures that meet national
standards for minimizing flood damages. 226 Congress' purpose was to
221. Orersight of the National Flood Insurance Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 404 (1977) (statement of Ruth Prohop).
222. S. REP. No. 583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3217, 3220.
223. See Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (D.D.C. 1978),
afd mem, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v.
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 444 U.S. 927 (1979).
224. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975.
225. A community is defined as a state or its political subdivision which has zoning and build-
ing code jurisdiction over a particular area with special flood hazards. 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(1)
(1976).
226. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4105, 4106(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The NFIP imposes the condition of
adoption of land use control measures both on grants to private recipients and on grants to state
and local governments because "financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes" is
defined to include grants for publicly and privately owned property. 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(4)
(Supp. IV 1980). The 1973 Act also prohibited financial institutions regulated or insured by the
national government from making loans in flood-prone areas of communities that had not
adopted land use control measures, but this restriction on private funds was repealed in 1977.
Pub. L. No. 93-234, § 202(b), 87 Stat. 982, codoedby 42 U.S.C. § 4106(b) (1976), repealedby Pub.
L. No. 95-128, tit. VII, 91 Stat. 1144, 42 U.S.C. § 4106(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
If a community becomes eligible for flood insurance by adopting the requisite land use control
measures, the 1973 Act also requires property owners to purchase flood insurance as a second
condition for national financial assistance and as a condition for loans from private financial
institutions regulated or insured by the national government. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a), (b) (1976).
See, e.g.. 12 C.F.R. § 523.29(b) (1981) (banks regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
This restriction on private loan funds has the same effect as the repealed provision of the 1973 Act
that prohibited nationally regulated private financial institutions from making loans in communi-
ties without flood control measures. Since flood insurance is available only through the NFIP, see
supra note 219, a requirement that nationally regulated financial institutions can make loans only
to landowners who have flood insurance means in practice that these financial institutions can
make loans to property owners in flood-prone areas only if the community participates in the
NFIP by adopting and enforcing land use and control measures. Thus, in an indirect but effective
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require state and local governments to adopt and enforce zoning and
building codes for flood-prone areas.22 7 The revised NFIP succeeds
228
where its predecessor failed because it substantially increases the polit-
ical pressure on state and local governments to comply with the na-
tional statute. If a community refuses to enact and enforce the requisite
land use control measures, landowners in parts of the community that
are subject to flooding are denied a wide array of national financial
assistance, including the purchase or subsidization of mortgages and
mortgage loans by the Federal Housing Authority and the Veterans'
Administration,2 9 most private mortgage and construction loan
funds, 230 other loans,23' and disaster assistance.232 The NFIP demon-
strates Congress' ability to make the benefits of several grants to private
recipients so substantial that state and local governments must comply
with the conditions that make the private recipients eligible for the
funds.
The effects on state and local governments of participation in the
NFIP are quite substantial. National policy for land use by private
fashion, the NFIP denies property owners mortgage and construction loans from nationally regu-
lated financial institutions unless the community adopts the requisite flood control measures.
The NFIP has a separate provision for flood insurance for state-owned property in flood-prone
areas. In order to be eligible for national financial assistance, the states are not required to
purchase flood insurance if they have an adequate policy of self-insurance approved by the na-
tional government. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(c) (1976); 44 C.F.R. § 75 (1981). Nevertheless, state-owned
property in areas with local flood control regulations established under the NFIP must comply
with these regulations or with flood control measures established by the state for its properties. 44
C.F.R. § 60.12 (1981).
227. In contrast with Congress' stated purpose in the 1968 Act of "encouraging" the states and
local governments to adopt land use control measures, see supra text accompanying note 218, the
purpose of the 1973 amendment of the NFIP was to "require" adoption and enforcement of such
regulations. Pub. L. No. 93-234, § 2(b)(3), 87 Stat. 976, 42 U.S.C. § 4002(b)(3) (1976); S. REP. No.
583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprintedin [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3217, 3220 (sanc-
tions to mandate community adoption of land use regulations).
228. Sixteen thousand communities participated in the NFIP in 1980. Holmes, supra note 217,
at 364.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980); Holmes, supra note 217, at 361.
230. See supra note 226.
231. See, e.g., 13 C.F.R. § 116.11 (1982) (Small Business Administration loans).
232. 44 C.F.R. §§ 200.38-.39 (1981). See 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). Nationally
regulated financial institutions must notify landowners who seek construction loans or mortgages
for property in a flood-prone area that national disaster relief assistance will not be available if the
community is not a participant in the NFIP. 42 U.S.C. § 4106(b) (Supp. IV 1980). See, e.g., 12




parties in flood plains233 is substituted for the substantive policy estab-
lished by the state or local political process. The community must exer-
cise its lawmaking powers to adopt regulations meeting national
standards,2 34 and it must assume the costs of administering and enforc-
ing these regulations." 5 In short, state and local governments must af-
firmatively exercise their authority over private activity by adopting
and enforcing national standards for the use of privately owned lands.
Moreover, the level and choice of collective goods and services pro-
vided by the community may be affected by administrative costs or by
losses to the local tax base from the deterrence of investment in flood
prone areas.236 Notwithstanding these effects and Congress' careful
orchestration of political pressure on state and local governments, the
District Court for the District of Columbia concluded, in Texas Land-
owners Rights Association v. Harris,237 that the NFIP is a constitution-
ally valid exercise of the spending power because state and local
governments have a choice between accepting or rejecting the national
financial benefits. 38
The conclusion that state and local government participation in the
NFIP is voluntary followed readily from the court's refusal to address
the basic question whether the sanctions for nonparticipation make the
program mandatory. Although the court formulated the question in
these terms, 39 it did not assess the actual impact of the conditional
grants to property owners. Instead, the court simply assumed the an-
233. The national standards generally restrict development in flood-prone areas, require
flood-proof construction, and impose an obligation to plan land use to avoid flood damages. 42
U.S.C. § 4102 (1976); 44 C.F.R. § 60 (1981).
234. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.22(a)(l)-(3), (b) (1981) (national approval of community participation
in the NFIP requires submission of statutes, ordinances, and regulations).
235. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.22(a)(8) (1981) (national approval of community participation in the
NFIP requires a community commitment to take official action necessary to carry out the
program).
236. See Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (D.D.C. 1978),
qf'd mem.. 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v.
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 444 U.S. 927 (1979). For a thorough assess-
ment of the impact of the NFIP on states and local governments, see Note, supra note 217, at 753-
(L
237. 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), apfdmemr, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deniedsub
nom. Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 444
U.S. 927 (1979).
238. Id at 1030. The district court also rejected fifth amendment taking and due process
challenges to the NFIP. Id at 1031-33.
239. Id at 1029.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
838 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
swer to the question at issue by characterizing the NFIP as offering
"certain inducements for state participation.""24 Since the national
grants are merely inducements, the states and local governments have a
choice whether to participate in the NFIP based on their measurement
of "the potential local benefits of flood insurance against the costs of
participation to local sovereignty and pocket books."24' By this reason-
ing, the court brought the NFIP within the rule of Steward Machine
Co. that Congress can exercise the spending power to induce participa-
tion in national programs242 and avoided the bar of NLC which the
court read to prohibit only mandatory imposition of national require-
ments on the states.243
The court's analysis of the NFIP is, of course, entirely unsatisfactory
because it ignores reality. Congress intended the NFIP to be
mandatory.2' Congress carefully orchestrated political pressure on the
states and local government. It made adoption of land use controls a
condition for landowners in flood-prone areas to obtain a wide array of
national grants and to be eligible for vital mortgage and construction
loan funds.245 Moreover, the NFIP has, at the very least, as substantial
an effect on states as the FLSA, which was held unconstitutional in
NLC.21 Although the court's reluctance to make a difficult distinction
between inducements and coercion in spending power programs is un-
derstandable, there is no justification for its conclusion that state and
local government participation in the NFIP is voluntary in the absence
of such an inquiry.
2. Grants to the States
Grants of national funds to state and local governments on condi-
tions directly applicable to these recipients are a more familiar and typ-
ical exercise of the spending power than grants to private recipients.247
240. Id at 1030.
241. Id
242. See supra text following note 197.
243. 453 F. Supp. at 1029-30. On the basis of a textual analysis of the NLC plurality's formu-
lation of the holding, see supra text accompanying note 91, the court read NLC to prohibit na-
tional regulations that have a "direct" effect on the states and concluded that there is no direct
intrusion on state sovereignty if a state has a choice whether to accept national funds.
244. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 233-36.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
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The states rarely refuse grants,248 and they must comply with the condi-
tions of a grant if they accept it. 49 Conditions imposed on national
248. Instances of state rejection of national funds are so rare that a rejection is "news." For
example, in 1980 both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal reported that the Metro-
politan Transit Authority of New York had decided not to comply with a national regulation
requiring transit systems to provide special access for handicapped persons although compliance
with the regulation was a condition for over $400 million in national transportation aid. New
York Rejects U.S. Rule on Handicapped, N.Y. Times, September 20, 1980, at 9, coL 1 (national
ed.); Review and Outlook, Wall St. J., September 24, 1980, at 22, col. 1 (facsimile ed.). Other
instances of state refusals of national grants are also reported. See, e.g., $1 Million School Aid
Rejected by Oklahoma, N.Y. Times, September 28, 1980, at 8, col. 5 (national ed.).
249. The sanction for failure to comply with the conditions of a national grant is that the funds
are withheld. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 564 F.2d 573, 580
(D.C. Cir. 1977). For example, the Department of Transportation withheld national highway aid
funds from South Dakota because it failed to comply with regulations governing the removal of
billboards. See infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text. The Environmental Protection Agency
has cut off funds to states that fail to adopt programs to test motor vehicle air pollution emissions.
See infra notes 693-704 and accompanying text.
This sanction of withholding national funds from states that fail to comply with the conditions
of a grant is often practically or politically difficult to invoke, especially in election years. The
Secretary of the Department of Education has compared proposals to cut off national higher edu-
cation assistance to states that fail to desegregate colleges in compliance with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to "killing the patient the doctor can't treat," and the newspapers reported that
withholding these funds would hurt former President Carter in his bid for reelection in 1980. U.S.
to Pursue Texas College Desegregation Order, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1980, § A, at 10, cols. 1-3
(national ed.). See North Carolina v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 480 F. Supp. 929
(E.D.N.C. 1974) (court refuses to interfere with an administrative proceeding brought to deter-
mine whether North Carolina's higher education system complies with Title VI); Adams v.
Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977) (suit to enjoin the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare to enforce Title VI by cutting off funds to states that operate segregated systems of higher
education).
A second example of the political difficulty of withholding funds is provided by a New York
legislator who temporarily blocked a bill that would have made the state eligible for a national
grant of several million dollars because he did not believe that the President would cut off funds
with a presidential election only a little more than a year off. New York Faces Loss of U.S. Aid
over Car Fumes, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1979, at 23, col. 1 (national ed.).
Although the power of an administrative agency to withhold national funds from a state that
fails to comply with the conditions of a grant is well-settled, it is not clear whether courts are
limited to the corresponding power to prohibit the use of national funds or whether the courts also
have the power to invalidate state law that is contrary to the requirements of a national grant. See
Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Sugges-
tionsfor Beneficiar
, 
Involvement. 58 VA. L. REv. 600, 633 (1972). On the one hand, the Court has
suggested that the termination of a grant is the appropriate remedy and that a state must revise its
law to permit compliance with the requirements of a grant. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,421-
22 (1970). On the other hand, the Court has also suggested that a state can accept or continue to
receive a national grant with conditions contrary to state law by holding that state law prohibiting
compliance with the conditions of a national grant is invalid under the supremacy clause and is
preempted. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968). The distinction between these two
alternative means of enforcing the conditions of national grants is addressed infra at notes 325-35.
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grants to the states may displace the states' substantive policies for pri-
vate activity, control the structure and organization of the states' polit-
ical processes, regulate the goods and services provided collectively,
and require the states to allocate legislative, judicial, or executive re-
sources to implement policies determined by the national political pro-
cess. Moreover, compliance with the conditions of national grants
usually entails enactment of legislation, adoption of regulations, and
appropriation of state funds. 250
Although conditional grants have the same effects on the states as
direct regulation of the states or direct requirements that the states ex-
ercise affirmative authority over private activity, the courts have con-
sistently upheld Congress' power to impose conditions on grants.
These courts have rejected NLC-based arguments that the conditions
of national grants intrude on state sovereignty on the grounds that the
Court did not intend to apply NLC's federalism limits to the spending
power;25 1 that state participation in national spending programs is vol-
untary; 2 and that this use of the spending power is generally ac-
cepted.253 The only exception to the general approval of Congress'
power to impose conditions on grants to the states is that several state
courts have questioned Congress' power to control the allocation of au-
thority between the Governor and the state legislature over national
finds.254
a. Conditions that Regulate the States
National grants contain a wide range of conditions prescribing rules
250. Many national grants are "matching grants" that require the states or their political sub-
divisions to appropriate funds to cover a portion of the total costs of a program. See infra note
317.
251. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
252. In some 40 cases decided after NLC and raising the question of federalism constraints on
Congress' power to attach conditions to national grants, only one judge has questioned the propo-
sition that conditions of a national grant do not intrude on state sovereignty because the state's
decision to accept the grant is voluntary. Walker Field v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290,298-300 (10th Cir.
1979) (McKay, J., dissenting). See infra note 261. The Court has held, however, that the condi-
tions of a grant must be stated clearly because otherwise a state's acceptance of a grant cannot be
understood as voluntary. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981).
See Gilbert v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 167 N.J. Super. 217, 227, 400 A.2d 803, 809
(App. Div. 1979) (Conford, P.J.A.D. dissenting).
253. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34
(1968); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Serv. Comn'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1947).
254. See infra notes 282-305 and accompanying text.
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for state government, and no survey of the cases challenging these con-
ditions can reveal completely their rich variety and broad impact.
Nonetheless, the cases do reveal that the courts have approved, as con-
ditions of national grants, many regulations that would, if imposed di-
rectly under the commerce power, fall within NLC's proscription. The
courts, for example, have held that Congress can regulate the organiza-
tion of a state administrative agency as a condition of national financial
assistance to the state in providing social welfare services.255 The
courts have also held that Congress can regulate the states and their
political subdivisions in their capacities as employers by requiring col-
lective bargaining with the former employees of a private transit com-
pany acquired by a municipality with national funds.256
255. In Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services v. Caiffano, the district court
held that conditioning national funds on the adoption of a particular governmental structure did
not encroach on state sovereignty because any intrusion on the state was "indirect", the condition
was related to assuring the proper functioning of the national program, NLC did not limit the
spending power, and state participation in the national program is voluntary. 449 F. Supp. 274
(N.D. Fla.), afTd on opinion below, 585 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
Long before its decision in NLC, the Court sustained a condition of a grant regulating the person-
nel of state administrative agencies. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
127, 142-44 (1947) (as a condition of all national grants, state employees who administer any
national spending program prohibited by the Hatch Act from taking part in political campaigns or
management). Although conditions controlling the organization and structure of state and local
agencies are a typical component of most national grants, Congress has attempted to reduce the
impact of some of these conditions by providing the heads of national agencies with the authority
to waive requirements that a single or specific state agency must administer the grants. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4214, 4255(c) (1976).
256. The Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980),
amended by Omnibus Budget Reconcilation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XI, subtit. C,
§ I 111 (a), 95 Stat. 627, provides national funds to assist states and local governments to acquire
private transit companies on the condition, inter alia, that they make arrangements to protect the
employees interests, including the continuation of collective bargaining agreements. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1609(c) (1976). Seegenerally Note, Transit Funding Under the Urban Mass Transportation Act, 9
TRANsP. L. J. 391 (1977).
At the end of the October 1981 term, the Court held that state law governs collective bargaining
agreements made by public transit authorities as a condition of national aid and that unions do
not have a federal cause of action to enforce these agreements. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local
Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 102 S. Ct. 2202 (1982). This decision implicitly sustains
Congress' power to make grants on the condition that a public agency engage in collective bar-
gaining with its employees because the Court assumed the existence of other means to enforce the
condition. Id at 2210 n. 13. Before this decision, one court expressly held that protection of em-
ployee rights to collective bargaining is a valid condition of a national grant because the states
have an option whether to accept the grant. City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-
18 (M.D. Ga. 1977). Five circuits also implicitly sustained Congress' power to require the states to
engage in collective bargaining with their employees in finding federal jurisdiction and an implied
private cause of action for municipal transit employees to enforce collective bargaining rights
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b. Conditions that Regulate the Allocation of Political Power
Within a State
The conditions of other national grants may have a profound impact
recognized by a public transit authority as a condition for national financial assistance. See Divi-
sion 587, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Municipality of Seattle, 663 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1981);
Division 1447, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Louisville & Jefferson County Transit Auth., 659
F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated andremanded, 102 S. Ct. 2919 (1982) (for further consideration
in light of Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 102 S. Ct. 2202
(1982)); Division 1235, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 650 F.2d 1389
(6th Cir. 1981); Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Jackson Transit Auth., 650 F.2d
1379 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2202 (1982); Local Div. No. 714, Amalgamiated Transit
Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Local Div. 519, Amalgamated
Transit Union v. LaCrosse Mon. Transit Util., 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978); Division 1287,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 582 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979). Cf. Division 580, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Central N.Y.
Regional Transp. Auth., 578 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1978) (jurisdictional question moot). Although the
Eleventh Circuit broke the ranks and held, consistent with the Supreme Court's judgment, that
federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits by public transit employees to enforce collective bargain-
ing rights, this decision also did not question Congress' power to make grants on the condition
that a public agency engage in collective bargaining with its employees. Local Div. 732, Amalga-
mated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 1327 (11 th Cir.
1982).
One court has held that agreements between a public transit authority and a union made as a
condition of Urban Mass Transportation grants and requiring public transit authorities to engage
in collective bargaining with their employees do not preempt state law. This court found that
Congress intended only that grants for public acquisition of private transit companies would be a
weapon to force the states to respect the rights of employees of these companies and that denial or
loss of national funds would be the sole sanction for a state's failure to change its laws to recognize
collective bargaining rights for public employees. Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 627-36 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2928 (1982). See
Division 587, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663 F.2d 875,
879-80 (9th Cir. 1981) (question not reached whether agreement between public transit system and
union made as a condition of national grant preempts state law in absence of any conflict); Divi-
sion 580, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 556 F.2d 659 (2d
Cir. 1977) (suggestion that agreement between public transit authority and union made as a condi-
tion of a national grant does not preempt state law restrictions on rights of public employees). Put
see Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 582 F.2d 444,
452-53 (8th Cir. 1978) (terms of an agreement between public transit authority and union made as
a condition of national grant override state law); Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 485 F. Supp. 856, 862-65 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (terms of an agree-
ment between public transit authority and union do not conflict with state law but in the event of a
conflict state law does not control the validity of the agreement).
Collective bargaining rights for public employees as a condition of a grant has a heritage reach-
ing back to Depression-era loans and grants for the construction of municipal power plants.
Memphis Power & Light Co. v. City of Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346, 362-64, 112 S.W. 2d 817, 823
(1937); Note, Municipal Corporations: Validity of Federal Grants and Loans for Municoal Power
Plants, 26 CORNELL L. Q. 314 (1941).
In addition to imposing collective bargaining on state and local government, Congress has also
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on the allocation of political authority within a state. These conditions
may require the states to expand the powers of their political subdivi-
sions, to confer political authority on quasi-autonomous private
groups, or to alter the allocation of political power between their execu-
tive and legislative branches.
i. Allocation of Political Power Between a State and Its
Political Subdivisions
The powers of a state's political subdivisions may be expanded either
by national grants to local governments that purport to authorize the
recipient to act in excess of or contrary to its authority under state law,
or by national grants to a state on conditions that its political subdivi-
sions be allowed to exercise particular powers. Only one court has ex-
pressed doubt about Congress' power to expand the political authority
of a state's political subdivisions. In Rogers v. Brockette,2 5 7 a school
district argued that a national statute providing subsidized breakfasts
for school children authorized it to refuse to participate in the program
notwithstanding a state statute that required participation. Although
the Fifth Circuit assumed that NLC imposed some limits on national
regulated the wages of state and local government employees as a condition of grants. For exam-
ple, the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, as amended in
1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), requires state and local governments to pay
the minimum prevailing wage on similar construction in the locality to their employees who work
on capital projects completely financed by the national government. 42 U.S.C. § 6708 (Supp. IV
1980). The Attorney General construed the original 1976 Act to apply this wage requirement
solely to private contractors who received funds for capital projects through state and local grant-
ees. Pub. L. No. 93-369, tit. I, § 109, 90 Stat. 1001; 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 8 (January 11, 1977). The
Attorney General based his construction on the statute, the legislative history, and NLC's warning
against interference with state and local governmental wage scales. Id at 7. When Congress
amended the Act in 1977, it repealed the statutory language on which the Attorney General's
construction was based and presumably extended the wage requirement to public employees. See
Pub. L. No. 95-28, tit. I, § 108, 91 Stat. 119; H.R. REP. No. 230, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 168, 174.
Other national grants also have conditions regulating the wages paid to public employees. The
revenue sharing program established by the State and Local Government Financial Assistance
Act requires that public employees whose wages are paid in whole or in part with these national
funds must be paid at least as much as other employees in similar public occupations. 31 U.S.C.
§ 1243(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1980). The wages of state and local government employees who held pub-
lic service jobs created through national funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Train-
ing Act of 1973 were also regulated. 29 U.S.C. §§ 848(a)(2), 964(b)(3) (1976). See 43 Op. Att'y
Gen. 8 (1977). These wage regulations were subsequently deleted when the Act was completely
revised in 1978. See Comprehensive Employment and Training Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-524, 92 Stat. 1909.
257. 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
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interference with a state's internal allocation of political authority, it
was uncertain whether these limits applied solely to the commerce
power or whether they also applied to the spending power. The court
then avoided a resolution of the constitutional issue by finding that
there was no conflict between the national and state statutes because
the national statute did not confer power on individual school districts
to decide whether to accept financial assistance. 258
The court's concern about national interference with the state's
power to control its political subdivisions rested on the recognition that
"different political interests [have] different degrees of influence" at
various levels of government and that, for example, a "statewide mi-
nority [may be] a majority in certain localities."2 59 By conferring on a
state political subdivision the power to decide whether to accept a
grant, Congress may inadvertently or intentionally achieve a result
258. Id at 1070-73. Accord Dupler v. City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Me. 1976) (a
municipality cannot complain of being bound by a state's decision to participate voluntarily in a
national spending program); Memphis Power & Light Co. v. City of Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346,
362-64, 112 S.W.2d 817, 823 (1937) (state statute authorized municipality to accept national grants
and to agree to conditions). For an argument that Congress' power to control the allocation of
political authority between a state and its political subdivisions as a condition of a grant should be
determined by balancing national interests against the state's interest, see Comment, Municipal
Corporation Standing to Sue the State: Rogers v. Brockette, 93 HARv. L. REv. 586, 595-96 (1980).
Although the Rogers court avoided the constitutional question of Congress' power to control the
allocation of political power between a state and its political subdivisions by finding that the
condition of a national grant did not authorize a political subdivision to act contrary to state law,
another court has upheld a national statute that it construed to authorize a local government to act
contrary to state law. The Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act (PILOT), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980), amendedby Military Construction Authorization Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
99, tit. IX, § 912(a), 95 Stat. 1387, provides payments to local governments as compensation for
the burdens of providing services for national lands that are constitutionally immune from state
and local taxes. See generally Comment, The Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act." A Legislative Re-
sponse to Federal Tax Immunity, 85 DICK. L. REV. 455 (1981). In Lawrence County v. South
Dakota, a district court construed the PILOT Act to give local governments total discretion in the
distribution of PILOT funds and held, albeit without any consideration of federalism limits on
Congress' power to interfere with a state's control over its political subdivisions, that a state law
regulating the distribution of national PILOT funds was preempted. 513 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D.
1981), vacated and remanded with direction to dismissfor want offederaljurisdiction, 668 F.2d 27
(8th Cir. 1982). Disputes between the states and their political subdivisions over the distribution
of national grants are common. Eg., Town of Bloomsburg v. Pennsylvania, 527 F. Supp. 982
(M.D. Pa. 1981).
For another example of a national grant to local government bypassing the state similar to the
grants at issue in Rogers and Lawrence County, see D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 22 (1977).
259. 588 F.2d at 1062.
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with respect to the implementation of the substantive policy of a na-
tional grant that would not prevail at the state level.
Other courts, seemingly unaware that the state's political process de-
termines the level of government at which particular decisions are
made, have not been troubled by conditions of grants to the states or
local governments that require the states to expand the powers of their
political subdivisions. For example, in Walker Field, Colorado, Public
Airport Authoriy v. Adams, 60 the Tenth Circuit held that Congress
could make a grant to a state airport authority on a condition that two
other state political subdivisions, a city and a county, also assume
financial obligations as cosponsors of an airport improvement project
to be financed by the grant. Although this condition had the effect of
requiring the state to expand the authority of its city and county gov-
ernments to assume indebtedness contrary to state policy that only air-
port authorities could assume such financial obligations, the court
found no impermissible intrusion on state sovereignty because the state
could avoid these effects by declining the grant.26'
Similarly, in County of Los Angeles v. Adams,262 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit upheld a grant to a state with a condition that expanded
the powers of the state's political subdivisions by making their approval
of a nationally funded highway project a prerequisite for a state request
for national aid. Although the national statute in effect gave an organi-
zation of local governments a veto over a project deemed desirable by
the state government, the court easily found that there was no adverse
impact on state sovereignty because the state could refuse the grant.263
260. 606 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1979).
261. Id at 297. In dissent, Judge McKay argued that since the possibility of refusing national
funds is more apparent than real, any distinction between the spending power and the commerce
power in terms of freedom of choice is a fiction. Accordingly, he would have applied NLC and
held that the condition impermissibly regulated the state's governmental structure. Id at 298-300.
262. 574 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
263. Id at 609. The district court addressed a different argument that the requirement of
approval by an organization of local governments, designated by the state, impermissibly dimin-
ished the county's prior authority to select projects under an agreement with the state. County of
Los Angeles v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 496, 500 (D.D.C. 1976), aj#'d, 574 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir.
1978). This court concluded that notwithstanding the reduction of the county's state law authority
there was no valid NLC objection because the state's power to select projects was not diminished.
Id at 502, n.27. The district court's focus on the effect on the county apparently blinded it from
seeing the real issue correctly identified by the court of appeals.
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I. Allocation of Political Power to Private Groups:
Establishment of a Quasi-Autonomous
Political Process
Conditions of some national grants go beyond requiring states to ex-
pand the powers of their political subdivisions and force the states to
confer political authority on private groups and to establish a quasi-
autonomous political decisionmaking process. The National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA),26 4 for
example, completely displaces the states' political decisionmaking pro-
cess for health care planning and substitutes at both the local and state
levels a complex quasi-autonomous private decisionmaking process.
At the local level, the Act provides for the establishment of a Health
Systems Agency (HSA), which may be either a nonprofit, private cor-
poration or a public entity.26 Both private and public HSAs must have
a governing body comprised of health care consumers, providers of
health care, and public officials or representatives of state and local
government.266 The HSA is selected by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services after consultation with the Governor,26 7 and it has
broad responsibility for regulating the delivery of health care serv-
ices268 and the authority to approve or disapprove the use of most na-
tional health care funds in its area.269 At the state level, the Governor
264. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k to 300t (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit.
Ix, subtit. A, §§ 902(e)(1), (g)(4)-(6), subtit. E, §§ 933-937, subtit. F, § 949(c), (d), 95 Stat. 560, 561,
570-72, 578)). For a concise overview of the Act, see National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology
Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 383-88 (1981); Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F. Supp.
1230, 1231-34 (D.Md. 1978), aj'dmem, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979); Note, The NalonalHeallh
Planning and Resources Development Act and Sate Action: A Reappraisal of the Role of Private
Health Care Institutions, 57 B.U.L. REv. 511, 513-17 (1977). The effects of this Act on the states
have been challenged in three significant cases. See infra text accompanying notes 276-81, 282-83
& 306-12.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(1) (1976). An HSA must be created for every health service area,
and each state is divided into Health Service Areas established by the Governor under national
standards and approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id §§ 3001, 3001-4
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(3)(A), (C) (Supp. IV 1980). The HSA must establish a process for
selecting the members of its governing body. Id § 300-l(b)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1980).
267. Id § 3001-4 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
268. Id § 3001-2(a)-(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). National grants support the HSAs. Id
§ 300/-3, -5 (Supp. IV 1980). Given financial assistance to private corporations serving as HSAs, it
would also be possible to analyze this aspect of the Act as a grant to a private recipient. See supra
text accompanying notes 180-84.




must select a state agency to serve as the State Health Planning and
Development Agency (SHPDA) to fulfill certain duties of the state gov-
ernment under the Act.27° The SHPDA is, however, subject to the con-
trol of a Statewide Health Coordinating Council (SHCC) which has the
ultimate responsibility for health care planning at the state level and
which has power to disapprove state applications for national funds.27'
Since at least sixty percent of the members of the SHCC must be ap-
pointed by the Governor from a list of nominees submitted by the
HSAs,272 entities which are governed by persons selected outside of the
state's political process, 273 the Act vests significant political decision-
making power at the state level in an entity which is only partially and
indirectly accountable through the state's political process.
Thus, through a series of interrelated conditions for obtaining a wide
range of national health grants,274 the NHPRDA requires each state to
adopt at the state and local levels a decisionmaking process that con-
forms. to national standards. Moreover, the Act in effect establishes a
semiautonomous and nonaccountable decisionmaking process in each
state.275 The states are required to vest political authority over health
care planning and regulation at the local level in an HSA which is
either a private, nonprofit corporation or a public entity with a gov-
erning body selected outside the states' political process, and at the
state level political decisions about health care are made by an entity
(the SHCC) controlled by the HSAs.
270. Id § 300m to m-6 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The effect of the Act on the respective powers
of the Governor and the state legislature is discussed infra at notes 282-83. The SHDPA's duty to
administer a certificate of need program is discussed infra at notes 306-12.
271. Id § 300m-3(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Note, supra note 264, at 516 n.27. If the
SHCC disapproves an application for national funds, the Secretary may override the disapproval
and make a grant upon submission of a detailed statement of reasons to the SHCC. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300m-3(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-3(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
273. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-2(e), 300m(d), 300m-3(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1980), amended by Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. IX, subtit. A, § 902(g)(4)-(6), 95 Stat.
561. For example, North Carolina was threatened with the loss of $50-55 million under 42 na-
tional health assistance programs for failing to comply with one condition of the NHPRDA. See
infra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
275. Other national statutes have similar effects. See Cervantes v. Guerra, 651 F.2d 974, 975-
78 (5th Cir. 1981) (Community Action Agencies established under the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2781-2837 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconcila-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. VI, subtit. B, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 519, function as "autono-
mous bodies responsive to the poor in the community" and exercise governmental power without
direct supervision by the national, state or local governments).
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Notwithstanding this impact on the states, the court in Montgomery
County v. Califano276 upheld the NHPRDA on the grounds that the
economic incentive of national grants did not constitute coercion 2
77
and that the federalism limits of NLC applied solely to statutes enacted
under the commerce power.278 The co frt, however, may not have fully
appreciated the effects of the NHPRDA on a state's political decision-
making process. Although most HSAs are private, nonprofit corpora-
tions, 279 the constitutional challenge to the Act was brought by a
county that had been designated as an HSA.28 0 Since the HSA in this
case was a state political subdivision, the court may not have consid-
ered carefully the question of Congress' power to require a state to
transfer political decisionmaking power to a private group as a condi-
tion of a national grant. Even though the governing body of a public
HSA is selected outside the state's political process, the allocation of
political authority to a private group is not as stark as when the HSA is
itself a private, nonprofit corporation. Nevertheless, the court's praise
of the Act as "carefully drawn to disperse widely the authority over
health planning" '' suggests that the court would not have reached a
different result if the case had involved a private HSA. This praise
276. 449 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Md. 1978), aff'dmem., 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).
277. Id at 1247. The court did not determine the amount of the grants that would be termi-
nated if the state failed to comply with the conditions of the Act.
278. Id at 1247-48. Without any analysis, the court also concluded that the NHPRDA would
also have been a valid exercise of the commerce power within NLC because it did not impair the
state's integrity or "unduly restrict" the state's freedom to structure its health care functions. Id at
1248. The court also rejected a guarantee clause claim as nonjusticiable. Id at 1242-43. For the
conclusion that NHPRDA is unconstitutional under a balancing test derived from NLC, see Note,
Emerging Concepts of Federalism: Limitations on the Spending Power and National Health Plan-
ning, 34 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1133 (1977).
279. There are 203 HSAs, of which 180 are private, nonprofit agencies, 5 are units of local
government, and 18 are public regional planning bodies. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVIcEs, DIRECTORY-HEALTH SYSTEMS AGENCIES, STATE HEALTH PLANNING AND DEVELOP-
MENT AGENCIES, AND STATE HEALTH COORDINATING COUNCILS (1980). The courts that have
addressed the role of private HSA's under the Act have not considered any claim that the Act is an
unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty. See Texas Acorn v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems
Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977); Aldamuy v. Pirro, 436 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D.N.Y.
1977); Mid-America Regional Council v. Mathews, 416 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
280. The plaintiffwas Montgomery County, Maryland. By invalidating several national regu-
lations that gave the private governing body of the HSA authority over the county as an HSA, the
court reduced the extent of national interference with the county's authority over health planning.
449 F. Supp. at 1234-42.
281. Id at 1247.
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makes the allocation of political authority pursuant to national stan-
dards a virtue and not an intrusion on state autonomy.
iii. Allocation of Political Power Between the Governor and
the State Legislature: Who Speaks for the State?
In contrast to the courts' acquiescence in conditions of national
grants that affect the allocation of political power among the state gov-
ernment, its political subdivisions, and private groups, two state courts
have strongly suggested that a condition of a national grant altering a
state's constitutional allocation of power between the Governor and the
state legislature would be unconstitutional. In Opinion of the Jus-
tices,282 the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that a condition
precluding the state legislature from designating the state agency to re-
ceive national health grants under the NHPRDA and giving the sole
authority of designation to the Governor contrary to the state constitu-
tion would be an impermissible intrusion on state sovereignty. The
court, however, construed the national statute to avoid this issue.283
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also has construed a national statute
narrowly to avoid interference with the state's constitutional allocation
of power between the Governor and the legislature. In Shapp v.
Sloan,284 the court read the state constitution to give the legislature
power to appropriate national grant funds received by the state and
rejected the argument that Congress intended to give the Governor the
282. 118 N.H. 7, 381 A.2d 1204 (1978). This case is discussed in Brown, Federal Funds and
National Supremacy; The Role of State Legislatures in Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U.L. REV.
279, 311-12 (1979).
283. The issue in this case was whether the NHPRDA gave the Governor exclusive authority
to designate a state agency as the State Health Planning and Development Agency. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300m(b)(l) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra text accompanying note 270. The court inter-
preted the phrase "selected by the Governor" to mean selected by the Governor in compliance
with the state's constitutional processes that gave the legislature the power to determine the agency
to administer national grant funds. 118 N.H. at 13-16, 381 A.2d at 1208-10. The court reasoned
that this interpretation was necessary to avoid an intrusion on state powers barred by NLC. Id at
16-19, 381 A.2d at 1210-11. Another provision of the NHPRDA raises a similar issue of national
control of the powers of the state executive and legislative branches. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-3(b)(2)
(Supp. IV 1980) (Governor selects the chairman of the SHCC, see supra text accompanying note
271, with the advice and consent of the state senate or of a unicameral state legislature).
284. 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 440
U.S. 942 (1979). This case is discussed in Brown, supra note 282, at 308-11, and in Comment,
Federal Interference with Checks and Balances in State Government: A Constitutional Limit on the
Spending Power, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 402, 405-11 (1979).
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exclusive authority to accept and expend these funds without legislative
approval.
It is hardly surprising that these two state courts resorted to statutory
interpretation2"5 to avoid confrontation with a condition of a national
grant that, contrary to state law, expands the power of the Governor at
the expense of the state legislature. Such conditions raise the question
of Congress' power to control who speaks for the state in deciding
whether to accept a national grant and to take the actions required for
compliance.28 6 The conditions of most grants simply raise the question
of Congress' power to require the states to take particular actions; and,
as in most of the cases discussed above, the power of the Governor, the
legislature, or both to take the actions necessary to make the state, its
political subdivisions, or a private recipient eligible for a national grant
285. In both cases the statutes expressly provided that the Governor should take the action
necessary to meet a condition of the grant. 42 U.S.C. § 300m(b)(l) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 42
U.S.C. § 3723(a)(1) (1976), deleted by Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
157, § 203, 93 Stat. 1167, 1174. In the light of legislative history the courts concluded, however,
that Congress did not intend to preclude participation by the state legislature. 118 N.H. at 17, 381
A.2d at 1210; 480 Pa. at 469, 391 A.2d at 604.
Three other state courts avoided resolving the issue of Congress' power to confer exclusive
control of national funds on a Governor by holding that as a matter of state law the legislature
had no authority over these funds. Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dep't of Admin., Ill Ariz. 279, 528
P.2d 623 (1974); MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (en banc 1972); State exrel. Sego
v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N. M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974), discussed in Brown, supra note 282, at 289-90.
The question of the roles of the state legislature and the executive in accepting national grants and
in meeting the conditions has excited great interest. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS, INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 76-4 (November 1976) (state legislatures
should assert greater control over national grants). See generally Hearings Before the Subconzm. on
Intergovernmental Relations of the Sen. Comn. on Governmental Affairs on Role of State Legisla-
tures in Appropriating Federal Funds to States, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL, supra note 178; Brown, supra note 282, at 282-88.
286. By avoiding the question of the constitutionality of a condition controlling who speaks
for the state, the courts also avoided a difficult question of the remedy for a state's failure to
comply with a grant condition. If the courts had held that the condition was valid, they would
then have had to address the Governors' arguments that the national statute preempted conflicting
state law provisions giving the legislatures power to act on the grant and that under the national
statute the Governors had exclusive power to act. 118 N.H. at 10, 16-19, 381 A.2d at 1206, 1210-
11. See 480 Pa. at 469-70, 391 A.2d at 605. The remedy for a state's failure to comply with the
conditions of a national grant is discussed infra at notes 325-35. For an argument that a condition
of a national grant controlling the allocation of political authority between the Governor and the
legislature is unconstitutional under NLC because it interferes with the state's system of checks
and balances and that such a condition, if valid, is enforceable only by a funding cut-off and not
by preempting the state law provision for legislative authority, see Comment, supra note 284, at
417-23, 425-28.
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is controlled by state law.287 When a condition of a national grant also
controls who speaks for the state by specifying that the action of the
state is to be taken by a particular branch of state government,285 it has
a fundamental impact on the state similar to the effects of a condition
authorizing a political subdivision of a state to act in excess of or con-
trary to state law.289 To comply with the condition, the state may have
to change its political decisionmaking process. 2 90
If, for example, a condition requires the Governor alone to take an
action for which the state constitution requires executive and legislative
authorization, then the state constitution must be amended to give the
Governor exclusive power. This reallocation of political decisionmak-
ing power between the two branches of state government is a change in
the state's principle of separation of powers. A change in the state's
political decisionmaking process may in turn yield significantly differ-
ent results with respect to the implementation of national grants.29'
287. When the decision to accept or to refuse a grant is made for the state by the Governor
and legislature in accordance with their state law powers and no condition of a grant controls the
authority of these two branches of state government to act, the sole issue is whether the require-
ment that the state take particular actions to obtain national funds intrudes impermissibly on state
sovereignty. The court does not have to consider the separate, anterior question of who speaks for
the state. Thus, for example, in County of Los Angeles v. Marshall and New Hampshire Depart-
ment of Emplo)ment Security v. Marshall, there was no question who decides if the state will take
the actions necessary to make private employers eligible for a national tax credit. See supra notes
203-16 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitation
Services v. Calfano, the power of the executive and legislative branches of state government to
reorganize a state bureaucracy as a condition of a grant was not at issue. See supra note 255 and
accompanying text. In Montgomery Count, v. Califano, the powers of the Governor and the legis-
lature to establish a semiautonomous health care decisionmaking process were not at issue. See
supra notes 264-81 and accompanying text.
288. Most grants are made to the states and not to a particular branch of state government, but
they often assign specific responsibilities to the executive branch. Brown, supra note 282, at 282.
If the condition is read to assign exclusive responsibility to the Governor and to preclude legisla-
tive participation as required by state law, then the effect is to control who speaks for the state.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59. A grant condition that expands the authority
of a state's political subdivision reduces the power of the Governor and the legislature. A condi-
tion that expands the Governor's power reduces the power of the legislature. In the first instance,
political authority is reallocated between two levels of subnational government; in the second
instance, political authority is reallocated between two branches of state government.
290. The New Hampshire and Pennsylvania courts construed the national statute narrowly
because they interpreted NLC to deny Congress the power to control the state's political decision-
making process. Opinion of the Justices, 118 N.H. 7, 18-19, 381 A.2d 1204, 1211 (1978); Shapp v.
Sloan, 27 Pa. Cominw. 312, 325 n.4, 367 A.2d 791, 799 n.4 (1976), a7'd 480 Pa. 449, 468-69, 391
A.2d 595, 604 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
291. It might, of course, be argued that no change would be made in the state's political deci-
sionmaking process unless a change in result is also desired; therefore, the distinction between a
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Various political interest groups, differing in degrees of strength at the
state and local levels of government, z92 may also have different degrees
of influence in the legislative and executive branches of state govern-
ment. A Governor, who is subject to a different constellation of polit-
ical pressures than the legislature, may well exercise the discretion
permitted by a national grant in a different fashion than would the
legislature.293
Gilbert v. New Jersey Department of Human Services2 9 4 affords an
excellent example of how a condition controlling who speaks for the
state changes both the state's decisionmaking process and the actual
decision whether to accept a national grant. In the Volunteers in Serv-
ice to America (VISTA) program,295 Congress provides financial assist-
ance to state and local governments through the services of
"volunteers" who are paid a national stipend. The volunteers are as-
signed by a national officer to work in public and private social welfare
programs, but the Governor of each state has the power to disapprove
the assignment of a volunteer.296 One condition of the VISTA program
is that the stipend paid to the volunteers by the national government
may not be included in the determination of eligibility for benefits
under any other governmental program.297 The State of New Jersey
and its local governments provide financial aid to poor persons through
a General Public Assistance (GPA) program that is supported com-
pletely by state and local funds, and a state regulation requires that all
income obtained from the national government must be considered in
change in process and a change in result is a distinction without a difference. This argument
neglects several crucial points. Changes in the allocation of a political authority between the
Governor and the legislature usually require an amendment of the state's constitution by the elec-
torate. Even if the voters understand that an amendment will produce a particular result with
respect to one grant, a generally applicable change in the distribution of executive and legislative
powers will affect other grants in ways that can not be anticipated.
292. See supra text accompanying note 259.
293. In Shapp v. Sloan, the underlying issue in the contest between the legislature and the
Governor for control over the expenditure of the national grant was a dispute concerning the use
of funds for an investigation of political and official corruption. 480 Pa. at 479-81, 391 A.2d at 610
(dissenting opinion). See Brown, supra note 282, at 309 n.210.
294. 167 N.J. Super. 217, 400 A.2d 803 (App. Div. 1979).
295. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4951-4958 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
296. 42 U.S.C. § 4953(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
297. Id § 5044(g) (Supp. IV 1980). Although Congress amended this provision in 1979 after
the decision in Gilbert and added a limit on the total governmental benefits paid to a VISTA
volunteer, the basic requirement that benefits be paid without regard to the stipend was not




the determination of an individual's state benefits under its GPA pro-
gram 9.29 In accordance with this regulation, a local welfare department
denied a VISTA volunteer GPA benefits because her national stipend
brought her monthly income above the eligibility level for the state
GPA benefits.299
In Gilbert, a majority of the state court concluded that the state regu-
lation was invalid under the supremacy clause of the Constitution be-
cause it was in conflict with the national statute.300 The court
determined that the state had to pay GPA benefits to VISTA volunteers
without regard to their national stipend.3 °0 The majority also held that
this national interference with the state-funded welfare program was
not barred under NLC because gubernatorial approval of the assign-
ment of VISTA volunteers demonstrated that the state's participation
in the program was voluntary 30 2 and because the VISTA program did
not substantially increase the cost to the state of providing relief for the
needy.303
The majority's analysis of the state sovereignty issue in Gilbert was
superficial. The Gilbert majority put only one condition of the VISTA
program at issue-the requirement that all governmental assistance be
calculated without reference to a volunteer's national stipend. The ma-
jority failed to recognized that the provision for gubernatorial disap-
proval of the assignment of a VISTA volunteer was also a condition of
the national program. The court compounded this error by reading the
condition to make the state's participation in the VISTA program vol-
untary. This provision for gubernatorial disapproval would make the
state's participation voluntary only if state law authorized the Gover-
nor alone to accept for the state the grant of nationally financed volun-
teer services; otherwise, this second condition dictated who spoke for
the state in deciding whether to accept national assistaiice and thus al-
298. 167 N.J. Super. at 220-21, 400 A.2d at 805.
299. Id
300. Id at 223, 227, 400 A.2d at 806, 808. The court construed the national statute to require
that assistance under all governmental programs, including programs funded solely from state and
local revenues, must be provided without regard to the national stipend paid to VISTA volunteers.
301. Id at 227, 400 A.2d at 809.
302, Id at 225, 400 A.2d at 807.
303. Id at 226-27, 400 A.2d at 808. The majority also suggested that NLC did not preclude
national interference with a state welfare program because national participation in the total
scheme of welfare services is so pervasive that state welfare services may no longer be "tradi-
tional" and hence may no longer be an aspect of state sovereignty as recognized by the Supreme
Court in NLC. Id
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tered the state's constitutionally established decisionmaking process by
excluding the legislature. If the New Jersey constitution required joint
legislative and executive action for a state decision either to accept a
national grant or to authorize an amendment of a regulation in conflict
with a condition of a grant,304 then the state's political decisionmaking
process was circumvented by the Governor's independent action of ac-
cepting the assignment of a VISTA volunteer. The conflict between the
state regulation and the national grant condition may have demon-
strated either that the legislature did not have an opportunity to con-
sider the grant or that it had determined not to accept the grant of
VISTA volunteer services.
If the Gilbert majority had recognized that joint legislative and exec-
utive action was required for a decision by the state to accept the na-
tional grant or to change a regulation in conflict with a condition of the
grant, then it might have considered more carefully its holding that the
state regulation was preempted. 5 The court could have held that the
state could not accept the grant until the state regulation was changed
by the joint action of-the Governor and the legislature to permit the
state to comply with the conditions of the grant. The effect of the grant
on the state would then have been simply to require the state to amend
its constitution to give the Governor the sole authority to accept a grant
or to require the state legislature to take the appropriate action to
change the regulation to exclude the VISTA stipend from the calcula-
tion of GPA benefits. By holding that the state regulation was pre-
empted, the majority exacerbated the effects of tie national grant on
304. In his dissent, Judge Conford argued that the state constitution required legislative action
to change the GPA regulation and that the Governor alone could not waive it by a decision not to
disapprove the assignment of a VISTA volunteer. Although he recognized that the state constitu-
tion limited the Governor's power, he did not pursue the argument here that the provision for
gubernatorial disapproval is a condition of a national grant that changes the state's political deci-
sionmaking process. His dissent, instead, focused on the effect on the state's welfare policy of the
requirement that benefits be calculated without regard to a VISTA volunteer's national stipend.
He concluded that NLC probably precluded national interference with a state policy to deny
welfare benefits to employed persons with an income above a certain level and construed the
required exclusion of the VISTA stipend to apply solely to governmental assistance financed at
least in part with national funds and not to apply to a welfare program like the GPA, which is
funded solely by state and local revenues. Id at 227-29, 400 A.2d at 809 (Conford, P.J.A.D,,
dissenting).
305. A determination that a condition of a national grant preempts state law is rare, and the
usual remedy is to withhold the grant until the state changes its law. See supra note 249. The





the state. Instead of requiring the state to change its political decision-
making process, national law made the change and expanded the Gov-
ernor's powers at the expense of the state legislature; the Governor in
effect was empowered by national law to disregard the GPA regulation
without the legislature's participation.
Regardless whether the change in the state's political decisionmaking
process is made by the state or by national preemption, the change
rather obviously may lead to a different result with respect to the as-
signment of VISTA volunteers. If, for example, the VISTA program is
more popular with the Governor than with the legislature, then exclu-
sive gubernatorial power may lead to the assignment of volunteers that
the legislature would otherwise block.
c. Conditions that Require the Affirmative Exercise of State
Authority Over Private Activity
Just as the courts have upheld conditions of national grants that reg-
ulate directly state and local government and control the allocation of
political decisionmaking power, they also have routinely sustained con-
ditions of national grants that require the affirmative exercise of state
authority over private activity. For example, in North Carolina ex rel
Morrow v. Calyfano,306 the court upheld Congress' power, as a condi-
tion of many related grants, to require the states to regulate the con-
struction or expansion of privately owned health care facilities under a
certificate of need (CON) program." 7 The state argued that its consti-
tution prohibited such regulation of private activity0 8 and that its in-
ability to establish a CON program would result in loss of over $50
million in forty-two national health assistance programs. 30 9 The court
concluded, however, that the necessity for the state to amend its consti-
tution to comply with a condition of a national grant was not an uncon-
306. 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (three judge court), ajfd Men, 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
dccord Goodin v. State ex rel Oklahoma Welfare Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
307. The requirement that the states establish a CON program is part of the system of na-
tional, state and local health planning established by the National Health Planning and Resource
Development Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m-2(a)(4)(B), 300m-6 (Supp. IV 1980); supra text accom-
panying notes 264-81.
308. 445 F. Supp. at 533, 535. In a classic economic substantive due process decision, the
North Carolina Supreme Court had previously held that under the state constitution the regula-
tion of private property under a state certificate of need law was a deprivation of liberty without
due process. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
309. 445 F. Supp. at 533, 535.
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stitutional intrusion on state autonomy.310 The state was not coerced
because it could have refused the grant,311 and NLC applies only to
direct regulation under the commerce clause and not to the spending
power.312
The courts also have upheld Congress' power to require the states to
regulate private individuals who construct or maintain billboards adja-
cent to interstate and primary highways. Under the Highway Beautifi-
cation Act, a state that fails to regulate the use of billboards by
landowners and advertisers in accordance with detailed national stan-
dards may be denied ten percent of its national-aid highway funds. 313
This requirement that the states exercise affirmative governmental au-
thority over private activity was upheld in South Dakota v. Adams on
the ground that the threat of loss of national funds is not coercive.314
310. Id at 534. Cf. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 417 (1974), modofied, 422 U.S. 1004
(1975) (Congress did not intend that compliance with a condition of a grant would require the
states to amend their constitutions).
311. The court found that the loss of $50 million in national health care grants was not coer-
cive when measured against state revenues of $3.1 billion. 445 F. Supp. at 535.
312. Id at 536 n.10. The threat of the loss of the national grants apparently dissolved the state
constitutional barriers, and the state enacted a CON program after the court's decision. 1977 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. ch. 1182, amendedby 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 651; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131-
175 to -188 (1981 Cum. Supp.). The North Carolina legislature specifically noted that this statute
was enacted to avoid the loss of $55 million of national funds. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-175(5)
(1981 Cum. Supp.).
313. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally D. MANDELKIER & D. NETSH,
supra note 258, at 555-88.
314. 506 F. Supp. 50, 58-59 (D.S.D.), af'dsub nom. South Dakota v. Goldschmidt, 635 F.2d
698 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom South Dakota v. Lewis, 451 U.S. 984 (1981). See also
South Dakota v. Adams, 506 F. Supp. 60 (D.S.D.), af'dsub nom. South Dakota v. Goldschmidt,
635 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1980), cer. denied sub nonm South Dakota v. Lewis, 451 U.S. 984 (1981)
(companion case upholding determination of the Secretary of Transportation to withhold na-
tional-aid highway funds as a penalty for the state's failure to institute effective control of bill-
boards). The court's analysis of both the spending power and state sovereignty limits on that
power is puzzling. Contrary to received wisdom, the court apparently assumed that the reach of
the spending power is limited by Congress' other enumerated powers. Compare 506 F. Supp. at
55, 57 (grant condition requiring states to regulate billboards is within Congress' spending power
because Congress has power to regulate billboards directly under the commerce clause) with
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1936) (spending power is an independent power and is
not limited to effectuation of other enumerated powers). With this understanding and the as-
sumption that if Congress had decided to regulate billboards directly it would have done so under
the commerce power, the Court considered the question whether NLC would preclude direct na-
tional regulation of billboards. Since national regulation of billboards would fall on private activ-
ity rather than directly on the state, NLC would not bar national control of billboards even
though it displaced traditional state and local regulation of land use. 506 F. Supp. at 55-56. The
purpose of this line of analysis is difficult to fathom because the court ultimately recognized that
the issue was state enforcement of national standards for private activity. When the court reached
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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In sustaining Congress' power to require the states to regulate the con-
struction of hospital facilities and the use of billboards, these two courts
in effect recognized that Congress can use the spending power to em-
ploy the states as its agents in regulating private activity.
The constitutionality of national grant conditions that require the
states to regulate private activity is by no means settled. A major test of
the validity of such conditions is presented by a requirement of grants
under the Clean Air Act that the states regulate motor vehicle air pollu-
tion by establishing inspection and maintenance programs to ensure
that privately owned vehicles conform to national air pollutant emis-
sion standards and by denying registration to vehicles failing to comply
with the national standards.31 5 More importantly, the Supreme Court
recently has cast some doubt on Congress' well-settled practice of em-
ploying the states as its agents in social welfare programs.
In many national social welfare spending programs, the states ad-
minister the distribution of goods, services, and benefits. For example,
in the Medicaid, Food Stamp, and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) programs, grants are made to the states to assist low-
income persons by providing medical care, by increasing food purchas-
ing power, and by covering the daily living expenses of needy depen-
the question of Congress' power to require the state to regulate private activity as a condition of a
national grant, it relied on Steward Machine Co., see supra text accompanying notes 193-97, to
conclude that the conditional grant was valid because the state was not coerced, and it did not
consider directly the effect, if any, of NLC. 506 F. Supp. at 57-58. The Steward rationale was also
employed in a pre-NLC challenge to the Highway Beautification Act in which the court upheld a
requirement that a state must pay just compensation to persons whose billboards were removed.
Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606 (D.Vt. 1974). See also Lamm v. Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1075 (1972) (challenge to just compensation requirement
dismissed on alternative grounds that plaintiff state legislator lacked standing and that controversy
was moot after state legislature enacted a statute to comply with the just compensation require-
ment).
The notorious 55 mph national maximum speed limit is another condition of a national-aid
highway grant that requires the states to regulate private activity. To obtain financial assistance
for highway construction the states must establish and enforce a 55 mph maximum speed limit. 23
U.S.C. § 154 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XI, subtit. B, § 1108, 95 Stat. 626. In an opinion of remarkable misappre-
hension, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that Congress has the power to establish this
maximum speed limit. Newkirk v. State, 260 Ark. 526, 542 S.W.2d 282 (1976). The court incor-
rectly assumed (without reference to the statute) that Congress had exercised the commerce power
to establish the maximum speed limit. In a complete non sequitur, it then concluded that there
was no intrusion on state sovereignty because the Arkansas legislature, not Congress, had estab-
lished the 55 mph speed limit. Thus, the court never considered the issue of Congress' power to
require the states to regulate the speed of private motor vehicles as a condition of a national grant.
315. See infra note 703 and accompanying text.
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dent children. 6 These grants are typically made on the condition that
the state appropriate funds to match all or a portion of the national
aid3 17 and on the condition that these national and state funds will be
passed through the state to particular. classes of recipients.318 In ad-
ministering these grants, the states serve as the nation's agents319 in reg-
ulating individual activity because the basic public policy decisions are
316. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amendedby Omnibus Budget Reconci-
lation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XXI, subtit. C, §§ 2161-2184, 95 Stat. 786-828 (Medi-
caid); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (Supp. IV 1980), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconcilation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. I, subtit. A, §§ 101-117, 95 Stat. 358 (Food Stamps); 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-
645 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amendedby Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, tit. XXIII, subtit. A, ch. 1, §§ 2301-2321, 95 Stat. 843 (AFDC). For a brief overview of
national and state roles in the Food Stamp and AFDC programs, see 3 ACIR STUDY, Public
Assistance. The Growth of a Federal Function A-79, supra note 82, at 29-32, 73-89.
317. Approximately 60% of 442 national grant programs in 1978 required grantee matching. 3
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, Categorical Grants: Their Role and
Design A-52, at I 1I(1978) [hereinafter cited as Categorical Grants]. See generally id at 111-15,
143-95.
318. In addition to specifying the use of the funds and eligibility criteria, conditions of social
welfare grants usually include fiduciary, administrative and planning requirements, provisions for
public participation, and prohibitions of racial discrimination. See Brown, Beyondthe New Feder.
alism-Revenue Sharing in Perspective, 15 HARV. J. ON LEaIs. 1, 8-10 (1977).
319. There is some question whether national social welfare grants employ the states as the
nation's agents and should be characterized as national aid to individual beneficiaries adminis-
tered by the states or, alternatively, whether they should be characterized as national aid to the
states to assist them in providing governmental services to their citizens. The proper characteriza-
tion of national social welfare grants turns on distinctions between categorical grants, block
grants, and the general revenue sharing program. Categorical grants require the states to spend
national funds for discrete, well-defined purposes, and other conditions of these grants frequently
impose planning, fiscal management, and administrative organization requirements. Although
there is no sharp line between categorical grants and block grants, the states have greater discre-
tion under block grants that limit the purposes of the expenditure only to a broad functional area
like law enforcement and otherwise permit the states to determine the use of the national grant.
The states have the greatest discretion under the general revenue sharing program. Under this
program, funds are distributed on the basis of a formula with few constraints, other than anti-
discrimination requirements, on the purposes to which they may be applied. Categorical Grants,
supra note 317, at 5-6.
Since the states have broad discretion to determine the package of goods and services provided
to their citizens with funds distributed in block and revenue sharing grants, it is, then, appropriate
to characterize these two kinds of grants as financial assistance to the states for the purpose of
executing their governmental functions. In categorical grants, however, the relationship between
Congress and the states is one of agency because the states must follow a detailed national plan for
distribution of the benefits. The state is merely the administrative funnel for the distribution of
national funds.
It should be noted that this distinction between national aid to individuals in categorical grants
administered by the states as the nation's agents and aid to the states in block and revenue sharing
grants to assist them in providing governmental services is blurred if the states and the nation have
identical social policies for the provision of benefits. See infra note 320.
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made at the national level and executed at the state level. The determi-
nation to provide benefits and the establishment of eligibility criteria
are both made by the national political process,32 and the states exe-
cute these national policies by administering the distribution of the
grants to the individual beneficiaries. In serving as the nation's agent
in administering these grants, a state must exercise affirmative govern-
mental power over private beneficiaries to whom it distributes the na-
tionally financed benefits. The state must establish, in conformity with
national standards, rules governing the eligibility of beneficiaries, and
it must enforce rules requiring the beneficiaries to comply with the con-
ditions of the grant to the state.32'
The courts have uniformly dismissed claims that discrete conditions
of social welfare grants requiring state regulation of individuals are an
unconstitutional invasion of state autonomy,322 but no court has con-
sidered the broader question of Congress' power to use the states to
administer these programs. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Haldermann,32 3 however, the Supreme Court suggested that the con-
320. It is true of course that state participation in spending programs indicates approval or at
least acquiesence in these national political decisions, but it is also true that the state political
community, acting in the absence of national financial assistance, might decide to provide a differ-
ent set of benefits. At a minimum, national grants for particular social welfare programs which
require state matching funds influence the state's priorities and may alter the package of collective
goods and services provided by the state to its residents. In short, national social welfare grants
affect the states' welfare policies.
Perhaps because national social welfare programs are so well-established, there is little or no
analysis of their effects on the states. Although there is a substantial body of political science
literature, political scientists often beg the question of the effect of these programs on state auton-
omy by assuming that the states and the nation share the same substantive goals in the provision
of benefits. Blinded by this assumption, political scientists then ignore the fact that the states
function as the nation's agents in implementing national policy, and they focus instead on identi-
fying the mix of national, state, and local responsibility necessary to achieve common goals most
efficiently and on categorizing different allocations of authority under rubrics like "cooperative
federalism." Eg., D. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP (1962); M. GRODZINs, THE AMERI-
CAN SYSTEM (1966); M. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM (1972); 1-10 PUBLIUS-TtE J. OF FED-
ERALISM, passim.
321. For example, in Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796, 798 (W.D. Okla. 1977), a grant
condition established a staff ratio for day care centers, and the state enforced it by refusing to pass
on national funds to day care centers that did not meet the staff ratio requirement.
322. See, e.g., Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1976) (condition establishes
who is eligible to receive the benefits); Oklahoma v. Harris, 480 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1979)
(amount of state matching funds required as a condition of a grant), af'd sub nom. Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Okla. 1976)
(staff requirements for nationally funded day care centers).
323. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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cept of state sovereignty recognized in LTC may limit Congress' power
to impose affirmative duties on the states as a condition of national
social welfare grants.324
3. Sanctions. Loss of the Grant or Preemption
No court has held that a condition of a national grant to private re-
cipients or to the states and their political subdivisions is an unconstitu-
tional intrusion on state autonomy and is prohibited by NLC. 325
Regardless of the effects on a state of complying with a condition of a
national grant, courts reaching the merits have held that the conditions
are constitutional because state participation in national spending pro-
grams is voluntary and that the states can avoid any adverse effects by
the simple expedient of refusing the grant. Most of the courts have
then either explicitly or implicitly assumed that the only sanction for a
state's failure to comply with the conditions of a grant is the loss of
national financial assistance. A few courts, however, have held that a
state law provision which is inconsistent with a condition of a grant is
invalid under the supremacy clause and is preempted.326 A distinction
324. Id at 17 n.13. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amendedby Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. IX, subtit. B, §§ 911-913, 95 Stat. 563, provides financial assistance
to the states to care for and treat the developmentally disabled. The principal issue was whether a
particular provision of this Act required the states to fund certain very expensive types of care and
services. The Court concluded that the states did not have to provide these benefits for develop-
mentally disabled persons because the provision at issue was merely hortatory and was not a
condition of the grant. Id at 11-27. Once the Court eliminated by statutory interpretation the
question of Congress' power to impose an affirmative obligation on the states to provide particular
services for its citizens, it then cautioned that NLC might constrain this power.
The three dissenting Justices found that the provision at issue was a condition of the grant, and
the argument that the state could avoid the requirements of the Act by refusing the grant was
apparently their answer to the question of Congress' power to impose affirmative obligations on
the states as a condition of a grant. Id at 33-47 (White, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
325. Since no condition of a grant has been held invalid, no court has considered the appropri-
ate relief. A court might either hold the whole grant invalid or treat the unconstitutional condi-
tion as severable and direct the grant to be made to a recipient who complied with all other
conditions. Although the effect of severing the invalid condition would be to force Congress to
make a grant on less than all the terms it deemed appropriate, Congress could always withdraw
the grant.
326. Three courts that rejected NLC arguments that a condition of a grant was unconstitu-
tional have expressly held that a provision of state law in conflict with the condition is preempted.
Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 1976); City of Boston v. Harris, 461 F. Supp.
1201, 1202-03 (D. Mass. 1978), a'd, 619 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1980) (discussed ura at notes 183-84);
Gilbert v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 167 N.J. Super. 217, 223, 400 A.2d 803, 806 (App.
Div. 1979) (discussed supra at notes 294-303). See Lawrence County v. South Dakota, 513 F.
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between these two sanctions is important because preemption has a sig-
nificant impact on a state entirely apart from and in addition to the
effects of the condition itself.
On the one hand, if the only sanction for a state's failure to change
its law to permit and effect compliance with a condition is that the state
cannot accept the grant or, conversely, that the national government
will withhold its financial aid, there is no interference with a state's
political decisionmaking process. Although the state may have to com-
ply with conditions that affect its autonomy by regulating the organiza-
tion and conduct of state government,327 the allocation of political
power within the state,328 or the state's control of private activity,329 the
decision to accept a national grant and to comply with these regulations
is made through the political process established by state law. Con-
gress takes a state's political decisionmaking process as it finds it with
certain powers allocated by state law to the Governor, the legislature,
and its political subdivisions. Congress defers to a state's political deci-
sionmaking process because the power of the Governor, the legislature,
or a state political subdivision to accept a national grant and to comply
with its conditions is determined by state law.
On the other hand, preemption of a provision of state law that con-
Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1981), vacated and remanded with direction to dismissfor want offederaljuris-
diction. 668 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1982) (discussed supra at note 258); Central Fla. Legal Servs. v.
Perry, 406 So.2d 111 (Fla. App. 1981) (discussed supra at note 184). Three other courts avoided
the question whether a condition of a national grant preempted state law by finding no conflict.
Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979) (discussed supra at
notes 257-59); Opinion of the Justices, 118 N.H. 7, 381 A.2d 1204 (1978) (discussed supra at notes
282-83); Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449. 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh
v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979) (discussed supra at note 284). Cf. Local Div. 589, Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 627-36 (1st Cir. 1981) (question whether condition
of national grant preempts state law avoided by finding that Congress intended loss of national
funds to be the only sanction), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2928 (1982) (discussed supra note 256).
Each one of these cases, except City of Boston v. Harris, involved a national grant to a state. As
discussed infra at notes 327-35, preemption of a provision of a state law that conflicts with a
condition of a national grant to a state or its political subdivisions interferes with the political
process established by state law for deciding whether to accept the grant and to comply with its
conditions. If a grant is made to a private recipient, there is no risk of interfering with the state's
political procedure for deciding whether to accept the grant because the grant is not offered to the
state. Thus, in City ofBoston v. Harris, where the grant was made to a private recipient and the
court held that a condition of the grant applicable to the recipient preempted a provision of local
law, see supra notes 183-84, there was no national control of the local political decisionmaking
process. Preemption of the local law simply displaced local substantive policy for private activity.
327. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 257-305.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 306-24.
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flicts with a condition of a national grant cuts deeply into the state's
political decisionmaking process. A state law provision in conflict with
a condition of a national grant is, of course, a product of the state's
political process. The conflicting provision can be changed through the
same state political process which created it; but if the state law provi-
sion is held invalid under the supremacy clause and preempted, Con-
gress circumvents the process required by state law for a decision to
accept a grant and to comply with its conditions. In circumventing the
state's political decisionmaking process, Congress alters the state's allo-
cation of power to the Governor, the legislature or its political subdivi-
sions by allowing action when there could be none in the absence of
preemption. Congress thus in effect controls the state's political deci-
sion whether to accept the grant. The difference between withholding a
national grant and preempting state law provisions that conflict with
grant conditions is, in essence, the difference between permitting the
state's political process to decide whether to comply with the terms of a
national grant and national control of the state's political decisionmak-
ing process.
The impact of preemption on a state's political decisionmaking pro-
cess is easily illustrated by considering situations where a state or its
political subdivisions are prohibited by a provision of state law from
complying with a condition of a national grant. A state may be prohib-
ited from complying with the terms of a grant by a state statute or the
state's constitution, and in both cases judicial invalidation of the state
law provision may interfere significantly with the state's political deci-
sionmaking process.330 If, for example, a Governor has state law au-
thority to accept a grant without the approval or participation of the
state legislature, as the majority in Gilbert v. New Jersey Department of
Human Services implicitly assumed, and a condition of the grant
preempts a regulation promulgated pursuant to a state statute, then
Congress has in effect expanded the Governor's power to amend a state
statute without action by the state legislature.33' In contrast, the sanc-
330. Similar problems of circumventing the state's political process arise when Congress at-
tempts to delegate national authority to state officers, agencies, or political subdivisions to take
actions in excess of or contrary to their state law authority. See infra text accompanying notes
941-78.
331. See su.pra text accompanying note 304. In Gilbert, national interference in the state's
political decisionmaking process may be analyzed in two different fashions. If state law requires
joint action by the Governor and the legislature to accept a grant, a condition that requires an




tion of withholding the grant does not interfere with the state's alloca-
tion of political power. The grant is simply withheld unless the state
legislature amends the state statute and regulation to permit compli-
ance with the grant condition. Any gubernatorial attempt to accept the
grant without such legislative action could presumably be barred by a
suit to enforce the state statute and regulation.
If, instead of state statutes, a state constitutional provision in conflict
with a condition of a national grant is held invalid under the
supremacy clause, then Congress may effectively expand the powers of
one of the branches of state government or the powers of state govern-
ment beyond the limits established by the political communitj. As-
sume, for example, in Shapp v. Sloan and Opinion of the Justices that
Congress had made the grants on the condition that the Governors
would exercise exclusive control over the disbursement of the grant and
the designation of the state agency to implement the spending pro-
gram.332 Preemption of state constitutional requirements that these ac-
tions be taken jointly by the Governor and the legislature would alter
the states' political decisionmaking processes by allocating significant
power to the executive with a corresponding elimination of legislative
power. A holding that the state could not accept the grant or a refusal
to make the grant would, of course, require the same reallocation of
political power, but the change, if made, would be accomplished
through the states' political decisionmaking process. Since there is no
guarantee that the political communities in these states would amend
the states' constitutions to expand the Governors' powers, preemption
has a stark effect on the states' political processes.
Preemption of a state constitutional provision may not only alter the
state's allocation of power between the legislative and executive
branches of state government, but it also may have the effect of ex-
panding the powers of both branches beyond the limits established by
the political community of the state. In North Carolina ex rel. Morrow
v. Califano, a condition of a national grant required the state to regu-
late private activity in a manner prohibited by the state constitution.333
If the court had held that this condition preempted the state constitu-
if the Governor does have exclusive power under state law to accept a grant, preemption of a state
statute that conflicts with a condition of a grant has the same effect of reducing the state law power
of the legislature.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 282-84.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 306-12.
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tional restriction and permitted the Governor and the legislature to dis-
regard a state constitutional limit on their powers, Congress would
have increased the political power of the state government and de-
creased the power reserved by the political community. Although the
court's actual holding that the condition was valid required the same
enlargement of state governmental powers in order to obtain the
grant,334 this change, if made, would have been accomplished through
the state's procedures for amending its constitution. The difference
here between preemption and withholding the grant is that preemption
allows Congress to change the state's political decisionmaking process
and to circumvent the usually complicated procedures for *amending
the state constitution.
A final example of the effect of preemption on a state's political deci-
sionmaking process is afforded by national grants to states or their
political subdivisions on a condition authorizing the political subdivi-
sions to act in excess of or contrary to their state law powers.335 If a
court simply holds that the state or local government cannot accept the
grant or, alternatively, that national aid must be withheld, the effect is
to require the state, acting through the Governor and the legislature, to
expand the powers of its political subdivisions. Preemption of a state
statute, however, bypasses the state's political procedure for amending
or repealing a statutory restriction on its political subdivisions' powers,
and it allows Congress to restructure the state's relation with its polit-
ical subdivisions and to determine which level of government decides
whether to accept the grant.
In addition to altering a state's political decisionmaking process, pre-
emption of state law in conflict with a condition of a national grant also
substantially undermines the concept that a state's decision to accept a
grant and to comply with its conditions is voluntary. Although pre-
emption of a state statutory or constitutional provision prohibiting the
state or its political subdivisions from complying with a condition of a
grant does not force the state or local government to accept the grant
and to participate in the spending program, it does redefine the state by
bypassing part of the state's political decisionmaking process. If state
law allocates power to make a particular decision to the political com-
334. The state legislature in fact avoided the necessity of a constitutional amendment by en-
acting a statute that it apparently interpreted to be within its constitutional powers. See supra note
312.




munity by a state constitutional amendment, then the state for the pur-
poses of that decision is the political community. Preemption of a
constitutional provision, as in the example built on North Carolina ex
rel. Morrow v. Califano, in effect redefines the state as a matter of na-
tional law as the Governor and the legislature. If state law provides
that an action must be taken jointly by the Governor and the legisla-
ture, then these two branches of state government acting in concert
constitute the state for the purpose of that action. Preemption of the
legislature's power to participate in that action, as in the examples
drawn from Gilbert v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, Shapp
v. Sloan, and Opinion of the Justices, redefines the state as the Gover-
nor. Preemption of the state government's power to control its political
subdivisions redefines the state as its political subdivisions.
A decision by the state as redefined by national law hardly seems to
be either a state decision or a voluntary decision. It is not a decision by
the state because the decision is not made according to the political
decisionmaking process prescribed by state law. Assuming that Con-
gress has consciously bypassed part of the state political decisionmak-
ing process in order to enhance the odds of compliance with the terms
of its grant, then this manipulation of the state's political process sours
the milk of voluntary participation.
E. State Autonomy and the Constitutional Source of Congress'
Power-Enforcement of the Civil War 4mendments
Congress can use its constitutional powers to enforce the Civil War
Amendments, 336 just as it uses its article I powers to regulate the states
and to require the affirmative exercise of state authority over individual
conduct.337 In the wake of NLC, litigants have focused on national
regulation of state and local government and in particular on the ques-
336. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2; XIV, § 5; XV, § 2.
337. Congress has exercised its article I, section 8, powers to regulate private activity as well as
to regulate the states and to require the affirmative exercise of state authority over private activity;
but, given the "state action" requirement, Congress has rarely enforced the Civil War Amend-
ments by regulating private activity. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Thus, in most instances of national regulation of the states enacted under the Civil War Amend-
ment enforcement powers, any counterpart regulation of private activity has been enacted under
one of the article I, section 8, powers. For example, the prohibition of age discrimination in
employment by private employers was enacted under the commerce power, and it was extended to
public employers by a statute enacted either under the power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment or the commerce power. See infra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.
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tion of Congress' power under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment to regulate state and local governments in their capacities as
employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,338 the Equal
Pay Act,339 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).340 Perhaps because these Acts are administered by the na-
tional government 341 and because Congress has not asserted the power
to employ the states as its agents in enforcing the antidiscrimination
provisions of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the ADEA against pri-
vate employers, there has as yet been no occasion for the courts to ex-
plore the Supreme Court's recent hint that state sovereignty may limit
Congress' power under section five of the fourteenth amendment to im-
pose affirmative duties on the states.342
1. Federalism and the Framers' Intent to Expand National Power
The state sovereignty challenges brought against national regulation
of state and local government under Congress' power to enforce the
Civil War Amendments have been almost uniformly unsuccessful. In
contrast to its failure to elaborate any reasons for its suggestions in
NLC that federalism principles do not limit either the war power or the
spending power,343 the Court has elaborated a reason for its NLC sug-
338. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
339. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
340. Id §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
341. Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act are all administered by the national Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g), 2000e-5(a) (1976); Reorganiza-
tion.Plan No. 1 of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Note) (Supp. IV 1980).
342. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), a divided Court
held that a requirement that the states provide particular services for developmentally disabled
individuals was not stated with sufficient clarity to be a valid condition of a grant. See supra note
324. The whole Court also agreed that Congress had not exercised its power to enforce the four-
teenth amendment in order to impose this requirement on the states. 451 U.S. at 15-17 (Rehn-
quist, J., Burger, C.J., Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.), 32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), 35 (White, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part). The infer-
ence that NLC may impose some limits on Congress' powers to use the states as its agents in
implementing national social welfare programs follows from the Court's unanimous opinion that
congressional reliance on its power to enforce the fourteenth amendment should not lightly be
assumed when a statute would place an affirmative obligation on the state to fund expensive social
services for its citizens. Id Since the Court had held previously that Congress' powers to enforce
the Civil War Amendments are immune from the federalism limitations of NLC, see infra text
accompanying notes 348-53, its reluctance to find that Congress invoked one of these powers sug-
gests that these broad holdings may be narrowed and that the Court might recognize federalism
limits on Congress' power to enforce the Civil War Amendments by requiring the states to act as
the nation's agents.
343. See supra notes 121, 123 & 137 and accompanying text.
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gestion 3" that neither the tenth amendment nor federalism principles
limit Congress' power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. In Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, 45 decided only four days after NLC, the Court held
that the principle of state sovereignty embodied in the eleventh amend-
ment3 46 does not limit Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment. The Fitzpatrick Court concluded that Congress has the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment by subjecting the states to
suit in federal court, notwithstanding the prohibition of the eleventh
amendment, because the purpose of the Civil War Amendments is to
expand national power and to diminish state sovereignty.
3 47
The Court subsequently extended this understanding of the special
nature of Congress' power in enforcing the Civil War Amendments to
alter the balance of national and state authority by holding that these
powers override the tenth amendment principles of federalism recog-
nized in NLC as well as the eleventh amendment. In City of Rome v.
United States, the Court held that federalism principles do not limit
344. See supra text accompanying note 122 & note 121.
345. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The case is discussed infra at notes 358-59.
346. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
347. In addition to Fitzpatrick, the Court also held in Hutto v. Finney that Congress' power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment is not confined by the eleventh amendment. 437 U.S. 678
(1978) (Congress' power to authorize a federal court to award attorneys' fees against a state).
Although both Fitzpatrick and Hutto purport to rest on the fundamental principle that Congress'
powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments were intended to expand the authority of the nation
over the states, these cases do not explain Congress' power to override the tenth amendment feder-
alism principles of NLC because the courts have also held that Congress can exercise its article I,
section 8, powers to override the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184 (1964) (commerce power); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (war
power); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (copyright and patent power).
Cases like Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer are best understood, as several scholars argue, as examples of the
broader principle that Congress has the authority under all of its legislative powers to subject the
states to suit in federal courts notwithstanding the eleventh amendment's prohibition. Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit
Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV, 1203, 1261-62 (1978); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional
Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1441-45 (1975); Tribe, Intergovernmental Im-
munities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies
About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 682, 693-99 (1976). Thus, although the principle that the
Civil War Amendments altered the balance of national and state power supports Congress' pow-
ers in enforcing these amendments to disregard the tenth amendment federalism constraints rec-
ognized in NLC, the actual holdings in Fitzpatrick and Hutto that Congress has the power to
override the eleventh amendment provide no support for the conclusion that Congress has greater
power to disgregard NLC tenth amendment federalism constraints in exercising its powers to
enforce the Civil War Amendments than in exercising its article I, section 8, powers.
348. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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Congress' power to enforce the fifteenth amendment by regulating state
and local voting practices. 4 9 In Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services,35 the Court held that NLC does not limit Congress'
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment by creating a cause of ac-
tion and authorizing a remedy against a municipality for violation of
an individual's constitutional rights.35' Although the Court has long
construed the Civil War Amendments to expand national power over
349. Id at 178-80. In this case, the Court upheld national regulation under the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976), of electoral changes and annexations made by a local gov-
ernment that have a racially discriminatory effect.
350. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
351. Id at 690 n.54. 4ccord Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 231 (8th Cir. 1982) (NLC does
not limit judicial enforcement of individual constitutional rights in a section 1983 action). The
principal issue in Monell was the construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). This section,
enacted as part of the 1871 Civil Rights Act to enforce the fourteenth amendment, creates a pri-
vate cause of action for the deprivation of nationally protected rights against a "person" acting
under the color of law, and it authorizes money damages and equitable relief. The Monell Court
overruled Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) and held, on the basis of a fresh reading of the
legislative history, that a city is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. 436 U.S. at 684-89.
The principal effect of this decision is to make local governments directly liable for damages and
injunctive relief for the deprivation of constitutional and national statutory rights under official
policy or custom. Id at 690-91.
The curt rejection in a footnote of NLC federalism limits on Congress' power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment by creating a private cause of action against a municipality for the depri-
vation of constitutional rights is surprising because it belies the impact of section 1983 on the
federal system. No single federal statute has had a greater impact. See generally Developments in
the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Devel-
opments]. At bottom, section 1983 is important because it provides a vehicle for judicial interpre-
tations of the constitution that have greatly expanded individual rights. The delineation of the
substantive and procedural constitutional rights of prisoners, students, and public employees; the
declaration of abortion and other privacy rights; and for that matter most of the modem substan-
tive due process revolution-all have in large part been the product of suits against state and local
officers under section 1983. The enforcement of this broad panoply of constitutional rights has
had a significant effect on the allocation of power between the nation and the states. The rights
established in section 1983 actions create a constitutional standard for the conduct of state and
local government because the courts are authorized to award damages and injunctive relief
against state officers, local officials, and now under Monell municipalities that violate these consti-
tutional rights. For example, the Court held that the political patronage practices of a local gov-
ernment, which arguably promoted effective policy implementation and served the partisan
politics of our democratic system, violated the first amendment rights of public employees not to
be discharged on the bases of their political beliefs. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). An
action for money damages may also have the effect of displacing state tort law because most
official misconduct that would constitute a tort can also be characterized as a constitutional viola-
tion. Developments, supra, at 1173. Eg., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). An injunction re-
quiring a state or local officer to take affirmative steps to remedy a constitutional violation may
have a more profound effect. To take only the most prominent examples, federal courts have
ordered state and local school, prison, and mental hospital officials, often at overwhelming costs,
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the states,3 52 the post-NLC pronouncements in City of Rome and Mo-
nell strongly suggest for the first time that these powers are completely
immune from any judicially imposed federalism constraints.353
to restructure their institutions completely. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 715 (1978).
Ironically, given the already substantial impact on the federal system of section 1983 actions
against state and local officers, the NLC federalism question in Monell of Congress' power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment by creating a private cause of action against a municipality for
deprivation of constitutional rights under its official policy or custom may indeed have appeared
trivial to the Court. It is true, as Justice Rehnquist complained in dissent, that Monell exposes
municipal treasuries directly to damage awards; however, these treasuries were already exposed
indirectly by virtue of orders enjoining local officials to correct constitutional violations. 436 U.S.
at 714, 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The impact of section 1983 on the federal system and the question of federalism limits on Con-
gress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to create a cause of action for the
deprivation of constitutional rights is assessed in greater detail infra at notes 399-422.
352. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-
43 (1972); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1879).
353. The Court employed broad language in both cases. In City of Rome, the Court stated
that "principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are
necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legis-
lation.'" 446 U.S. at 179. In Monell, the Court deemed NLC "irrelevant" to Congress' power
under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments. 436 U.S. at 690 n.54. The Court
has also stated in dictum that "the Tenth Amendment places no restrictions" on Congress' power
under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287 n.28 (1981). See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
476-78 (1980) (assumption by three justices that NLC does not limit Congress' power under the
enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment). Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291, 295
(1977) (unanimous agreement that tenth amendment and general principles of federalism are not
implicated by federal court judgment enforcing fourteenth amendment). Although the Court has
had an opportunity to hold only that Congress' powers to enforce the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments are not limited by federalism principles, there is no reason to believe that Congress
does not enjoy the same freedom to enforce the thirteenth amendment. Indeed, one court of
appeals has held that NLC is inapplicable to statutes enacted to enforce the thirteenth amendment
because both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments were intended to limit state authority.
United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 573 (6th Cir. 1981) (application of the Fair Housing
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 81-89, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980) to a municipality), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1972 (1982).
The theory that state autonomy does not limit Congress' power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments has been advanced without any direct dissent. In Monell the dissent complained
about the impact of liability under section 1983 on local government treasuries, see supra note 351,
but there was no suggestion that federalism principles limited Congress' power to create a cause of
action for deprivation of constitutional rights. In Cit ofRome, six Justices joined in the broad
statement of Congress' power. 446 U.S. at 187, 190. On the issue of the constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act, the three Justices argued in dissent that the statute was not within Congress'
power under section 2 of the fifteenth amendment because it was not "appropriate" legislation to
enforce the guarantees of that amendment. 446 U.S. at 200-05 (Powell, J., dissenting), 207-21
(Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Although the dissenting Justices noted that national regu-
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2 Regulation of the States. Title V, the Age Discrimination in
Employment and Equal Pay Acts
The lower courts were quick to seize the simple and hence appealing
notion that NLC does not limit Congress' powers to enforce the Civil
War Amendments as a basis for upholding national regulation of state
and local government employment practices under Title VII, the
ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act. In fact, this rationale that the Civil
War Amendments were intended to expand national power and to di-
minish state sovereignty has proved so alluring that many courts have
rather disingenuously found that Congress enacted a statute under its
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, instead of the more obvi-
ous reliance on the commerce power, in order to avoid completely the
federalism restraints of NLC. This enticing rationale also has led these
courts to expand its reach beyond the relatively narrow confines of ra-
cial discrimination354 to sex and age discrimination. This same entice-
ment led the courts to apply the rationale mechanically without any
lation of state and local voting practices affected an important aspect of state autonomy, they did
not argue that NLC or the tenth amendment limited Congress' power to enforce the fifteenth
amendment. 446 U.S. at 201 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting), 221 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., dissent-
ing).
The Court's theory that the tenth amendment and principles of federalism place no restrictions
on Congress' powers under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments is new. In
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970), the Court held that Congress did not have the
power to establish the voting age in state elections. Justice Black expressly recognized that feder-
alism principles limited Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Id at 124-30.
Three Justices implicitly recognized the same restraint. Id at 293-94. (Stewart, J., Burger, C.J., &
Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Only four members of the Court found
that state sovereignty did not limit Congress' enforcement power. Id at 135-44 (Douglas, J.,
separate opinion), 249-50 (Brennan, white & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). The deadlock was broken by Justice Harlan who found that Congress had no power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment by regulating discriminatory voting practices because the
amendment contemplated no restrictions on state authority to control voting practices. Id at 154-
209, 212-13.
354. The Supreme Court's two pronouncements that federalism principles do not limit Con-
gress' power to enforce the Civil War Amendments are tied to the problem of racial discrimina-
tion. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 (1980) (racial discrimination in voting);
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978) (sole support for
cursory finding that the tenth amendment does not limit Congress' power to enforce fourteenth
amendment was prior holding in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977), that tenth amend-
ment does not limit power of a federal court to remedy racial segregation in public schools). Even
Justice Black, the most explicit proponent of federalism limits on Congress' powers under the
enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments, see supra note 353, recognized that these
limits were reduced when Congress acted to remedy racial discrimination. Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 129-30 (1970).
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evaluation of the extent to which Congress' powers to enforce the Civil
War Amendments were intended to alter the balance of national and
state power.355
As amended in 1972, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibits employment discrimination on the grounds of "race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin" '35 6 either by private employers or by states
and their political subdivisions. 7  Although the Supreme Court in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer held that Congress had the power under section 5
355. There are two potential limits on Congress' powers in enforcing the Civil War Amend-
ments to alter the allocation of power between the nation and the states. One limit-NLC, feder-
alism principles, and the tenth amendment-has apparently been rejected. The other potential
hmit is the requirement that legislation enacted to enforce these amendments must be "appropri-
ate." U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2; XIV, § 5; XV, § 2. The scope of Congress' authority to
enforce the Civil War Amendments by "appropriate legislation" is not settled. It is generally
agreed that Congress is not limited in enforcing these amendments to prohibiting conduct that the
Court has held unconstitutional. For example, although the Court has held that proof of discrimi-
natory intent is necessary to establish a violation of the fourteenth amendment, Congress has the
power to enforce the equal protection guarantee of this amendment by prohibiting practices that
have a discriminatory impact. See infra note 363. However, as a comparison of the majority and
dissenting opinions in Cit
, 
of Rome v. United States indicates, there is no clear consensus on the
obviously related question of Congress' power under the enforcement clause of the fifteenth
amendment to prohibit voting practices that have a discriminatory effect. 446 U.S. at 173-78, 192-
93 (Stevens, J. concurring), 200-05 (Powell, J., dissenting), 207-21 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., dis-
senting). On the broad question of "congressional power to extend constitutionally based protec-
tions beyond limits fixed by the Court," there is nothing approaching a consensus. Note,
Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1265, 1267 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Congressional Power]. See generally id
A few members of the Court have argued that Congress' power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments by "appropriate legislation" is constrained, if not directly by NLC or federalism
principles, at least indirectly by the need to avoid expanding national power over the states to a
greater extent than the framers of these amendments intended. City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. at 201-02 (Powell, J., dissenting), 221 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., dissenting) ("[t]o permit
congressional power to prohibit the conduct challenged in this case requires state and local gov-
ernments to cede far more of their powers to the federal government than the Civil War Amend-
ments ever envisioned"). Cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 717-18 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth amendment by overriding state eleventh
amendment immunity to suit in federal court may depend on question whether Congress is en-
forcing a constitutional provision judicially incorporated into the fourteenth amendment or a pro-
vision placed in the amendment by its drafters).
356. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1976).
357. Id § 2000e(a), (b), (h) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The 1972 Amendments expanded the
definition of the persons subject to the Act to include "governments, governmental agencies, [and]
political subdivisions" and repealed the express exemption of "a State or a political subdivision
thereof." Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103. The
prohibition of employment discrimination applies identically to public and private employees
with the sole exception that elected officials and their high ranking advisors are exempt. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f) (1976).
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of the fourteenth amendment to override the eleventh amendment and
to subject the states to suit in federal court for damages and attorneys
fees for violation of Title VII,35s it left open the question of Congress'
power to regulate state employment practices.359 In light of the express
holding in Fitzpatrick that Congress enacted the 1972 Amendments ex-
tending Title VII to public employers under its power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment,360 the lower courts have uniformly sustained
Congress' power to prohibit employment discrimination by public em-
ployers.36' In upholding the application of Title VII to state and local
governments, these courts simply invoked the rationale that Congress'
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments is unencumbefed by fed-
eralism restraints, and they rejected arguments that NLC precludes na-
tional interference with employment decisions. 62 These courts also
rejected claims that NLC requires proof of intentional discrimination
in an action against a governmental employer as opposed to the lower
standard of discriminatory impact applicable to private employers.363
358. See supra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
359. 427 U.S. 445, 456 n.ll (1976).
360. Id at 447, 453 n.9. The legislative history suggests, however, that Congress relied on the
commerce power as well as its power to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Note, Title VII and
Public Employers: Did Congress Exceed Its Powers?, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 372, 373 n. 14, 377-79
(1978).
361. Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity, 671 F.2d 330, 336 (9th
Cir. 1982); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 940 (1981); United States v. Virginia, 620 F.2d 1018, 1022-24 (4th Cir. 1980); Shawer v.
Indiana Univ. of Pa., 602 F.2d 1161, 1163-65 (3d Cir. 1979); Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d
897, 898-900 (5th Cir. 1979); Blake v. City of Los Angeles; 595 F.2d 1367, 1372-74 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 422-24 (7th Cir.
1978); Love v. Waukesha Joint School Dist., 560 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v.
New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 277, 281-82 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976); Pennsylvania
v. Rizzo, 466 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-28 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 465 F. Supp. 451,
462 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 441 F. Supp. 1377, 1380-82 (E.D. Wis.
1977); Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1076-77 (D.Me.
1977). See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 242 n.17 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d
506,510 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977). Only one
district court decision finding that NLC limits Congress' power to apply Title VII to public em-
ployers has not been reversed, but that decision was subsequently disapproved. Compare Friend
v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 385-86 (E.D. Va. 1977), a 9'd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978) with
United States v. Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077, 1082-84 (E.D. Va. 1978), ajf'din part and rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 620 F.2d 1018, 1022-24 (4th Cir. 1980).
362. Shawer v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 602 F.2d 1161, 1163-65 (3d Cir. 1979); Love v. Waukesha
Joint School Dist., 560 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1977); Curran v. Portland Superintending School
Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1076-78 (D. Me. 1977).
363. A finding that an employment practice of a state or local government is a denial of equal
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Title VII cases proved to be relatively easy for the lower federal
protection contrary to the fourteenth amendment requires proof of a discriminatory purpose or
intent. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Prior to the extension of Title VII to state and
local governments, the Court sustained Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth amendment by
making a private employment practice that has a discriminatory impact a violation of Title VII.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). One issue in applying Title VII to public employ-
ers is whether Congress has the power to apply the discriminatory impact standard to public as
well as private employers. See generally Note, supra note 360.
Most courts have concluded that Congress has the power to apply the same discriminatory
impact standard to both private and public employers because NLC does not limit Congress'
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d
79, 88 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); United States v. Virginia, 620 F.2d 1018,
1022-24 (4th Cir. 1980); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372-74 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416,422-24 (7th Cir. 1978);
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 466 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-28 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. City of Mil-
waukee, 441 F. Supp. 1377, 1380-82 (E.D. Wis. 1977). See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 242 n.17 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982); Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 510 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom.
Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094,
1111-12 (D. S.C. 1977), affdmem,, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). Two courts that upheld Congress' power
to prohibit state and local government employment practices that have a discriminatory impact
did not simply invoke the rationale that NLC is inapplicable when Congress acts to enforce the
fourteenth amendment. These two courts, instead, applied a balancing test and concluded that the
national interest outweighed any intrusion on state sovereignty. Scott v. City of Anniston, 597
F.2d 897, 898-900 (5th Cir. 1979); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 465 F. Supp. 451, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
The application of a balancing test by the Fifth Circuit raises the inference that it believes that
NLC's federalism principles may impose some restraint on Congress' powers to enforce the Civil
War Amendments. However, the same inference cannot be drawn as readily from the other deci-
sion because the court failed to determine the power under which Congress enacted the 1972
Amendments to Title VII.
Although no court has ever held that NLC precludes Congress from enforcing the fourteenth
amendment against state and local governments by prohibiting employment practices that have a
discriminatory impact, three federal district courts did conclude that NLC indirectly precluded
Congress from applying the discriminatory impact test to governmental employers. These courts
found that Congress had the power under the commerce clause to prohibit employment practices
of private employers that have a discriminatory impact, but they also found that NLC prohibited
any national regulation of state and local government employment practices. Resort to Congress'
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment was of no avail because Congress' power here was
confined to prohibiting constitutional violations which require a discriminatory intent. All three
of these decisions were reversed or repudiated. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 435 F. Supp. 55, 63-
64 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); Scott v.
City of Anniston, 430 F. Supp. 508, 514-16 (N.D. Ala. 1977), rev'd and ajJ'd in part on other
grounds. 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979). Compare Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 384-86
(E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978) with United States v. Virginia, 454 F. Supp.
1077, 1082-84 (E.D. Va. 1978), afl'd in part and rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 620 F.2d
1018, 1022-24 (4th Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court has noted, without resolution, this Title VII question whether Congress has
the power in enforcing the fourteenth amendment simply to prohibit intentional discrimination or
whether it also has the power to prohibit state and local government employment practices that
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courts in light of the Supreme Court's explicit holding that Congress
enacted the 1972 Amendments under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. These courts, however, have had more trouble in apply-
ing the antidiscrimination requirements of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act to state and local governments
in their capacities as employers. The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act prohibits employment discrimination against individuals be-
tween the ages of forty and seventy,3" and the Equal Pay Act requires
employers to pay women and men the same wages for performing
equal work.365 Both statutes were originally enacted under the com-
merce power 366 and applied solely to private employers. The coverage
of both statutes was subsequently extended to the states and their polit-
ical subdivisions by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,367
have a discriminatory impact. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583 n.23
(1979); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306 n.12 (1977). Nonetheless, the
Court's decision in City afRome Y. United States suggests that it will not find that NLC federalism
principles require different standards under Title VII for public and private employers. In City of
Rome the Court concluded that Congress had the power in enforcing the fifteenth amendment to
prohibit state voting practices that have a discriminatory effect even if the amendment itself pro-
hibits only purposeful discrimination and that NLC did not limit Congress' power to enforce the
fifteenth amendment. 446 U.S. at 173-80. Although the Court did not address the combined
argument that NLC's federalism principles limit Congress' power to enforce the fifteenth amend-
ment to a prohibition of intentional discrimination, there can be little doubt that this argument
would have been found as wanting as its components. City fRome, then, would seem to settle
the question of Congress' power in Title VII to enforce the fourteenth amendment by prohibiting
state and local government employment practices that have a discriminatory effect because there
is no reason why NLC should be understood to impose greater restraints on Congress' power to
enforce the fourteenth than the fifteenth amendment.
364. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, as
amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally Note, National League of
Cities v. Usery: Its Implicationsfor the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 10 J.L. REFoRM 239, 260 (1977).
365. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56. The Equal Pay Act is an amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id § 3. It is codified with the minimum wage provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act that were at issue in NLC. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). Seesupra
note 86. See generally Note, supra note 364, at 258-60.
366. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-602, § 2(a), 81 Stat. 602,
29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1976); Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2, 77 Stat. 56.
367. The 1974 Amendments specifically amended the ADEA to apply to the states and their
political subdivisions. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2),
(4), 88 Stat. 74 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), (f) (1976)). Except for an exemption of
elected officials and their high ranking advisors, the ADEA imposes exactly the same require-
ments on public and private employers. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1976). The same exemption is pro-
vided in Title VII. See supra note 357. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1976) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f) (1976).
No specific provision of the 1974 Amendments was required to apply the Equal Pay Act to state
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which also extended to the state and local governments the minimum
wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA that were held invalid in
NLC.36 8 Both Acts may have a significant effect on state and local
government employment practices and the delivery of traditional gov-
ernmental services if for no other reasons than that they increase the
cost of government by requiring equal wages for men and women 69
and that they limit discretion in removing aging employees from the
payroll by discharging them.370 Notwithstanding the obvious analogy
to the effect of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
FLSA, the courts, often by dint of strained reasoning, have for the most
part evaded the federalism limits of NLC and sustained the application
of the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act to public employers.3 71
Although both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
and local government. Since the Equal Pay Act is part of the FLSA, see supra note 365, the same
provisions of the 1974 Amendment which extended the minimum wage and overtime require-
ments of the FLSA to public employees also extended the equal pay requirements to state and
local government. See supra note 86. The general limitations on the coverage of state and local
government employees under the FLSA, see supra note 86, also apply to the Equal Pay Act.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 85-109.
369. Note, Appying the Equal Pay Act to State andLocal Governments: The Effect ofNational
League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 665, 671 (1977).
370. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Wyo. 1981),prob.juris. noted, 102 S. Ct.
996 (1982) (No. 81-554).
371. Twelve courts in officially reported opinions have upheld the application of the ADEA to
state and local governments: EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567
F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 238-40
(S.D. Ga. 1982); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135, 1137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1981);
Adams v. James, 526 F. Supp. 80, 84 (M.D. Ala. 1981); EEOC v. County of Calumet, 519 F. Supp.
195 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Johnson v. Mayor & City Council, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1291-92 (D. Md.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1440 (1982); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 508 F.
Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del.
1979); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D. N.D. 1977); Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp.
1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976). See EEOC v.
City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162, 1164 n.3 (8th Cir. 1982) (court did not address question of consti-
tutionality of application of the ADEA to state and local governments when parties did not raise
this issue); EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1980) (remand to consider
constitutionality of the ADEA). Two courts have held that under NLC the ADEA is unconstitu-
tional. Taylor v. Department of Fish & Game, 523 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mont. 1981); EEOC v.
Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981),prob.juris. noted, 102 S. Ct. 996 (1982) (No. 81-554).
The application of the Equal Pay Act to state and local government has been upheld by the
courts of appeals in five circuits and by several district courts in two other circuits. See cases cited
infra at notes 377-82. There is only one reported decision holding that NLC precludes the appli-
cation of the Equal Pay Act to a public employer. Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.
N.D. 1976).
In its interpretation of the impact of NLC on the application of the minimum wage and over-
time provisions of the FLSA to state and local governments, see supra note 112, the Department of
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and the 1974 Amendment extending it to state and local governments
were enacted under the commerce power,372 most courts have upheld
the application of the Act to public employers on the grounds that Con-
gress either did or could have prohibited age discrimination under its
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and that consequently the
federalism principles of NLC are inapplicable.37 3  Only two courts
Labor has opined that NLC does not preclude regulation of public employees under the ADEA
and the Equal Pay Act. 29 C.F.R. § 775.2(e)(1)(2) (1981).
372. There is no question that the constitutional basis of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 is the commerce power, see supra text accompanying note 366, but Congress did
not state the constitutional basis of the 1974 Amendments which extended the ADEA to state and
local government. The legislative history strongly suggests that Congress relied solely on the com-
merce power, and not on its power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, to enact the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6-7, reprintedin
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2812, 2816-17; S. REP. No. 690, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess.
24 (1974). See also Carpenter v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 508 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
373. The paths to the conclusion that Congress had acted under its power to enforce the four-
teenth amendment were varied. Most courts drew an analogy between the ADEA and Title VII,
which the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer had held was enacted under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, to support the conclusion that the ADEA was also enacted under this power. EEOC
v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 603-09 (7th Cir. 1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (4th Cir.
1977); EEOC v. County of Calumet, 519 F. Supp. 195, 197 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Johnson v. Mayor &
City Council, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1291-92 (D. Md. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1440 (1982);
Carpenter v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 508 F. Supp. 148, 149-50 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Aaron v.
Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718, 720-
21 (D. Utah 1976). One court simply assumed that Congress had relied on its power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment. Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D. 1977). Two courts
did not assess independently the source of Congress' power to apply the ADEA to state and local
government and relied on prior decisions holding that Congress had exercised its power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment. EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135, 1137-38 (C.D.
Cal. 1981); Adams v. James, 526 F. Supp. 80, 84 (M.D. Ala. 1981). See Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-
State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 238-39 (S.D. Ga. 1982); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 531
F. Supp. 122, 124 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Another court reasoned that the correct question is Congress'
actual power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and not the stated constitutional basis. Mar-
shall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 891-92 & n.7 (D. Del. 1979). Seven of
these courts, perhaps in recognition of Congress' apparent reliance on the commerce power, also
found that NLC did not limit Congress' power under the commerce clause to prohibit age dis-
crimination in employment by state and local governments. EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 609-12
(7th Cir. 1982) (arbitrary discrimination not an essential state function and national interest in
nondiscrimination outweighs state interest in unfettered employment policies); Bleakley v. Jekyll
Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 239-40 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (national interest outweighs
state interest because national policy against age discrimination is consistent with state policy and
does not restrict state power to set terms of employment); EEOC v. County of Calumet, 519 F.
Supp. 195, 201-02 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (no interference with state policy because the ADEA prohibi-
tion of age discrimination is consistent with state policy and age discrimination serves no sover-
eign state function); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 892 (D. Del.
1979) (no substantial interference); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 916 n.3 (D.
N.D. 1977) (national interest in employment outweighs state interest in age discrimination); Aaron
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have held the application of the ADEA to state government unconstitu-
tional, and these courts based their holdings on a determination that
the ADEA was authorized by the commerce clause. 74 Perhaps be-
cause evidence that Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act under its com-
merce power is overwhelming,375 judicial efforts to uphold this Act
have been more convoluted. All but one court that have considered the
question of Congress' power to prohibit sex-based wage discrimination
by state and local governments have sustained Congress' power over
NLC federalism objections.37 6 These courts are about equally divided
on the question whether the Equal Pay Act should be viewed as an
exercise of the commerce power or the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment. The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, and Sixth
Circuits have concluded that, regardless of any actual reliance on the
commerce power, NLC is inapposite because Congress could have en-
acted the Equal Pay Act under its power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment.377 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have upheld the Equal
Pay Act as a valid exercise of the commerce power. In Pearce v. Wich-
v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (no interference with allocation of local
government financial resources); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718, 719-20 (D. Utah
1976) (public education is an integral state government function, but national interest in protect-
ing individual rights outweighs state interest in age discrimination and minimal burden of com-
plying with prohibition against arbitrary use of age as an employment criterion).
374. Taylor v. Department of Fish & Game, 523 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mont. 1981); EEOC v.
Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981),prob.jur. noted, 102 S. Ct. 996 (1982) (No. 81-554).
The Wyoming district court held that the ADEA was unconstitutional as applied to prevent the
mandatory retirement at the age of 55 of a state officer who enforced fish and game laws. The
court held that management of wildlife is a traditional state function and that the ADEA inter-
feres with state policy of law enforcement by young, vigorous officers. The interference with state
functions was not outweighed by any legitimate national interest. There could be no legitimate
national interest in prohibiting the mandatory retirement of state officers at the age of 55 because
national law requires the mandatory retirement of certain national officers at the age of 55. In the
other case, which also involved a state game warden, the Montana district court simply followed
the holding in the Wyoming case that the ADEA was unconstitutional as applied to state officers.
375. Both the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the 1974 Amendments extending coverage to state
and local governments were enacted under the commerce power. See supra text accompanying
notes 366-67 & note 367. Moreover, the Equal Pay Act is part of the FLSA, see supra note 365,
and NLC limited the application of this very statute to the states.
376. See supra note 371 and cases cited infra notes 377-82.
377. Marshall v. Kent State Univ., 589 F.2d 255, 255 (6th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Owensboro
Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116, 118-20 (6th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Charleston County School
Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148,
154-56 (3d Cir. 1976). A federal district court in the Sixth Circuit has followed the same line of
analysis. EEOC v. Ferris State College, 493 F. Supp. 707, 711-12 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
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ita County3 71 the Fifth Circuit held that NLC was inapplicable because
"[tihe ability to pay female employees wages less than those paid to
male employees for equal work is not among the 'functions essential to
[the] separate and independent existence' of the states. 379 In Marshall
v. City of Shebogan,38 ° the Seventh Circuit rejected NLC arguments on
the same ground that sex discrimination is not an attribute of state sov-
ereignty and the additional ground that the equal wage requirement
would have a minor financial impact.381 Other courts have upheld the
Equal Pay Act as a valid exercise of both the commerce power and the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment. 8 2
F NLC and the Constitutional Source of Congress' Power-
Distinctions Without a Difference
Congress can exercise its war powers, the spending power, and its
powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments in essentially the same
fashion. These powers can be used to regulate private activity, to regu-
late state and local government, or to require the affirmative exercise of
state authority over individual conduct, and statutes enacted under all
three of these powers have similar effects on the states. National regu-
lation of private activity under any one of these powers displaces state
substantive policy. 38 3 State and local governments in their capacities as
378. 590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1979).
379. Id at 132 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976)). Pearce
has been consistently followed in the Fifth Circuit. See Marshall v. Dallas Indep. School Dist.,
605 F.2d 191, 193 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. A & M Consol. Indep. School Dist., 605 F.2d
186, 188 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Georgia S.W. College, 489 F. Supp. 1322, 1329 (M.D. Ga.
1980). Two district courts in Iowa have also upheld the Equal Pay Act as a valid exercise of the
commerce power on the ground that sex discrimination is not an attribute of state sovereignty.
Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Christensen v.
Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976), a'd, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). Prior to the decision
in Pearce, a district court in the Fifth Circuit had upheld the Equal Pay Act as a valid exercise of
the commerce power. Usery v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 421 F. Supp. Ill (N.D. Tex. 1976).
380. 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978). This case is discussed in Note, Equal Pay Act Upheld Under
Commerce Clause: Marshall v. City of Shebogan, 19 URB. L. ANN. 228 (1980).
381. 577 F.2d at 6.
382. See Schulte v. New York, 533 F. Supp. 31,35-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Nilsen v. Metropolitan
Fair & Exposition Auth., 435 F. Supp. 1159 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial
Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112
(C.D. Cal. 1977). The Ninth Circuit avoided determining the constitutionality of the Equal Pay
Act under either the commerce power or the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment by
finding no discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607
F.2d 1276, 1282 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979).
383. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49 (war power) & 180-84 (spending power).
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employers are required to reinstate former employees called to active
military service by a statute enacted under the war power;384 they are
required to pay unemployment compensation to their employees by a
condition of a national grant;385 and employment discrimination by
state and local governments on the grounds of race, sex, or age is pro-
hibited by statutes enacted under Congress' power to enforce the four-
teenth amendment. 386 These three powers can also be used to require
the states to act as the nation's agents in regulating private activity.38 7
Congress can also exercise its power under the commerce clause to
regulate private activity, to regulate state and local government, and to
require the affirmative exercise of state authority. The effects of stat-
utes enacted under the commerce power 388 are similar to the effects of
statutes enacted under the war power, the spending power, and the
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. Given these similarities,
the obvious question is whether there is any valid rationale for confin-
ing NLC to the commerce power. If there are no valid distinctions
between these powers, then NLC is nothing more than an occasionally
inconvenient requirement that Congress or the courts shop for an ap-
propriate power to avoid its strictures.
L The D(efense Powers
The application of the Supreme Court's suggestion in NLC that fed-
eralism principles confine the commerce power and place no limits on
certain other powers proves its poverty. The courts have not elaborated
any reason why Congress' war powers are immunized from federalism
restraints, and one is left to conclude that they are employing an im-
plicit balancing test in which the national interest, subsumed in the tal-
ismanic phrase "national defense," automatically outweighs any
countervailing state interests. If, in fact, we have a latent balancing
test, it is difficult to understand any distinction between the war power
and the commerce power. A distinction between these powers in terms
of the importance of the national interest rests on the tacit assumption
that the war power is exercised to vindicate only clear war and national
384. See supra text accompanying notes 150-59.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 198-216.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 356-82.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 161-75 (war power), 217-46 & 306-24 (spending
power), and 342 (power to enforce the Civil War Amendments).
388. See infra text accompanying notes 458-713.
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defense needs, but such an assumption flies in the face of reality. Con-
gress has exercised the war power to regulate matters only tenuously
related to the obvious object of this power and otherwise easily within
the reach of the commerce power.389 If, as seems so plausible, the na-
tional interests served by some statutes enacted under the commerce
power are often similar to and as equally compelling as some interests
promoted by statutes enacted under the war power, then any distinc-
tion between these two powers collapses.
2 The Spending Power
The distinction, propounded by the lower courts, between the spend-
ing and commerce powers fares no better. Most courts have concluded
that NLC federalism principles do not apply to the spending power
because there is no intrusion on state autonomy when a state volunta-
rily decides to comply with the conditions of a national grant. Al-
though this theory may have had some merit when it was initially
advanced, it is now at war with reality.390 In the era of Steward
Machine Co., national grants were limited in number and amount, and
it was probably true that a state could avoid complying with the condi-
tions of a grant by the "simple expedient" of refusing it.391 Such a
notion is today, to say the least, antiquated. According to some esti-
mates, national grants to state and local governments have grown from
twenty-eight million dollars in 1902, to over one billion dollars in 1939
(two years after Steward Machine Co. was decided), and to almost
eighty-three billion dollars in 1980.392 These grants provide financial
assistance for almost every function and service performed by the states
and their political subdivisions, and they comprise approximately
twenty-five percent of their budgets.393 National tax revenues dwarf
the tax revenues of any individual state and its political subdivisions, 394
389. E.g., Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (rent regulation).
390. Wiessert,.4CIR's Grant Law Conference W-hys and Wherefores, 3, 4 in ADVISORY COM-
MISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AWAKENING THE SLUMBERING GIANT: INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND FEDERAL GRANT LAW (1980) [hereinafter cited as SLUMBERING
GIANT].
391. Seesupra text accompanying notes 186-97. The phrase "simple expedient" first appeared
in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) and was popularized in Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
392. See I ACIR STUDY,.4 Crisis of Confidence and Competence, A-77, supra note 82, at 120
(Table A-13); Categorical Grants, supra note 317, at 22 (Table 1-5).
393. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.




and the states are constrained from increasing taxes by interstate com-
petition for economic development. In these circumstances, the only
answer to the question "[clan a state--or local government-afford to
refuse a federal grant if it finds the rules and regulations accompanying
that grant unreasonable?"3 95 is no. Rare, usually well-publicized refus-
als to accept national grants simply confirm this analysis.3 9 6 The no-
tion that state participation in national spending programs is voluntary
is nothing more than a legal fiction, albeit an important one that sup-
ports the primary means by which Congress controls the federal
system.
3. Congress' Power to Enforce the Civil War Amendments
In contrast to the Court's failure to explain the purported distinctions
between the war and spending powers and the commerce power, the
Court has advanced a theory that NC, federalism principles, and the
tenth amendment do not limit Congress' power to enforce the Civil
War Amendments because the drafters of these amendments intended
to expand the power of the nation and to diminish state autonomy.
Although the absolute nature of this "black letter" rule makes it ap-
pealing, it is simply too facile and proves too much. The drafters of the
Civil War Amendments did intend to expand national power, but they
did not intend that either the courts or Congress would have the power
in enforcing them to obliterate the states as political decisionmaking-
units.39
7
The limits of the Court's rationale are inherent in its historical foun-
dation. To the extent that a statute enacted under the enforcement
clauses of the Civil War Amendments implements the framers' intent,
the theory that these amendments authorized an expansion of national
power at the expense of the states does justify an intrusion on state
autonomy. To the extent, however, that congressional interpretations
totalled only $204 billion ($125 billion for state and $79 billion for local governments). See ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFIcANT FEATURES OF FIscAL
FEDERALISM, M-123, at 61 (Table 46) (1979-80 ed.).
395. The former Mayor of New York City, Abraham D. Beame, posed this question in a
preface to a recent report of the ACIR on national grants. SLUMBERING GIANT, supra note 390, at
iii.
396. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
397. See Matz, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on Democracy and
Distrust, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 215-16 (1981); Note, To ward Limits on Congressional Enforcement
Power Under Civil War Amendments, 34 STAN. L. REV. 453, 470-79 (1982).
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of the constitutional rights protected by the Civil War Amendments
exceed the framers' intent, the argument that history justifies national
intrusion on state autonomy becomes attenuated. At some point of
wide divorce between the framers' intent and Congress' interpretation
of the rights protected by the Civil War Amendments, the historical
warrant for rejecting federalism limits on the enforcement powers
degenerates into a bald assertion that all intrusions on state sovereignty
are warranted because the framers intended some intrusions.398  The
Court's theory that Congress' powers under the enforcement clauses of
the Civil War Amendments are not constrained by federalism princi-
ples ignores the necessity of accommodating these powers with a role
for the states in our federal system. If carried to its logical extreme, this
theory would tolerate an unlimited expansion of national power over
the states.
The poverty of the Court's theory that NLC and federalism princi-
ples are inapposite when Congress acts to enforce the Civil War
Amendments may be illustrated by a hypothetical statute, enacted
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which requires a state
legislature to afford its members a reasonable time to speak for or
against pending legislation.399 This statute could have a major impact
398. The question of the scope of rights that the framers of the Civil War Amendments in-
tended to protect has been answered in many fashions. The point here is not that Congress'
enforcement powers are necessarily limited by history, but that the historical justification for na-
tional intrusion on state autonomy is itself limited. For example, with few exceptions legal histori-
ans agree that the framers of the fourteenth amendment were concerned solely with the issue of
race, and the area of dispute is confined to the question of what particular rights were to be
protected against racial discrimination. E.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER-
OUS BRANCH (1962); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered- The Segregation Question,
54 MICH. L. REv. 1049 (1956); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The 'Right"to Vote, and
the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 33. Although the original
intent was probably confined to race, there is a substantial argument that the language of the
fourteenth amendment is expansive and invites broader application. E.g., A. BICKEL, supra, at
103; Van Alstyne, supra, at 63. Nonetheless, as judicial and congressional enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment moves beyond racial matters, the argument that the framers intended to
expand national power at the expense of the states becomes attenuated.
399. The Court has held that state legislators have rights protected by the first amendment.
E.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). In Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1981), the
Third Circuit held that a rule of the New Jersey Senate permitting a question to be brought to a
vote without further debate did not violate the first amendment because it is content neutral and
the interest in a reasonable time for debate is not a right protected by the first amendment. Con-
gress, however, may have the power to protect the interest in a reasonable time for debate under
its power to enforce the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which incorporates the
first amendment. See CongressionalPower, supra note 355, at 1281-85. Congress could determine
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on a state's political decisionmaking process by, for example, invalidat-
ing legislative rules governing debate and limiting filibusters, and it
might in turn affect the substantive determination whether to enact a
bill.4" Even though it would seem clear that the framers of the four-
teenth amendment never contemplated national control of state legisla-
tive procedures, under the Court's theory there would be no
consideration of federalism limits, much less a bar, simply because
Congress had invoked its power to enforce one of the Civil War
Amendments.
This hypothetical statute may seem far-fetched because of doubts
either that Congress would ever enact such a provision or that the
courts would find it to be "appropriate legislation" to enforce the four-
teenth amendment .4 0  The same result of national control of state leg-
islative processes might obtain, however, under an existing statute
enacted under Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth amendment.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now section 1983)4°2 creates a cause of
action for the deprivation of constitutional rights by any person acting
under the color of law. If the Court construed the first amendment 40 3
to guarantee state legislators a reasonable opportunity to debate pend-
ing legislation, that constitutional right would be enforceable under
section 1983 against an officer of the state legislature,4 4 and a court
could prohibit this officer from enforcing any procedural rule of the
state legislature in conflict with a right of debate guaranteed by the first
amendment as interpreted by the Court.40 5
that a reasonable time for debate is required by the first amendment and prohibit state laws that
restricted debate.
400. See Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848, 852, 854 (3d Cir. 1981).
401. See supra note 355.
402. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp IV 1980).
403. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
404. Although the court in Parker Y. Merlino rejected the argument that the first amendment
protects a state legislator's interest in a reasonable time for debate, it entertained no doubts that a
suit against state Senators who enforced the challenged rule limiting debate was authorized by
section 1983. 646 F.2d at 852.
405. A federal court order prohibiting a state legislative leader from enforcing a rule limiting
debate or requiring the state legislature to afford its members a constitutionally required mini-
mum time for debate might be barred by federalism principles. In an analogous case, the Ninth
Circuit held that there is no constitutional requirement that committee appointments to the state
legislature must be in proportion to the strength of the major political parties, and it based this
holding in part on its understanding that NLC would prohibit a federal court from determining
the number of Republicans and Democrats to be appointed to state legislative committees. Da-
vids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 127 (9th Cir. 1977). The question whether the federalism restraints on
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From the state's perspective, it makes no difference whether Con-
gress enforces the fourteenth amendment by declaring a substantive
rule that broadens constitutional rights as found by the Court or by
providing a cause of action to enforce a constitutional right as estab-
lished by judicial interpretation. The impact of compliance on the state
is, of course, the same. Nevertheless, courts have devoted greater atten-
tion to the question of federalism limits on statutes that expand consti-
tutional rights beyond the bounds set by the Court than to section
1983.406 This focus is ironic because Congress has exercised its powers
to enforce the Civil War Amendments sparingly,40 7 and in terms of
actual impact on state autonomy, constitutional rights declared by the
Court and enforced under section 1983 are far more important than
statutory rights established by Congress.408
The absence of any consideration of federalism limits on section
1983 apart from Monell 4 °9 is perhaps best explained by the following
tacit understandings: Congress can do at least as much as the courts to
enforce the Civil War Amendments; 410 there is no legitimate state sov-
ereignty interest in violating the constitution;41' and state officers are
Congress' powers recognized in NLC also limit the equitable powers of federal courts is, however,
completely unsettled. See infra note 416.
406. On the one hand, the courts have at least considered federalism limits on Congress' pow-
ers to enforce the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment prohibitions of intentional discrimination
by prohibiting state and local government employment and voting practices that have a discrimi-
natory impact. See supra notes 355 & 363. On the other hand, federalism limits on section 1983
were dismissed in a curt footnote. See supra note 351 and accompanying text. Statutes that ex-
pand constitutional rights beyond the limits set by the Court raise separation of powers questions
as well as federalism issues, and greater judicial scrutiny of these statutes is at least in part ex-
plained by the presence of this additional issue. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Congress' power to determine what conduct violates the Con-
stitution is contrary to "well-established distinctions between the Judicial Branch and the Legisla-
tive or Executive Branches of the Federal Government."). Indeed, analysis of Congress' power to
enforce the Civil War Amendments usually focuses more on the question of the comparative
competency of the Court and Congress to interpret the constitution than on federalism issues. See
Congressional Power, supra note 355.
407. Congressional Power, supra note 355, at 1265 n.5.
408. See 5supra note 351.
409. See id. and accompanying text.
410. Justice Rehnquist who is probably the principal proponent of a narrow construction of
Congress' powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments, see supra note 355, has stated that "[i]t
has never been seriously maintained ... that Congress can do no more than the judiciary to
enforce the [Civil War] Amendments' commands." City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
210 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




otherwise independently obligated under article VI to support the Con-
stitution.41 2 Moreover, the question of Congress' power to impose any
duty on the states is easily pretermitted because the Court, not Con-
gress, determines the constitutional rights for which section 1983 pro-
vides a remedy.413 Thus, the curt rejection in Monell of federalism
limits on Congress' power to create a cause of action against a munici-
pality for the deprivation of constitutional rights probably rests as
much on these tacit understandings as it does on the formal rule that
Congress' power to enforce the Civil War Amendments is immune
from federalism limits.
The theory that the framers of the Civil War Amendments intended
to expand the power of the nation at the expense of the states is not
adequate to the task of explaining all intrusions on state autonomy
under statutes enacted to enforce these amendments. If the constitu-
tional rights identified by the Court and enforced under section 1983 or
the statutory rights elaborated by Congress to enforce these amend-
ments exceed the rights for which the framers intended to provide na-
tional protection, the historical argument standing alone does not
justify intrusions on state autonomy. Although the suggestion may be
heresy, Congress' power to enforce the Civil War Amendments, as it
does under section 1983, by providing a cause of action for constitu-
tional rights found by the Court, should not be any more or less im-
mune from federalism limits than statutes that expand constitutional
rights beyond judicial interpretations. To treat section 1983 differently
than other statutes enacted to enforce the Civil War Amendments per-
mits the Court, acting in conjunction with Congress, to impose duties
on the states that would otherwise be subject to some scrutiny if either
Congress or the Court acted alone.
414
412. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
413. The federalism issues raised by section 1983 are typically considered questions of limits
on judicial, not congressional, power. Eg., Developments, supra note 351, at 1175-90. Even in
Monell, when the Court formally addressed the question of Congress' power to create a cause of
action for deprivation of constitutional rights, it upheld Congress' power on the basis of its prior
holding in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977) that the tenth amendment does not limit
the equitable powers of a federal court in a section 1983 school desegregation case. 436 U.S. at
690 n.54.
414. There are four ways in which the Congress and the Court can enforce the Civil War
Amendments by imposing a duty on the states to protect individual rights. First, Congress acting
alone can determine that an individual interest is entitled to protection as a statutory right, pro-
vide a private cause of action to enforce that right, vest a court with jurisdiction to hear the action,
and authorize the court to award a particular remedy. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
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The question of federalism limits on section 1983 would not be an
amended provides a good example of this alternative. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980). It prohibits employment discrimination by public and private employers on the
basis of race, religion, sex or national origin; it authorizes a private cause of action if provisions
for public enforcement are inadequate; it vests the courts with jurisdiction to hear actions arising
under Title VII; and it authorizes the courts to enjoin unlawful practices, to order reinstatement,
and to award back pay and attorneys' fees. See Note, supra note 360, at 372 & nn.l-5. Although
the courts have dismissed rather easily the question of federalism limits on Congress' power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment by enacting Title VII, the issue has at least been considered.
See supra notes 356-63 and accompanying text.
A second means of enforcing the Civil War Amendments depends primarily on the courts in-
stead of Congress. A federal court, assuming a general grant of statutory jurisdiction such as 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1980), can act alone by determining that an individual interest is pro-
tected as a constitutional right, recognizing an implied cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment to enforce it against a state, and exercising traditional judicial remedial powers. This
means of enforcing the rights protected by Civil War Amendments has received scant judicial
exploration because Congress provided a cause of action and authorized a remedy for the viola-
tion of constitutional rights under color of law in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. IV 1980), and an action could be maintained indirectly under this section against a state by
a suit against a state officer. Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that the courts do con-
sider federalism principles as a potential restraint on their power to imply a cause of action under
the fourteenth amendment. Before the 1978 decision in Monell, reversing a prior holding that
section 1983 did not create a cause of action against a municipality, see supra note 351, many
courts considered the question whether a cause of action could be implied under the fourteenth
amendment against a municipality for the violation of constitutional rights. See generally Note,
Damage Remedies Against Municioalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922
(1976). Some of these courts considered the question whether federalism principles limited judi-
cial power to create an implied cause of action. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 160 n.25
(2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 974 (1978) (for further consideration in light of Monell
v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)), modfled on remand, 591 F.2d 426
(2d Cir. 1979) (NLC and the tenth amendment do not bar judicial implication of a damages
remedy under the fourteenth amendment against a municipality for violation of constitutional
rights); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977) (tenth amendment suggests caution in
exercising judicial power to create action to enforce the fourteenth amendment against a munici-
pality for violation of constitutional rights). C. Rhodes v. Wichita, 516 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan.
1981) (post-Monell determination that NLC does not bar an implied constitutional cause of action
against a municipality under a theory of respondeat superior although Monell prohibited munici-
pal liability under this theory in a section 1983 action). Notwithstanding significant differences
between the tenth and eleventh amendments, see supra note 347, cases holding that an implied
private right of action under the fourteenth amendment does not override the eleventh amend-
ment suggest that the tenth amendment or general principles of federalism may impose a similar
constraint. E.g., Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980);
Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
Although no case directly addressing the question of federalism limits on judicial power to
imply a private cause of action against a state for violation of constitutional rights has been found,
the Fourth Circuit has held that both federalism and separation of powers principles prohibit an
implied public cause of action to enforce rights protected by the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments. United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1129 (4th Cir. 1977) (suit by the United States
Attorney General without specific statutory authorization against several state officers to enjoin
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important issue if the Court interpreted constitutional rights narrowly.
The corresponding restrictions on the exercise of state authority and the
states' duty to remedy constitutional violations would in turn be lim-
ited. The truth is quite the opposite-the courts have interpreted con-
stitutional rights broadly, and the enforcement of these rights under
section 1983 has had a major impact on the states.41 5 The absence of
any federalism limits4 16 on section 1983 must be justified by something
practices and policies that allegedly violated the constitutional rights of mentally retarded persons
confined in a state institution), a9g 419 F. Supp. 358, 366-68 (D. Md. 1976).
In addition to an implied cause of action to enforce constitutional rights, a third means of
enforcing the Civil War Amendments is an implied private cause of action to enforce statutory
rights. See generally Note, Implied Rights trAction to Enforce CivilfRghts: The Casefor a Sympa-
thetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978). For example, Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 prohibits sex discrimination by private and public educational institutions that receive na-
tional financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). It also establishes an administrative enforce-
ment procedure to terminate assistance to institutions that violate the act. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Court held that there is an implied
cause of action under Title IX against a private educational institution. On its face Title IX is a
typical spending program, and the prohibition of sex discrimination is a condition of national aid.
Although the Cannon court did not consider the source of Congress' power to prohibit sex dis-
crimination and the sparse legislative history does not indicate the constitutional base of Congress'
power, see Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title
IX 88 YALE L.J. 1254, 1255 n.l1 (1979), the decision in effect read the prohibition itself, apart
from the funding sanction, as an exercise of Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment. In the absence of any clear invocation of the commerce power as in the ADEA and the
Equal Pay Act, see supra text accompanying notes 366, 372 & 375, section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment would seem to be the most logical source of Congress' power to establish the statutory
right and corresponding obligations of public and private educational institutions. Given the stat-
utory right, the Court then implied a private cause of action to enforce it and dismissed the ques-
tion of federalism limits on its power on the ground that the prohibition of invidious
discrimination is the primary responsibility of the national government. 441 U.S. at 712.
A fourth means of enforcing the Civil War Amendments is that Congress can, as it did in the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, provide a cause of action, vest a court with jurisdiction, and authorize
remedies for violations of constitutional rights as determined by the courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)
(Supp. IV 1980); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
From the perspective of national and state relations, it makes no difference whether Congress
establishes a statutory right and a cause of action, whether the Court establishes a right and im-
plies the cause of action, whether Congress creates a right and the Court implies a cause of action,
or whether the Court defines a right and Congress authorizes a cause of action. Given identical
effects on the states, there would seem to be no reason why any one of these four means of enforc-
ing the Civil War Amendments should be any more or less subject to federalism restraints. More-
over, the historical argument that the framers of these amendments intended to expand the
nation's powers over the states would not seem to warrant any distinctions.
415. See supra note 351.
416. Federalism limits on the enforcement of the fourteenth amendment under section 1983
could be imposed at three points. First, Congress' power to create a cause of action to enforce the
rights protected by the fourteenth amendment could be limited. Monell, see supra note 351, seems
to foreclose the possibility of NLC or federalism limits on Congress' power, but it could still be
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more than resort to the convenient, all-inclusive theory that the framers
of the Civil War Amendments intended to expand national powers.
That "something more" is not provided by the arguments that Con-
gress can do as much as the Courts to enforce the Constitution, that
there is no legitimate state sovereignty interest in violating the Consti-
tution, and that state officers are found to obey the Constitution. t7
These arguments all beg the question of federalism limits on judicial
power to expand the constitutional obligations of the states.
The Court's recent opinion in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman418 suggests that the Court may be forced to confront the
problems inherent in its theory that federalism principles impose no
limits on Congress' powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments as
well as its view of the relationship of section 1983 to other statutes en-
acted under the enforcement powers conferred by these amendments.
In this case, the Court suggested that NLC may limit Congress' power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment by defining a minimum level of
care for retarded persons and by requiring the states to meet these stan-
dards.4 19 Even if, as the Court concluded, Congress did not exercise its
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute
or even if such a statute would not be within Congress' power as "ap-
argued that section 1983 is not "appropriate legislation" to enforce a particular constitutional right
under the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 355. Second, the constitutional rights enforcea-
ble under section 1983 could be construed narrowly. For example, in Elrod v. Burns, Chief Justice
Burger suggested that the first amendment rights of public employees not to be discharged on the
basis of their political affiliation should be construed narrowly to avoid interference with the tradi-
tional political practice of patronage appointments. 427 U.S. 347, 375-76 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Such judicial self-restraint in interpreting the Constitution is not, however, a charac-
teristic of the modem Court, and it hardly provides any principle for limiting national
interference.
A third alternative is to recognize federalism limits on the courts' remedial powers. Most com-
mentators agree that an accommodation between federalism principles and the protection of indi-
vidual rights under section 1983 should be achieved by limiting the courts' remedial powers.
Frug, supra note 351, at 787-94; Developments, supra note 351, at 1175-90. The Supreme Court
has not yet decided clearly whether NLC, federalism principles, or the tenth amendment limits the
equitable powers of federal courts. On the one hand, it has held that the tenth amendment does
not limit the powers of a federal court to enforce constitutional rights in a section 1983 school
desegregation case. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977). On the other hand, it has also
suggested, in a case where it found no justiciable or established violation of constitutional rights,
that federalism principles limit a federal court's equitable powers to control the administration of
a municipal police department. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-80 (1976); Frug, supra note
351, at 747.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 410-12.
418. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). This case is also discussed supra at notes 324 & 342.
419. See supra note 342.
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propriate legislation" to enforce the fourteenth amendment,42 ° similar
obligations could be imposed on the states if the Court recognized that
retarded persons have a constitutional right to treatment.42' In an ac-
tion under section 1983, a court could enforce this constitutional right
to treatment by an order enjoining state officials to provide, perhaps
regardless of costs, the constitutionally required minimum level of
care. 422 Whether a right to treatment is established by statute or by
judicial interpretation, the corresponding duty imposed on the state is
the same. Since such a statutory or constitutional right of retarded per-
sons to a minimum level of care would appear to exceed the rights for
which the framers of the Civil War Amendments intended national
protection, the intrusion on state authority cannot be justified simply by
invoking the platitude that the framers intended to expand the nation's
powers.
4. Shopping for an Appropriate Power to Avoid NLC
In the absence of any persuasive distinction between the war power,
the spending power, and the power to enforce the Civil War Amend-
ments on the one hand and the commerce power on the other hand, the
concept of state sovereignty announced in NLC has no content. The
decision seems to be little more than an invitation to the courts and
Congress to shop for an appropriate power to avoid federalism limits.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick423 is an apt
example of power shopping by a court. The Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977 authorized national grants to state and local govern-
ments for the construction of public works projects. The principal issue
in Fullilove was whether a condition of the grant that required ten per-
cent of the national funds to be used to aid minority-owned business
enterprises (MBE) violated the equal protection clause, but the Chief
420. The Court stated that Congress might lack the power to create the right of a retarded
person to a minimum level of care and the corresponding duty of the state because the Court had
not yet recognized a constitutional "right to treatment." 451 U.S. at 16 n.12.
421. The district court in this case found that retarded persons who are institutionalized have a
constitutional right to treatment, but neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court decided
the constitutional claim on the merits. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1313-20 (E.D. Pa. 1977). a,Od in part andrev'd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84, 94,
115 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. 1, 31 (1981).
422. For a thorough analysis of the equitable powers of the federal courts to enforce the con-
stitutional rights of prisoners and inmates of institutions for the mentally retarded and mentally ill
and of federalism limitations on these powers, see Frug, supra note 351.
423. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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Justice also addressed the question of federalism limits on Congress'
power to impose this requirement on state and local governments.424
His analysis turned on the anachronistic notion that the spending
power can only be used to achieve ends that Congress could obtain
under its other enumerated powers.425 He found first that Congress had
the power under the commerce clause 426 to apply the MBE provision to
private contractors, who received the national funds from the state and
local grantees and were required to assist in achieving the ten percent
goal, because their activities affect interstate commerce.4 27 The com-
merce power, however, could not support the application of the MBE
provision directly to the state and local government recipients of the
grant because national regulation of state and local government pro-
curement practices was barred by NLC.428 The Chief Justice then
found that the state sovereignty objection could be "avoided ' 429 be-
cause Congress could have imposed the MBE requirement under its
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, which is not subject to the
federalism restraints ofNLC. 4 ° This search for the "correct" power to
excuse national regulation of state and local government from federal-
ism restraints is ironic because the Chief Justice could have resorted to
the prevailing view that NLC is applicable to the spending power.
The question whether a court should judge a statute by the power
Congress purports to exercise or by the powers Congress might have
exercised 43' remains unsettled. The Chief Justice in Fullilove and
many lower courts432 have been willing to assume that Congress acted
424. Id at 473-78. Chief Justice Burger wrote for himself and Justice White. Although Jus-
tice Powell wrote a separate concurrence, he joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Id at 496.
425. The Chief Justice initially recognized that the spending power is "an independent grant
of legislative authority, distinct from other broad congressional powers," but his analysis turned
on the much narrower view that "[t]he reach of the spending power, within its sphere, is at least as
broad as the regulatory powers of Congress." Id at 474-75. The contest between these two con-
tending interpretations of the spending power was resolved in favor of the former in United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1936), and the resurrection of the Madisonian view of the spending
power at this late date is, to say the least, surprising. A recent district court decision also reverts to
a narrow interpretation of the spending power. See supra note 314.
426. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
427. 448 U.S. at 475-76.
428. Id at 476.
429. Id For purposes of demonstrating the Court's effort to supply Congress with the appro-
priate power to escape NLC, the Chief Justice's choice of words is serendipitous.
430. Id
431. G. GuNTHER, supra note 56, at 223 n.*.




under its power to enforce the fourteenth amendment in order to elude
the federalism bar of NLC. Nevertheless, the Court has stated that
where a national statute would impose affirmative obligations on the
states to spend large sums of money to protect individual rights, Con-
gress must state its intention to enforce the fourteenth amendment
clearly because the Court will not assume an intention to intrude on
state sovereignty.433 The choice between requiring Congress to state
clearly its reliance on a power that is immune from NLC and uphold-
ing a statute that is enacted under a power subject to federalism limits
on the ground that Congress could have enacted it under another
power is difficult because a court is torn by two confficting principles of
judicial deference to Congress. One principle teaches that Congress
has the responsibility for altering the balance of national and state
powers and that courts should construe statutes narrowly to avoid ex-
panding national power.434 The other principle teaches that courts
should attempt to uphold statutes whenever possible by assuming that
Congress has acted within its constitutional powers.435
As long as the courts adhere to the view that federalism limits vary
with the constitutional basis of Congress' power, the question whether
a court should judge a statute on Congress' "recitals of the power which
it undertakes to exercise 436 will remain. Even if the Court were to
decide that Congress must invoke expressly its war power, spending
under the commerce power, many lower courts have sustained the application of the requirements
of these statutes to state and local governments over federalism objections on the theory that
Congress could have enacted them under its power to enforce the fourteenth amendment. See
supra notes 372-82 and accompanying text.
433. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981). See supra notes
324 & 342 and accompanying text. The requirement that Congress state clearly its intention to
rely on a particular power that is exempt from NLC is supported by several other recent cases in
which the Court has held that Congress must state clearly its intention to override a state's elev-
enth amendment immunity. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978) (clear statement in the
legislative history); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (explicit statutory language).
This clear-statement requirement apparently appeared for the first time in Justice Rutledge's con-
curring opinion in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 585 (1946).
434. Eg., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
435. Eg., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
436. The phrase is taken from Justice Douglas' opinion in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333
U.S. 138, 144 (1948). In Woods, Douglas argued that the constitutionality of a statute did not turn
on Congress' recital of its power, but in a later case he stated that a statute must be judged on the
basis of the power that Congress actually exercised. Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 101
(1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 56, at 223 n.*.
Number 3)
Washington University Open Scholarship
892 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
power, or powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments in order to
override NLC,437 Congress would still be able to shop for the "right"
power. Power shopping either by the Court or Congress is, however,
not the problem; it is a symptom.
There would be nothing wrong with Congress shopping for a partic-
ular power that is exempt from judicially imposed federalism limits if,
inherent in the exempted powers, there was either some guarantee of
protection for state interests or a justification for national intervention
that is not present in the powers subject to NLC. The courts, however,
have not articulated any adequate basis for exempting three of Con-
gress' powers, and the empty distinctions suggest that the NLC concept
of state sovereignty has a hollow core. Congress can in large part
achieve the same results under its exempted powers as it would other-
wise accomplish under the powers limited by NLC. As we shall see,
protection of state interests turns on the question whether Congress, in
exercising any one of its powers, is politically accountable. The rule
that some powers are and other powers are not subject to federalism
limits denies Congress the flexibility of using all its powers and obfus-
cates the real question whether political accountability limits Congress'
power to control the states or justifies national control and when, in the
absence of political accountability, judicial protection of the states' role
in the federal system is necessary.
G. State Autonomy Immunity for Traditional or Integral Functions
and Balancing Tests
During the period between the Court's 1976 NLC decision and its
437. If Congress invokes a power limited by NLC when it could have enacted the statute
under a power not so limited, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress was politically incapable
of a complete decision to override state sovereignty. At least for those who support national
power over the states on the ground that state interests are represented in Congress, see infra text
accompanying notes 794-808, the clear-statement rule, see supra note 433, would seem to be a
necessary corollary of their theory, and the Court then should not uphold a statute on the basis of
a power that Congress might have invoked. For an argument that the Court should uphold a
statute on the basis of powers that Congress might have invoked, see Note, supra note 369, at 679-
81. Given the conclusion below that power shopping is only a symptom of the problem caused by
the courts' artificial distinctions between Congress' powers, judicial power shopping can aggravate
the problem of congressional power shopping only if the courts have the discretion to decide when
to uphold a statute on the basis of an unrestricted power. If the courts are free to hold Congress to
the powers it purports to exercise on one occasion and yet free on another occasion to look to
powers that Congress might have exercised, then the courts will have an unprincipled means of
sustaining only those statutes deemed to be wise interventions in state and local affairs.
[Vol. 60:779
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consideration of state autonomy limits on national political authority in
1981 in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Associa-
tion43s and, in 1982, in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail
Road439 and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississipi440
(FERC), the lower courts held consistently that NLC applies to statutes
enacted under all of Congress' powers except the war, spending, and
Civil War Amendment enforcement powers. Since the chief source of
Congress' regulatory powers is the commerce clause, most of the elabo-
ration of federalism limits by the lower courts has been in this con-
text.44 These courts all followed NLC directly in refusing to find any
438. 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (companion case).
439. 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982).
440. 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982).
441. In addition to the commerce power, statutes enacted under the other powers enumerated
in article I, section 8, may also raise significant federalism issues. For example, Congress has
exercised its power under article I, section 8, clause 4, "to establish. . . uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States" to regulate municipal bankruptcy. 11
U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (Supp. IV 1980). The provisions governing municipal bankruptcy, which are
for the most part similar to the rules for private bankruptcy, restrict the states' power to control
their insolvent political subdivisions. Although the Supreme Court upheld an early version of the
municipal bankruptcy provisions, NLC has revived arguments that national regulation of munici-
pal bankruptcy is unconstitutional. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27; Municipal Bankruptcy,
supra note 16. See supra note 22.
Most of the federalism questions that the courts have addressed are raised by statutes enacted
under such enumerated powers of article I, section 8, as the spending, commerce and bankruptcy
powers, and under Congress' power to enact all laws that are "necessary and proper" to imple-
ment these enumerated powers. The enumerated powers, however, do not exhaust Congress' leg-
islative powers. Congress also has the power to enforce "all other powers" vested by the
Constitution in the national government. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Among these "other
powers," the guarantee clause, which provides that "[tihe United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government," is potentially the most important source
of congressional authority. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. This clause is generally considered a dead
letter because the courts have held that claims that state or national actions deny the state a repub-
lican form of government are nonjusticiable and because Congress has rarely invoked its power to
enforce it. Note, A Nichefor the Guarantee Clause, 94 HARV. L. REV. 681 (1981). Nonetheless,
absent any judicially imposed federalism limits, Congress could exercise its power to enforce the
guarantee clause to control the structure of state government and the states' political processes.
Dispensabili
, 
ofJudicial Review, supra note 10, at 1599 n.258 (power to control the qualifications
of state officials and selection by appointment or election). Cf. Note, A Niche for the Guarantee
Clause, supra (judicial power to reorganize state government to protect individual rights).
Although the courts have never considered a question of federalism limits on Congress' powers
to enforce the guarantee clause, they have considered federalism limits on Congress' authority to
enforce powers other than those enumerated in article I, section eight. In Coyle v. Smith, the
Court held that Congress could not control the location of a state capitol under its article IV,
section 3, clause 1, power to admit new states. 221 U.S. 559 (1911). See also State v. Lewis, 559
P.2d 630 (Alaska), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 432 U.S. 901 (1977). In United States v.
Simms, 508 F. Supp. 1179 (W.D. La. 1979), the court held that Congress could enforce its consti-
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limits on national regulation of private activity,442 but they had great
difficulty in determining the appropriate test of national power to regu-
late the states. Some courts read NLC to hold that traditional state
activity is absolutely immune from all national control" 3 and at-
tempted to distinguish traditional and nontraditional governmental ac-
tivity. Most courts, however, read NLC to invite a balancing test.4 "
As applied by the lower courts, these two tests of Congress' power
under the commerce clause to regulate the states had no content and
very little bite. Although NLC limited the commerce power in theory,
the result of its application to statutes enacted under the commerce
power was much the same as if Congress had enacted them under its
war, spending, or Civil War Amendment enforcement powers. The
lower courts, with a few notable and aberrational exceptions, typically
upheld statutes enacted under the commerce power on the grounds
either that the affected state function was not traditional or integral or
that the national interest outweighed the state interest. Much as the
lower courts limited the reach of NLC as a check on national regula-
tion of the states under the commerce power, they also refused, for the
most part, to invoke NLC as a restriction on the means employed by
Congress under the commerce clause to induce the states to act as its
agents in implementing national regulatory programs and to exercise
affirmative authority over private activity.
Hodel, United Transportation Union, and FERC will not produce
any major changes in the evaluation and disposition of arguments that
state autonomy limits Congress' power under the commerce clause to
regulate private activity, to regulate the states, or to require the affirma-
tutional power under article 1, section 4, clause 1, to regulate the time, place, and manner of
national elections by prohibiting bribery in a state election conducted at the same time as an
election for national office. The court found that the statute was a necessary and proper means of
protecting the integrity of national elections and that NLC was inapplicable because there was no
interference with state regulation of state elections. See United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sayre, 522 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
442. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
444. Seesupra text accompanying notes 118-20. The commentators, for the most part, agreed
with the courts that NLC is best read to establish a balancing test, and they also applauded bal-
ancing as the best means of determining the scope of Congress' power to regulate the states. E.g.,
Kilberg & Fort, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its Meaning andlImpact, 45 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 613 (1977); Matsumoto, National League of Cities--From Footnote to Holding-Slate lmmu.
nityfrom Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 35; Ripple & Kenyon, State Saver-
eignt.y-,4 Polished But Slippery Crown, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 745 (1979); Municipal Bankruptcy,




tive exercise of state authority over private activity. The lower courts
will find encouragement to continue rejecting tenth amendment claims
because the Court upheld national power in all three cases. Nonethe-
less, these courts will also still be forced to grapple with state autonomy
arguments on an ad hoc basis because the Supreme Court failed to
establish any clear principle or criterion for federalism limits on the
commerce power.
Hodel is the most disappointing of the three decisions because a
nearly unanimous Court" 5 reviewed the "actual basis and import"44 6
of its NLC decision and formulated a three-prong test for evaluating
NLC claims. Drawing on the language of the NLC plurality opinion,
Hodel held that legislation enacted under the commerce power is inva-
lid if: (I) it "regulates the 'States as States,'" (2) it "address[es] matters
that are 'indisputably attributes of state sovereignty,'" and (3) the
"States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their
ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional func-
tions.' "447 Notwithstanding the superficial allure of an enumerated
test, the Hodel three-prong test is an intellectual sham because it does
not resolve the basic issues left unanswered in NLC.44s It does not de-
fine the states' role in the federal system nor does it establish a princi-
pled basis for judicial intervention in the national political process.
Hodel teaches only that the Court now believes that some particular
language of the NLC plurality opinion is especially pertinent.
In addition to the mere invocation of talismanic words from NLC
and the failure to resolve the basic issues raised by NLC, the Hodel test
is marred by three other defects. First, prong number one rules out any
state autonomy limit on national authority to regulate private activity.
Although the Court expressly held that NLC does not limit Congress'
power to regulate private activity," 9 it did not explain why the states'
interests in regulating private activity are any less important than the
interests protected under the test from national interference. Second,
445. Eight Justices joined in the opinion. 452 U.S. 264, 266 (1981). The Chief Justice and
Justice Powell concurred specially in separate opinions, but they did not question the Court's
interpretation of NLC. Id. at 305-07. Although Justice Rehnquist concurred only in the judg-
ment, he did not challenge the Court's reading of his plurality opinion in NLC. Id. at 307-13.
446. Id. at 286.
447. Id. at 287-88 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854, 845, 852
(1976)).
448. See supra text accompanying notes 125-34.
449. See infra text accompanying notes 458-64.
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the Hodel test does not settle the question whether NLC provides abso-
lute immunity for certain, specific state activities or whether the valid-
ity of national regulations as applied to the states is to be determined
by balancing national and state interests. The third prong of the test
suggests that traditional state functions enjoy absolute immunity from
regulations established under the commerce power, but tIodel also ap-
proved a balancing test by stating that some national interests may jus-
tify "state submission" even if the three-prong test for immunity is
satisfied.450 Since the Court concluded that the first prong was not satis-
fied because the statute regulated private activity,451 it did not interpret
or apply the language quoted from NLC and provided no guidelines
for identifying either protected state functions or for balancing national
and state interests. Finally, Hodel recognized Congress' power to em-
ploy the states as its agents by upholding one of the means by which
Congress induces the states to enforce national standards governing
private activity.45 The Court, however, did not apply its new test to
this question of Congress' power to require the affirmative exercise of
state authority over private activity. The Court did not explain why its
three-prong test of Congress' power to diminish state autonomy by reg-
ulating the states did not also apply to the question of Congress' power
to employ the states as the nation's agents. Nor did it formulate any
alternative, principled test of this power.
The Court's 1982 decisions in United Transportation Union and
FERC do not cure the defects of the three-prong Hodel test. In United
Transportation Union the Court upheld national regulation of a state-
owned railroad under the three-prong Hodel test because operation of
a railroad is not a traditional state function.453 This decision will en-
courage lower courts to decide questions about Congress' power to reg-
ulate the states on the basis of a distinction between traditional and
nontraditional governmental functions.4 54 Apart from reference to his-
450. 452 U.S. at 288 n.29. Although the Court did not use the word "balancing", the citation
of Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), and Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in NLC
supports the conclusion that the Court approved a balancing test. See supra text accompanying
notes 118-20.
451. See infra text accompanying notes 458-63.
452. See infra text accompanying notes 559-80.
453. 102 S. Ct. 1349, 1353-54 (1982).
454. Shortly after United Transportation Union was decided, the Third Circuit invoked this
decision and held that application of the overtime pay regulations of the FLSA to a transit author-
ity was not barred by the tenth amendment because operation of a mass transit system is not a




tory, it does not establish any criteria for identifying traditional state
functions. 55 United Transportation Union also leaves unresolved the
question whether a traditional function or balancing test should be em-
ployed to determine state immunity because the Court quoted Hodel's
statement that national interests may justify "state submission" even if
all three prongs of the test are satisfied.4 56 The application of the Hodel
three-prong test by a unanimous Court in United Transportation Union
would have suggested that the Court had settled on a fixed framework
for analysis of NLC claims but for its decision in FERC only ten weeks
later. In this case, the Court upheld Congress' power to employ the
states as its agents in regulating private activity without any reliance on
the Hodel three-prong test.457
Although the Court has decided three cases in the last two terms that
provided an opportunity to define the states' role in the federal system
and to establish a principle for judicial intervention in the national
political process to protect the states, it has left unanswered these two
basic questions raised by NLC. There is still no explanation for the
absence of any federalism limit on Congress' power to regulate private
activity and to diminish state autonomy by displacing state policy
choices. The lower courts remain at sea without navigational aids to
determine the scope of Congress' power to regulate the states and to use
the states as its agents in administering and enforcing national
regulations.
677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982). But see Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transp. Auth., 539 F.
Supp. 36 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (post-United Transportation Union decision holding that a municipal
transit system is immune from the FLSA). The Third Circuit is the only court that has upheld the
application of the FLSA to the states or their political subdivisions. See supra note 115. The
Third Circuit's reading of United Transportation Union is supported by a subsequent order of the
Supreme Court vacating a district court judgment that NLC bars the application of the FLSA to a
local transit authority. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 25 W. & H. Cases
274 (W.D. 1981), vacated and remanded sub nom Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 102 S. Ct. 2897 (1982) (for further consideration in light of United Transp. Union v. Long
Island R.R., 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982)).
455. See infra text accompanying notes 505-11.
456. 102 S. Ct. 1349, 1353 n.9 (1982). See Hamilton v. Board of Supervisors, - Cal. 3d..,
P.2d - - 182 CaL Rptr. 868, 875-78 (2d Dist. 1982) (post-United Transportation Union deci-
sion upholding application of Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), to county as an employer on the
ground that national maritime law does not interfere directly with integral governmental opera-
tions and without deciding whether operation of a rescue boat is a traditional governmental
function).
457. 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2148-49 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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. Regulation of Private Activity
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,'
the Court flatly held that neither NLC nor the tenth amendment limits
Congress' power under the commerce clause to regulate private activ-
ity. 5 9 Several lower courts had held that national regulation of private
businesses and individuals engaged in strip mining was precluded by
NLC because it interfered with the traditional state governmental
function of controlling land use.460 Although the Court recognized that
national regulation of private activity "curtail[s] or prohibit[s] the
458. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
459. Id. at 283-93; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 330 (1981) (companion case).
460. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(Supp. IV 1980) establishes national environmental standards for surface coal mining which re-
quire miners to restore the lands after the coal is removed and prohibit surface mining in some
areas. See generally Harvey, Paradise Regained? Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 15 Hous. L. REv. 1147 (1978). If the state legislature enacts laws implementing the stan-
dards, the state may regulate surface mining; otherwise, the Secretary of the Interior must estab-
lish a program for regulating surface mining. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253-1254 (Supp. IV 1980). See infra
text accompanying notes 560-63.
Two federal district courts held that the Act was unconstitutional under the tenth amendment
because it interfered with state regulation of land use. Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452, 461-
68 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rey'd and remanded sub nom. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 431-35 (W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd
and aj'd in part on other grounds and remanded sub nom. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). In addition to the tenth amendment bar, the Indiana
district court also found that various provisions of the Act exceeded Congress' power under the
commerce clause because the regulated activities did not have a substantial, adverse effect on
interstate commerce; that the Act violated the fifth amendment guarantee of equal protection
because it had a disproportionate impact on mining in some states; that the Act constituted a
taking of private property without just compensation contrary to the fifth amendment; and that
some of the enforcement provisions of the Act violated the constitutional guarantee of procedural
due process. 501 F. Supp. at 457-61, 468-72. The Virginia district court rejected the commerce
clause and equal protection arguments, but it found taking and procedural due process violations
of the fifth amendment. 483 F. Supp. at 430-31, 435-48. Three other federal district courts re-
jected arguments that the Act was unconstitutional. Andrus v. P-Burg Coal., 495 F. Supp. 82
(S.D. Ind. 1980) (statute is within Congress' power under the commerce clause), a'd, 644 F.2d
1231 (7th Cir. 1981); Concerned Citizens v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (no fifth
or tenth amendment violation); Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (S.D.
Iowa 1980) (preliminary injunction on grounds that Act exceeds commerce power, violates tenth
amendment, constitutes a taking, and violates equal protection guarantee of fifth amendment de-
nied, but granted with respect to an enforcement provision denying procedural due process).
The Supreme Court held that the Act is a valid exercise of the commerce power and that the
tenth amendment does not bar either national regulation of private activity or the provision for
state enforcement of the national environmental standards, and it rejected the fifth amendment
contentions on the merits or on the ground that they were not ripe. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314
(1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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States' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the
State may consider important,"46 it did not specifically characterize
these state policy choices as an aspect of state sovereignty.462 Perhaps
because the Court did not confront directly the argument that the sub-
stitution of national policy for state policy diminishes state autonomy,
it reversed the lower courts and upheld Congress' power to regulate
private activity on the rather simple ground that recognition of a feder-
alism limit would be contrary to long settled precedent.463 Even before
Hodel, the lower courts all concluded that NLC did not limit Congress'
power under the commerce clause to regulate private activity,4" and,
461. 452 U.S. at 290.
462. A year later the Court expressly recognized that state power to make policy decisions
about private activity is "perhaps the quintessential attribute of sovereignty." Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2138 (1982).
463. 452 U.S. at 292. Prior to the Court's decision, several commentators argued that NLC
should not be limited to a prohibition of direct national regulation of the states and that it should
be read more broadly to prohibit some types of national regulation of private activity that dimin-
ish the states' power to determine substantive policy for their citizens. Note, Tenth .4mendment
Challenges to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977- The Implication of Na-
tional League of Cities on Indirect Regulation of the States, 49 FoRDHAM L. REV. 589, 595-611
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Indirect Regulation]; Note, The Constitutionality of the Federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 13 IND. L. Rav. 923, 940-45 (1980). Contra Brion,
Federal Regulation of Surface Mining in Virginia, 67 VA. L. REv. 329, 338-40 (1981) (NLC does
not bar national regulation of private activity).
464. Most courts simply held that NLC and the tenth amendment did not bar national regula-
tion of private activity, but a few courts upheld national regulation of private activity and preemp-
tion of conflicting state regulations on the ground that state control of a particular private activity
was not a traditional function of state government. For cases in the former category, see Nance v.
EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Crow Tribe of Indians, 102 S. Ct. 635
(1981)); United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1979); Vehicle Equipment Safety
Comm'n v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin'n, 611 F.2d 53, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Avarello, 592 F.2d 1339, 1345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 844 (1979); Commercial
Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 522-23 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Florida Bd.
of Business Regulation v. NLRB, 497 F. Supp. 599, 603-04 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Barnes, 452 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); Mclnnis v. Cooper Communities, 611 S.W.2d 767 (Ark.), rev'g 49
U.S.L.W. 2469-70 (1981) (on rehearing the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed its prior decision
that national regulation of interest rates charged by private lenders was an invalid exercise of the
commerce power and barred by the tenth amendment); International Trading Ltd. v. Bell, 556
S.W.2d 420, 426 (Ark. 1976); Northern States Power v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 38 (N. Dak. 1981).
For cases in the latter category, see Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334,
1339-40 (9th Cir. 1981) (regulation of air transportation not a traditional state function);
Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 494 F. Supp. 636, 653-58 (W.D. Okla. 1980)
(regulation of intrastate sale of natural gas not a traditional state government function), aft'd, 661
F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsub nom. Texas v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 102
S. Ct. 2902 (1982); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (regu-
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unlike Hodel, they rarely paused even to note that national regulation
of private activity displaces state power to determine substantive
policy.
The significance of the Court's rather casual determination in Hodel
that national regulation of private activity is completely immune from
federalism limits may be illustrated by considering the potential impact
of the national antitrust laws on the states. The Sherman Act 465 estab-
lishes a policy of free competition which applies broadly to private ac-
tivity in interstate commerce. No one doubts that Congress has the
power to regulate private anticompetitive conduct under the commerce
power. It is possible that many conflicting state regulations which re-
quire private parties to act anticompetitively could have been pre-
empted, but a wholesale displacement of state economic regulation of
private activity by the national policy of competition was avoided by
the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Brown.466  The issue in
Parker was whether a state agricultural program that restricted compe-
tition among raisin producers in order to maintain prices violated the
lation of private health insurance plans is not an essential and traditional function of state govern-
ment), ajrd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aj'd, 102 S. Ct. 79 (1981).
There is limited support for the proposition that state-regulated private activity is exempt from
national regulation by virtue of NLC. A few courts have read NLC to support the conclusion that
national law should not be interpreted to preempt state control of private activity. New York
Telephone Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir. 1977), a'd, 440 U.S.
519 (1979); Summey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 449 F. Supp. 132, 139 (S.D. Cal. 1976), affrdmem.,
573 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1978); State v. Local 1115 Joint Bd., 56 A.D.2d 310, 314-15, 392 N.Y.S.2d
884, 887 (1977). One court has held that NLC immunizes state-funded private activity from the
FLSA. See supra note 115.
Lower federal courts have also held that national regulation of private activity under powers
other than the commerce clause is not prohibited by NLC or the tenth amendment, E.g., National
Ass'n of Property Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223, 1259-62 (D. Minn. 1980), aJ'dsub
norz Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1251-53 (8th Cir. 1981) (national regulation under the
property clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2, of lands adjacent to lands owned by the United
States is not prohibited by the tenth amendment), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1645 (1982); Historic
Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 848 (E.D. Va. 1980) (designation of an area as a
National Historic Landmark which restricts private use of land does not violate tenth amendment
by interfering with local zoning powers, but court did not consider whether the national statute
was a valid exercise of any particular constitutional power).
Post-Hodel lower courts, of course, have had no doubts that national power to regulate private
activity and to displace state regulation is not limited by NLC. City of New York v. United States
Dep't of Transp., 539 F. Supp. 1237, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F.
Supp. 979 (W.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. 0.16 of an Acre of Land, 517 F. Supp. 1115, 1122
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
465. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
466. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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Sherman Act. Although the Court assumed that a similar private
agreement among growers would violate the Sherman Act and that
Congress could prohibit such a state program because of its effect on
commerce, it held that the state program did not violate the Sherman
Act because Congress had not intended to limit state action.467
The extent to which the "state action" rule of Parker immunizes the
states and private parties from antitrust liability is not settled,468 but for
our purposes, the crucial point is that Parker preserves some state regu-
lation of private activity from being superseded by national antitrust
regulation of private individuals and business.469 The state action doc-
trine is, however, only a matter of statutory interpretation, and it has
always been understood, at least prior to NLC, that Congress could
preempt all state regulation that requires private parties to engage in
anticompetitive conduct.47° If Congress were to amend the Sherman
Act to override Parker, a nationally determined free market policy
would supplant a wide range of state regulation of private activity that
has anticompetitive effects.471 Although some have suggested that NLC
could serve the same purpose as the Parker state action doctrine and
limit Congress' power to supersede state economic regulation of private
467. Id at 350-52. The Court's interpretation of the statute was influenced by the considera-
tion that "an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
hghtly to be attributed to Congress." Id at 351. This concern about interference with state of-
ficers administering the agricultural program misses the more fundamental federalism question of
interference with the program itself and displacement of the state's economic and regulatory
policies.
468. See, e.g., Handler, Antitrust-197, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1978); Note, Parker v. Brown
Revisited- The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 898
(1977).
469. Compare New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (state regula-
tion of competition between new motor vehicle dealers exempt from antitrust liability under
Parker) with California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980) (state regulation of wine producers and wholesalers does not qualify for Parker immunity).
470. The Court in Parker recognized that Congress could preempt state regulation that re-
quires private parties to engage in anticompetitive conduct. See supra text accompanying note
467. Professor Handler, the foremost student of the antitrust laws, has argued that "Parker is
integral to our federalism" and that preemption of state economic regulation would be unwise, but
he did not argue that Congress lacks this power. Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v.
Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1976).
471. State anticompetitive laws that are arguably inconsistent with national antitrust policy
include: restrictions on retail sales such as Sunday closing and blue laws, regulation of the size
and design of signs advertising prices, bank branch restrictions, preferences for in-state purchases,
and occupational licensing. For more complete lists, see Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus
Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 950, 951 (1970); Slater, Antitrust and Govern-
ment Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 75-77 (1974).
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activity,472 these hopes are probably misplaced. Hodel held flatly that
federalism principles do not limit Congress' power to regulate private
activity under the commerce power. Even though a congressional de-
termination that the national free market policy should override state
economic regulation of private activity would substantially expand the
political authority of the nation at the expense of the states, NLC does
not limit national control of private individuals and business. At most,
NLC establishes some limits on Congress' power to apply the antitrust
laws directly to state and local government activity.4 73
472. Blumstein & Calvani, State ,4ion as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services ,4ntitrust
Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 DUKE L.J. 389, 400, 413; Rogers,
Municioal Antitrust Liability in a Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 318-31; Note, The
Application of4ntitrust Laws to MunicopalActivities, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 535-37 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as MunicopalAntitrust Liability]; Note, supra note 468, at 899 n.6.
473. As long as the state action doctrine of Parker provides a sub-constitutional vehicle for
reconciling national and state conflicts, the Court will not be forced to determine the extent to
which NLC protects state and local governments from antitrust liability. In two significant re-
spects, however, the Court has recently narrowed substantially the protection afforded to both
government activity and government regulation of private activity under Parker, and these deci-
sions may force a consideration of NLC or federalism limits on the application of the antitrust
laws to state and local governments. With respect to the states, the Court has held that for state
regulated private activity to be immunized from antitrust liability the anticompetitive "activity
must be part of an articulated regulatory scheme," it must be compelled by the state acting as a
sovereign, and the "state must continually supervise the anticompetitive conduct." MunicrpalAnti-
trust Liability, supra note 472, at 520-21 (synthesizing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975)). Although the scope of the Parker exemption for state regulation of private activity has
been narrowed and national power to displace anticompetitive state regulation has been ex-
panded, the Court has not determined whether the new Parker standards also apply to state activ-
ity. With respect to local government, the Court has limited municipal antitrust immunity under
Parker by holding that a municipality is subject to the antitrust laws for both its own activity and
its regulation of private activity. The municipal antitrust liability decisions merit brief elaboration
because they provide a vehicle for assessing the extent to which NLC may limit the application of
the antitrust laws to state and local government.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), the Court held that a
municipally owned and operated electric utility may be subject to the Sherman Act. The holding
rested on sharply different interpretations of the state action doctrine. Writing for a plurality of
four, Justice Brennan concluded that the Parker doctrine is not directly applicable to a municipal-
ity because Congress intended to reach municipalities under the Sherman Act and that a munici-
pality, much like a private party, can qualify for the Parker exemption only if the state has
authorized or directed its anticompetitive conduct when it empowered the municipality to act. ld
at 394-413. The Chief Justice concurred in the view that the Sherman Act applies to municipali-
ties but he stated a different test for immunity under Parker. Drawing on NLC, he argued that
traditional governmental functions are immune from the antitrust laws but that entrepreneurial
activities of a municipality, like the operation of an electric utility, are protected by Parker only if
they are, just like private activity, compelled by the state. Id at 418-26. Justice Stewart argued in
dissent that the Sherman Act applies only to private action and not to governmental activity and
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Notwithstanding the Court's broad holding that NLC does not re-
that state and local governments are equally immune under Parker from antitrust liability. Id at
426-41. For a thorough and perceptive analysis of these opinions, see Munic6palAntitrust Liability,
supra note 472, at 521-27. In Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835
1982), the Court further limited municipal immunity from the antitrust laws under the Parker
state action doctrine by holding that a municipality is subject to the antitrust laws for ordinances
regulating private activity as well as for its own activity. A majority of five Justices applied the
plurality standard of City of Lafayette to a municipal ordinance regulating the construction of
cable television systems and held that the municipality was not within the Parker state action
exemption because the local legislation was not "municipal action in furtherance or implementa-
tion of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" to impose anticompetitive re-
straints. Id at 841-43.
Cit of Lafayette and City of Boulder hold that a municipality may be liable for violations of the
antitrust laws, but these cases do not settle the nature and scope of municipal antitrust liability.
See Handler, supra note 468, at 1376-78 (questioning whether anyone can understand the Parker
state action doctrine after City of Lafayette). Under the nebulous criteria of City of Lafayette and
City of Boulder, a municipality may still come within the protection of the Parker state action
exemption if its anticompetitive conduct is "directed or authorized" by the state, or if its action in
enacting an ordinance with anticompetitive effects is "in furtherance or implementation of clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." 102 S. Ct. at 841; 435 U.S. at 416. Even if a
municipality is not protected by Parker, the standards for establishing a violation of the antitrust
laws by a municipality have not been established because in both City of Lafayette and City of
Boulder questions about violation of the antitrust laws were left to the lower courts on remand.
See 102 S. Ct. at 844-45 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Antitrust Symposium: Municipal
Antitrust Liability, 1980 ARiz. ST. UJ. 245-431 (debate after City of Lafayette about the extent of
municipal immunity under Parker and the effects of the antitrust laws on municipal activity).
Although the extent of municipal antitrust liability is unsettled, the holding in City of Lafayette
that the Sherman Act applies to municipalities has generated arguments that the scope of munici-
pal immunity provided under the Parker state action doctrine is constitutionally inadequate and
that NLC may limit the application of national antitrust laws to municipal activity. See Rogers,
supra note 472, at 318-31; Municpal Antitrust Liability, supra note 472, at 536-44. After City of
Boulder it is reasonable to anticipate arguments that NLC also limits the application of the anti-
trust laws to municipal regulation of private activity.
Although the various opinions in Cit of Lafayette and City of Boulder all focus on the statutory
question whether municipalities enjoy the Parker state action exemption as a matter of congres-
sional intent, the decisions do settle, albeit indirectly, two questions about constitutionally based
federalism limits on the application of the Sherman Act to state and local governments. First, the
whole Court apparently agrees that NLC federalism principles restrict national interference with a
state's control of its political subdivisions. The rule of these two cases that municipalities are
immune from antitrust liability under the Parker state action doctrine if they are implementing a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition rests on a rec-
ognition that the states are protected under Parker and that the states may use municipalities as
their agents or instrumentalities. Application of the antitrust laws to a municipality that is imple-
menting state policy would interfere with the states' authority over their political subdivisions, and
such interference would be barred by NLC. The plurality's conclusion in City of Lafayette that
NLC federalism issues are eliminated by holding that a municipality is immune from antitrust
liability to the same extent as a state when it is acting pursuant to the state's directions is an
acknowledgment that NLC limits national intrusions on a state's control over its political subdi-
visions. 435 U.S. at 412 n.42. Since the dissenting Justices in City of Lafayette and City of Boulder
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strain Congress' power under the commerce clause to regulate private
found that the Court's interpretation of Parker would "impair the ability of a State to delegate
governmental power broadly to its municipalities," they share the opinion that NLC provides
some protection for a state's authority to control its political subdivisions. 102 S. Ct. at 850-51
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 435 U.S. at 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
A second point established by City o Lafayette and City of Boulder is that, apart from some
agency relationship between the municipality and the state, neither municipal activity nor munici-
pal regulation of private activity is independently entitled to protection from antitrust liability
under NLC. Although a careful reading of City of Lafayette suggests that a majority might find
NLC federalism limits on municipal antitrust liability, the Court in City ofBoulder has apparently
rejected this contention. In City of Lafayette, the plurality's finding that state political subdivi-
sions are not sovereigns equivalent to the states indicates that a municipality is not" as such inde-
pendently entitled to protection from national control under NLC. See 435 U.S. at 412.
Nevertheless, five members of the Court would have recognized federalism limits on municipal
antitrust liability. Justice Stewart, writing for four members of the Court in dissent, argued that
Congress did not intend to reach governments under the Sherman Act and that state and local
governments are equally within the Parker state action exemption because NLC "held that the
States and their political subdivisions must be given equal deference." Id at 430 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). The Chief Justice apparently concurred in this broad view of federalism limits on
Congress' power over state political subdivisions because he stated that traditional governmental
functions of a municipality, in contrast to the proprietary activity of operating an electric utility at
issue in City ofLafayelte, are brought within Parker by NLC. Id at 422-24 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). Notwithstanding these intimations of constitutionally based federalism limits on municipal
antitrust liability in City of Lafayette, four years later a majority in City of Boulder adopted the
City ofLafaye/fe plurality's position that local governments are not sovereigns equivalent to the
state and stated that the federalism principle underlying the Parker state action exemption "makes
no accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States." 102 S. Ct. at 840.
Even assuming that Cify of Lafayette and City of Boulder do not foreclose recognition of NLC
federalism limits on the application of the national antitrust laws to a municipality, the opinions
do not speak at all to the nature of these limits. To determine the limits that NLC may impose on
the application of national antitrust laws to a municipality, or for that matter to a state, one must
make a distinction that has not been important in the interpretation of the Parker state action
doctrine. "State action" is generally understood to include both governmental regulation of pri-
vate activity and state and local government activity. See Handler, supra note 470, at 8. Thus, for
example, the state action doctrine does not distinguish state or local regulation of an electric utility
and state or local operation of an electric utility. Compare Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976) (state regulation of a private electric utility) with City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (municipally owned electric utility). Since governmental regula-
tion of an electric utility and government operation of an electric utility can serve the same pur-
poses, recognition of both as "state action" for the purpose of determining immunity from the
antitrust laws makes sense. See Note, supra note 468, at 912.
For the purposes of constitutionally based federalism limits under NLC, the Court has, how-
ever, established an artificial dichotomy between national regulation of private activity which
displaces state regulation and national regulation of state and local governments themselves. Un-
fortunately, most analyses of federalism limits on the application of the national antitrust laws to
state and local government have not been attentive to this dichotomy. E.g., Rogers, supra note
472, at 318-37; MunicfalAnitrust Liability, suvra note 472, at 535-44.
Unless the Court abandons its recent pronouncement in Ilodel that NLC does not limit national
regulation of private activity, there is no federalism limit on the application of the antitrust laws to
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activity, a conclusion that federalism principles impose no indirect lim-
its would be rash. The modem Court has permitted national regulation
of private activity that has only a tenuous connection with interstate
commerce;474 however, Hodel suggests that the Court may now be pre-
pared to limit Congress' power under the commerce clause by requiring
proof that the regulated local private activity affects interstate com-
merce.475 Such a limit would not be imposed under the banner of fed-
private activity and neither state nor local regulation of private activity that is not protected by the
Parker state action doctrine will be immunized by NLC. Put see Gold Cross Ambulance v. City
of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 961-69 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (municipal regulation of private ambu-
lance services is immune from the national antitrust laws under the state action doctrine and the
tenth amendment).
If, instead of state or local regulation of private activity, a state or local government activity like
the operation of an electric utility is not protected from the national antitrust laws under Parker,
NLC may impose some constitutionally based limits. Given the recent narrowing of the Parker
state action exemption, two courts have already considered arguments that state and local activity
not within Parker may be immunized from the antitrust laws by NLC. In Jordan v. Mills, 473 F.
Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979), a district court held that even if the operation of a prison store was
not within Parker, vLC precluded state antitrust liability. In Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of
Akron, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that municipal ordinances establishing a govern-
mental monopoly in garbage collection and waste recycling violated the antitrust laws. 654 F.2d
1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982) (for consideration in light of
Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982)). The court did not deter-
mine whether this municipal activity was immunized under the City of Lafayette interpretation of
the Parker state action doctrine. Instead, the court held that regardless of the ultimate rule for
statutory municipal antitrust immunity, municipal operation of an incineration plant is a tradi-
tional activity of local government that is constitutionally immune from the antitrust laws under
NLC. Id at 1195-96. The scope of any constitutional immunity for governmental activity from
the antitrust laws will turn at least in part on whether the Court applies a traditional function or
balancing test to determine state immunity from national regulation. See infra text accompanying
notes 489-513.
474. E.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
475. Although the Court stated that the test of Congress' power under the commerce clause to
regulate a local, private activity is whether Congress has a rational basis for its determination that
the local activity affects interstate commerce, the opinions in both cases carefully scrutinized con-
gressional findings that the particular, regulated aspects of surface mining affected interstate com-
merce. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 321-29 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 275-83 (1981). This careful review of congressional findings of
the relationship between local activities and interstate commerce is contrary to the Court's defer-
ence in the past to unelaborated congressional assertions of its power to regulate private activity
under the commerce clause. Eg., Perez v. United States, 402 US. 146, 147 n.l (1971). The Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist argued separately that the long quiescent requirement of NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937), that the local activity must have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce was still a limit on Congress' power under the commerce clause.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 305 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring), 307-13 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (1981). See also McLain v. Real Estate
Bd., 583 F.2d 1315, 1324 n.10 (5th Cir. 1978) (limits on the reach of the commerce power are
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eralism, but it would have the same effect of limiting Congress' power
to displace state regulation of private activity. Such an evasion of a
principled explanation of federalism limits on Congress' power to regu-
late private activity under the commerce clause would aggravate the
Court's failure to define the states' role in the federal system and would
reduce the pressure to develop a comprehensive theory of Congress'
power to control the allocation of political decisionmaking power.
Two aspects of Congress' power to regulate private activity under the
commerce clause merit special note. First, although national regula-
tion of private activity typically displaces state regulation, it may also
affect state governmental activity. For example, national regulation of
private individuals and businesses may prohibit or limit a state's exer-
cise of its taxing powers. The power of a state to raise revenues
through taxation is at the base of all state government activity, and no
matter how narrowly traditional governmental functions are defined, it
would seem to be the type of state function for which the Court at-
tempted to provide some protection in NLC. Nevertheless, in two re-
cent decisions upholding Congress' power under the commerce clause
to prohibit certain state taxes as part of a scheme of national regulation
of private businesses engaged in interstate commerce, the Court has not
even noted the question whether NLC restricts Congress' power to
limit state taxation.476 If it is too much to conclude from these decisions
consistent with the principle of federalism reorganized in NLC), vacated and remanded, 444 U.S.
232 (1980); Engdahl, Some Observations on State and Federal Control ofNatural Resources, 15
Hous. L. Rv. 1201, 1214-18 (1978) (argument that the Surface Mining Act is unconstitutional
based on a narrow reading of the necessary and proper clause).
476. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S.
141 (1979). Seealso Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 409 (9th Cir. 1981). Two
lower federal courts have considered an argument that Congress' power to control state taxation is
limited by the federalism principles ofNLC. The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976 prohibits state and local taxes on railroad transportation property at a rate higher than
that applicable to commercial or industrial property. 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (Supp. IV 1980). In Ten.
nessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), a f'dmem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 135 (1981), a federal district court upheld national control of state
taxation on the grounds that the national interest in revitalizing the railroads by eliminating dis-
criminatory taxes outweighed the state's interest in a discriminatory tax classification and that the
burden on the state was minor because it could collect the same amount of revenue by a nondis-
criminatory tax. In Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 407-09 (9th Cir. 1981), the
Ninth Circuit also upheld Congress' power under the commerce clause on similar grounds and on
the additional ground that state regulation of railroads and state assessment of property taxes on
instrumentalities of interstate commerce are not traditional or integral functions. See also Ogilvie
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1981) (state tax that discriminates against
railroads is invalid). In addition to national statutes limiting state taxation of private activity,
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that Congress' power to restrict state taxation of interstate commerce is
completely free from any federalism restraints,477 it is not too much to
conclude that they provide further evidence of the Court's failure to
work out an intelligible principle of the states' role in the federal
system.
United States v. Gillock 47 8 provides a second example of national
regulation of private activity that affects state governmental functions.
In this prosecution of a state legislator under three criminal statutes
enacted under the commerce power, the Court held that the defend-
ant's legislative acts could be introduced as evidence. Although the
state constitution afforded the legislator an evidentiary privilege for
legislative acts in a state court prosecution,479 the Court found that
state taxing power may also be limited by statutes that prohibit taxation of national instrumentali-
ties and by international agreements prohibiting taxation of property owned by foreign govern-
ments. E.g., United States v. Maryland, 488 F. Supp. 347 (D. Md.) (national statute prohibiting
state and local taxes on the income of out-of-state congressmen residing in the state for the pur-
pose of attending sessions of Congress), al'd, 636 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. City of
Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982) (real property of German Democratic Republic immune
from a local real property tax); see supra note 56.
National statutes limiting state taxing power are rare, but the courts have frequently held that a
state tax is invalid under the dormant commerce clause because it burdens or discriminates
against interstate commerce. Compare Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609
(1981) (state severance tax of up to 30% of the "contract sales price" of coal produced in the state
held valid) with Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (state tax that
discriminated against out-of-state transactions held unconstitutional). In contrast to its failure to
consider federalism limits on Congress' power to limit state taxation, the Court has considered the
necessity of reconciling its power to invalidate state taxation of interstate business with the states'
interest in exercising their taxing powers. E.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318, 329 (1977).
477. Support for federalism limits on Congress' power to restrict state taxing powers is not
hard to find. In Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868), the Court found that there
was no conflict between a state law requiring its political subdivisions to pay taxes in gold and
silver coin and a national statute making United States notes legal tender. The Court construed
the national statute to make United States notes legal tender only for private debts and not for
state taxes, but there is language in the opinions which suggests that the statute was construed in
this fashion because Congress lacks the power to control state taxation. Although this decision is
hoary, modem support for federalism limits on Congress' power to control state taxation can be
derived from the tax injunction act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), which prohibits a federal court from
restraining the collection of state taxes where a remedy is available in the state courts. See A
Bonding Co. v. Sunuck, 629 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1980) (NLC counsels against federal court inter-
ference with state tax collection). For an analysis of national statutes limiting state taxation of
interstate businesses and an argument that NLC limits Congress' power to control state taxing
powers, see Parnell, Constitutional Considerations of Federal Control Over the Sovereign Taxing
Authorit
, 
of the States, 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 227 (1979).
478. 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
479. Id. at 368.
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there was no impermissible national interference in the state legislative
process because the criminal statutes regulated individual activity and
did not directly control the state's legislative process s.48  Perhaps in rec-
ognition of the rather thin line between national regulation of individ-
ual activity and national control of the state government, the Court did
not rely exclusively on its rule that NLC is inapplicable to national
regulation of private activity. It also concluded that the national inter-
est in enforcement of criminal statutes outweighs the "only speculative
benefit to the state legislative process of its speech and debate privi-
lege."'48 ' In balancing these interests, however, the Court did not con-
480. Id. at 371. The state legislator was charged with obtaining money under color of official
right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), using an interstate facility to distribute a bribe in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), and participating in an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). Although these statutes apply directly to
individual activity, the Court's implicit assumption that they regulate private individual activity,
not the activity of an individual in his public, official capacity, is strained. Legislative acts are by
definition only something that a public official can do and acting "under color of official right" is
likewise not private, but public or governmental, activity.
481. 445 U.S. at 373. For an argument that the state interest in a speech or debate privilege for
state legislators outweighs the national interest in enforcement of criminal laws, see Note, Prolec-
lion of Slate LegislaziveActivifrom Federal Proseculion: Common-Law and Consilutionallmmu-
ni, 58 B.U.L. REv. 469, 486-91 (1978).
The lower courts, albeit without reference to Giliock, have also rejected arguments that national
criminal and bankruptcy statutes are invalid under NLC as applied to individuals because of their
effects on state or local government. Criminalstalutes: United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d
Cir. 1981) (no NLC barrier to removal of local officer from municipal post for violation of na-
tional criminal statute); Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1978) (national statute prohibit-
ing a felon from possessing a firearm does not interfere impermissibly with state employment
decision to hire a felon and to permit the felon to possess a firearm because the national require-
ment is imposed on individuals and not directly on the state). Cf. United States v. Tonry, 605
F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979) (federal court order prohibiting a former congressman convicted of viola-
tions of national election laws from running for political office as a condition of probation does
not interfere with the state power to control elections because it simply prohibits one individual
from participating in politics); In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, Appeal of Scott, 581 F.2d 589
(7th Cir.) (grand jury subpoena duces tecum to the staff of the state attorney general does not
intrude impermissibly on state officers where the investigation concerns the personal affairs of the
state attorney general), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d
577 (3rd Cir. 1977) (grand jury subpoena served on state senator does not interfere substantially
with state functions); Inre Grand Jury Empanelled Jan. 21, 1981, 535 F. Supp. 537 (D.N.J. 1982)
(tenth amendment does not bar grand jury subpoena duces tecum for private firm's tax records
protected by a state confidentiality statute). Bankruptcy statutes: In re Glidden, 653 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1981) (national bankruptcy regulation permitting discharge of debtor's child support obliga-
tions assigned to the state is valid although the effect is to reduce state revenue available to pro-
vide welfare assistance); In re Galbraith, 15 Bankr. 549, 555-58 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (national
bankruptcy regulation permitting discharge of state's judical lien on real property of welfare recip-
ient is not barred by NLC notwithstanding some interference with the state's traditional function
of providing welfare assistance); In re Holt, II Bankr. 797, 802-03 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (na-
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sider the state's interest in legislative independence and unfettered
debate.
A second point to note about Congress' power to regulate private
activity under the commerce clause is that the command may be ad-
dressed, as a formal matter, to the state and not to private individuals
and businesses. In most cases, a national statute prescribes a rule for
private activity directly, and state law regulating that activity is affected
because it may be preempted.48 2 In other cases, however, the national
rule for private activity may be the consequence of a direct prohibition
of state control of private activity.483 Apart from the addressee of the
tional bankruptcy regulation permitting discharge of debtor's child support obligations assigned to
the state is valid although the effect is to reduce state revenue available to provide welfare assist-
ance); In re Morris, 10 Bankr. 448, 451-55 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981) (same and list of cases at 455);
Minnesota ex rel. Daggett v. Barr, 315 N.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Iowa 1982) (same).
Although the courts have consistently rejected NLC-based arguments that national criminal
and bankruptcy statutes are unconstitutional, one court has suggested that national power to regu-
late private activity may be limited because of its effects on the states. In Jefferson County Phar-
maceutical Association . Abbott Laboratories, the Fifth Circuit held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that governmental purchases for traditional functions like hospitals are outside the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). 656 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981)
(adopting the district court opinion at App. A, at 97-103), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1629 (1982).
The holding has the effect of exempting sales by private companies to state and local government
from the antitrust price discrimination rules that apply to all other sales. Absent this exemption,
the cost of government purchases would be increased because private companies would not be
able to engage in price discrimination by charging lower prices to governmental bodies than are
charged to private purchasers. The court bolstered its finding that governmental purchases are
exempt from the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act by drawing an analogy to NLC.
The court reasoned that since a national statute setting the minimum price of labor purchased by
the states and their political subdivisions was invalid, another statute in effect setting the mini-
mum price for goods purchased by these entities would also be invalid. Id at 102-03.
482. See cases cited supra note 464.
483. National statutes may also authorize state regulation of private activity that would other-
wise be barred by the dormant commerce clause. See supra note 56. In Appeal of New England
Power Co., 120 N.H. 866, 424 A.2d 807 (1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1096 (1982), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court upheld such a national statute over a rather novel contention that Nc limits
Congress' power to expand state authority over private activity. The court held that an order of
the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission prohibiting an electric utility from selling hydro-
electric energy generated in New Hampshire via interstate commerce to consumers in other states
was authorized by a national statute. According to the state court, Congress had expressly author-
ized certain states to reserve hydroelectric energy generated within the state for in-state uses if
they had regulated the exportation of hydroelectricity prior to the enactment of the statute. Mas-
sachusetts, a neighboring state whose residents would be denied the comparatively inexpensive
hydroelectric power, contended that the national statute construed in this fashion was unconstitu-
tional because by favoring certain states it impaired the ability of other states to function effec-
tively in the federal system contrary to NLC. Id at 875, 424 A.2d at 813. The state court
concluded that the tenth amendment imposed no limits on either Congress' power to expand the
powers of some but not all states or Congress' power to regulate electric utilities since the regula-
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command, there is no difference between national regulations directly
applicable to private activity and a national prohibition of the exercise
of state authority over private conduct because in either case the effect
is to substitute national policy for state policy.484 For example, Con-
gress may prohibit certain state taxes on private businesses engaged in
interstate commerce.485 Although the command is directed to the state,
Congress is in effect prescribing a rule that certain private activity shall
not be taxed.
Another example is provided by United States v. Ohio Department of
Highway Safety, in which the Sixth Circuit upheld Congress' power to
prohibit a state from granting a motor vehicle registration to vehicles
that fail to comply with nationally established air pollution stan-
dards.4"6 The requirement that the states deny a motor vehicle registra-
tion is simply a limit on the exercise of state authority over private
activity. If the national statute regulated private activity directly by
prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles that fail to comply with
pollution control requirements, it would have the same effect of prohib-
iting the states from granting a registration and authorizing operation
of the vehicle in violation of national law. This requirement that the
states deny motor vehicle registrations is part of a broader national reg-
ulatory program that requires the states to exercise affirmative author-
ity over private activity.487 Since Congress' power to compel the states
to exercise affirmative authority over private activity raises important,
unsettled questions, it is important to remember that the court did not
tion of electric utilities is not an essential state governmental function. Id The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the state court on statutory construction grounds and did not address the
tenth amendment argument. The Court found that Congress had not expressly authorized any
state to restrict the sale of hydroelectric energy in interstate commerce, and the question of tenth
amendment limitations on Congress' power to authorize state restrictions on interstate commerce
was mooted. In the absence of such authorization, the Court held that under well-settled dormant
commerce clause principles a state could not give its own residents a preference in the use of the
state's natural resources and that the order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission
was invalid. 102 S. Ct. at 1100-03.
484. See supra note 73.
485. See supra note 476 and accompanying text.
486. 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981). The court could have
upheld Congress' power on the ground that national regulation of private activity is not limited by
NLC. See supra text accompanying notes 458-64. The court in fact applied a balancing test and
concluded that the "federal interest in controlling air pollution far outweighs any state interest in
permitting non-complying vehicles to use public streets and highways." 635 F.2d at 1205. For an
explanation of the validity of this regulation, see infra text accompanying notes 862.63.
487. See infra text accompanying notes 581-606 & 693-703.
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uphold any requirement that the state enforce a ban on driving a motor
vehicle that fails to comply with the national requirement; it simply
upheld a prohibition on the exercise of state authority over private
activity.488
2. Regulation and Taxation of the States
a. The Commerce Power
The courts have recognized consistently that NLC limits Congress'
power under the commerce clause to regulate the states, but the practi-
cal impact of NLC so far has been narrowly confined to decisions hold-
ing that the application of the minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements of the FLSA to a wide variety of state and local govern-
ment employees is unconstitutional." 9 Apart from the FLSA cases, the
lower courts have rejected all but one challenge to national regulation
of the states.490 The sole exception was the Second Circuit's holding in
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road that the Railway
Labor Act was unconstitutional as applied to a state-owned commuter
railroad because NLC prohibited national interference with the bar-
gaining relationship between a state and its employees.49' The
Supreme Court, however, reversed this judgment and upheld Congress'
power to regulate nontraditional state activities.492
The lower courts have employed traditional function tests, balancing
488. It is possible, however, to read the opinion more broadly. The court did not analyze the
national requirement that the state deny a registration to motor vehicles which fail to comply with
air pollution standards as national control of private activity, and its statement that the state must
"deny the use of state-owned facilities [highways] to those whose use adds to the national problem
of pollution," 635 F.2d at 1205, might be read as an approval of a requirement that the state must
enforce the national rule prohibiting the operation of certain motor vehicles. Enforcement would
entail the affirmative exercise of state authority over private activity and would go well beyond a
prohibition of state power to authorize the operation of motor vehicles in violation of national
law.
489. See supra note 115. One court has also suggested that NLC may bar the application of
the national antitrust laws to a state prison store. See supra note 473.
490. The absence ofjudicial decisions holding that national regulation of state or local govern-
ment is barred by NLC is at least in part explained by Congress' practice of exempting the states
and their political subdivisions from regulations that apply to private industry. Eg., 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(1), (2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (regulation of labor relations); 29 U.S.C. § 652(4), (5) (1976)
(occupational safety and health regulations); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1) (1976) (pension
plans of state and local governments exempt from the Employee Retirement Income Security
Program).
491. 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980). See infra text accompanying notes 498-504.
492. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982).
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tests, and combinations of these two tests in sustaining Congress' power
under the commerce clause to regulate the states. These courts have
upheld the application to the states of requirements that a private roy-
alty holder obtain national authorization to divert natural gas to intra-
state commerce after it has been dedicated to interstate commerce, 93
that a private telephone company permit certain interconnections, 494
and that private employers file annual information reports on their
pension plans.495 One court has held that a local government agency,
as well as private operators, must obtain a national permit under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act in order to dredge wetlands for
the purpose of mosquito control.4 96 Some lower courts have also up-
held the application of antifraud provisions of the securities laws to
securities issued by the states and their political subdivisions, notwith-
standing claims of interference with the fundamental state and local
governmental functions of borrowing money to fund essential govern-
mental services.497
493. Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.), cert.
deniedsub nonm Louisiana v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 444 U.S. 879 (1979). Although
the state used its natural gas royalties for public education and it would have received greater
royalties by selling the natural gas in intrastate commerce, the court found that the oil and natural
gas business is not a traditional governmental function, the reduction of state revenues does not
"directly displace" the state's traditional educational functions, and the national interest in a con-
tinuous supply of natural gas in interstate commerce outweighs the incidental effects on public
education. In Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (W.D.
Okla. 1980), af'd, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), cert denied sub nom. Texas v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 2902 (1982), the court upheld national regulation of the price of
natural gas produced on state-owned lands.
494. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1977). The court, apparently equat-
ing Puerto Rico with a state for the purposes of the tenth amendment, found that operation of a
telephone company is not an integral governmental activity.
495. California ex rel Younger v. Blumenthal, 457 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Cal. 1978), res'd on
other grounds rub nom. California exrel. Deukmejian v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1981). The
district court found that a requirement that the state, like private employers, must file an annual
information report on its pension plans was not barred by NLC. Even though it increased to some
extent the cost of state operations, the state's ability to structure its relationship with its employees
was not affected and the burden of compliance was minimal where the information required was
readily available. Id at 1317-18.
496. United States v. Plaquemines Mosquito Control Dist., 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1649
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1972 (1982).
497. Securities issued by the states and their political subdivisions are generally denominated
"municipal securities." See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (1976). Municipal securities are exempt from
the reporting and registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (the 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78jj (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (the 1934 Act). Comment, FederalRegulation of Municpal Securities.'
.4 Constitutional and Statutory Anaolsis, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1261, 1264-65 [hereinafter cited as Duke
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Although the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's judgment
Comment]. These exemptions apparently rest on policy considerations and not on doubts about
Congress' power to regulate municipal securities. Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation
ofMunicivoal Securities Issuers: Applying the Test of National League of Cities v. Usery, 51 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 982, 984 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NYU Note]; Note, Disclosure by Issuers ofMunicipal
Securities: An Analysis of Recent Proposals and a Suggested Approach, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1017,
1020-22 (1976).
Two general antifraud provisions of the securities laws are, however, applicable to the states
and their political subdivisions. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), and rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), promulgated to enforce section l0b of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), generally impose a duty on the issuer of a security not to be misleading if it
releases information to the public. Although section 17(a) has always been read to apply to gov-
ernmental issuers, rule lOb-5 did not apply clearly to governmental issuers until it was amended in
1975. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the power to enforce these antifraud
provisions against governmental issuers and officials and municipal securities professionals by
investigations, by suing for injunctions, and by recommending criminal prosecutions. A private
right of action has been implied under rule lob-5 and perhaps under section 17(a). Note, Federal
Securities Fraud Liability and Municipal Issuers: Implications of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 1064, 1065 & n.2, 1070 & n.30, 1071, 1076-77 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Columbia Note].
The courts have considered tenth amendment challenges to the enforcement of the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws against municipal issuers in the context of two SEC investigations
and in two private actions for damages. In City of Philadelphia v. SEC, 434 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), appeal dismissedfor want ofjurisdiction, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978), the court held that a
preliminary investigation of the sale of securities by Philadelphia was not barred by NLC. The
city argued that the investigation would have an adverse impact on municipal services because it
would undermine investors' confidence and force the city to pay higher interest rates. Although
the court recognized the "financing and distribution of municipal services" as traditional govern-
mental functions, it concluded that NLC did not bar an investigation because "the city has not
been ordered to adopt any measure as to the financing and distribution of its services." Id at 287-
88. The City of New York also resisted an SEC investigation of its finances on NLC grounds, but
its action for a declaratory judgment that an investigation of the issuance and sale of municipal
securities was unconstitutional was dismissed and the investigation was completed. City of New
York v. SEC, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,667 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
See also COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 1ST SaSS., SE-
CURITY AND EXCHANGE COMMIssIoN's FINAL REPORT IN THE MATTER OF TRANSACTIONS OF
THE CITY OF NEw YORK (Comm. Print 1979); Schwarz, Municipal Bonds and the Securities Laws:
Do Investors Have an Implied Remedvz 7 SEc. REG. L.J. 119, 120 n.2 (1979).
"No municipal securities issuer or issuer official has ever been held liable under the antifraud
provisions," and private actions for damages against these issuers and officials have been rare.
Doty & Peterson, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municial Securities, 71 Nw.
U.L. REv. 283, 373 (1976). Only two courts have addressed the question of federalism limits on
the application of the antifraud provisions to municipal issuers, and both avoided any resolution.
With respect to rule lOb-5, these courts concluded that at least prior to the 1975 amendment it did
not apply to municipal issuers and dismissed complaints against a municipal issuer based on the
sale of securities before 1975. With respect to section 17(a), both courts concluded that there was
no implied cause of action. In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 180-87
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in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road,498 the lower
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270,
1280-82, 1284-88 (D. Kan. 1980).
Although both decisions avoided resolution of the constitutional issue, they support conflicting
inferences about Congress' power to impose financial liability on municipal issuers for fraudulent
conduct. One court suggested in dictum that if the 1975 amendment of rule lOb-5 made it applica-
ble to a municipal issuer it would be unconstitutional to the extent that, for example, a mayor
could be held liable for remarks to his constituents about the city's financial condition. 507 F.
Supp. at 185-86, 187 n.40. The other court held that a municipal issuer could be liable for fraud in
the issuance of an industrial development bond (IDB) under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act (15
U.S.C. § 77/(2) (1976)). 489 F. Supp. at 1288-97. The IDB was issued by the municipality to
finance the construction of a manufacturing facility, and the revenue from the lease of the land
and plant was to finance the payment of interest and principal to bondholders. Id at 1276. The
court reasoned that there is no tenth amendment bar to private liability for fraud because issuance
of an IDB is not a traditional governmental function. The court found that there was no tradi-
tional governmental function because the primary benefits of an IDB are private-the low rent
paid by the manufacturer who in effect borrows funds at a low interest rate and the tax exempt
interest received by bondholders-and the public benefits of community economic development
are only secondary. Id at 1296-97. Given the implicit distinction between IDB's and other mu-
nicipal securities in terms of public benefit, it is not clear whether this court would hurdle the
NLC bar to antifraud liability with respect to other types of municipal securities.
Although the courts have not yet resolved the question of the liability of the states and their
political subdivisions under the securities laws, most commentators, with a few caveats, agree that
NLC should not be read to preclude application of the antifraud provisions governing corporate
securities to municipal issuers. E.g., Doty & Petersen, supra, at 363-67. See generally NYU Note,
supra; Columbia Note, supra. Proposals to subject municipal securities to the reporting and regis-
tration requirements of the securities laws have also generated arguments that the burden of com-
pliance with these disclosure requirements is an impermissible intrusion on the traditional
governmental function of borrowing money. E.g., Comment, Municipal Bonds: Is There a Need
for Mandatory Disclosure, 58 J. U"B. L. 221 (1981); Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securi-
ties: Disclosure Requirements and Dual Sovereignty, 86 YALE L.J. 919 (1977); Duke Comtnent,
supra; NYU Note, supra.
498. 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982). The Second Circuit's decision is
rehearsed and supported in Note, The Commerce Clause and the Balancing Approach: The De-
lineation of Federaland State Interests.- United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road,
1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 189; Note, The Essential Governmental Function After National League of
Cities: Impact of an Essentiality Test on Commuter Rail Transportation, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149
(1980). The decision of the Second Circuit is criticized in Comment, Railroad Regulation After
National League of Cities: United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 809 (1981).
Before the Second Circuit's decision in United Transportation Union, two courts had considered
the application of the RLA to the employees of the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Au-
thority (SIRTOA) which, like the Long Island Rail Road, is a state-owned railroad primarily
engaged in providing commuter rail service. A state court held that a strike by SIRTOA employ-
ees could be enjoined even though SIRTOA was covered by the RLA. Although this court recog-
nized that NLC approved national regulation of state-owned railroads, see supra note 114, it
applied a balancing test and concluded that the state interest in prohibiting strikes by public em-
ployees outweighed the national interest in promoting interstate commerce under the policies of
the RLA because SIRTOA's only connection with interstate commerce was one freight run per
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court's opinion illustrates the problems of evaluating NLC challenges
to Congress' power to regulate the states that will survive the Court's
unanimous opinion. The issue in this case was whether the employees
of the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), a wholly owned subsidiary of a
state agency, were subject to the National Railway Labor Act4 99
(RLA), which permits strikes after exhaustion of dispute resolution
procedures, or to a New York law prohibiting strikes by public employ-
day. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. Local 922, IBEW, 57 App. Div. 2d 614, 393
N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dept.), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, cert. denied 434 U.S. 934 (1977). In a
subsequent case involving SIRTOA, a federal district court rejected the state court's argument that
the tenuous relationship between the railroad and interstate commerce justified the application of
the state law prohibition of strikes. The court held, primarily on the basis of the suggestion in
NLC that the operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not a traditional governmental
function, see supra note 114, that the RLA authorization of peaceful strikes preempted the state
law prohibition. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating
Auth., 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3154, 3160-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). See Amalgamated Transit Union,
Div. 819 v. Byrne, 568 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1977) (avoids question whether national regulation
of employees of state-subsidized transit company would be precluded by NLC); In re Valuation
Proceedings Under §§ 303(c) & 306 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 439 F. Supp. 1351,
1373 n.37 (Special Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 1977) (assumption that NLC ap-
proved national regulation of state-operated railroad).
499. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit XI, subtit. E, pt. 6, § 1157, 95 Stat. 681. The Railway Labor Act (RLA)
applies to "carrier[s] by railroad" that are involved in transportation outside a single state, and it
permits resort to self-help once dispute resolution procedures have been exhausted. United
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d at 20 n.2, 22-23. See Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380-85 (1969); 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); 49
U.S.C. § 10501 (a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See general
, 
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD AND AIRLINE INDUSTRIES (C. Rehmus ed. 1976).
Although the state argued that LIRR was not covered by the RLA because it was essentially a
"local commuter transportation system" with a minimal connection to interstate commerce
through a declining freight business, the court held that the LIRR is subject to the RLA. 634 F.2d
at 22-23.
In contrast to the RLA, New York's Taylor Law (Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,
N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981)) prohibits strikes by public
employees. Id § 210. Many other rules governing labor relations under the RLA and the Taylor
Law are different, but the case did not raise any question of Congress' power to control, for exam-
ple, the definition of bargaining units or the subjects of collective bargaining. See Brief for Re-
spondents at 28-30, United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982).
When the Second Circuit held in 1980 that the application of the RLA to a state-owned com-
muter railroad was unconstitutional, the Act made no distinction between public and private rail-
roads, and both were subject to the same dispute resolution procedures. Congress amended the
RLA in 1981 and provided special procedures for publicly owned commuter rail services. These
amendments permit the Governor or the parties to a dispute to delay a strike for 240 days longer
than a strike on other railroads. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
tit. XI, subtit. E, pt. 6, § 1157, 95 Stat. 681. To the extent that the national rules governing labor
relations on publicly and privately owned railroads are different, these rules are less onerous for
public than private employers.
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ees. The Second Circuit combined a traditional or integral functions
test derived from the plurality opinion in NLC with a balancing test
derived from Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. 00
The court first found that the national policy permitting strikes "di-
rectly displaces [the] State's ability to structure its employee-employer
relationships and to make essential decisions" because strikes can lead
to higher wages and the state had made the essential decision that a
prohibition of strikes was necessary "to provide its citizens with contin-
uous public transportation." 0' The court then found that the "opera-
tion of a passenger rail service" is an "integral governmental function"
because it is an important public service which perhaps can be pro-
vided only by the government given the "economic elimination of pri-
vate suppliers."50 2 Having determined that the RLA affected essential
state decisions about the operation of an integral governmental func-
tion, the court concluded that the RLA could not be applied to the
LIRR because "the federal interest in preserving the right of LIRR em-
ployees [to strike] is not 'demonstrably greater' than New York State's
interest in preventing LIRR strikes in order to ensure continuous pas-
senger service for so many daily commuters. 50 3 The national interest
was not "demonstrably greater" than the state's interest because both
the RLA labor dispute settlement procedures and state law prohibition
of strikes serve the same policy of preventing the disruption of com-
merce, and the state as a practical matter is more concerned about
transportation on the LIRR between New York City and its suburbs
than the national government. °4
500. 634 F.2d at 24.
501. Id at 25.
502. Id at 27. The court distinguished prior Supreme Court decisions upholding national
regulation of state-owned railroads that were apparently approved in NLC, see su ra note 114, on
the ground that these cases involved freight service which is a less important state interest than
passenger service. Id at 26-27.
503. Id at 30. The requirement that the national interest must be "demonstrably greater"
than the state interest was drawn directly from Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in NLC.
See supra text accompanying note 118.
504. Id at 29-30. The Second Circuit recognized that "the determination of whether state or
federal interests are paramount may be difficult to resolve in future cases." Id at 30. Given the
flexibility inherent in balancing tests, NC may be nothing more than a vehicle for judicial assess-
ment of the comparative worth of state and national legislative policies. Indeed, it is hard to avoid
the suspicion that the court simply believed that the state's "no strike" policy was a better means
of assuring continuous service than the RLA's dispute resolution procedures which ultimately
permit a strike. The court's choice of New York State's policy for labor disputes over the national
policy of the RLA suggests that the general rule that courts should not sit as a "super-legislature"
[Vol. 60:779
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The Supreme Court found the case far less troubling than the Second
Circuit. Chief Justice Burger, in a short unanimous opinion, upheld
the application of the RLA to the state-owned railroad on the grounds
that NLC had approved such national regulations" 5 and that under the
third prong of the Hodel test 50 6 the operation of a railroad was not a
traditional function of state government. 0 7 Notwithstanding the Chief
Justice's contention that the Court "was not merely following the dicta
of [NLC] or looking only to the past to determine what is 'tradi-
"508 to509tional,' ,0 there is little, if anything, more to the opinion.
The lower courts will continue to face the problems illustrated by the
Second Circuit's opinion. In addressing NLC challenges to Congress'
power under the commerce clause to regulate state functions other than
the operation of a railroad, these courts will still have problems in de-
fining traditional state functions when history is an inadequate guide,
and they must still address the question whether national regulation of
to review the wisdom of legislative policy has a practical foundation in addition to being a rule of
democratic theory. New York's Taylor Law prohibition of strikes by public employees has been
remarkably ineffective in achieving its end of preventing the disruption of public services by
strikes. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981). See, e.g., Schender v.
Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 93 Misc. 2d 1099, 403 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (strike of
bridge and tunnel employees disrupting commuter traffic); Dowling v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 862, 385
N.Y.S.2d 355 (1976) (police strike disrupting traffic).
505, See supra note 114. The Court said that there was no basis for the Second Circuit's
distinction between state-owned freight and passenger railroads, see supra note 502, because the
operation of both types of railroads "has traditionally been a function of private industry, not state
or local governments." 102 S. Ct. at 1354 (footnote omitted).
506. See supra text accompanying note 447.
507. 102 S. Ct. at 1354. Shortly before the decision in United Transportation Union, the Spe-
cial Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act, upheld national regulation of initial hiring deci-
sions by a state agency operating a commuter railroad and the imposition of a duty to engage in
collective bargaining. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 534 F.
Supp. 832 (Special Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2271 (1982).
This court held that NLC did not bar national regulation of state employment decisions because
the national interest outweighed state interests. 534 F. Supp. at 849-51.
508. 102 S. Ct. at 1354.
509. The principal ground for the Court's decision was "the historical reality that the opera-
tion of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by state and local govern-
ments." Id (emphasis in original). The Chief Justice did, however, note several other arguments
in support of Congress' power to apply national labor relations policies to a state-owned railroad:
recognition of state immunity would permit the states to erode national authority by "acquiring
functions previously performed by the private sector" and would frustrate the national interest in
uniform regulation; the long history of national regulation of railroads was not matched by an
equivalent history of state regulation; and the state had acquired the Long Island Rail Road with
knowledge of national railway labor regulations and operated the railroad under those regulations
for thirteen years without protest. Id at 1355-56.
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traditional state functions is valid because national interests outweigh
state interests. The Court did hold clearly that historical state functions
are traditional state functions immune from national regulation under
the third prong of the Hodel test, but it also denied that history was the
sole criterion of immunity.510 Moreover, the Court left open the appli-
cation of a balancing test by reiterating the reservation in Hodel that
traditional state functions may be subject to national regulation if the
national interest is "so great as to 'justif[y] State submission.' "'11
After the Supreme Court's judgment upholding the RLA, the FLSA
is the only statute enacted under the commerce power that has been
held unconstitutional as applied to the states on the ground of imper-
missible interference with state autonomy. The results seem anoma-
lous: Congress can regulate a state in its capacity as an employer by
authorizing the employees of a state-owned railroad to strike, but Con-
gress cannot regulate a state in its capacity as an employer by setting
minimum wage and maximum hour standards for most of their em-
ployees. Indeed, no matter where one turns to make a comparison, the
FLSA cases stand in stark, and seemingly inexplicable, contrast with
the results in other cases.51 2 Nonetheless, the Court has not attempted
to reconcile the results of its cases either by the simple expedient of
510. The Court argued that its focus on traditional governmental functions did not "impose a
static historical view of state functions generally immune from federal regulation" and that NLC
immunized "basic State prerogatives." Id at 1354-55. For an assessment of the problems with
using history as a guide to the definition of important state functions, see infra note 874.
511. Id at 1353 n.9 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 n.29 (1981)).
512. The courts have upheld substantial requirements imposed upon the states in their capaci-
ties as employers under powers other than the commerce clause: the states must reinstate former
employees who are called to active service in the armed forces, see supra text accompanying notes
150-59; the states must provide unemployment compensation benefits for their employees, see
supra text accompanying notes 198-216; the states must engage in collective bargaining with some
of their employees, see supra note 256 and accompanying text; the states are prohibited from
discriminating in employment on the grounds of race, sex, or age, see Supra text accompanying
notes 356-82. If one looks beyond national regulation of the states as employers, the contrast is
even more stark. Congress can effectively require states to regulate private activity under national
standards, see supra text accompanying notes 160-75 (war power), 217-46 & 306-24 (spending
power); see infra text accompanying notes 542-713 (commerce power), and to reallocate political
power within the branches of state government, between the states and their political subdivisions,
and even to private groups, seesupra text accompanying notes 257-305. Even if the comparison is
confined to statutes enacted under the commerce power, the results seem anomalous. The courts
grant Congress plenary power to displace state policy for private activity, see supra text accompa-
nying note 458-75, and recognize Congress' power to override a state's speech and debate privilege
for its legislators, see supra text accompanying notes 478-81, and to limit the states' taxing powers,
see supra text accompanying notes 476-77.
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confining NLC to its facts or by starting a principled theory of federal-
ism limits on national political authority. Instead, the Court has simply
maintained that the federalism principle recognized in NLC is a
broadly applicable restraint on Congress' power under the commerce
clause to regulate the states.513
b. The Tax Power
The taxing power-"4 of the national government is broad, '1 5 but with
the exception of Chief Justice Marshall's early dictum that state instru-
mentalities are not immune from national taxation,1 6 the courts have
long recognized that there are some federalism limits on Congress'
power to tax the states.5" 7 Since the doctrine of state immunity from
national taxation was well-established before NLC was decided, there
is some question about the relation of the rules for regulatory and tax
immunity.
The modem Court's last major assessment of state immunity from
national taxation was New York v. United States.5" s The Court upheld
513. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2142 n.32 (1982);
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 102 S. Ct. 1349, 1353-55 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 283-93 (1981).
514. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, provides that "Congress shall have the power to lay and
collect taxes .... "
515. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.) (apart from limita-
tions on the methods of taxation, national tax power reaches every subject except exports from a
state); Dam, supra note 42, at 287-90. A tax may be beyond Congress' power if its regulatory
purpose is too clear or if it contains provisions "extraneous to any tax need." United States v.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 31 (1953); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
516. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819). After holding that a state
tax on bank notes issued by a branch of the Bank of the United States was unconstitutional, the
Chief Justice stated that a similar national tax on the operations of state government would be
valid. His distinction here between "the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on
the whole" suggests that he saw a political check on Congress' power to tax the states.
517. State immunity from national taxation was first recognized in Collector v. Day, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 113 (1871) where the Court held that the salary of a state judge, who performs a state
function, was immune from a national income tax. The courts subsequently expanded state im-
munity to encompass the claims of private taxpayers that their relation to state government war-
ranted immunity from national taxes, but the Supreme Court repudiated "derivative immunity"
in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938). During the period of over sixty years in which
derivative immunity flourished, the immunity of state and local governments themselves from
national taxes turned on a distinction between governmental activity, which was entitled to immu-
nity, and proprietary activity, which was subject to taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States,
435 U.S. 444, 454-60 (1978) (plurality opinion of Justice Brennan tracing the history of state im-
munity from national taxation); Dam, supra note 42, at 290-91.
518. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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a national tax on the sale of mineral water produced by the State of
New York at a state-owned mineral spring, but the decision rested on
two similar, but slightly different theories. Justice Frankfurter, in an
opinion joined only by Justice Rutledge, held that the national tax was
valid because it was nondiscriminatory-that is-it applied equally to
all mineral water vendors, state or private.5 19 He also added a signifi-
cant example of his general rule that a state is not immune from a non-
discriminatory tax: the national government cannot tax "State activi-
ties and State-owned property that partake of uniqueness from the
point of view of intergovernmental relations," such as a statehouse or
state tax revenues.52 Chief Justice Stone, writing for three other mem-
bers of the Court, conceded that a discriminatory tax against a state
would be invalid,52" ' but he argued that even if a tax was nondiscrimi-
natory, it would still be invalid if it "interfere[d] unduly with the State's
performance of its sovereign functions of government. ' 522 Although he
recognized greater immunity in theory than Justice Frankfurter, he
then decided the case essentially on the narrow ground of Justice
Frankfurter's opinion. He held that the national tax on mineral waters
was valid because its nondiscriminatory nature ensured that it did not
"curtail the business of state government more than it does the like
business of the citizen" and because immunity would withdraw from
the national taxing power "a subject of taxation . . . traditionally
within that power." '523
519. Id at 582, 584.
520. Id at 582. Justice Frankfurter believed that this example was inherent in his general
rule, and not an exception to it. Although he recognized that an "abstract category of taxpayers"
such as all real estate owners might include both private property owners and the state as owner of
the statehouse, a general (apportioned) national real estate tax would be discriminatory and thus
invalid as applied to the statehouse because a statehouse is unique in the sense of having no
private counterpart. See id Justice Frankfurter supplied only one example of state-owned prop-
erty (statehouse) and one example of a state activity (taxation) that he believed had no private
analogue. To the extent that there are in fact private counterparts to state property and activities
that he would immunize, he created an exception to his general rule that a nondiscriminatory tax
is valid. See Note, Federal Immunityfrom State Taxation: A Reassessment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv.
695, 709 n.83 (1978). Regardless of the consistency of his example with his theory, immunity for
"unique" state activity seems to be, as Justice Douglas suggested, governmental immunity
"poured into a new container." 326 U.S. at 592. Justice Frankfurter, however, had expressly
repudiated a distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" activity as the test of state
immunity. Id at 580.
521. 326 U.S. at 586.
522. Id at 587.
523. Id at 588-89.
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The differences between these two tests of state immunity from na-
tional taxation are rather small. Both Justice Frankfurter and the
Chief Justice believed that a discriminatory tax was invalid, and both
recognized similar types of state activity or property as absolutely im-
mune from national taxation. 24 The principal difference is that Justice
Frankfurter would have held that a nondiscriminatory tax is valid un-
less it was exacted from "State as a State," 525 but the Chief Justice
would have balanced the intrusion on state sovereignty against the re-
duction of the national taxing power to determine the validity of most
nondiscriminatory taxes. 26
Although the doctrine of state immunity from national taxation was
fully developed when New York v. United States was decided in 1946,
there was no counterpart doctrine of regulatory immunity until the
NLC decision thirty years later in 1976. The two decisions merge in a
common statement that there is a core of state sovereignty immune
from national regulation or taxation, but the effect of NLC on the prior
rule of state immunity from national taxation is not clear.5 27 Justice
Rehnquist's conclusion in his plurality opinion in NLC that federalism
principles prohibit national regulations that "directly displace" or "im-
permissibly interfere" with "traditional" or "integral" state governmen-
tal functions528 certainly echoes Chief Justice Stone's prohibition of
524. The Chief Justice said that a nondiscriminatory tax could not be applied to "the State's
capitol, its State-house, its public school houses, public parks, or revenues from its taxes or school
lands." ld at 587-88. Justice Frankfurter thought that his test would exempt the statehouse and
state tax revenues from national taxation. See supra text accompanying note 520.
Justice Douglas, in an opinion joined by Justice Black, dissented on the ground that all state
activity, which is by definition for the benefit of the state's citizens, should be immune from na-
tional taxation. Id at 590-98.
525. Id at 582.
526. Although Chief Justice Stone never stated explicitly that the validity of a nondiscrimina-
tory tax turns on a balancing of national and state interests, the conclusion that he intended a
balancing test is inescapable. First, his concern that a nondiscriminatory tax could "interfere un-
duly" with sovereign state functions, id at 587-88, and conversely that the national taxing power
might be "unduly curtailed" by recognition of tax immunity, id at 589, suggests a test balancing
the impairment of a state's sovereign functions of government against the effects of immunity on
the national taxing power. Second, he applied such a test in the case at hand. The national tax on
mineral waters was valid because the effect on the national taxing power of state immunity, which
he measured by its tendency to withdraw a general class of activity or property from national
taxation, id at 590, outweighed the minimal burden on the state. Third, he had applied a balanc-
ing test in a contemporaneous opinion addressing an analogous question of national and state
relations. See Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
527. See supra Note, note 520, at 708-813.
528. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
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national taxes that "interfere unduly with the State's performance of its
sovereign functions of government, 5 29 and Justice Rehnquist also sug-
gested that state sovereignty imposed the same restraints on the com-
merce and tax powers. 3 Nevertheless, the Court's failure to determine
any precise test of regulatory immunity, in NLC, coupled with the ab-
sence of any direct consideration of the issue of tax immunity, makes
hazardous any prediction whether NLC modifies or preserves the non-
discrimination, sovereign functions, or balancing tests of the mineral
waters tax case.
Subsequent decisions have not answered the question whether NLC
or the tests of New York v. United States determine the scope of state
immunity from national taxation. In Massachusetts v. United States,53
the Court upheld the application of an annual registration tax on civil
aircraft to a state-owned helicopter used exclusively for police func-
tions. The Court construed the tax as a "user fee", that is, a charge for
airport facilities and navigational services provided by the national
government, and it analogized payment of this tax to the payment for
stamps on letters carried by the United States Postal Service. 32 The
Court upheld the user fee on the basis of a three-part test which served
the dual purposes of identifying a user fee and of explaining why the
state was not immune. 533 First, the tax was nondiscriminatory, and ap-
plication of the tax to private and state civil aircraft minimized or elim-
529. See supra text accompanying note 522.
530. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 843 n.14 (1976). Justice Rehnquist's
equation of regulatory and tax immunity was a response to Justice Brennan's argument that the
doctrine of tax immunity recognized in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), should
not be extended to limit regulation under the commerce clause. Compare 426 U.S. at 843 with 426
U.S. at 863-64, 869. He apparently believes, however, that state sovereignty imposes less restraint
on national taxation than on national regulation. In his dissent in Fry v. United States, see supra
text accompanying notes 119-20, he argued that it is less burdensome for a state "to pay a nondis-
criminatory tax.., than to comply with a nondiscriminatory regulation" because payment of a
tax only forces a state to raise additional revenue or to reduce expenditures and a regulation alters
state policy choices. 421 U.S. 542, 554 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
531. 435 U.S. 444 (1978). Prior to the decision in Massachusetts v. United States, a federal
district court held the tax unconstitutional as applied to a state-owned airplane used for police
purposes on the ground that except in special circumstances NLC denies Congress the power to
tax the means by which a state performs its traditional functions. State Dep't of Transp. v. United
States, 430 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
532. 435 U.S. at 453-54, 453 n. 11.
533. Justice Brennan's opinion, stating and applying the user fee test, was joined by five other
Justices. Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice, dissented because the state
had not been given an opportunity to prove that the tax was not a user fee, but he argued that




inated the danger of an abusive exercise of the taxing power.534
Second, the "tax was a fair approximation of the benefits civil aircraft
receive from federal activities" which apparently assured that the state
received its quid pro quo.535 Third, the tax was "structured to produce
revenues that will not exceed the total cost to the Federal Government
of the benefits supplied," and this ceiling on the total amount of the tax,
like its nondiscrimination, ensured that the states would not be unduly
burdened.5
36
Since the Court specifically disclaimed any decision on the general
question of state immunity from national taxation,537 it is difficult to
estimate how far the rationale of the decision transcends the narrow
confines of a "user fee." The quid pro quo of national services for the
states' payment of the tax is a distinction, but the Court did not explain
why this distinction is one of constitutional dimension requiring a dif-
ferent test of state immunity. There are at least two reasons why the
test applied in Massachusetts v. United States may have a broader reach
than its facts. First, a "user fee" is like any tax-it increases the costs of
state government, and these costs may in turn effect state policy deci-
sions. 3' Second, the Court's identification of the tax as nondiscrimina-
tory, and its conclusion that the tax would not "unduly burden"5 39 the
states' activities, are consistent with Chief Justice Stone's analysis of the
national tax on mineral waters in New York v. United States.540 Never-
theless, given the narrow context of the decision and the absence of any
elaboration of either New York v. United States or NLC, the relation of
the doctrines of tax and regulatory immunity remains unsettled.54
by the national government to a state. Id at 472. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the
decision.
534. Id at 466-67.
535. Id at 466-68.
536. Id at 466-67, 469-70.
537. Id at 454.
538. The Court recognized that the "user fee" imposed costs on state government, but it found
that an economic burden alone did not warrant immunity. Id at 461. A federal district court,
which held this tax unconstitutional before the decision in Massachusetts v. United States, see
supra note 531, found that the increased cost of operating a state police airplane might affect state
policy by forcing "the use of fewer air patrols and more ground level reconaissance in detecting
and combating forest fires." State Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 823, 826 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
539. 435 U.S. at 467.
540. See supra text accompanying notes 522-23.
541. Justice Brennan, writing only for himself and the three other members of the Court who
dissented in NLC, did review the doctrine of tax immunity and explained its relationship with the
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3. Regulations Requiring the Affirmative Exercise of State
Authoriy Over Private Activity
Much as Congress uses the spending power to obtain state coopera-
tion in implementing national regulatory and social welfare pro-
grams,5 42 it also uses the commerce power extensively to employ the
states as its agents in regulating private activity. At the risk of some
oversimplification, one can identify, in statutes enacted under the com-
merce power, three distinct means of providing for state administration
and enforcement of national substantive policy for private activity.-
43
First, Congress often delegates national authority to state officers,
agencies, and political subdivisions and supplements their power under
state law to regulate private activity.5 " This means of providing for
regulatory immunity recognized in NLC. 435 U.S. at 454-60. He argued that political checks
should be considered in determining the scope of state immunity from national taxation even
though NLC had rejected this argument with respect to regulatory immunity. Id at 456 n.13.
Since he found that prior decisions had identified political checks in the nondiscriminatory appli-
cation of a tax to state and private activity, he stated a very limited test of tax immunity that drew
heavily on Chief Justice Stone's opinion in New York v. United States.
NLC so far has had little impact either in the courts or in Congress on state immunity from
national taxation. In addition to the tax at issue in Massachusetts v. United States, the courts have
considered the constitutionality of only one other tax applied to state government after NLC. In
California exrel. California Dep't of Justice v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Cal. 1977), a
federal district court upheld an eight percent excise tax upon air travel as applied to state employ-
ees. The court found that the tax was valid under New York v. United States because it was
nondiscriminatory and did not interfere unduly with the state's performance of its sovereign func-
tions and that it was valid under NLC because any effect on traditional governmental functions
was minor in comparison with the effects of the FLSA. Id at 23-26.
Although Congress has read NLC to limit some of its powers, see supra notes 22-23 and accom-
panying text, Congress has apparently concluded that its power to tax the states and their political
subdivisions is not so limited. Congress has reduced the scope of the basic tax exemption for
interest on municipal bonds, 26 U.S.C. §§ 103, 103A (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), on several occasions
after NLC was decided. See, e.g., Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499,
tit. XI, §§ 1101-1104, 94 Stat. 2660-2681, adding 26 U.S.C. § 103A (Supp. IV 1980) and anending
26 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1976). But see Keohane, The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1979: An
Unwarranted Attack on State Sovereignty, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483 (1980) (tax on interest of
municipal bonds issued to finance housing construction is an unconstitutional intrusion on tradi-
tional governmental function of borrowing money to provide for housing). On the question of
Congress' power to tax the obligations of state and local government, see generally Doty & Peter-
sen, supra note 497, at 349 n.256. There is some evidence, however, that Congress doubts its
power to tax the states after NLC. See supra note 202.
542. See supra text accompanying notes 186-97, 217-46 & 306-24.
543. Congress has employed the states as its agents to regulate private activity since 1789. The
history ofthis practice and the full range of mechanisms used by Congress to induce or require the
states to implement national regulatory programs are assessed infra at notes 920-1032.
544. See infra text accompanying notes 705-13.
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state enforcement of national law is weak because the delegate may
choose not to exercise the authority or may exercise it in a fashion con-
trary to Congress' intention. It also raises the question of Congress'
power to authorize a state officer, agency, or political subdivision to act
in excess of or contrary to its state law powers.
A second means of employing the states as the nation's agents rests
on the threat of national assumption of the regulation of private activ-
ity. Congress may establish rules for private activity and hold direct
national regulation in abeyance on the condition that the states adopt
and enforce national standards under state law. 45 This mechanism
avoids the problem of supplementing state law because the states regu-
late private activity under the authority of state statutes. It ensures that
the national standards will govern private activity because if the states
fail to implement the national standards, direct national regulation is
imposed. The threat that the national government will take over the
regulation of private activity and supplant state regulation provides
some incentive for the states to conform the affirmative exercise of their
authority to national requirements. Congress often enhances this in-
centive by grants to states that enforce national standards. Congress
also may orchestrate political pressure on the states by establishing a
scheme of regulations for state implementation that is less onerous than
a set of alternative regulations to be enforced directly by the national
government.5 46 Regardless whether one labels such incentives "induce-
ment" or "coercion," Congress has been remarkably successful in using
such means to employ the states as its agents.
There is a third means of providing for state administration and en-
forcement of national regulatory programs if a state is able to resist
Congress' blandishments. In a few instances Congress has enacted stat-
utes that either require the states to enact and enforce state laws regu-
lating private activity547 or supplement state law and require the states
to exercise authority conferred by national law over private activity: 48
All three of these means of using the commerce power lead to the
same result-state regulation of private activity under national stan-
dards. Together they raise a common question of federalism limits on
Congress' power to employ the states as its agents to regulate private
545. See infra text accompanying notes 559-80.
546. See infra note 982.
547. See infra text accompanying notes 581-609.
548. See infra text accompanying notes 610-91.
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activity. Separately they raise questions whether concerns about pro-
tecting state autonomy limit Congress' choice of means. The Court has
been presented with three cases in the last six terms that raised the
question of Congress' power under the commerce clause to use the
states as its agents, but it has never considered the full range of means
available to Congress under both the commerce and spending powers.
In EPA v. Brown,549 the Court avoided a review on the merits of
several courts of appeals decisions finding that a statute would be un-
constitutional if it was construed to compel state regulation. In Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,55 ° the Court ap-
proved, in general terms and on the basis of a rather preemptory analy-
sis, Congress' power to provide for state regulation of private activity
under national standards by threatening to impose direct national regu-
lation. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississpli," 'decided
near the end of the October 1981 term, is the Court's latest word on the
question of Congress' power to employ the states as its agents. The
statute at issue in this case appeared to raise the question left open in
EPA v. Brown: Do NLC federalism principles deny Congress the
power to compel state implementation of national regulations gov-
erning private activity? The Court, however, again avoided this ques-
tion. It read the statute to provide for state administration of certain
national regulations for private electric utilities under the threat that a
national prohibition of all state regulation of electric utilities would be
imposed if the state failed to act.552 Having construed the statute disin-
genuously,553 the Court then sustained Congress' power to use the
states as its agents.
On both occasions that it reached the merits, the Court has upheld
Congress' power to use the states as the nation's agents, but Hodel and
FERC failed to assess accurately the actual impact of the statutes at
issue on the states and to establish a principled justification of Con-
gress' power. In both cases the Court failed to recognize that state im-
plementation of national regulations requires the states to allocate their
549. 431 U.S. 99 (1977), vacating and remanding, Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir.
1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827
(9th Cir. 1975); Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1975); see infra text accompanying notes
592-602.
550. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 559-80.
551. 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 610-91.
552. See infra text accompanying notes 654-59.




legislative, executive, judicial and financial resources to satisfy national
political demands at the expense of implementing state policies and ful-
filling the demands of its own political community.554 Since the Court
in effect denied that state implementation of national regulations gov-
erning private activity has any significant impact on state autonomy, it
did not provide any justification of Congress' power to employ the
states as its agents. 5" In short, neither Hodel nor FERC answered the
question whether NLC federalism principles restrict Congress' power
under the commerce clause to employ the states as its agents as well as
Congress' power to regulate the states.
Even on their own terms, which sidestep federalism issues, Hodel
and FERC establish an inadequate framework for resolving questions
of Congress' power to require the affirmative exercise of state authority
over private activity. In Hodel the Court approved Congress' power to
induce state implementation of national environmental standards
under the threat of imposing direct national regulation. The Court dis-
approved Congress' power to mandate state enforcement of national
regulations, but it did not provide any criteria for distinguishing be-
tween the means approved and impermissible compulsion.5 6  In
FERC, the Court blurred the already vague distinction between state
implementation under a threat of alternative national rules governing
private activity and mandatory state implementation." 7 The majority
strained to construe provisions for mandatory state implementation as
analogous to the means previously approved in Hodel, and they sug-
gested that state agencies may have a "duty" to enforce national law.
The legacy of Hodel and FERC-unresolved federalism issues and a
malleable prohibition of mandatory state implementation of national
regulations-will plague principled analysis in pending challenges 58 to
statutes providing for state administration and enforcement of national
regulations.
a. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association
In Hodel the Court upheld both Congress' power under the com-
554. See infra text accompanying notes 566-68 & 668-72.
555. See infra text accompanying notes 569-80, 632-53 & 665-72.
556. See infra text accompanying notes 607-09.
557. See infra text accompanying notes 673-91.
558. See infra text accompanying notes 693-713.
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merce clause to regulate surface mining559 and a provision in the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) for state
enforcement of the national environmental standards for this private
activity. This Act provides that the states can regulate surface mining if
they adopt a program which applies national environmental standards
to surface mining operations.5 60 The Act also establishes procedural
requirements for state administration and enforcement of the environ-
mental standards.5 61 The state regulatory program must be approved
by the Secretary of the Interior, and it "must demonstrate that the state
legislature has enacted laws implementing the environmental protec-
tion standards established by the Act and accompanying regulations,
and that the State has the administrative and technical ability to en-
force these standards." '562 If a state's program is not approved, or if a
state fails to submit or to enforce its program, then national regulation
is exclusive and the Secretary must promulgate and enforce a national
program for the regulation of surface mining in that state.5 63 In short,
the SMCRA requires the states to exercise affirmatively their authority
over private activity by adopting and enforcing national environmental
standards in order to avoid a national takeover of the regulation of
surface mining.
Congress has used the mechanism of the SMCRA, or similar means,
in many energy and environmental programs to obtain state coopera-
tion in the regulation of private activity, and prior to Hodel the lower
courts consistently approved state implementation of national pro-
grams .5  Nevertheless, Hodel's general approval of state participation
559. See supra notes 458-63 & 475 and accompanying text.
560. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. IV 1980).
561. E.g., id §§ 1263-1264, 1270 (administrative standards for issuance of surface mining per-
mits and citizen suits to compel implementation of state programs).
562. 452 U.S. at 271.
563. 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (Supp. IV 1980). The environmental standards of the SMCRA are
imposed in two phases, and the provision for state enforcement applies only to the second phase.
In the first phase, the "interim regulatory program," only eight of the Act's 25 standards are im-
posed on surface mining, and the Secretary has the responsibility to enforce them. The second
phase is the "permanent regulatory program," and all 25 standards are to be enforced by either
the states or the national government. 452 U.S. at 271; Indirect Regulation, supra note 463, at 592-
93.
564. Although two courts approved state participation in national regulatory programs, the
approval was simply stated in passing without any analysis either of the means employed to ob-
tain state cooperation or of the broader question of Congress' power to employ the states as its
agents in regulating private activity. Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1978);
Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215,
[Vol. 60:779
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in the regulation of surface mining should be read narrowly because
the Court did not address directly the question of Congress' power to
employ the states as its agents in regulating private activity.565
The Court described the SMCRA as a "program of cooperative fed-
eralism that allows the States, within limits established by federal mini-
mum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory
programs, structured to meet their own particular needs. 566 This
228 (4th Cir. 1975) (dictum approving threat of national regulation as a means of inducing states
to implement national programs), vacated and remanded 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
One court has considered more carefully Congress' power to use the states to administer na-
tional regulations. In Oklahoma . Federal Energy Regulator, Commission, the court rejected the
state's argument that it had been coerced into administering national price regulations for the
intrastate sale of natural gas. 494 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Okla. 1980), ajf'd, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2902; see Tenneco v. Sutton, 530 F. Supp. 411,432 (M.D. La. 1981)
(decision on tenth amendment issue is binding on defendants under doctrine of resjudicata). The
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 US.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980), provides for national
regulation of the price of natural gas sold in intrastate and interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3311-3333 (Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is charged with the
responsibility of administering and enforcing these regulations, but it may delegate certain regula-
tory functions to state agencies with their consent. Id §§ 3411, 3413(c). Oklahoma complained
that this provision for delegation of regulatory responsibility was barred by NLC because the state
was coerced into enacting legislation, assigning state employees, and expending state funds to
implement national policy. 494 F. Supp. at 664, 658-61. The mechanism for obtaining state regu-
lation of the price of natural gas sold in intrastate commerce is identical to the means employed in
the SMCRA to obtain enforcement of national environmental standards for surface mining: if the
state agrees to enforce national standards for the sale of natural gas, then the national government
will not regulate this activity directly. The court held that this quid pro quo is not unconstitu-
tional coercion and that the provision for state enforcement of national regulations of natural gas
is valid because there is no mandatory requirement that the states regulate private activity. Id at
659-61. The court left unanswered the question of Congress' power to regulate the procedures
employed by the state in enforcing national price rules. Id at 659.
565. The Court's failure to explore carefully the question of Congress' power to use the states
to regulate surface mining is in part explained by the fact that the challenges to the Act did not
focus on this issue. The provision for state enforcement applies only to the permanent regulatory
program, which is the second phase of implementation, supra note 563, and the principal attacks
were on the interim regulatory program, which is enforced by the Secretary of Interior. 452 U.S.
at 273. Nevertheless, most of the lower courts, like the Supreme Court, also considered the provi-
sion for state enforcement. See supra note 460. The Virginia district court suggested that the state
was coerced into enforcing the national law, but it decided the case on the ground that national
regulation of surface mining was barred by NLC because it interfered with the traditional state
function of controlling land use. 483 F. Supp. at 432 & n.6. The Indiana district court did not
reach the question of Congress' power to require the states to regulate surface mining because it
held that national regulation of this private activity was unconstitutional. 501 F. Supp. at 464.
Two of the three other federal district courts that considered the constitutionality of the SMCRA
held that the provision for state regulation is valid because the states are not compelled to regulate
or to expend state funds. 494 F. Supp. at 682; 14 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) at 1329.
566. 452 U.S. at 289.
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description is disingenuous, and it begs the basic question of Congress'
power to induce or to require the affarmative exercise of state authority
over private activity. Although most of the states subject to the SM-
CRA had previously regulated surface mining, the national statute was
enacted because state regulation had proved inadequate. 67 The SM-
CRA and accompanying regulations substitute comprehensive, de-
tailed national standards for the states' regulations, and the states'
discretion to modify these standards is limited.568 Thus, contrary to the
Court's assertion, the states do not enforce their "own" regulatory pro-
grams and administer state policy; they enforce policies set at the na-
tional level by Congress.
The Court's conclusion that the SMCRA "allows" the states to regu-
late surface mining also is flawed. Even though the Act falls short of a
mandatory requirement that the states enforce the national standards,
there is something more than permission inherent in the threat of direct
national regulation of surface mining if the states fail to act. The threat
of national regulation plays on the desire of state bureaucrats to be the
administrators. It also plays on state legislators' fears of being charged
with ceding authority to the national government and their hopes of
establishing a less restrictive program than one enforced by the na-
tional government.5 69 The Act also provides two additional incentives
that the Court ignored. First, the Act authorizes grants to the states to
567. Harvey, supra note 460, at 1149.
568. Note, Surface Mining Control andReclamation Act of 1977 Regulator), Controversies and
Constitutional Challenges, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 762, 768-70 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Regulator)'
Controversies]; Indirect Regulation, supra note 463, at 593 n.20, 605-06. State arguments that the
national environmental standards are too rigid and thwart the regulatory flexibility intended by
Congress have been, for the most part, unsuccessful. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litig., 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. deniedsub nom. Peabody Coal Co. v. Watt, 102 S.
Ct. 106 (1981); In re Permanent Surfacing Mining Regulation Litig., 3 POLLUTION CONT. GUIDE
(CCH) 40,307 (D.D.C. No. 79-1144) (May 6, 1980); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litig., 3 POLLUTION CONT. GUIDE (CCH) 40,282 (D.D.C. No. 80-05613) (February 26, 1980),
rev'dinpart, In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., Peabody Coal, Appellant, 3 POL-
LUTION CONT. GUIDE (CCH) 40,323 (D.C. Cir. No. 80-1308) (July 26, 1980); see In re Perma-
nent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (interim regulatory
program), affg inpart, rev'g inpart, and remanding, 452 F. Supp. 327, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C.
1978). Congress has considered amendments that would give the states greater discretion in im-
plementing the national environmental standards. Shostak, The Pit andthe Pendulum.- The Senate
and S. 1403, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 1221 (1980).
569. Haggard, Federalism and EnvironmentalLaw, 54 DEN. L.J. 611, 614 (1977). The Virginia
legislature objected to the pressure to enact a law conforming to national standards and stated that
one purpose of its surface mining program was to "minimize the adverse effects of federal regula-




develop, administer and enforce the surface mining regulations,5 7 0 and
it makes fifty percent of the national funds allocated for reclamation of
abandoned mines within a state available on the condition that the
state agrees to regulate surface mining.57' These conditional grants are
probably as important in obtaining state participation in the regulation
of surface mining as the threat of direct national regulation. The sec-
ond incentive that the Court ignored is a difference between the state
and national regulatory programs. 72 If a national program is estab-
lished, no lands may be designated as unsuitable for surface mining
during the first year of direct national regulation, but the states may
begin immediately to prohibit surface mining on certain lands.573
Congress consciously combined all of these incentives to ensure that
the states would assume "primary governmental responsibility" '574 for
surface mining regulation and that direct national regulation would be
a last resort.575 The Court's statement that "the full regulatory burden"
would be borne by national government if the states decided not to
participate 576 ignores the crucial point that Congress designed the Act
to avoid this result. In the SMCRA, as in most national environmental
programs, state administration and enforcement is essential because
Congress did not authorize and appropriate sufficient funds for direct
national administration and enforcement of surface mining programs
in every state.57 7 State regulation is also essential in a second, more
570. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a), 1302(c) (Supp. IV 1980). The states may receive grants for up to
80% of their total costs in the first year, 60% in the second year, and 50% thereafter. Rochow, The
Far Side of Paradox: State Regulation of the Environmental Effects of Coal Mining, 81 W. VA. L.
REv. 559, 578-80 (1979).
571. In addition to the regulation of surface mining, the Act establishes a fund for the recla-
mation of abandoned mine lands. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243 (Supp. IV 1980). The fund is sup-
ported by a tax on coal mining operations. Id § 1232. Fifty percent of the funds collected on
mining operations in each state are allocated to that state if it establishes both an approved pro-
gram for the administration of these funds and an approved program for the regulation of surface
mining. Id §§ 1232(g)(2), 1235(c)(d)(h). Since the balance of the funds may be expended directly
by the Secretary of Interior in his discretion in any state, id § 1232(g)(3), a state may obtain its
minimum allotment of fifty percent of the tax assessed on its mining operations only if it agrees to
implement the national standards for surface mining. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 872.11 (b), 884.1, 884.11,
886.11 (1981); Rochow, supra note 570, at 580-81.
572. Harvey, supra note 460, at 1156.
573. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1254(a), 1272(a)(c)(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
574. Id § 1201(f).
575. Harvey, supra note 460, at 1156.
576. 452 U.S. at 288.
577. Congress authorized payment of only a portion of the states' costs of administering and
enforcing the surface mining regulations. See supra note 570. The delay of the Office of Surface
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fundamental sense. If Congress had believed that the national govern-
ment would bear the full regulatory burden, the political calculus lead-
ig to the enactment of the SMCRA probably would have been
different.
Notwithstanding noble motives of providing for state and national
cooperation and of preventing interstate competition in the establish-
ment of weak environmental regulations in order to promote coal
sales,578 Congress intended to employ the states as its agents in regulat-
ing private activity, and it succeeded.579 The Court's failure to confront
this purpose and to analyze carefully the means used to achieve Con-
gress' ends is intellectually dishonest.580 Its dismissal of the SMCRA as
"a program of cooperative federalism" simply compounds the problem
of distinguishing between the constitutionally valid means of this Act
and a second means of obtaining state enforcement of national regula-
tions that Hodel suggests is invalid.
Mining in issuing regulations establishing the environmental standards to be enforced by the
states and the guidelines for submission of state programs suggests that the national government's
resources would not have been adequate to fulfill the additional responsibility of promulgating
individual plans for each state. See Regulatory Controversies, supra note 568, at 763-64. State and
local government administration and enforcement of national environmental programs is gener-
ally regarded as essential because of "the nation's size and geographic diversity, the close interre-
lation between environmental controls and local land use decisions, and federal officials' limited
implementation and enforcement resources." Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifce? Problems of Federal-
ism in Mandating State Implementation ofNationalEnvironmentalPoiicy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1196-
98 (1977); see also Luneburg, The National Quest for Clean Air 1970-1978. Intergovernmental
Problems and Some Proposed Solutions, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 397, 404-06 (1978).
578. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201(g),(k), 1202(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
579. 452 U.S. at 272 n.7 (all but three states in which there are surface mining operations
submitted state programs).
580. This judgment is harsh, but it is fully warranted by the Court's use of precedent to sup-
port the argument that the lower courts had approved other statutes, like the SMCRA, which
provide a state role in the enforcement of national law. The Court cited three lower court deci-
sions. Id. at 289 n.30. In the first case, a court upheld Congress' power to regulate airborne
hunting under the commerce clause, but it did not consider the statutory provision for state en-
forcement of the restrictions on airborne hunting. United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784 (9th Cir.
1979); 16 U.S.C. § 742j-l(d) (1976). In the second case, a court upheld Congress' power to use the
states to enforce transportation controls. This case, however, conflicts with decisions in three other
circuits holding that Congress cannot compel such state action, and the Supreme Court did not
explain the basis for distinguishing this case. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes 599-606. In the third case,
another court upheld Congress' power to delegate authority to the states to implement national
regulations. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
This court's consideration of the issues was confined, however, to a single, brief paragraph, and
the act at issue was the Clean Air Act and not the Clean Water Act cited by the Supreme Court.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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b. The Transportation Control Plan Cases
This second means of employing the states as the nation's agents was
before the Court in EPA v. Brown. 8 1 The broad issue in this case was
the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (1970 Amendments) 582 to compel state
enforcement of national regulations designed to control motor vehicle
air pollution. The 1970 Amendments employed the same mechanism
as the SMCRA to obtain state administration and enforcement of na-
tional air pollution standards: the EPA was authorized to promulgate
an air pollution control plan for each state and to regulate air pollution
sources directly unless the state adopted and enforced a "state imple-
mentation plan" that would achieve national ambient air quality
standards. 83
In 1973 the EPA determined that state implementation plans must
include a variety of measures, known collectively as Transportation
Control Plans (TCPs), for the reduction of motor vehicle air pollution.
When several states failed to submit a TCP or submitted an inadequate
plan, the EPA promulgated transportation control plans for those
states.5 84 Although the TCPs drafted by the EPA varied from state to
state, most included both some measures to limit the use of
automobiles and provisions to reduce air pollution emissions. 585 The
states were required to limit automobile use by restricting parking and
gasoline supply, establishing car pool programs, creating special high-
581. 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
582. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1976). The current legisla-
tion, referred to herein as the Clean Air Act (CAA), is a combination of the 1970 Amendments
and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7626 (Supp. IV 1980). Although both the 1970 Amendments and the CAA embody the same
general scheme of regulation, the discussion of the transportation control plan regulations is lim-
ited to the 1970 Amendments unless otherwise noted. The CAA raises several distinct federalism
issues, which are discussed infra at notes 693-704.
583. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a), (c) (1976). La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environ-
mental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 777-78 & n.35 (1977); Note, The Clean Air Act
4mendments of1970: A Threat to Federalism. 76 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 993-96 (1976). In contrast
to the SMCRA, see supra note 568 and accompanying text, the states have broad discretion in
designing pollution control measures and strategies that will reduce air pollution emissions. La
Pierre, supra, at 778.
584. See general, 38 Fed. Reg. 30,626 (1973) (general preamble to all transportation control
plans promulgated by EPA); Battle, Transportation Controls Under the Clean Air Act-An Experi-
ence in (Un)Cooperative Federalism, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 4-16 (1980).
585. Eg., 38 Fed. Reg. 31,233 (1973) (California transportation control plan). The description
of the TCP's is drawn from the sources cited supra note 584.
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way lanes for car pools and buses, purchasing buses, constructing bicy-
cle routes, imposing time restrictions on truck operations, and
prohibiting the use of vehicles in certain "traffic free zones." The
EPA's plans included two principal provisions for reducing the level of
air pollution emissions. First, the states were required to enforce rules
requiring some automobiles, manufactured before the establishment of
new car air pollution standards, to be "retrofitted" with expensive pol-
lution control devices. Second, the states were required to establish
"inspection and maintenance" (I/M) programs. The I/M programs re-
quired the states to test automobiles for compliance with applicable
emission limitations, to order any necessary repairs, to refuse to register
vehicles that failed the inspection, and to prohibit the operation of such
vehicles.58 6
The EPA insisted that the states had a duty to enforce the TCPs be-
cause Congress so intended and because national enforcement would
be expensive and inefficient.5"7 The EPA reasoned that it had the
power to impose this duty on the states because they are "the owners
and operators of pollution sources through their ownership and opera-
tion of highway transportation facilities." '  Assuming that a state
power plant, which is a direct source of pollution, would be subject to
national regulation, the EPA argued that an indirect source, like a
highway which creates pollution by promoting automobile use, should
also be subject to national pollution controls. In short, the EPA argued
that a state-owned highway, like a state-owned railroad, is subject to
national regulation." 9
Although the EPA was certain of the states' duty, it was ambivalent
about the source of the states' authority to enforce the TCPs. On the
one hand, the EPA claimed that the 1970 Amendments and its regula-
tions supplemented state law and provided the authority for state en-
forcement.590 On the other hand, some of the TCP regulations
586. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 52.242(d) (1974) (California TCP) ("the State shall not register or allow
to operate on its streets and highways any light-duty vehicle that does not comply with applicable
standards"). Owners of noncomplying vehicles were also prohibited from operating them. E.g.,
id § 52.242(e).
587. 38 Fed. Reg. 30,626, 30,633 (1973). The EPA has consistently maintained that the courts
can enforce by injunctions the states' duty to implement the TCPs, but it has disclaimed any
intention to seek criminal penalties. Id.; 42 Fed. Reg. 30,504, 30,505 n.15 (1977).
588. 38 Fed. Reg. 30,626, 30,632 (1973).
589. Id




required the states to submit "a detailed compliance schedule" includ-
ing "the text of needed statutory proposals and needed regulations that
it will propose for adoption," "the date by which [it] will recommend
any needed legislation to the state legislature," and "[a] signed state-
ment from the Governor and State Treasurer identifying the sources
and amount of funds for the program."5 91
Courts of appeals in five circuits considered the validity of the trans-
portation control plans, but the decisions do not support any neat, clear
conclusions about the scope of Congress' power to use the states as its
agents because the courts analyzed the statutory and constitutional is-
sues in distinctly different fashions. 92 All these courts apparently
agreed that the EPA had both the statutory and constitutional power to
regulate state activities that are a direct source of pollution;593 however,
they divided on the question whether the TCPs regulated the states as
polluters or required the states to regulate private pollution-causing ac-
tivity. Of the three courts that considered the EPA's argument that
state operation of its highways is subject to national regulation, two
concluded that it had some merit. The Third Circuit accepted the
EPA's argument completely and upheld the agency's power to compel
Pennsylvania to establish a program requiring all pre-1968 motor vehi-
cles in two parts of the state to be equipped with pollution control de-
vices.594 Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
591. 38 Fed. Reg. 31, 232 (1973) (regulations governing the California inspection and mainte-
nance program). See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(F) (1976) (EPA approval of state implementation
plans required "necessary assurances that the State will have adequate personnel, funding, and
authority to carry out such implementation plan").
592. These courts divided rather evenly on the ultimate question of the validity of the TCPs.
Two courts upheld the TCPs. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 902 (1977); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974). Two courts held that most
of TCP regulations promulgated by EPA were invalid. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Brown I), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), on remand, 566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Brown II). The Ninth Circuit also decided two other cases on the basis of its decision in Brown L
Alaska v. EPA, 521 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1975); Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). The Court of Appeals for District of Columbia upheld some
provisions of the TCPs for Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. District of Colum-
bia v. Train, 530 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (DCI), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), on
remand, 567 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (DC II). See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 320 (5th Cir.
1974) (court declined to decide constitutional issue).
593. Only two of the five courts stated this proposition expressly. District of Columbia v.
Train, 530 F.2d 971, 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975).
594. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974). The court accepted the EPA's analogy
between a state-owned railroad and state highway operation. The court's specific reliance on
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disapproved requirements that two states and the District of Columbia
must establish inspection and maintenance programs and retrofit pro-
grams,5 95 it upheld requirements that these jurisdictions must purchase
an additional 475 buses for a public transit system and must establish
exclusive bus lanes.596 The court apparently agreed with the EPA that
the operation of the highways and of a public mass transit system was
analogous to state operation of a railroad, and it rejected arguments
that the increased financial burden invalidated these requirements.597
The Ninth Circuit rejected the analogy between state operation of high-
ways and a state-owned railroad system. Although Congress could reg-
ulate an economic activity like the operation of a railroad, it could not
regulate the states' governance of private activity like the use of
highways.598
With respect to the components of the TCPs that were read to re-
quire the states to regulate private activity, the District of Columbia,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits all uniformly held that the EPA had no
such statutory authority.5 99 These three courts also concluded that
there is a constitutional bar to Congress' power to compel the states to
regulate private activity, but they identified different constitutional
problems. The District of Columbia and the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the states cannot be compelled to implement nationally imposed
regulations °.6 0 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the TCP regulations
Maryland v. Wirtz for the proposition that state and private activities are equally subject to na-
tional regulation to the extent that they affect interstate commerce is, of course, no longer valid
because NLC overruled that case and rejected the equation of state and private activity. See supra
text accompanying notes 98 & 109.
A district court in the Third Circuit has now found, contrary to Pennsylvania v. EP4, that Con-
gress cannot "constitutionally require the states to pass legislation establishing a regulatory pro-
gram to enforce the Clean Air Act." Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 533 F.
Supp. 869, 879 (E.D. Pa.), aF'don other grounAd, 678 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 1982). For a brief analysis
of this case, see infra note 704.
595. See infra note 600 and accompanying text.
596. DC I, 530 F.2d at 989-90. The Court also suggested that it would have upheld a require-
ment that the states construct a system of bicycle lanes if the record had provided adequate sup-
port. Id
597. Id
598. Brown 1, 521 F.2d at 838-39. On remand, this court adhered to the view that state regula-
tion of its highways did not make the state the "indirect" source of pollution caused by vehicles
operated by private parties. Brown II, 566 F.2d at 672.
599. DC I, 530 F.2d at 983-88; Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d at 227; Brown 1, 521 F.2d at 832-
37.
600. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that recognition of the
EPA's power "to commandeer the regulatory powers of the states, along with their personnel and
[Vol. 60:779
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were invalid because they compelled the states to legislate.60 1 Although
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded these three judgments, 60 2
they would seem to establish a limit on Congress' power to require the
states to enforce national law but for a subsequent decision of the Sec-
ond Circuit.
resources, for use in administering and enforcing a federal regulatory program against the owners
of motor vehicles" would be an unprecedented, "drastic" intrusion on state sovereignty. DC I, 530
F.2d at 992, 994. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that such national power is unconstitutional because
the severance of state control over spending from the obligation to raise the revenues required to
implement the national program might violate the guarantee clause and because national control
of state spending would impair the state's ability to function effectively in the federal system con-
trary to the tenth amendment. Brown I, 521 F.2d at 840, 842. The District of Columbia Circuit
did uphold, however, the validity of the EPA regulation prohibiting the states from registering or
allowing to operate vehicles that fail emission tests. Its approval was confined to requiring the
states to deny a registration and apparently did not include any requirement that the states enforce
the prohibition on operation. See DC I, 530 F.2d at 991-92. The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar
position on remand. Brown II, 566 F.2d at 673. The Sixth Circuit also has upheld Congress'
power to prohibit the states from granting a motor vehicle registration to vehicles that fail emis-
sion tests. See supra text accompanying notes 486-88.
601. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224-25 (4th Cir. 1975).
602. 431 U.S. 99 (1977). Since all these lower court decisions were before NLC, there was a
widespread expectation that the Supreme Court's decision would be a watershed, and there is an
extensive literature on the constitutional issues raised by the EPA's TCP regulations. Luneburg,
,upra note 577, at 466 n.297 (list of articles).
The Supreme Court vacated the judgments because the EPA conceded that its regulations had
to be amended to remove "all requirements that the States submit legally adopted regulations,"
and the Court refused to pass on regulations "in need of certain essential modifications." 431 U.S.
at 103. The basis for the Court's decision hardly seems a dispositive point for it is difficult to
understand how a state can act other than through juridically valid means. It is possible, however,
that the decision to vacate reflects a tacit conclusion either that it is needlessly intrusive to superin-
tend the state legislative process by requiring the state to submit its proposed laws and regulations
or that review of the end product is sufficient. It is also possible that the Court's action reflects a
tacit understanding that there is a constitutional difference between requiring a state to enact and
enforce state laws regulating private activity under national standards and supplementing state
law and requiring the states to exercise authority conferred by national law.
The EPA, for one, found these tacit distinctions important, and it amended its regulations to
remove all references to state legislative activity and all requirements that the states adopt regula-
tions. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,504 (1977). Although the EPA concluded that it lacked the power to spec-
ify "the governmental processes and the details of implementation," it insisted on its power to
specify "the ultimate acts that states must perform to comply." Id at 30,505. Nonetheless, the
Ninth Circuit was not impressed. On remand, it adhered to its conclusion that the California TCP
was unconstitutional. Since the same duty was imposed on the state, it viewed the changes made
by the EPA as "merely cosmetic." Brown II, 566 F.2d at 668-69. In the only other decision on
remand, the TCP was in turn remanded to the EPA. DC II, 567 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The
controversy over the 1973 TCP regulations subsided because EPA decided to focus its efforts on
the changes required by the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. 44 Fed. Reg. 20,372, 20,374 n.15
(1979). See infra text accompanying notes 693-704.
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In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Carey (FOE),60 3 which unlike the
other TCP cases was decided after NLC, the Second Circuit held that a
TCP promulgated by the New York State and the City of New York
was valid and that the city was required to regulate parking in the busi-
ness district, to control taxicab cruising, to impose tolls on two bridges,
and to implement a night time freight movement program. Although
the court rested its judgment in part on a procedural ground, it also
found that there was no constitutional bar to enforcement of the
TCP.6°4 The Second Circuit distinguished the other TCP cases on the
grounds that they involved a state duty to enforce nationally promul-
gated regulations and that because the TCP had been drafted by the
state, even under the threat of imposition of an EPA-drafted plan, there
was no interference with state policy.605 The court also concluded that
there was no impermissible interference with integral government func-
tions contrary to NLC because the policies of the TCP were adopted
locally and the city could use its existing institutions and personnel to
enforce it. Given this description of minimal interference with state
and local policymaking and of a minimal burden on the resources of
local government, the court concluded that the national interest in
health and safety outweighed any intrusion on local governmental
affairs. 60
6
Hodel and the transportation control plan cases, read together, do
not establish an adequate framework to evaluate Congress' power
under the commerce clause to employ the states as its agents in regulat-
ing private activity. Hodel implicitly approved the conclusion of three
courts of appeals that Congress cannot compel the states to administer
and enforce national regulations of private conduct.60 7 Compulsion,
603. 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). For a more thorough discussion
of this case, see Battle, supra note 584, at 21-24.
604. 552 F.2d at 34-36.
605. Id at 36-37.
606. Id at 37-39.
607. 452 U.S. 264, 288-89 (1981) (contrasts the SMCRA with the national regulations at issue
in Maryland v. EPA, Brown I & DCI which "[commandeer] the legislative processes of the States
by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.").
One might reasonably ask whether the approval of these cases extends to the holding of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that the EPA can compel the states to purchase
additional buses and to establish express bus lanes. See Supra text accompanying note 596. The
line between national regulation of the states as polluters and national control of state regulation
of private activity is very thin. For example, state operation of a mass transit system and state
regulation of private transit companies may easily be considered alternative means to the same




however, is little more than a label. Hodel also expressly approved
FOE as an example of state participation in a national regulatory pro-
gram,60 8 and in that case the Second Circuit required the City of New
York to regulate private activity under a TCP that it had adopted
under the threat of EPA promulgation of a substitute plan and that it
no longer, if it ever, wished to enforce. Moreover, the Court in Hodel
ignored several provisions of the SMCRA that are designed to obtain
state cooperation in regulating surface mining.6" 9 Although Hodel and
the TCP cases are most easily read as establishing "compulsion" as the
limit on Congress' power to employ the states as its agents, the ap-
proval of FOE also leaves the door open to a balancing test derived
from NLC.
c. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississiopi
Far from curing the problems inherent in the analytical framework
derived from Hodel and the TCP cases, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v. Mississppi6 0 aggravates them. In this case the Court
considered the constitutionality of provisions of the Public Utility Reg-
ulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)61' that require state agencies to
implement national regulatory programs. Under Title I of this Act,
state agencies that regulate electric utilities under state law must con-
duct administrative proceedings to consider and determine whether
twelve national rate design policies and service standards should be
adopted and enforced with respect to each regulated electric utility.612
Under Title III, similar obligations with respect to two standards are
the states as owners of transportation systems to purchase buses, can it also compel the states to
regulate private transit companies and require them to purchase additional vehicles? Put simply,
restrictions on Congress' power to require the states to regulate private activity may be avoided by
characterizing the regulation as controlling the state itself.
608. See supra note 580. Although FOE can be read to rest entirely on procedural grounds,
see text accompanying note 604, Hodel cited FOE expressly for its holding that there was no
constitutional bar to compelling the state to implement the TCP.
609. See supra text accompanying notes 570-73.
610. 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982), rerig, No. J79-0212(C) (S.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 1981).
611. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 42 and 43
U.S.C. (Supp. IN 1980).
612. Pub. L. No. 95-617, tit. I, §§ 101-134, 92 Stat. 3120-34, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2644 (Supp. IV
1980). State regulatory authorities must consider the adoption of six rate design policies, five
standards setting the terms and conditions of electricity service, and a special "lifeline rate" for the
essential needs of residential electric consumers. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(a),(d), 2623(a),(b), 2624(a),(b).
If an electric utility is not subject to state regulation, the obligation to consider adoption of these
twelve standards is imposed directly on the electmc utility. Id
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imposed on state agencies that regulate natural gas utilities.613 A duty
is also imposed on the states under section 210 of Title II to enforce
national regulations that require electric utilities to purchase electric
energy from cogeneration and small power production facilities and to
sell energy to such facilities.614
In light of the Court's surprising and unwarranted conclusions615
that the requirements of Titles I and III are not mandatory and hence
have an insignificant impact on the states, two points bear special em-
phasis. First, PURPA's requirements are mandatory: Congress in-
tended to impose a duty on state agencies to enforce national policies
for electric and natural gas utilities. In Titles I and III and in section
210, the duty is imposed directly on state regulatory authorities (SRAs),
which are defined as the state agencies with ratemaking authority
under state law over the sale of electric energy and natural gas. 61 6 In
Title I Congress provided that SRAs "shall" conduct administrative
proceedings to consider and determine whether to adopt and imple-
ment the twelve national rate design policies and service standards for
613. Pub. L. No. 95-617, tit. III, §§ 301-311, 92 Stat. 3149-54, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (Supp.
IV 1980). State regulatory authorities and nonregulated gas utilities must consider adoption of
standards governing termination of service and the allocation of costs of promotional and political
advertising. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3203(a),(b).
614. Pub. L. No. 95-617, tit. II, § 210, 92 Stat. 3144-47, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. IV 1980). A
"cogeneration facility" produces both heat and electricity for use in industrial processes. Unless
this facility is interconnected with the power distribution system of an electric utility, excess elec-
tric power or electric power generated from excess heat cannot be used. A "small power produc-
tion facility" uses biomass, waste, wind, solar energy, or water to generate electric power and must
have a production capacity of 80 megawatts or less. Id § 796(17), (18); American Elec. Power v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The PURPA au-
thorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to adopt rules that promote conser-
vation through interconnection between cogeneration and small power production facilities and
electric utility companies. In particular, the Act directs the FERC to promulgate rules requiring
electric utilities to sell electric energy to small power production and cogeneration facilities and to
purchase electric energy from these facilities. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a). See 675 F.2d at 1233-46
(approving and disapproving certain cogeneration and small power production facilities rules).
State regulatory authorities must enforce these rules. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f)(l) ("each State regula-
tory authority shall . . . implement such rule . . . for each electric utility for which it has
ratemaking authority"). Electric utilities that are not subject to state rate regulation also must
implement FERC's rules. Id § 824a-3(f)(2).
The FERC is also empowered to adopt rules exempting cogeneration and small power produc-
tion facilities from certain national and state laws governing electric utilities. 1d § 824a-3(e).
615. See infra text accompanying notes 654-64.
616. Title I, § 3(17), 16 U.S.C. § 2602(17) (Supp. IV 1980); Title II, § 201, 16 U.S.C. § 796(21)
(Supp. IV 1980); Title III, § 302(8), 15 U.S.C. § 3202(8) (Supp. IV 1980).
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electric utilities.6"7 In Title III Congress provided that SRAs "shall"
hold hearings on the question whether to adopt two national standards
for natural gas utilities.6"' In section 210 Congress provided that SRAs
'"shall . . implement" FERC's rules governing cogeneration and
small power production facilities.61 9 It is true that the Act does not
impose any penalty on SRAs for failure either to complete considera-
tion of the national standards in a timely fashion or to enforce FERC's
cogeneration and small power production facility rules,6 20 but the ab-
sence of a penalty does not negate the mandate. All the obligations
imposed on state regulatory authorities under Title 1,621 Title 111,622 and
section 210623 are enforceable by court order.
Second, as illustrated by a brief consideration of the Title I provi-
sions governing state regulation of electric utilities, the PURPA does in
fact have a significant impact on the states. If one considers only the
effect on state substantive policy, PURPA's impact is quite limited. In
contrast to the EPA's transportation control plans, there is no direct
displacement of state regulatory policies because the states are free,
provided they consider adoption of the national standards, to reject
them.624 Nonetheless, the PURPA may have at least three major ef-
617. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(a), 2623(a), 2624(b) (Supp. IV 1980). In addition to these directions
that SRAs "shall" consider the twelve national standards, Title I provides that SRAs "shall" take
many other actions. Eg., id §§ 2612(c), 2626(a).
618. 15 U.S.C. § 3203(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
619. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
620. The PURPA contains only one provision addressing the question of a SRA's failure to
comply. If a SRA fails to conduct administrative proceedings for consideration of six national
rate design policies in a timely fashion, then the Act provides that the SRA "shall" consider and
determine whether to adopt the national standards in its next rate proceeding. 16 U.S.C. § 2622(c)
(Supp. IV 1980). No penalty is imposed for continued noncompliance.
621. Id § 2633(c)(1) ("[a]ny person... may bring an action to enforce the requirements of
ITitle I] in the appropriate State court ,.. "). In the Conference Report, Congress stated that it
contemplated "enforcement (including by writ of mandamus) of obligations of State regulatory
authorities ... to hold hearings, to make determinations, and to comply with all the other re-
quirements of [all the sections of Title I applicable to SRAs]." H.R. REP. No. 1750, 95th Cong. 2d
Sess. 63, 84 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7797, 7818 [hereinafter cited as
Conference Report].
622. 15 U.S.C. § 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) ("[a]ny person may bring an action to enforce the
requirements of [Title III] in the appropriate State court.").
623. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980) (the FERC "may enforce the requirements
of subsection (f) of this section [which requires states to implement FERC's cogeneration and
small power production facility rules, see supra note 614 and accompanying text] against any State
regulatory authority .... ").
624. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(a), (c)(l)(B), (c)(2), 2623(a), (c)(2), 2627(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
Under Title III SRAs have identical policy discretion with respect to the national standards for
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fects on the states. First, it purports to enlarge the authority of state
regulatory agencies. If a state agency lacks state law authority to com-
ply with PURPA's requirements, then the Act provides that its pur-
poses "supplement otherwise applicable state law.1625 Second, the
requirements that state agencies conduct hearings on the national stan-
dards,62 6 compile information necessary to review these standards,
627
and report information about regulated utilities to the national govern-
ment628 impose regulatory and financial burdens 62 9 and reduce the re-
sources available for implementation of state policies. Finally, the state
regulatory agency may have to change its decisionmaking processes to
conform with procedural requirements for hearings on the national
standards.630
Notwithstanding the duty imposed on SRAs and the impact on the
states of implementing national regulatory policies, the Court upheld
both section 210 and Titles I and III.631 The Court unanimously632
natural gas utilities. 15 U.S.C. § 3203(a) (Supp. IV 1980). The states' policy discretion is limited,
however, under Title II because they are required to enforce national rules governing the relation-
ship between electric utilities and cogenerators or small power producers. See .rupra note 614 and
accompanying text.
625. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(a), 2623(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
626. Id §§ 2622, 2623(a), 2624(b).
627. EBg., id §§ 2621(d)(1), 2625(a) (determination of costs of service to particular classes of
consumers under prescribed methods).
628. Id § 2626.
629. The PURPA does authorize grants to offset some of the costs of compliance with its
requirements. Title I, §§ 141-142, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6807-6808 (Supp. IV 1980).
630. The PURPA imposes many procedural requirements including: public notice and hear-
ing, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(b)(1), 2623(a) (Supp. IV 1980), intervention and participation by a national
agency, affected electric utilities, and electricity consumers, id § 2631(a), discovery rules, Id
§ 2631(b), written statements of findings and reasons, e.g., id § 2621(b)(1), and procedures gov-
erning compensation for the costs of intervention and participation, id § 2632.
631. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S, Ct. 2126 (1982), revpg, No. J79-
0212(C) (S.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 1981). The district court held that the PURPA was unconstitutional
because Congress did not have the power under the commerce clause to regulate electric utilities
and because the Act directly intruded on the "integral and traditional functions of the State of
Mississippi" contrary to the tenth amendment. No. J79-0212(C), slip. op. at 3-4; No. J79-0212(C),
Final Judgment at 1. This court's reliance on Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), and
Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918), indicates the quality of its
commerce clause analysis. The Supreme Court easily concluded that the district court's analysis
and commerce clause contention were "without merit." 102 S. Ct. at 2134-36.
Although the district court simply asserted that "three standards under PURPA," which it did
not identify, were unconstitutional, No. J79-0212(C), slip. op. at 6, and then held summarily that
Titles I and III and section 210 of Title II were unconstitutional, No. J79-0212(C), slip. op. at 6,
the Supreme Court analyzed the statute and rejected the tenth amendment challenges. 102 S. Ct.
at 2137-43. The district court did not explain its assertions that the PURPA also violated the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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upheld the mandatory633 requirement of section 210 that SRAs imple-
ment national cogeneration and small power production facility
rules, 63 4 and it based its holding on a regulation promulgated by the
FERC. This regulation authorizes SRAs to implement FERC rules by
"issuance of regulations, an undertaking to resolve disputes between
[cogeneration and small power production] facilities and electric utili-
ties arising under [section 210 and FERC regulations], or any other
action reasonably designed to implement [section 210 and FERC regu-
lations]. ' 635 The Court noted that this regulation gives SRAs "latitude
in determining the manner in which the regulations are to be imple-
mented"6 36 and read the regulatory provision for implementation by
dispute resolution as requiring SRAs to adjudicate disputes arising
under the PURPA between cogeneration and small power production
facilities and electric utilities.637
Having construed section 210 to impose a duty on SRAs to adjudi-
cate claims arising under a national statute, the Court concluded that
Testa i. Katt63s was controlling.639 Under this case, state courts have a
duty to adjudicate claims arising under national law if they have ade-
quate state law jurisdiction to hear analogous state law claims.64 Since
guarantee clause, U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4, and the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2,
and the Supreme Court did not consider arguments based on these two constitutional provisions.
102 S. Ct. at 2134.
632. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Stevens, delivered
the opinion of the Court, which upheld section 210. 102 S. Ct. at 2137-38. Justice Powell con-
curred in this part of the Court's judgment except to the extent that section 210 imposes proce-
dural rules on state agencies. Id at 2143-45, 2144 n.2. Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the Court's decision to sustain section 210, but she
noted a few reservations. 102 S. Ct. at 2146 n.1.
633. In contrast to the majority's conclusion that Titles I and III are not mandatory, see infra
text at notes 654-59, the Court explicitly recognized that section 210's requirements are
mandatory. Id at 2133, 2137.
634. The Court also unanimously upheld FERC's power under section 210(c) to adopt rules
exempting cogeneration and small power production facilities from state laws governing electric
utilities, see supra note 614, and to preempt conflicting state regulations because NLC does not
limit Congress' power to regulate private activity. 102 S. Ct. at 2137, 2146 n.1 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part).
635. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401(a) (1981).
636. 102 S. Ct. at 2133.
637. Id at 2137.
638. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
639. 102 S. Ct. at 2137.
640. Id at 2137-38. It is well-settled that state courts have the power to hear a federal cause of
action unless Congress limits jurisdiction exclusively to the federal courts and that, at least in
some circumstances, Congress may impose a duty on state courts to adjudicate a federal cause of
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the Court found that "[t]he Mississippi Commission has jurisdiction to
entertain claims analogous to those granted by PURPA"' 6 4 and that
the combination of administrative duties with the state agencies' judi-
cial duties "is of no significance," 42 it upheld section 210.643
Apart from a rather selective reading of the FERC regulation to limit
the duty imposed on SRAs under section 210 to adjudication of dis-
putes arising under the PURPA, there are two serious problems with
the Court's insistence that Testa v. Kat controls. First, Testa begs the
question of federalism limits on Congress' power to compel state en-
forcement of national law. The Court held in Testa that under the
supremacy clause644 a state court had a duty to adjudicate a claim aris-
ing under a national statute.6 5 Reliance on the supremacy clause begs
the question of federalism limits on national power because if Congress
had no power to impose a duty on a state court, then the national law
imposing the duty is not valid and the supremacy clause has no ef-
fect. 46 The Court's invocation of Testa and its reference to "the pre-
eminent position held by federal law throughout the Nation" 647 simply
repeat the original error of Testa and beg the question whether a na-
tional statute imposing a duty on a state agency is a valid exercise of
Congress' power or is limited by federalism principles.
The second problem with the Court's reliance on Testa to uphold
section 210 is the extrapolation of a duty of state administrative agen-
cies to enforce national regulations by adjudicating claims from the
duty of state courts to perform the same function. History provides a
solid warrant for Congress' power to impose a duty on state courts to
action. There are several generally recognized limits, subsumed under the rubric "valid excuse,"
on Congress' power to compel state courts to entertain a federal cause of action. State courts can
decline jurisdiction if the suit is brought in a state court of limited jurisdiction, if the doctrine of
forum non conveniens applies, or if the state courts do not enforce an analogous forum or sister
state created rights. The question whether there are other limits on Congress' power to compel
state court adjudication of national statutory and constitutional rights is not settled. See generally
Redish & MuenchAdjudication ofFederal Causes ofAction in State Court, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 311,
340-59 (1976).
641. 102 S. Ct. at 2138.
642. Id
643. Id
644. See supra note 45.
645. 330 U.S. at 389-91. The supremacy clause was the sole basis of the Court's holding al-
though there are other arguments that support Congress' power to impose duties on state courts.
See in/ra note 995 and accompanying text.
646. See supra note 45.




entertain claims arising under national law," 8 but there is no similar
support for national power to impose duties on state administrative
agencies. The Court explained its extrapolation of a state administra-
tive agency's duty from a state court duty only by recognizing that
modem agencies have functions similar to those of courts. 64 9  Even
Professor Stewart, the foremost proponent of the states' duty to imple-
ment national regulations,6 0 has questioned this argument for extend-
ing Testa to administrative agencies.651 More importantly, the implicit
resort to history by analogizing the functions of state agencies to the
functions of state courts does not support Congress' power to impose a
duty on state administrative agencies to enforce section 210. Even if
FERC's regulations can be implemented through adjudication by
SRAs, the implementation of these regulations is essentially an execu-
tive function. Our constitutional history does support Congress' power
to impose a duty on state courts to hear claims arising under national
law.6 52 It also shows, however, that when Congress has sought enforce-
ment of national law through the performance of quasi-judicial or ex-
ecutive functions by state judicial and executive officers, it has
delegated national authority and not imposed a duty to enforce na-
tional law.653
Although the entire Court was content to uphold Congress' power
under section 210 to impose a duty on SRAs to enforce national law by
adjudication, the question of the validity of Titles I and III divided the
Court.654 Statutory interpretation was the key to the Court's decision
648. See infra note 995 and accompanying text.
649. 102 S. Ct. at 2138 n.24. The Court also invoked Testa to support Congress' power under
Titles I and III to regulate the procedures employed by SRAs in hearings to consider the adoption
of rate design and service standards governing electric and natural gas utilities. Id at 2142. Since
the conduct of hearings and enforcement of the national standards are not adjudicatory functions,
the Court may read Testa broadly to support Congress' power to impose a duty on state agencies
to administer national regulations as well as to compel adjudication of claims arising under na-
tional law.
650. See infra text accompanying notes 1033-55.
651. Stewart, supra note 577, at 1246-47.
652. See infra note 995 and accompanying text.
653. See infra text accompanying notes 996-1032.
654. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's opinion up-
holding Titles I and III. 102 S. Ct. at 2138-43. Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion. He
agreed that these titles were valid to the extent that SRAs are required to consider and determine
whether to adopt national standards, but he dissented from the Court's determination that the
procedural requirements governing state administrative proceedings are valid. Id at 2143-45.
Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id at 2145-57.
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to uphold Titles I and III. The majority concluded that these titles are
not mandatory because if a state abandons utility regulation or abol-
ishes its SRA, then it does not have to comply with the requirements to
consider the national standards for electric and gas utilities.65 5  The
majority did not explain the basis for this interpretation of the PURPA,
but its logic would seem to be as follows: (1) the duty to implement the
PURPA is imposed directly on SRAs65 6 and not on the states; (2) states
are free to abolish their SRAs and abandon utility rate regulation; (3) if
a state has no SRA, then Titles I and III do not impose any duty on
that state. Since Congress has power under the commerce clause to
regulate electric and natural gas utilities and the states are free to aban-
don regulation of such utilities, the Court concluded that "Titles I and
III simply establish requirements for continued state activity in an
otherwise pre-emptible field.116 7 The Court found that the states have
a choice between two alternatives: they can continue to regulate elec-
tric and natural gas utilities if they agree to implement the PURPA, or
they can abandon utility regulation.65 8 The Court left unstated a third
alternative and its consequence: if the states refuse to implement the
PURPA and continue to regulate utilities, their regulations are
preempted. 9
If the search for congressional intent is arbitrarily confined solely to
the language of Titles I and III providing that SRAs "shall" take cer-
tain actions,661 then the Court's interpretation of these two titles is per-
haps plausible. It is, however, totally inconsistent with any fair,
complete reading of the PURPA and its legislative history. Congress
specifically imposed duties on SRAs.66 t It provided for enforcement of
Thus, the provisions of Titles I and III requiring SRAs to conduct administrative proceedings to
consider the adoption of national standards were upheld on a six-to-three vote, and Congress'
power to regulate the procedures governing these state proceedings was sustained by a narrow
five-to-four majority.
655. Id at 2 138-4 1.
656. See supra text accompanying note 616.
657. 102 S. Ct. at 2142. In a footnote to this statement, the Court said that "[w]e hold only that
Congress may impose conditions on the State's regulation of private conduct in a pre-emptible
area." Id at 2142 n.32.
658. Id at 2140-41 & 2141 n.30.
659. State regulation of electric and natural gas utilities that did not include implementation
of Titles I and III would conflict with the statute as interpreted by the Court. Under the
supremacy clause, state law in conflict with national law is invalid. See supra note 55.
660. See supra text accompanying note 616.
661. See supra text accompanying notes 617 & 618.
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these duties by court order.662 There is simply no evidence that Con-
gress intended to prohibit all state regulation of electric and natural gas
utilities if SRAs refused to fulfill their obligations under the PURPA,
and the Court cited no support for its interpretation of the statute.
Moreover, a statutory provision preserving state regulation of rate of
return and overall utility revenues663 is directly contrary to the Court's
conclusion that if the states fail to implement Titles I and III then they
must abandon the field of utility regulation or suffer preemption of
their power to regulate utilities. In finding that Titles I and III are not
mandatory and that implementation of these Titles by SRAs is a condi-
tion of continued state regulation in a preemptible field, the Court re-
wrote the statute.664
Given its construction of Titles I and III, the Court easily rejected
NLC and tenth amendment objections to Congress' power "to use state
662. See supra notes 620-23 and accompanying text.
663. In section 117 of the PURPA, Congress provided that nothing in the Act would affect the
rate of return or amount of revenues permitted under other laws, and the Conferees explained that
"determinations with respect to rate of return and overall revenues permitted to utilities is exclu-
sively a matter of state law, and the principal federal concern is with the structure of rates to
different classes of consumers as specified in the rate structure." Conference Report, supra note
621, at 81.
Since Congress stated that the PURPA would have no effect on state regulation of rates of
return and overall utility revenues, it expressly saved such state regulations from preemption. See
Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 55, at 440-45, 441 n.261. Preemption of state regulations gov-
erning rates of return and overall revenues under the Court's interpretation of the statute would be
directly contrary to the well-settled rule that the courts defer to congressional determinations
about the preemptive scope of national laws and in particular to statutory provisions preserving
state law from preemption. Id Even in the absence of an express provision saving the rate of
return and overall revenue regulation, preemption of such regulations would be inappropriate.
Since Congress stated that the national interest is confined to the rate structure, there would be no
conflict warranting preemption. See supra note 55.
In addition to this strong evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt all state regulation
of electric and natural gas utilities if SRAs refused to implement Titles I and III, preemption as a
sanction would lead to an improbable result. Electric and gas utilities would still be subject to
Titles I and III because the provisions of these titles apply directly to nonregulated utilities as well
as SRAs. See supra note 612. These utilities would, however, be freed from all state rate regula-
tion, and the PURPA does not provide for national rate regulation to fill the regulatory void. 102
S. Ct. at 2141. Ifa utility objected to the order ofa SRA denying a rate increase and that SRA
had refused to implement the PURPA, the Court would have to uphold the utility's claim that
state rate regulation conflicted with the PURPA and was invalid. If such a case arises, the Court
will not be able to find any support for a claim that Congress intended to sanction state failure to
implement the PURPA with a void in utility rate regulation.
664. Notwithstanding the Court's strained reading of Titles I and III, the partial dissent ac-
cepted the Court's construction of the statute. See 102 S. Ct. at 2145-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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regulatory machinery to advance federal goals. ' 665 The Court found
that the provisions for state implementation of Titles I and III were
similar to the provisions for state enforcement of national regulations
approved in Hode.6 66 As the Court construed Titles I and III, the ar-
gument has some force. In Hodel the Court approved Congress' power
to obtain state regulation of private surface mining companies under a
threat that direct national regulation would be imposed if the states
failed to implement national environmental standards. 667 In FERC the
Court in effect approved state administration of national regulatory
policies governing utilities under a threat that all state regulation of
electric and natural gas utilities would be prohibited if the states failed
to act.
In addition to the analogy between the statutes at issue in Hodel and
FERC, the Court also upheld Titles I and III on the ground that they
do not interfere with the "quintessential attribute of sovereignty"-the
states' "power to make decisions and to set policy" for private activ-
ity.668 Since the PURPA requires only "consideration" of national
standards, the Court found no interference with the states' power to
regulate private activity.66 9 The absence of any interference with the
states' power to set policies also was supported by the argument that
Congress could have imposed the national standards directly on elec-
tric and natural gas utilities and preempted state regulation and by the
finding that Congress had in fact chosen a less intrusive alternative by
requiring merely consideration of the national standards.670  The
Court's finding that there is no intrusion on the states' power to set
regulatory policies is correct because the states are free under Titles I
and III to refuse to adopt the national rate design policies and service
standards.67' The Court, however, failed to consider the administrative
and financial costs borne by the states in conducting hearings to con-
sider the adoption of the national standards and the diversion of state
government resources from the implementation of state policies to the
665. Id at 2137.
666. Id at 2141.
667. See supra text accompanying notes 559-80.
668. 102 S. Ct. at 2138.
669. The Court emphasized the point that Titles I and III require only "consideration" of
national standards by italicizing this word. Id at 2140.
670. Id




implementation of national regulatory policies.67 2
FERC, unfortunately, does not establish any clear test of Congress'
power to employ the states as its agents to administer and enforce na-
tional regulatory policies for private activity. It leaves unresolved the
questions raised by the TCP cases and Hodel: Is Congress' power to be
judged under some test derived from NLC? Does Congress have the
power to induce, but not to compel, state implementation of national
regulations? 673
The possibility that the Court may limit Congress' power to employ
the states as the nation's agents under some test derived from NLC
remains open because the majority in FERC, as the dissent con-
tended,674 basically ignored the question of NLC limits. The Court ig-
nored this question because it found that Titles I and III of the PURPA
have no significant impact on the states.675 Absent some impact on
state autonomy, there is, of course, no reason to consider whether NLC
applies and limits Congress' power to interfere with the states. The
Court's conclusion, however, is wrong: the PURPA does have a signifi-
cant impact on the states. 676 If, in another case, the Court assesses more
accurately than it did in either Hodel6" or FERC the effect on the
states of implementing national regulations, then it may well conclude
that NLC limits Congress' power to use the states as its agents as well
as Congress' power to regulate the states.67
In addition to leaving open the possibility of some test derived from
672. See supra text accompanying notes 625-30. The Court did note that Congress had au-
thorized grants, see supra note 629, to assist SRAs in implementing Titles I and III. 102 S. Ct. at
2133 n.14. Since the Court did not recognize that implementation of national regulatory policies
has a significant impact on the states, it was baffled by the dissent's argument that states might
prefer preemption and direct national regulation in order to be able to devote state governmental
and financial resources to the implementation of state, as opposed to national, policies. Compare
id at 2140 n.32 with id at 2151-52.
673. See supra text accompanying notes 607-09.
674. 102 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
675. See supra text accompanying notes 668-71.
676. See supra text accompanying notes 625-30.
677. See supra text accompanying notes 566-80.
678. In FERC, for example, the Solicitor General recognized that Titles I and III of the
PURPA have an impact on state autonomy and that NLC applied to the question of Congress'
power to use the states to implement national regulatory policies for utilities. Nonetheless, he
argued that the PURPA was valid under either the three-prong Hodel test, see supra text accom-
panying note 447, or under a balancing test derived from NLC. Brief for the Appellants at 27-41,
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). The dissent in FERC
agreed with the Solicitor General that Titles I and III have an impact on the states and would
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NLC, the Court in FERC also muddled the question whether some
indeterminate distinction between inducement and coercion is the test
of Congress' power to use the states to enforce national law. It mud-
dled the question by inconsistent analysis of the coercive effects of Ti-
tles I and III and compounded the confusion with contradictory dicta
about the general scope of national power to impose a duty on the
states to enforce national law.
In analyzing Titles I and III of the PURPA, the Court managed to
suggest that coercion as a test of Congress' power was both irrelevant
and relevant. On the one hand, the Court's description of the states'
choice between abandoning utility regulation and considering the na-
tional standards suggests that coercion is irrelevant. 679 The Court rec-
ognized that this choice is "difficult," especially "when Congress...
has failed to provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the
area in the event of state default."680 The Court also assumed that "it
may be unlikely that the States will or easily can abandon regulation of
public utilities to avoid PURPA's requirements. ' 68 1 On the other
hand, two points suggest that coercion is relevant. The Court expressly
refused to decide the question of "federal power to compel state regula-
tory activity," '682 and it construed Titles I and III disingenously68 3 in
order to avoid the question of Congress' power to impose a duty on
SRAs to implement national regulations. Moreover, by virtue of its
strained statutory analysis the Court was able to draw an analogy be-
tween the provision for state implementation of Titles I and III and the
means of obtaining state enforcement of national environmental sur-
face mining standards approved in Hode684 and to label both as "pro-
grams of cooperative federalism. 685
have held them invalid under the three-prong Hodel test. 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2147-49 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part).
679. The Court also stated that
it cannot be constitutionally determinative that the federal regulation is likely to move
the States to act in a given way, or even to "coerc[e] the States" into assuming a regula-
tory role by affecting their "freedom to make decisions in areas of 'traditional govern-
mental functions.'"
102 S. Ct. at 2141 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Auth., 452 U.S. 264,
289 (1981)).
680. 102 S. Ct. at 2140-41.
681. Id
682. Id at 2140.
683. See supra text accompanying notes 660-64.
684. See supra text accompanying notes 666-67.




The confusion inherent in the Court's inconsistent assessment of the
significance of the coercive effects of Titles I and III is exacerbated by
contradictory dicta on the broad question of Congress' power to impose
a duty on the states to enforce national law. The Court prefaced its
analysis of Titles I and III by noting a famous statement from Kentucky
i'. Dennison686 that Congress "has no power to impose upon a State
officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it."6 7
The Court's characterization of this statement as "rigid," "isolated,"
and "not representative of the law today" '688 gives rise to the inference
that Congress does have the power to impose duties on state officers
and administrative agencies.6 89 Nevertheless, this inference must be
tempered by the Court's immediate qualification that it has "never...
sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate
and enforce laws and regulations."690 More importantly, any inference
of Congress' power to impose a duty on the states seems to be counter-
balanced by the Court's statement that the holding in FERC "does not
purport to authorize the imposition of general affirmative obligations
on the States."69'
d. Pending Challenges to Statutes Providing for State
Implementation of National Regulations
The Court may soon have an opportunity to consider two statutes
that provide for state implementation of national regulatory pro-
grams.692 First, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977693 have re-
vived the controversy over the EPA's power to compel the states to
administer and enforce transportation control plans. The 1977 Amend-
ments extend the deadline for achievement of the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) from December 31, 1977, to Decem-
ber 31, 1982, and in the case of two pollutants (ozone and carbon mon-
oxide) the deadline may be postponed until December 31, 1987.694 The
686. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 55 (1861). For a brief assessment of this case, see infra notes 1026-32
and accompanying text.
687. 102 S. Ct. at 2138 (quoting Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861)).
688. 102 S. Ct. at 2138 (footnote omitted).
689. Congress' power to impose duties on state officers and agencies to enforce national law is
discussed infra at notes 979-1055.
690. 102 S. Ct. at 2138.
691. Id at 2142 n.32.
692. See supra text accompanying notes 542-48.
693. See supra note 582.
694. This brief description of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments is drawn from Connecticut
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
952 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
new amendments employ the same basic mechanism as the 1970 Act to
obtain state administration and enforcement of the national air pollu-
tion standards.6 95 If the states fail to submit a revised "state implemen-
tation plan" by July 31, 1979, that will achieve the NAAQS by the end
of 1982 for all areas that did not meet these standards in 1977, the EPA
is authorized to promulgate an air pollution control plan and to regu-
late directly private sources of air pollution. The implementation plan
of any state that seeks an extension of the deadline for achieving the
ozone and carbon monoxide standards must "provide for the imple-
mentation of a vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance
program" and other measures necessary to achieve the NAAQS by
1987.696
To ensure state submission of revised implementation plans and state
administration and enforcement of the controversial motor vehicle
emission control inspection and maintenance programs, Congress
adopted two new sanctions over and beyond the threat of substituting
direct national regulation for state regulation of private pollution caus-
ing activity. If a state fails to adopt an approved implementation plan,
the EPA may withhold national grants for state clean air programs, for
highway construction, and for sewage treatment facilities. 697 The EPA
also may impose a moratorium on the construction of new industrial
plants that would be major sources of air pollution.698
These sanctions are very effective means of inducing the states to
submit revised implementation plans and to enforce national air pollu-
tion standards because severe restrictions on residential and industrial
growth are the price of refusal. The courts have not yet reached the
question of NLC federalism limits on Congress' power to combine the
following means of inducing the states to act as the nation's agents in
regulating private pollution-causing activity: the threat of direct na-
tional regulation as a substitute for state regulation, a direct national
moratorium on construction of major pollution sources as an alterna-
tive to state regulations restricting air pollution from new industrial
plants, and the denial of national grants.699
Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1000-02 (2d Cir. 1982) and Citizens for a Better
Env't v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264, 266-68 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
695. See supra text at note 583.
696. See Connecticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1001 (2d Cir. 1982).
697. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506(a),(b), 7616(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
698. Id. §§ 7410(a)(2)(I), 7502(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
699. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Congress has employed two basic means of
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A few courts, without addressing any federalism issues, have either
required the EPA to impose a construction moratorium if a state sub-
mits an inadequate implementation plan7" or assumed that the EPA
would impose a construction moratorium if a state implementation
plan is not fully approved."' When the EPA has imposed the funding
and construction moratorium sanction on states that failed to make an
adequate provision for the administration and enforcement of motor
vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance programs,70 2 liti-
gants have raised NLC as a limit on Congress' power to compel state
implementation of national standards for private activity. The two
challenges to the EPA's power of requiring the states to regulate motor
vehicle air pollution by withholding grants and restricting new indus-
trial construction have foundered so far on procedural grounds.70 3 Al-
though the withholding of national grants and a moratorium on
obtaining state implementation of national air pollution standards. First, Congress has threatened
to substitute direct national regulation of private activity and to supplant state regulation if the
states fail to enforce national air pollution standards. Direct national regulation of private sources
of air pollution under a pollution control plan promulgated by the EPA and a nationally imposed
moratorium on construction of new industrial facilities are both imposed only if the states fail to
adopt and enforce an implementation plan that will ensure achievement of the NAAQS. Second,
Congress has made grants on the condition that the states regulate private activity. Both of these
means of employing the states as the nation's agent are constitutionally valid. See infra text ac-
companying notes 927-40. For a comprehensive overview of federalism issues raised by these
amendments, see generally Luneburg, supra note 577.
700. Connecticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1982) (EPA must
impose construction moratorium if the state implementation plan is given only "conditional ap-
proval"). Cf., City of Seabrook v. EPA, 659 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981) (conditional approval of
state implementation plan upheld without consideration of construction moratorium).
701. See cases cited in Connecticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1008 n.20
(2d Cir. 1982).
702. The EPA has withheld grants and imposed a moratorium on the construction of new
industrial facilities as sanctions against at least three states that did not adopt adequate vehicle
emission control inspection and maintenance programs when they revised their state implementa-
tion plans to comply with the 1977 Amendments. 45 Fed. Reg. 16,486 (1980) (Colorado); 45 Fed.
Reg. 81,752 (1980) (Kentucky); 45 Fed. Reg. 81,746 (California). The EPA has threatened to
impose the funding and construction moratorium sanctions on many states. E.g., 45 Fed. Reg.
43,794,43,807 (1980) (New York). Although the EPA has chosen to rely on funding and construc-
tion moratorium sanctions, it still claims the authority under the Clean Air Act to mandate state
enforcement of inspection and maintenance programs. 44 Fed. Reg. 20,372, 20,374 n.15 (1979).
703. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980) (standing and
mootness), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981); Pacific Legal Found. v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917 (9th
Cir. 1980) (preliminary injunction denied), cert. denied 450 U.S. 914 (1981). In Pacfic Legal
Foundation, the district court denied the preliminary injunction in part because it found that there
was little chance that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their claim that the withholding
of national funds for a state's failure to regulate private motor vehicle air pollution is unconstitu-
tional. This court thought that the state sovereignty argument was weak because it believed that
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industrial growth are effective sanctions that may overwhelm state
resistance and preclude any further litigation,7°4 the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1977 afford an instructive example of the means employed by
NLC does not limit the spending power. Pacific Legal Found. v. Costle, Civil No. S-79-925 LKK
(E.D. Cal. March 10, 1980).
704. A district court has ordered a cut-off of all national highway grants for two urban areas in
Pennsylvania because the state failed to establish a motor vehicle emission control inspection and
maintenance program, but the court imposed this sanction under its equitable powers to enforce a
consent decree by civil contempt and not as a remedy for the state's failure to comply with the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 533 F.
Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aft'd, 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982); see Delaware Valley Citizens' Coun-
cil v. Pennsylvania, 17 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1423 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The origin of this case is a
decision of the Third Circuit upholding EPA's power to compel the states to establish inspection
and maintenance programs. See supra note 594 and accompanying text, After this decision,
Pennsylvania agreed to implement an inspection and maintenance program, and the district court
entered an appropriate consent decree. 533 F. Supp. at 872-74. The state subsequently failed to
establish an inspection and maintenance program and argued that it could not comply with the
consent decree because the state legislature, over the Governor's veto, had enacted a statute
prohibiting the expenditure of state funds for implementation of an inspection and maintenance
program. Id at 875-76.
Although this statute was challenged on the ground that it conflicted with both the consent
decree and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, the court held that it was valid. The court
rejected the argument that the Pennsylvania statute was invalid under the supremacy clause be-
cause it conflicted with the consent decree on the ground that NLC bars a federal court from
"countermand[ing] the decision of a state legislature not to expend state funds on the establish-
ment of an I/M program". Id at 878 (footnote omitted). The court also rejected a second argu-
ment that the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977 on the dual grounds that there was no conflict because Congress had not
mandated state implementation of inspection and maintenance programs and that such a man-
date, even if imposed by Congress, was barred by NLC. 1d at 879. Notwithstanding its conclu-
sion that the Pennsylvania statute prohibiting expenditure of state funds for inspection and
maintenance programs was valid, the court concluded that the statute did not excuse compliance
with the consent decree, held the state in civil contempt, and enjoined certain national highway
grants to the state as a sanction. Id at 880-84. The Third Circuit upheld the district court's civil
contempt order. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982).
Even though the district court borrowed the civil contempt sanction of enjoining national high-
way grants from the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, the case does not raise any question of
federalism limits on Congress' power to employ the states as its agents in regulating private activ-
ity. 533 F. Supp. at 882-83. It raises separate, distinct questions about federalism limits on the
equitable powers of the federal courts. See supra notes 28 & 416. If the EPA disapproves the
Pennsylvania implementation plan because the state's provision for a motor vehicle emission con-
trol inspection and maintenance program is inadequate and either withholds national grants or
imposes a construction moratorium, then the courts may have an opportunity to consider NLC
federalism limits on Congress' power to use the states to administer and enforce national regula-
tions governing private activity. See 46 Fed. Reg. 58,593 (1981) (notice that the Pennsylvania




Congress to obtain state implementation of national regulatory
programs.
Section 402 of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978705
is the second statute that has been challenged on the ground that the
means employed by Congress to obtain state enforcement of national
regulations are an unconstitutional intrusion on state autonomy. This
statute prohibits the installation of outdoor lighting fixtures using natu-
ral gas and authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Energy (the
Secretary) to promulgate a rule prohibiting the sale of natural gas for
use in outdoor lighting and other rules granting exemptions from the
general prohibition.70 6 The Secretary promulgated a rule prohibiting
the use of natural gas in outdoor lighting,7 ° 7 and, as authorized by the
statute,708 delegated the authority to enforce the prohibition and to
grant exemptions to appropriate state regulatory authorities.70 9
Several natural gas companies challenged this delegation of national
authority to state agencies on the grounds that the Secretary has in fact
made state administration and enforcement of the national regulations
mandatory and that such an appropriation of state regulatory resources
is contrary to the tenth amendment.71 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
the argument that the delegation is mandatory because, under its con-
struction of the statute and regulations, the states can refuse the delega-
tion and the Secretary's only recourse in this event is to rescind the
delegation.71  The court easily concluded that, absent coercion, the
mere delegation of national authority did not violate the tenth amend-
ment because Congress had established a program of "cooperative fed-
eralism" 712 similar to the provision for state enforcement of national
surface mining regulation approved in Hodel.713
705. 42 U.S.C. § 8372 (Supp. IV 1980), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. X, § 1024, 95 Stat. 617-18.
706. Id. § 8372(a)-(c) (Supp. IV 1980), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. X, § 1024, 95 Stat. 617-18.
707. 10 C.F.R. §§ 516.21-.22 (1982).
708. 42 U.S.C. § 8372(e).
709. 10 C.F.R. § 516.30 (1982).
710. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Department of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982).
711. Id at 1369.
712. Id
713. See supra text accompanying notes 559-80.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
956 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
4. Necessity of a Princoled Theory of State Autonomy
In practice NLC has proved to be an insignificant restraint on Con-
gress' power under the commerce clause. In addition to the FLSA, the
courts have held that only one other statute is an unconstitutional
transgression on state autonomy.714 It is, then, tempting to dismiss
NLC itself as an aberration 7 t5-the attempted revival of federalism
limits on Congress avoided for the most part by the lower courts as a
limit on the commerce power and neutered with respect to the defense
powers, the spending power, and the power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments. Nonetheless, this temptation should be eschewed both
because it ii possible to provide principled, consistent answers to the
questions of state autonomy raised by NLC and its progeny and be-
cause failure to do so entails three risks.
The first risk is a consequence of the Court's flat rule that national
regulation of private activity is not limited by NLC.716 State authority
to set substantive rules for individual conduct is certainly an aspect of
state autonomy. In the absence of some explanation why national
power to regulate private activity and to displace state law is plenary,
or why state authority to determine the wages and hours of public em-
ployment is a more important aspect of state autonomy deserving
greater protection from national intereference than state control of pri-
vate activity,7 17 there inevitably will be pressure to confine the nation's
powers over private activity. Indeed, there already are indications that
some of the Justices want to narrow the scope of the commerce power,
although they accept the formal proposition that NLC does not limit
national power over private activity.7 18
The second risk is a function of the vague and indeterminate tests of
state regulatory immunity that the lower courts have derived from
714. See supra note 21.
715. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEx. L. REv. 695, 757-59 (1980) (NLC only a "cue"
to Congress to "renew its traditional role as protector of the states"); Cox, supra note 16, at 22
(NLC will probably be "an unprincipled exception to the general rule of federal supremacy");
Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism" 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 42 (1980)
(NLC "has, as yet, shown no generative power").
716. See supra text accompanying note 459.
717. See L. TRINE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-22, at 312 (1978) ("it seems anoma-
lous to hold that Congress retains its preemptory power to displace state regulation of private
conduct but is restrained when it attempts to control decisions effecting the state's own service-
providing employees") (footnote omitted).
718. See supra text accompanying notes 474-75 & note 475.
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NLC. The traditional or integral functions and balancing tests are an
open invitation to continued litigation of state autonomy claims and to
the substitution of judicial social policy for congressional policy.71 9
Both tests at bottom call for an ad hoc judicial determination of the
comparative importance of particular state and national interests.
7 0
Although these tests have been applied consistently by the lower courts
to uphold national regulation of the states, they could easily be
manipulated to impose significant restraints on national power.
The courts rarely address the question of state immunity from na-
tional regulation solely in terms of the issue whether the particular state
activity is integral or traditional,72 ' and they usually couple this inquiry
with a balancing test. It is perhaps fortunate that the courts do not rely
solely on the identification of state interests as integral or traditional as
the test of regulatory immunity because there is no clear definition of
these terms.722 There is substantial evidence that these tests simply rep-
licate the old distinction between governmental and proprietary func-
tions: integral or traditional functions are equated with governmental
functions and are immune; nontraditional or nonintegral functions are
defined as proprietary activities and are subject to national regula-
tion.723 If the test of protected state activities is a distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions, then NLC has reincarnated a
719. See supra note 504.
720. Only one court has attempted to formulate specific criteria for state immunity from na-
tional regulation. In Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979), the
Sixth Circuit stated that a four-part test for the identification of integral or traditional state func-
tions, but its test is designed merely to distinguish governmental and proprietary functions.
721. For examples of cases relying exclusively on a distinction between integral or traditional
functions and nonintegral or nontraditional functions as the test of immunity, see cases discussed
swpra notes 115 & 494.
722. The courts have held that a state's exercise of its power of escheat and the provision of
relief for the needy are not integral or traditional functions and that management of wildlife
resources is such a protected state function. Compare In re Levy, 574 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.), afdsub
nom. New York v. United States, 439 U.S. 920 (1978) and Gilbert v. New Jersey, Dep't of Human
Servs., 167 N.J. Super. 217, 400 A.2d 803 (1979) with EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D.
Wyo. 1981),prob.jurs. noted, 102 S. Ct. 996 (1982) (No. 81-554). Although the lower courts have
consistently held that state regulation of a variety of private activities is not an integral or tradi-
tional state function, the Supreme Court has assumed without deciding that state regulation of
land use is an integral governmental function. Compare cases cited supra note 464 with Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 293 n.34 (1981).
723. The best evidence that the integral or traditional functions test is the old distinction be-
tween governmental and proprietary functions in a new verbal guise is the Department of Labor's
statement of state activities that are subject to the FLSA. See supra note 112. The cases cited
supra at notes 493-95 also support this conclusion.
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long discredited test of state immunity from national regulation.724
Even if it is possible for the Court to define integral and traditional
functions clearly, the whole inquiry seems to be fundamentally mis-
taken if the goal is to protect important state interests from national
interference. Any judicial determination that a particular state activity
is not integral or traditional clashes with the best possible evidence of
the importance of that interest to the state-the state's determination
that a particular good or service should be provided directly by the
state and not left to the private sector, regulated or unregulated. If a
state decides that a service, like mass transit, is not provided adequately
by the private sector or that an activity, say off-track gambling, is too
important a source of revenue to be left to private interests, any deter-
mination that these activities are subject to national regulation725 be-
cause they are nonintegral or nontraditional begs the purpose of the
test-to protect important state interests.
Balancing tests seem, at least superficially, to be an improvement
over rigid categories of integral or traditional functions because they
permit consideration of both the effect of national regulations on state
activities like public transit and off-track gambling and the importance
of the national interests underlying the regulation. A balancing test,
however, is responsive to the problem of ad hoc judicial evaluations of
competing state and national legislative policies only if it is possible to
state criteria for assessing these interests. Since the courts have not, as
yet, identified any criteria for their balancing tests, their determinations
of the scope of state autonomy are necessarily ad hoc subjective judg-
ments. It is, for example, hard to reconcile the application of balancing
tests in two decisions of the Second Circuit on any ground other than
judicial policy preferences. In United Transportation Union the court
held that national law could not authorize strikes on a state-owned
commuter railroad engaged in interstate commerce,7 26 but in FOE the
court held that a city could be compelled to expend its funds and to
employ its personnel to enforce national policies for the reduction of
724. See generally Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitt-
Mional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073 (1980). The problem of identifying protected state interests on
the basis of the governmental-proprietary distinction is further complicated by a recent Supreme
Court decision which suggests that traditional or integral functions may include some proprietary
activities. See Reeves v. State, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
725. The Department of Labor has ruled that both of these state activities are subject to na-
tional regulation under the FLSA. See supra note 112.




motor vehicle air pollution.727
As these two cases suggest, a balancing test is an inherently subjec-
tive and unmanageable solution to questions of state autonomy and of
the scope of national power. Balancing tests are inherently subjective
because any statement of principled criteria for assessing the impor-
tance of national interests and the actual effects of national regulations
on the states, and for comparing the two, is impossible. 728 Even if crite-
ria for a balancing test could be formulated, it would be unmanageable.
An assessment of the actual impact of national regulations on the states
is precisely the type of factual inquiry that the Court abhors.729
A third, final reason why NLC should not be dismissed lightly as an
aberration is the risk that it will be used as a basis for establishing lim-
its on Congress' power to employ the states as its agents in implement-
ing national regulatory programs.730  All three risks, which are
aggravated by popular and judicial fears that the national government
is crushing the states, can be avoided under the theory of political ac-
countability developed below. Political accountability can justify
broad national power to regulate private activity and prevent an un-
warranted narrow construction of the commerce power. It provides
principled limits on the nation's power to regulate the states and to use
them as its agents, and it also protects the states' role in the federal
system.
727. See supra text accompanying notes 603-06.
728. For example, what are the criteria for assessing the relative importance of the national
interests in preventing the disruption of interstate rail transportation by labor disputes and in
promoting public health by reducing motor vehicle air pollution? What are the criteria for com-
paring the actual effects on a state of preempting its prohibition of strikes by public employees and
the actual effects of commandeering its resources and employees to enforce national pollution
control policies? What are the common criteria for balancing diverse national regulatory interests
against the actual effects of the regulations on the states?
For attempts to state criteria for balancing tests, see sources cited supra note 444.
729. In NLC the Court did not consider either the nature of the national interest or the actual
effects of the FLSA on the states. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17. The Court has often
stated its reluctance to decide constitutional issues on the basis of detailed factual inquiries. Eg.,
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627 (1981) (not undertake "a factual in-
quiry into the relationship between the revenues generated by a tax and the costs incurred on
account of the taxed activity" as a test of the validity of state taxes under the dormant commerce
clause.) For an unwitting example of the problems inherent in a balancing test that requires a
detailed factual inquiry into the effects of national regulations on the states, see Note, Practical
Federalism After National League of Cities- A Proposal, 69 GEo. L.J. 773 (1981). For a careful
critique of a balancing test, see Comment, supra note 284, at 423-25.
730. See supra text accompanying notes 673-91.
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H. Alternative Theories of State Autonomy. The Commentators and
NLC
If the courts have not succeeded in devising a workable theory of
state autonomy, the commentators have fared no better with the seem-
ingly intractable problems of state regulatory immunity and of Con-
gress' power to employ the states as its agents. Although most
academic observers simply advocate various balancing tests to deter-
mine the proper relation of national and state authority, some have
advanced more thoughtful theories for limiting national power. Others
have elaborated careful justifications of broad national power over the
states. Among the proponents of limits on national power, Professors
Tribe and Michelman are the most celebrated. They urge that NLC
should be interpreted as an individual rights decision and that the
states' role in providing constitutionally guaranteed social services to
their citizens should be protected from national interference. 3' Profes-
sor Kaden, another proponent of state autonomy, argues that the states'
role as a source of political liberty provides the basis for determining
limits on national authority.7 3 2 Professor Stewart is the principal pro-
ponent of broad national power over the states, 733 but Professor
Choper's proposal that federalism questions should be nonjusticiable734
would also recognize extensive congressional power over the states.
All these analyses of state autonomy and national power, however,
are marred by two fundamental defects. First, they do not consider the
full array of national legislative powers and Congress' authority under
each of these powers to regulate private activity, to regulate state and
local governments, and to employ the states as the nation's agents.
Since they fail to consider the full range of national power to control
the allocation of political authority between the states and the nation,
these analyses do not establish a comprehensive theory of national and
state relations. Second, they fail to establish principled and judicially
manageable standards for resolving conflicts between the political com-
munities of the states and the nation that will both permit effective im-
plementation of national policy and preserve the states' role in the
731. L. TRIBE, supra note 717, §§ 5-21 & -22, at 307-18; Permutations of Sovereigny, supra
note 35; Unraveling NLC, supra note 32.
732. Kaden, supra note 22.
733. Stewart, supra note 577.
734. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980);
Dispensabiliy of Judicial Review, supra note 10.
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federal system. The proponents of state autonomy limits on national
authority all rely in the end on ad hoe balancing tests to resolve con-
flicts of national and state power, and the theories of the proponents of
broad national power provide either insufficient protection for state in-
terests or inadequate justification for national intrusions on state
autonomy.
The Tribe-Michelman thesis that the states' function of providing
basic social services, like fire protection, education, and hospital care, is
the essence of the concept of state sovereignty recognized in NLC is
one plausible interpretation of that case. 35  Their argument that this
concept of state sovereignty rests on the constitutional rights of state
citizens to a minimum level of basic social services, as they admit, goes
far beyond the plurality's intention to protect state autonomy.736 The
argument does, however, have the virtue of providing a coherent expla-
nation for the plurality's conclusion that the states' function in provid-
ing traditional or integral governmental services is protected from
national control.737 In their view, the invalidation of the FLSA in NLC
735. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09 & 127-30.
736. Permutations of Sovereignty supra note 35, at 1172-80; Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at
1066, 1075-78. Both Tribe and Michelman argue that the internal logic of the plurality opinion,
divorced from its intent, supports the conclusion that state sovereignty is derived from individual
rights against government to the satisfaction of "basic human needs." Unraveling NLC, supra
note 32, at 1066. First, they note the plurality's distinction between the states' function of regulat-
ing private activity and the states' function of providing traditional or integral services to their
citizens. Since both of these functions are important state interests, the recognition of national
power to displace state regulation of private activity and the imposition of limits on national
power to regulate the states as service providers can be explained as a limit on Congress' power to
interfere with the individual right against state government to obtain basic social services. Permu-
tations ofSovereignty. supra note 35, at 1168-69, 1175; Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at 1075.
Second, protection of local government, as well as the states, from national regulation can be
explained by the duty of both the states and local government to provide basic social services to
their citizens. Permutations of Sovereignty, supra note 35, at 1169-71. Third, Professor Tribe ar-
gues that the plurality's distinction between Congress' authority to regulate the states under the
commerce power and under the spending power and power to enforce the Civil War Amend-
ments, see supra text accompanying notes 121-22, also supports the conclusion that NLCs concept
of state sovereignty is premised on individual rights to basic services. In his view, Congress has
greater power over the states' service provision functions under the spending power than under the
commerce power because national grants that cover the additional costs imposed on states do not
jeopardize the states' ability to furnish basic services. Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at 1091.
Similarly, Congress' power in enforcing the Civil War Amendments may override individual
rights to basic state social services because the national legislation also vindicates individual
rights. See id at 1077, 1077-99. Professor Tribe does not explain the plurality's suggestion, see
supra note 123 and accompanying text, that Congress has greater power over the states under its
war power than under its commerce power.
737. The NLC plurality's conclusion that the states' function of providing traditional or inte-
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is correct, not because it affects the "states as states" in their capacities
as employers, but because the increased costs occasioned by compli-
ance with national wage standards would increase the costs of the basic
social services provided by state and local governments. These in-
creased costs would in turn threaten a reduction of the services to
which the states' citizens have a constitutional right. The protected so-
cial service function of the states is thus a corollary of individual rights
against government to a minimum level of public services. It includes
all the services that the public expects the states and local government,
not the national government, to provide and that are provided collec-
tively out of general tax revenues without assessment of dny special
charge.738
Although individual constitutional rights are the core of their con-
cept of state sovereignty, both Michelman and Tribe recognize that the
states' social service function is not absolutely immune from national
control. Professor Michelman would permit national interference with
the provision of public services by the states if there is "a compelling
need for congressional action." 739 Professor Tribe analyzes the nation's
power to regulate the states as providers of basic social services more
carefully and thoroughly. State challenges would be appropriate only
if national regulation is "directed to, and directly increas[es] the costs
of, essential service provision functions performed by a state or munici-
pality,"740 and he notes three justifications for such a national
gral services is protected from national interference is poorly reasoned, and several propositions in
the opinion seem to be inconsistent with the result. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
Tribe and Michelman address the problems inherent in the plurality opinion, and their essays,
read together, provide an explanation for the plurality's conclusion. Compare text accompanying
notes 127-30 with note 736 supra. Nevertheless, they fail completely to resolve the broad questions
of national power and state autonomy. See infra text accompanying notes 751-64.
738. Michelman contends that the states have a duty to provide the basic social services which
the public has historically held them responsible for providing. 'ermutations of Soverei!nty, supra
note 35, at 1179. Tribe argues that state and local governments have a duty to provide all essential
services that are not provided by the national government. Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at
1076 n.42. Although neither defines the states' service function precisely, this function apparently
includes services like police and fire protection, sanitation, public health, parks and recreation,
and education that the NLC plurality describes as integral or traditional. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 108-09. Essential or basic services that are not provided by the states or local govern-
ment presumably become the duty of the national government.
739. Permutations ofSoverelgnty, supra note 35, at 1180 n.47. Michelman also states the na-
tional government has the authority to interfere with state social service programs if the national
interest is "compelling (or substantial, or whatever)." Id at 1191 n.86.





First, a national regulation is valid if it "clearly does not jeopardize
state provision of essential services. '7 4z This justification supports the
Court's decision in Fry '. United States upholding Congress' power to
freeze the wages of state employees743 because such a regulation does
not increase state costs in providing public services. 7" It also supports
Congress' authority under the spending power to regulate state provi-
sion of essential services because national grants covering the addi-
tional costs of compliance with the conditions of a grant do not portend
any reduction of services.745 Second, Congress may have the power to
regulate the states' social service functions if it is "acting to effectuate
other individual rights. ' 746 This justification creates a conflict between
two individual rights-the individual right protected by national legis-
lation and the individual right to basic social services provided by the
state. For example, Professor Tribe states that Congress may have the
authority to impose the Equal Pay Act's prohibition of sex-based wage
differentials 747 and the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA on
the states and local government. Although these requirements might
increase government costs and threaten a reduction of the services to
which the public is constitutionally entitled, he suggests, without stating
any test, that they may be valid if they were enacted for the specific
purpose of protecting the individual right to a decent living wage."
Finally, he provides a catch-all justification for national regulations
that are "the least restrictive means of dealing with an overriding na-
741. L. TRIBE, supra note 717, § 5-22, at 316-18; Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at 1096-99.
742. Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at 1096.
743. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
744. Unraveling ALC, supra note 32, at 1096-97.
745. Id at 1091. Professor Tribe would hold that "enhanced scrutiny" should be applied to
national statutes enacted under the spending power "JoInly where Congress uses its spending
power disproportionately-providing payments for only a small part of the increased cost of serv-
ice provision-or as a lever over unrelated areas-paying for part of the costs of one service, while
effectively controlling, and increasing the costs of providing, another." Id This test of the spend-
ing power is impractical: it does not state how much "enhanced scrutiny" is appropriate for any
particular degree of disproportionality between a national grant and the costs to a state of comply-
ing with the conditions of the grant, and it would require a detailed factual examination of the
actual costs imposed on a state. The problems inherent in Professor Tribe's analysis of the spend-
ing power are considered infra at notes 759-64.
746. Unraveling NLC. supra note 32, at 1097-99.
747. See supra text accompanying notes 365-71 & 375-82.
748. L. TRIBE, supra note 717, § 5-22, at 318 n.46; Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at 1098 n.
123,1103.
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tional problem. 7
49
Professors Tribe and Michelman clearly are more interested in estab-
lishing their novel theory of affirmative constitutional rights to basic
social services than in analyzing questions of state autonomy and na-
tional power. ° It is, nonetheless, important to note the limits of their
analyses of NLC because their essays have found favor with many
courts.75 I The most striking deficiency of their argument is the isola-
tion of the states' function of providing services to their citizens as the
core of state sovereignty. State decisions about the goods and services
to be provided collectively are certainly one aspect of the states' role as
political communities in the federal system, but other political deci-
sions about the rules for private activity, the structure and organization
of public decisionmaking processes, and the allocation of legislative,
executive, and judicial resources are equally important state func-
tions.7 52 Apart from the assumption that state autonomy is derived en-
tirely from individual rights, Tribe and Michelman provide no
explanation why state political decisions about public services are enti-
tled to greater respect than state political decisions about the rules for
private activity or about the structure of state government. 3  More-
749. Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at 1099.
750. Professor Michelman has long been a proponent of individual constitutional rights to
basic government services. Eg., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969). Both Tribe and
Michelman admit that their purpose is to demonstrate that the NLC plurality's opinion is an
unwitting case in support of their theory of government's constitutional duty to provide for basic
human needs, and they devote a large portion of their essays to establishing their theory of indi-
vidual constitutional rights. Permutations of Sovereignty, supra note 35, at 1166, 1181-91; (nrav.
eling NLC, supra note 32, at 1066, 1078-90. Since the Court has never accepted their theory of
individual constitutional rights, it seems improbable that the Court would use it to erect a super-
structure of state autonomy.
751. The Tribe and Michelman NLC essays are the most frequently cited academic analyses
of that case. Although many courts have accepted their interpretation of NLC as limiting Con-
gress' power to interfere with the states' function of providing basic social services, these courts
have not accepted their theory that state autonomy is derived from individual constitutional rights
to these services. E.g., United Trans. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 25 n. 15 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036 (6th Cir.
1979).
752. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
753. Professor Michelman does entertain the possibility that the states' role in the federal sys-
tem may be broader than the function of providing social services, and he notes that state power to
make and enforce laws governing private activity and to control the processes of political choice
might be considered a part of state sovereignty. Permutations of Sovereignty, supra note 35, at
1167-73. Such an analysis of state functions is in large part consistent with the argument that the
framers intended the states to be political communities. See supra text accompanying notes 29-53.
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over, the proposition that provision of basic public services, like fire
and police protection and welfare assistance, is a special function of the
states and local government has a very weak empirical foundation.
The national government supports through grants many of the basic
services that Tribe and Michelman describe as state functions, 754 and in
many social welfare programs, the states and local government are
merely administrative units employed by Congress to distribute goods
and services authorized by the nation.755  Tribe and Michelman are
correct that one aspect of the states' role in the federal system is to
provide services for their citizens, but the definition of the states' role
exclusively in terms of this one function is anomalous because it is
often the national political community, not the states, that funds basic
social services, establishes the level of benefits, and sets eligibility
standards. 6
This exclusive focus on the states' social service function precludes
the development of any comprehensive theory of Congress' power to
control the allocation of political authority between the nation and the
states. Neither Tribe nor Michelman addresses the question of limits
on or justifications for Congress' power to diminish state autonomy by
regulating private activity and by requiring the affirmative exercise of
state authority over private activity.757 Even with respect to the narrow
He rejects this broad interpretation of the states' role as inconsistent with the NLC plurality opin-
ion. Id. at 1167-73. He does not elaborate any reasons why a determination of the states' role in
the federal system should be based solely on one opinion of four members of the Court.
754. See supra text accompanying notes 392 & 393.
755. See supra text accompanying notes 316-21 & notes 319-20.
756. At least two courts have noted that national funding of the services provided by states
undermines the concept of the states' function as a service provider. In re Glidden, 653 F.2d 85,
88 (2d Cir. 1981); Gilbert v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 167 N.J. Super. 217, 226-27, 400
A2d 803, 808 (1979), discussed supra note 303. Contra United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 28 n.26 (2d Cir. 1980), revd, 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1981). Professor Tribe's account
of the relation between the national spending power and the states' social service function, see
supra note 745 and accompanying text, does not come to grips with the fundamental point that the
provision of basic social services is often more a national than a state function.
757. Although Professor Michelman does not consider the possibility that state interests other
than the states' social service function merit some protection from national control, Professor
Tribe does address this issue. According to Tribe, special scrutiny of national statutes that affect
the states' service provision function is necessary because of the effects on individual rights. Other
state interests, which do not implicate individual rights, are adequately protected in most instances
by the national political process. Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at 1070-72. The national polit-
ical process provides adequate protection for most state interests through the political safeguards
of federalism-the representation of state interests in Congress and the accountability of Congress
to the citizens of every state. Id at 1070 n.22, 1071. Judicial intervention to protect state interests
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question of national power to regulate state and local government, their
tests of state autonomy as a service provider are unprincipled and un-
workable because they require at bottom an ad hoc balancing of na-
tional and state interests.758
The problems inherent in the theory of state autonomy derived from
NLC by Tribe and Michelman may be illustrated by Tribe's analysis of
North Carolina ex rel Morrow v. Calfano.7  In this case, the district
court held that Congress could withhold over fifty million dollars in
forty-two health care assistance programs on the ground that the state
failed to comply with a condition of one of these grants requiring regu-
lation of private health care facilities in a fashion prohibited by the
state constitution. Professor Tribe argues that the Court's summary
affirmance is consistent with his thesis that NLC protects only a "citi-
zen's claim to services. "760 Since state reliance on national aid pre-
cludes any choice to decline a grant in order to avoid compliance with
its conditions, he views the condition as in effect a mandatory regula-
tion. He then concludes that judicial approval of a condition requiring
an amendment of the state constitution and state enforcement of na-
tional rules for private activity demonstrates that the state interests af-
fected by these requirements are not part of the concept of state
autonomy protected by NLC. It then follows, on the tacit assumption
that the condition requiring state regulation of private health care facil-
ities does not affect the delivery of state services, that NLC protects
only the state's social service function. Even if the result in North Caro-
lina ex rel Morrow v. Calano can be reconciled with the Tribe-
Michelman interpretation ofNLC,6 this claim of consistency obscures
a fundamental defect in the analysis-there is no explanation why state
is necessary only if the political safeguards of federalism fail, and Congress "takes action that
would effectively eviscerate a state's government and leave it an empty vessel." Id at 1072. This
analysis of national power to control the allocation of political authority between the nation and
the states is rather thin. Tribe does not describe the state interests that deserve protection other
than to give two examples of state choices between unicameral and bicameral legislatures and
between elected and appointed officials.
758. See supra text accompanying notes 739-49.
759. This case, discussed supra at notes 306-12, is the only post-NLC decision that either Tribe
or Michelman has attempted to reconcile with their theory of state autonomy derived from indi-
vidual rights. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 18-19 (Supp. 1979).
760. Id at 18.
761. The district court did not apply Professor Tribe's theory, and it held that there was no
constitutional intrusion on state autonomy because the state could refuse the grant and avoid




interests other than the provision of basic social services are not pro-
tected. In his analysis of North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Caifano,
Tribe never explains the justification for national power to compel the
amendment of a state constitution and to compel a state to enforce na-
tional regulations governing private health care facilities.
Tribe's tacit assumption that the requirement of state implementa-
tion of national regulations for private health care facilities has no ef-
fect on the state's service provision functions raises an additional
problem because the assumption is at odds with reality. Given limited
resources, a state might well reduce some existing social services in or-
der to muster the administrative resources necessary to implement and
enforce the national standards for private health care facilities. In an
apparent recognition of this possibility, he also contends that North
Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Caifano is consistent with his argument that
Congress has the authority under the spending power to regulate the
states' social service function because national grants that pay the addi-
tional costs of compliance with conditions do not threaten any reduc-
tion of services . 62 His test of the spending power would require a
court to measure the costs to a state of complying with the conditions of
national grants and to determine whether these costs are disproportion-
ate to the amount of national aid.763 In this case, it would impose on a
court the formidable and impractical task of assessing the full costs to a
state of compliance with the conditions of forty-two national health
assistance programs. Consideration of this one case suggests the basic
flaws of the Tribe-Michelman theory of state autonomy and national
power; it does not, of course, reveal the more fundamental problem
that their theory, derived solely from an exploration of the latent, inter-
nal logic of NLC, does not address the rich, complex pattern of na-
tional and state relations. 764
Professor Kaden also is a proponent of judicial enforcement or fed-
762. See supra note 745 and accompanying text. Tribe argues that in North Carolina ex rel.
Morrow v Califano "[t]he Court seems to have accepted the principle that when Congress pays the
piper as well as calls the tune, there is no real threat to the autonomy either of states or individu-
als." L. TRIBE, supra note 759, at 18 (footnote omitted).
763. See supra note 745.
764. To take but two examples, there is no explanation of either Congress' authority under the
spending power to make grants to private recipients on conditions directly applicable to the states
or of Congress' authority under the commerce power to employ the states as the nation's agents in
regulating private activity. See supra text accompanying notes 186-246 & 542-713. Since costs to
state government may be increased when a grant is made to a private recipient or when a state
undertakes administration and enforcement of comprehensive national standards for an activity
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eralism limits on Congress' powers. He has, however, a much broader
view of the states' role in the federal system than Tribe and Michelman,
and he also provides a more thorough overview of the means by which
Congress controls the allocation of political authority between the na-
tion and the states. In contrast to the Tribe-Michelman thesis that the
states' primary function is to provide basic services, Kaden recognizes
that the states are political communities with powers to make political
choices about the rules for private activity, public services, and the
structure of government.765 State autonomy in these political choices is
important because the states foster "political liberty," which he defines
as "the freedom to participate in the community's political life. 766
States foster political liberty because decisionmaking in small units en-
hances participation; the proximity of the governed to their officials en-
hances accountability; 767 and state discretion to make political choices
serves the values of diversity and experimentation.768 In addition to
this broad conception of the states' role, Kaden also provides a reason-
ably comprehensive assessment of the means by which national legisla-
tion diminishes state autonomy. He explains that the area of state
political choice is reduced by national legislation regulating private ac-
tivity,769 by statutes enacted under the commerce power that require
state implementation of national regulatory programs, 770 and by condi-
tional grants that impose national policies for social service programs
and control the organization of state government. 7
like surface mining, one is left to assume that such exercises of national power are constitutionally
suspect.
765. Kaden, supra note 22, at 849-53.
766. Id at 856 (footnote omitted). Protection of state autonomy thus serves the goal of indi-
vidual liberty. Id at 857.
767. Id at 853-54.
768. Id at 854-55.
769. Id at 890.
770. Id at 869-70.
771. Id at 874-81. There are many significant omissions in Kaden's analysis of the effects of
national legislation on state autonomy. His catalogue ofnational powers that may be exercised to
diminish state autonomy does not include either the war power, see supra text accompanying notes
148-75, or the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments, see supra text accompanying notes
336-82. He also fails to consider the wide variety of conditions attached to national grants, see
supra text accompanying notes 180-324, and he blurs a significant distinction between national
statutes that apply directly to the states and national statutes that require the affirmative exercise
of state authority over private activity by characterizing both types of statutes as "direct com-
mands to the states." Kaden, supra note 22, at 869-70, 890-93. Moreover, by characterizing all
national statutes enacted under the commerce power that require the affirmative exercise of state




The exercise of these national legislative powers threatens the capac-
ity of the states to realize the advantages of political liberty, and Profes-
sor Kaden believes that the Court's general concern in NLC to protect
state autonomy, as opposed to its reasoning, is well-placed. 772 Since the
representation of state interests in Congress is no longer adequate to
protect state interests, 773 judicial intervention to protect a minimum set
of state powers against national interference is necessary so that the
states can serve the functions of participation, accountability, diversity,
and experimentation.774 Judicially imposed limits on Congress' powers
also are important because many national statutes that diminish state
autonomy are themselves contrary to principles of political accounta-
bility-principles which are a crucial component of political liberty.
Kaden argues that national statutes enacted under the commerce and
spending powers that require the states to administer regulatory pro-
grams and to distribute benefits according to national standards may be
inconsistent with principles of political accountability because voters
"are left without a clear sense of the persons they may call to account-
the national legislators who conceived and ordered a program or the
state's officials charged with its implementation. ' 77  Thus, Kaden ap-
pears to contend that by limiting Congress' power to employ the states
as the nation's agents, a court can promote political liberty in two ways.
First, an area of state political choice is protected from national control,
and state political decisions are consistent with the goal of promoting
political liberty. Second, Congress' power to legislate in a fashion that
distorts political accountability is checked.
Kaden's analysis of state autonomy and congressional powers is the
most comprehensive and thoughtful response yet to NLC, but it has
tinctions between the means by which Congress exercises its authority under the commerce power
to obtain state administration and enforcement of national regulations. For example, he charac-
terizes both the provision for state enforcement of the EPA's 1973 transportation control plan
regulations and the provision for state enforcement of price regulations under the Natural Gas
Policy Act as "direct commands to the states." Id The means employed by Congress to obtain
state enforcement of these national regulations are, however, significantly different. See supra text
accompanying notes 543-48, 581-606 & note 564.
772. Kaden, supra note 22, at 849, 857, 868.
773. Id at 857-68. Kaden's analysis of the traditional concept of the political safeguards of
federalism is discussed infra at note 811.
774. Kaden, supra note 22, at 851 ("To function as a state, the body politic must have at least a
minimum of its powers protected against outside interference, including control over the structure
of government, the distribution of administrative responsibility, the process of electing popular
agents, and the capacity to tax and spend.").
775. Id at 868. See id at 857.
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several significant flaws that follow from his exclusive focus on the
states as political communities. The framers intended that both the na-
tion and the states would have broad powers to make political decisions
about the rules for private activity, public services, and the structure
and organization of the public decisionmaking process.776 In focusing
solely on the states as political communities, Kaden assumes that the
values of participation in government and accountability are best, and
perhaps only, served by the process of political choice in subnational
governments. This assumption sounds a persistent theme of federal-
ism: the states are more democratic than the national government be-
cause they are smaller and closer to the people. 777 Nevertheless, there
is no proof that either participation or accountability is greater in the
states and local government than in the national government. Many
studies show just the opposite: the process of political choice in the
states and local government is farther from the democratic ideal than
the national political process.778
776. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
777. The argument that state and local governments are more democratic than the national
government is often coupled with arguments that the states are a barrier to tyranny at the national
level, that the states provide for diversity and social experimentation, and that subnational govern-
ment facilitates local administration sensitive to special local needs. E.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449
U.S. 560, 579-80 (1981); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (states are a "laboratory" of federalism); Benson, Values of Decentralized Government,
in ESSAYS IN FEDERALISM 1-17 (1961); Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism Pre-
liminary Reflections on the Roles ofLocal Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980's,
21 B.C.L. REV. 763, 765-66 (1980); Stewart, supra note 577, at 1210-11, 1231. Nonetheless, the
federalist proponents of the Constitution did not place much weight on any of these arguments
about the states' special role in the federal system. In particular, the arguments that the states
provide for popular control of government and for a check on central authority were in fact sim-
ply alternative statements of the proposition stated above, see supra text accompanying notes 51-
53, that the electorate would determine whether the national or state governments would be
predominate. See Diamond, supra note 30, at 53-56.
778. Kaden cites no empirical evidence that participation and accountability are better served
by the states and local government than by the national government and notes only that political
philosophers have long propounded "the notion that localism enhances participation and liberty."
Kaden, supra note 22, at 890 n.281. Most modern studies of state and local government demon-
strate that voter participation in state and local elections is even lower than in national elections
and that these subnational governments are more likely to be controlled by one political party and
responsive to the demands of special interest groups. Eg., T. DYE, POLITICS IN STATES AND
COMMUNITIES 65 (1977); N. HENRY, GOVERNING AT THE GRASSROoTS 54, 73-76 (1980); G.
WASHNIS, PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT HANDBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 7-15
(1980). Thus, it is generally agreed that the national government is more democratically responsi-
ble than subnational governments. W. RIKER, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 294 (2d ed.
1965).
Even if it is true that the states and local government are more conducive to political liberty in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
The thesis that state autonomy promotes the values of participation
and accountability could justify drastic limits on congressional power
in order to carve out a large area of the political choice for the state and
local government, but Kaden avoids this consequence by finding that it
is necessary to protect only the minimum set of powers that allow the
states to function as political communities.779 He assigns the courts a
significant role in protecting state autonomy because he finds that the
representation of state interests in Congress is inadequate. He does not
see, however, that there are other more practical and efficacious means
of limiting national power and protecting state autonomy than the ar-
ticulation of vague, indeterminate state interests by legislators and lob-
byists. Kaden fails to see that there is an alternative to judicial
protection of state autonomy because in arguing that national legisla-
tion diminishes state autonomy and the capacity of the states to pro-
mote political liberty, he completely neglects any consideration of
political accountability in the national political process.780 Congress
can legislate in a politically accountable fashion, and its accountability
both establishes limits on the exercise of national political power and
justifies interference with state autonomy.7 8 In neglecting considera-
tion of Congress' political accountability, Professor Kaden fails in his
self-imposed task of explaining "the extraordinary intervention of the
terms of participation and accountability than the national government, this advantage is counter-
balanced by the fact that these subnational governments have often been hostile to another aspect
of political liberty-protection of individual rights from majority rule. As a historical matter, it is
the national government that has provided the greatest protection for individual rights. J.
CHOPER, supra note 734, at 250-54.
779. See supra note 774 and accompanying text.
780. Kaden's discussion of the accountability of the national political process is limited to the
assertion that Congress' power to employ the states as the nation's agents in administering na-
tional programs is contrary to principles of accountability because the voters do not know whom
to hold responsible. See supra text accompanying note 775. Given the imperfect knowledge and
general apathy of most of the electorate, it is, for example, probably true that most voters do not
know whether state or national officials are responsible for any particular environmental protec-
tion standard enforced under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. See supra text
accompanying notes 559-63. Nonetheless, the regulated industry knows the extent of state and
national responsibility and can invoke the appropriate political process, state or national, to pro-
tect its interests. Kaden's claim of voter confusion over whom to blame neglects the fact that those
who are directly and immediately affected know where to lobby, and it would ultimately discredit
most provisions for state administration of national programs. The political accountability of
Congress for the various means it employs to obtain state administration and enforcement of
national regulations is discussed infra at notes 920-92.
781. The concept of political accountability is developed infra at notes 829-49.
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courts against the judgments of the political branches"7"2 of the na-
tional government, and he states an unnecessarily broad role for judi-
cial superintendence of the federal system.
In addition to an inadequate justification for judicial intervention in
the political process, Kaden's proposed "standard[s] for judicial review
of federal actions affecting the states"7 3 are nothing more than ad hoc
balancing tests. Kaden argues first that the courts should not restrict
Congress' power to regulate private activity. Although such national
regulation diminishes state autonomy by displacing state political
choices about the rules for individual conduct, there is no need for judi-
cial intervention because the states retain the capacity to make political
choices in "residual areas" unaffected by national legislation. 78 4 Since
he does not specify how large a "residual area" of state regulation of
private activity is constitutionally required, his justification of national
power provides no answer to the Court's recent suggestion in Hodel
that Congress' power to regulate private activity under the commerce
clause may be narrowed.78 5
With respect to Congress' power to regulate the states and to require
the states to administer and enforce national regulatory and social ben-
efit programs, Kaden advances balancing tests. A statute enacted
under the commerce power is valid unless it "coopts the state's political
processes by interfering with legislative and executive direction [discre-
tion]78 6 in a significant way. '7 7 This impermissible effect of national
legislation on state autonomy is to be measured by "fiscal impact" and
"the effect on organizational structure and the allocation of nonfiscal
resources." 78 Given the broad gauge of these criteria, his standard for
judicial review is an invitation for an ad hoc judicial assessment of the
effects of national statutes on the states.
His standard for judicial review of conditions of national grants that
affect the organization of state government or require the states to regu-
late private activity compounds the problems inherent in his test of
Congress' power under the commerce clause by adding a second layer
782. Kaden, supra note 22, at 849.
783. Id
784. Id at 890.
785. See supra note 475 and accompanying text.
786. The word "direction" probably should read "discretion" because the core value to be
protected is the states' "political discretion." Kaden, supra note 22, at 891.





of balancing analysis. Kaden proposes a two-part test for conditions of
national grants. Conditions should first be evaluated under the balanc-
ing test he proposes for commerce power regulations. If the condition
would be an invalid intrusion on state autonomy as a regulation di-
rectly imposed under the commerce power, a court may still uphold it if
Congress can "demonstrate that the requirement is related to the
achievement of an important governmental objective." 789
Both the Tribe-Michelman thesis of the states' role as providers of
basic services and the Kaden thesis of the states' role as sources of
political liberty are superimposed on the framers' understanding that
the states, like the nation, are political communities with broad powers
to make political decisions. The framers did not intend that any partic-
ular state power, like the power to provide public services identified by
Tribe and Michelman, or any particular minimum constellation of
political powers, as Kaden suggests, would be immune from interfer-
ence by the political authority of the nation. The qualitative approach
to the states' share of political authority advocated by Tribe and
Michelman and the quantitative79° approach to the states' share of
political authority advocated by Kaden are modem reincarnations of
dual federalism. 91 However workable the concept of discrete areas of
state and national authority may have been in the nineteenth century, it
is no longer serviceable in a modem integrated economy where almost
every subject of local concern is also a matter of national concern.792
The ultimate reliance of Tribe, Michelman, and Kaden on balancing
tests to resolve conflicts of state and national political authority is per-
haps best understood as a tacit acknowledgement that their qualitative
and quantative definitions of state political authority are unworkable.
These balancing tests, once divorced from any theory of state auton-
omy, portend completely standardless judicial superintendence of the
allocation of political authority within the federal system.
789. Id at 896. To the extent that he tests the validity of conditions of national grants in terms
of the extent of Congress' power under the commerce clause, Kaden apparently adopts the previ-
ously discredited argument that the spending power is not a separate enumerated power and that
it can be exercised to accomplish only the ends obtainable under Congress' other legislative pow-
ers. See supra notes 314 & 425.
790. These characterizations of the Tribe, Michelman and Kaden analyses are drawn from R.
LEACH, supra note 10, at 35 ("the states have a right to a share of the power exerted in the federal
system, but not any particular share, either quantitative or qualitative").
791. See supra note 78.
792. S. DAvis, supra note 30, at 146-48.
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Two other commentators have attempted to avoid the problems of
devising a workable theory of the states' role in the federal system.
Professor Choper argues that NLC should be overruled and that ques-
tions about the authority of the national government over the states
should be nonjusticiable and relegated entirely to the political branches
of the national government.793 His proposal rests on the argument that
"[n]umerous structural aspects of the national political system serve to
assure that states' rights will not be trampled, and the lesson of history
is that they have not been. 794 Since Professor Choper never defines
"states rights" or state interests or the states' role in the federal system,
it is not clear what exactly is protected by the national political process.
Nonetheless, he seems to contend only that the national political pro-
cess protects the policy preferences of each state's citizens as perceived
by their congressmen, senators, and lobbyists.795 Since he does not ad-
dress explicitly the interest of the state as a political community in its
powers to make political decisions about the rules for private activity,
the goods and services to be provided collectively, the structure and
organization of its public decisionmaking process, and the allocation of
governmental resources, his analysis of the national political process
provides no justification for national authority over these state
interests.796
793. J. CHOPER, supra note 734, at 175; Dispensability of Judicial Review, stpra note 10, at
1552.
794. J. CHOPER, supra note 734, at 176.
795. See id at 176-93.
796. Indeed, these interests of the state political community as a whole are precisely the inter-
ests most likely to be sacrificed in a battle over substantive policy matters. For example, the
debate in Congress on the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 611-91, focused on the question of the proper standards for electric utility rates and on
preserving the authority of state regulators to determine these standards. See Note, The Legisla-
tive Evolution of Title I ofthe Public Utility Regulatory Policies. Act of 1978. The Study in Conpro.
mire, 5 J. CoRe. LAw 105, 105-37 (1979). There was little or no direct consideration of the effect
on the states of imposing the requirement that state agencies administer and enforce this national
program. The bill originally introduced and passed by the House established national rate stan-
dards for electric utilities and provided for direct national enforcement if the states declined to
enforce them. Id at 106-15. Electric utilities and state regulatory agencies strongly favored state
power to set rate policies and state administration of utility regulations. Id at 105, 116. These
two groups persuaded the Senate to modify the bill so as to give the Secretary of Energy only
limited power to intervene in state rate proceedings for the purpose of advocating national rate
policies. Id at 115-35. In a compromise, the conferees agreed to retain state authority to deter-
mine substantive policy by making the national standards hortatory, but they imposed a duty on
state agencies to conduct administrative proceedings to consider adoption of the national stan-




An answer to this charge that Choper's analysis of the national polit-
ical process does not explain national authority to diminish the states'
autonomy as political communities may perhaps be found in his argu-
ments that the states and local governments have retained their vitality
and that historically there have been and will be in the future few, if
any, serious national encroachments on the states. 97 Both of these ar-
guments, however, provide inadequate answers. On the premise that
state budgets and employment have increased substantially in recent
years he argues that "state and local governments are currently more
engaged than at any stage in our history" and that the states have not
been overwhelmed by the national government.7 98  This argument,
nonetheless, does not establish the vitality of the states as political com-
munities exercising their political decisionmaking powers because
many state employees are engaged in the administration of national
programs and state budgets have been increased, at least in part, to
meet spending priorities imposed by the nation through conditional
grants. His second argument is that Congress historically has been so-
licitous of states' rights and that egregious intrusions on the states, like
a "national prohibition of all state taxes or. . . federal confirmation of
all state officials," are completely improbable. 99 This contention will,
in many cases, fall on deaf ears because there already has been a signif-
icant transfer of political authority from the states to the nation. Pro-
ponents of state autonomy demand a justification of Congress' power
to diminish state autonomy, and the claim that the policy preferences
of state citizens are heard in Congress does not in itself justify the ex-
pansion of national political authority at the expense of the states. Ab-
sent a full explanation of the inherent limits on national power and a
comprehensive justification of national political power to diminish
state autonomy through statutes that regulate private and state activity
to have both national standards and national administration of utility regulations rejected. They
successfully protected the states' interests in controlling substantive rate policies. However, they
did not represent the political community's broad interest in controlling the use of its administra-
tive resource, the state agency responsible for enforcing the national program. See Conference
Report, supra note 621 (no consideration of the impact on the states of the duty to administer the
regulatory program).
For another argument that Choper has not advanced an adequate justification for his proposal
that federalism issues should be nonjusticiable, see Sager, Book Review, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 707
(1981).
797. J. CHOPER, supra note 734, at 184-90, 215-23.
798. Id at 188-90.
799. Id at 221.
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and that require the states to act as the nation's agents in administering
national programs, Choper's claim that the national political process
provides adequate protection for state interests will, in all probability,
have no persuasive force.
Professor Stewart, like Choper, would permit the national political
process to determine the allocation of political authority between the
states and the nation. In contrast to Choper's argument that questions
of national authority over the states should be nonjusticiable because
structural aspects of the national political process provide adequate
protection of state interests, Stewart advances a strong, elaborate argu-
ment to justify national power to regulate the states and to compel the
states to implement national regulatory programs. 80° His justifications
of national authority appear most clearly in his argument that Congress
has the power to compel the states to administer and enforce national
standards for pollution control. National authority is justified primar-
ily on the ground of necessity. If Congress was required to shoulder the
full financial and political costs of establishing a national bureaucracy
to implement national environmental programs, the goals of environ-
mental protection would not be achieved because the political obstacles
created by national accountability for these costs would be insurmount-
able. Thus, Stewart contends that the nation must have the power to
compel state implementation in order to achieve these goals. He also
argues that because pollution cannot be confined within a state's
boundaries and has a "spillover effect" on other states, national author-
ity to compel state implementation of environmental standards is justi-
fied to protect the autonomy of neighboring states and to resolve
potential interstate conflicts.8 0 Although the political process will ap-
parently prevent Congress in most cases from enacting statutes that
cannot be justified on the grounds of necessity and spillover effects,
Stewart holds judicial review in reserve for "extreme cases" to protect
the states. 802
The reliance by both Choper and Stewart on the national political
process to determine the scope of national authority over the states is
consistent with the framers' intention that popular support would de-
termine whether the nation or the states would be the predominate
800. Stewart, supra note 577.
801. Id at 1199-1202, 1226-30. Stewart's arguments are analyzed infra at note 905 and notes
1033-55 and accompanying text.




political decisionmaking unit. Choper's complete and Stewart's all-
but-complete deference to the national political process would, how-
ever, permit the nation to swallow the states. Deference to the political
choices of the nation and rejection of the political choices of state polit-
ical communities is warranted only to the extent that Congress is politi-
cally accountable. Political accountability can provide a justification of
national power that is otherwise absent from Professor Choper's argu-
ment that state policy preferences are represented in Congress; it also
imposes some limits on Professor Stewart's justifications of national
power that sacrifice Congress' accountability on the altar of
expediency.
III. THE COURT, CONGRESS, AND THE ALLOCATION OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
4. The Political Safeguards of Federalism
Herbert Wechsler's analysis of the national political process is the
classic justification for judicial deference to Congress' determinations
about the allocation of political authority in the federal system. 03 Pro-
fessor Wechsler argues that "[flederal intervention as against the states
is . . . primarily a matter for congressional determination" because
"the national political process in the United States-and especially the
role of the states in the composition and selection of the central govern-
ment-is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new in-
trusions by the center on the domain of the states."' "°4 In other words,
there are political safeguards of federalism inherent in the national
political process. The first safeguard is Congress' traditional reluctance
to supplant state law and the common understanding that national ac-
tion is a special, not ordinary, case."05 The second, and more basic,
safeguard is that the selection of congressmen from the states and
through state political procedures assures sensitivity to local inter-
ests." Indeed, the national political process is so responsive to insular
803. Wechsler, supra note 27.
804. Id at 558, 559.
805. Id at 544-46.
806. Professor Wechsler argues that "the Senate is intrinsically calculated to prevent intrusion
from the center on subjects that dominant state interests wish preserved for state control." Id at
548. The House, albeit to a lesser extent, serves the same function because of the states' control of
voter qualifications and congressional districting. Id at 548-52. Although Wechsler recognizes
that the President has a national constituency, the electoral college system ensures some respon-
siveness to "local values that have large support within the states." Id at 552-58, 558.
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state interests that the problem is more one of frustration of the will of
a national majority than it is one of national intrusion on the states.80 7
Professor Wechsler's theory justifies national power to regulate pri-
vate activity and in turn to diminish state autonomy by displacing state
policies on the ground that the policy preferences of a majority of each
state's citizens, or at least the policy choices of the most powerful inter-
ests in each state, are represented in the national political process by
each state's senators and congressmen. 8°s There are two significant
omissions, however, in this analysis of the capacity of the national
political process to protect the states. First, Wechsler does not consider
the states' interests in making political decisions about the structure
and organization of government, the goods and services to be provided
collectively, and the allocation of governmental resources. Each of
these political decisions is an aspect of state autonomy as important as
political choices about the rules for private activity. 80 9 Second, Wechs-
ler does not recognize that national regulation of private activity is only
one of the ways in which Congress controls the allocation of political
authority in the federal system, and he does not address Congress'
power to regulate the states or to employ the states as the nation's
agents in implementing national regulations.810 In the absence of a full
overview of state interests in political decisionmaking which are af-
fected by national statutes regulating the states and requiring the af-
firmative exercise of state authority over private activity, his theory of
the political safeguards of federalism is incomplete. It addresses only
the states' interests in prescribing rules for private activity and justifies
national power to supplant this one discrete kind of state political
choice. Wechsler's thesis has found both supporters and critics. None
of these commentators, however, has moved beyond the narrow con-
807. Id at 547.
808. It is, perhaps, an overstatement to say that Wechsler justifies national power to regulate
private activity. His conclusion that "the Court is on the weakest ground when it opposes its
interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states" apparently
admits that the national political process does not always protect the states adequately because it
leaves the door open to some role for the Court in protecting the States. Id at 559. Professor
Wechsler does not, however, state any standard for judicial review of national statutes that affect
state interests.
809. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
810. The omission of any analysis of Congress' power to require the states to exercise affirma-
tive state authority over private activity in implementing national programs may be a consequence
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fines of Wechsler's original thesis and advanced a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the capacity of the national political process to justify Congress'
power to control the allocation of political authority between the nation
and the states.8t1
Although Professor Wechsler's theory of the political safeguards of
federalism has had little direct influence on the courts,8 12 deference to
the political process is a persistent-albeit episodical-theme of judi-
cial review of federalism issues.813 The idea that the national political
811. Most commentators accept Wechsler's thesis that the representation of state interests in
Congress makes it a more appropriate body than the Court for resolution of questions of national
authority over the states. Professor Choper's argument that these federalism questions should be
nonjusticiable makes him the most extreme proponent of the political safeguards of federalism as
an adequate source of protection for the states; but, like Wechsler, his analysis is limited to the
representation of the policy preferences of each state's citizens, and he does not explain how state
interests other than the regulation of private activity are protected. See supra text accompanying
notes 793-96. Professor Stewart's argument for broad national power to mandate state implemen-
tation of national environmental standards also rests in part on the assumption that state interests
are protected by the national political process, but he does not explain how these political safe-
guards operate in a context that Wechsler's theory never addresses. See supra text accompanying
note 802. Ironically, given his argument that state autonomy limits national power as a means of
protecting individual rights to basic state social services, Professor Tribe has provided the most
careful elaboration of Wechsler's political safeguards. See L. TRiBE, supra note 717, §§ 5-7, -8, -
20, at 239-44, 304-06; supra note 757.
Professor Kaden is the primary critic of Wechsler's theory. Kaden argues that judicial protec-
tion of state autonomy is necessary because the representation of state interests in Congress is no
longer as adequate as when Wechsler first advanced his thesis in 1954. Specifically, he argues that
the states' influence upon the central government has declined because Supreme Court decisions
have reduced state control over voter qualifications and congressional districting, that state party
organizations have become less powerful, and that the role of national, state, and local bureau-
crats and special interest groups in determining public policy has increased. Kaden, supra note 22,
at 857-68. Nevertheless, like those who find political safeguards in the national political process,
his analysis is confined to the question of representation of the policy choices of state citizens and
at most it raises some doubt about the adequacy of Wechsler's justification of national power to
displace state regulation of private activity. Although Kaden defines state interests in political
decisionmaking broadly and recognizes many means by which national legislation diminishes
state autonomy, he never considers the possibility that the national political process may provide
an adequate justification for intrusion by the central government on the states entirely apart from
the extent to which Congressmen represent the policy preferences of their constituents about the
rules for private conduct. See supra text accompanying notes 779-80.
812. Although the political safeguards of federalism thesis has long been standard fare in the
leading casebook on constitutional law, G. GUNTHER, supra note 56, at 109-12, a review of Shep-
herd's Citations indicates that Wechsler's article has been cited only once by the Supreme Court
(Justice Brennan's dissent in NLC, 426 U.S. at 877) and only five times by lower federal courts.
813. Judicial deference to the political process is also a theme in review of individual rights
issues. Eg., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113-14 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Railway
Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Caro-
line Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
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process, not the courts, constitutes the principal check on national au-
thority both to regulate private activity and to regulate the states held
special appeal for two of our greatest Chief Justices. For Chief Justice
Marshall, the representation of all the people of the nation in Congress
counseled a limited role for the Court in restricting national authority
to regulate private activity. In McCulioch v. Maryland,8 14 he approved
Congress' power to charter a national bank in part on the ground that
considerable weight should be given to the determination of the polit-
ical branches of the national government.1 5 In Gibbons v. Ogden, t6
the Chief Justice stated more explicitly his theory that the political pro-
cess checks national authority to regulate private activity and reduces
the need for judicial intervention.1 7 Chief Justice Marshall believed
that the national political process limits congressional power to tax the
states as well as congressional power to regulate private activity. In
McCulloch he suggested in dictum that a national tax on a state-
chartered bank would be valid because the people of all the states, and
the states themselves, are represented in Congress81 I and they can pre-
vent their representatives from imposing an oppressive tax. 19 Some
one hundred years later, Chief Justice Stone returned to Marshall's the-
TRUST (1980); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE
LJ. 1063 (1980).
814. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
815. In McCulloch, the Court upheld Congress' power to create a second Bank of the United
States, and Chief Justice Marshall found that the previous establishment ofsuch a bank supported
the second exercise of national political authority:
But it is conceived that a doubtful question, on which human reason may pause, and the
human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty
are not concerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally the representatives
of the people are to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice of the government,
ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice.
Id at 401.
816. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
817. In upholding Congress' power under the commerce clause to license vessels and to dis-
place state regulation of steamboats, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the principal limit on Con-
gress' authority is the influence of the people on their representatives:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influ-
ence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances,
as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to
secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely
solely, in all representative governments.
Id at 197. The Court has frequently quoted or cited Chief Justice Marshall's statement that the
principal check on the commerce power is political, not judicial. Eg., Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 120 (1942); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Cases), 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903).
818. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 435.
819. Id at 428 ("The only security against the abuse of this [taxing] power, is found in the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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ory of the national political process as a check on congressional
power.820  Like his predecessor, Stone saw the political process as a
check on Congress' power to regulate private activity 2t and to tax state
instrumentalities.822
Scrutiny of state political processes as a source of protection for in-
terests affected by state legislation and as an alternative to judicially
imposed limits on state powers is a counterpart of the Marshall-Stone
thesis that political checks inherent in the national political process jus-
tify national authority to diminish state autonomy by regulating private
activity and by taxing state activity. As might be expected, Marshall
and Stone are the leading proponents of scrutiny of political checks in
the states' political processes as the key to judicial restraints on state
legislation. Beginning again with McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall
laid the groundwork. In that case, he held that a state tax that applied
only to a national bank was unconstitutional, but he also suggested in
dictum that if a state tax applied equally to state-chartered financial
institutions and national banks it would be valid.823 The thesis implicit
structure of government itself. In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is
in general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation").
Although the Chief Justice recognized that the national political process restrained Congress'
power to regulate private activity and to tax the states, his suggestion that the operation of state
political processes may provide adequate protection for national interests is better known. See
infra text at notes 823-24.
820. Chief Justice Stone saw some basis for judicial deference to the determinations of the
political process in three distinct contexts-national authority to regulate private activity and to
tax the states, see infra notes 821-22 and accompanying text; dormant commerce clause scrutiny of
state legislation, see infra notes 827-28 and accompanying text; and judicial review of individual
rights claims as in part a function of the extent to which these rights are protected by the political
process, see Caroline Prods. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
821. In United States v. Butler, Justice Stone dissented from the Court's holding that a grant to
farmers on the condition that they reduce crop acreage was unconstitutionaL He argued that the
three constitutional restraints on the spending power are requirements that the purpose of expen-
diture must be "truly national," that the expenditure "may not be used to coerce action left to state
control," and "the conscience and patriotism of Congress and the Executive." 297 U.S. 1, 87
(1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
822. In his opinion for the Court in Helvering v. Gerhardt, Justice Stone upheld the imposition
of a national income tax on the salaries of employees of an agency created by two states. Drawing
on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch, see supra notes 817-19 and accompanying text,
he concluded that the representation of all the people of the nation in Congress constituted a
political check on the exercise of the national taxing power and that the political process "provides
a readier and more adaptable means than any which the courts can afford, for securing accommo-
dation of the competing demands for national revenue, on the one hand, and for reasonable scope
for the independence of state action, on the other." 304 U.S. 405, 412, 416 (1938). See also
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 456 (1978) (Brennan, J.).
823. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
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in this dictum is that the state political process would check the imposi-
tion of any disabling state tax on a national bank if the tax also applied
equally to the constituents of the state's legislators.824 Although Mar-
shall's dictum was long neglected, it was revived as the basis for the
Court's holding in United States v. County of Fresno8 25 that a nondis-
criminatory local tax on the possessory interest of national employees
in housing supplied by the national government is valid. Since the tax
applied equally to national employees and to similarly situated state
voters, there was no danger that the state tax would be levied at a rate
that would interfere with the duties of the national employees.8 26
In contrast to its limited reliance on political checks as a justification
of state power to affect national interests, the Court has frequently con-
sidered the presence or absence of political checks as a key to judicial
review of state legislation affecting citizens of other states. This aspect
of the political checks doctrine was first advanced by Chief Justice
Stone in reviewing dormant commerce clause challenges to state regu-
lations and taxes. If the burden of a state regulation or tax falls equally
on in-state and out-of-state interests, he argued that the state's political
process provides adequate protection for both interests82 7 and that judi-
cially imposed limits on state regulation are not necessary to protect
interstate commerce. 828
824. Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unied Approach to
ConstitutionalAdjudicationZ 75 MICH. L. REV. 1426, 1449 (1977).
825. 429 U.S. 452 (1977). See Hellerstein, supra note 824, at 1434-41.
826. 429 U.S. at 462-63 n.l I. The key to the political check is the equal application of the
state tax on state and national interests. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the tax in
fact applied only to employees of the national government. Id at 468-76; Hellerstein, supra note
824, at 1449 n.144. For another example of scrutiny of a state tax to determine if its application to
both state and national interests provides a political check, see Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 167-72 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
827. In these circumstances, the accountability of the legislators of the state imposing the regu-
lation or tax on in-state interests checks the extent of the burden on out-of-state interests and on
the free flow of commerce.
828. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) (state regulation); Mc-
Goldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45-46 n.2 (1940) (state tax); South Carolina Highway
Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2 (1938) (state regulation).
Stone's doctrine of political checks has subsequently found favor in other modern dormant
commerce clause cases. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981);
Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18, 447 (1978). See Commonwealth Edison
v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981) (questions about the appropriate level of state taxes must be
resolved through the political process); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980) (adjustment
of state interests in a proprietary activity and national interest in unobstructed interstate com-
merce is "a task better suited for Congress than this Court"); Note, State Environmentalfrotection
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B. Political Accountability and Congress' Power to Control the
Allocation of Political Authority in the Federal System
Questions of national power to intervene against the states involve
conflicts between the political choices or decisions of two different
political communities-the nation and the states. Professor
Michelman, for one, despairs of any rule for preference between na-
tional and state political determinations. In his view "the category of
state sovereignty is precisely matched by an opposed category of na-
tional sovereignty," '29 and there is "no judicially cognizable answer" to
the question whether the nation or states shall "prevail when the people
speak, simultaneously but discordantly, through their state govern-
ments and through Congress." 8 30 Contrary to this argument that there
Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1762, 1774-75 (1974). Given the similar-
ity of the policies underlying the dormant commerce clause and the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV, it is not surprising that the political checks doctrine has also been employed in
this second context. E.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975); Allied Stores v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The absence of a political check if all interests affected by state legislation are not adequately
represented in the state's political process has also been invoked by the Court in several other
contexts as a ground for refusing to defer to state political decisions. In Nevada v. Hall, the Court
held that Nevada's limit on governmental tort liability did not bind the courts of sister states
under the full faith and credit clause in part because citizens of these sister states whose injuries
are caused by the negligence of Nevada's agents had no voice in Nevada's decision about the
waiver of sovereign immunity and the establishment of a limit on liability. 440 U.S. 410, 426
(1979). See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406 (1978) (plurality
opinion of Brennan, J.) (no merit to argument that consumers dissatisfied with the service pro-
vided by a municipally owned electric utility may seek relief through the political process because
some consumers live outside the municipality and are excluded from participation in the local
political process). The Court also justified in part its decisions requiring the reapportionment of
state legislatures on the ground that state political procedures did not afford any effective remedy
tor malapportionment. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 553-54 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 258-59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring); see Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 373 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
829. Permutations of Sovereignt;. supra note 35, at 1194. According to Michelman:
the rightful dominance of the states within their realm is precisely matched by that of
Congress within the national realm; the location of responsibility for social services
within the states' realm is precisely matched by the responsibility for national economic
welfare within the congressional realm; the institutional error of allowing a putatively
insensitive Congress to alter the economic equations that determine local-government
service levels is precisely matched by that of allowing narrowly self-interested local voter
majorities to disregard national social costs in construction those equations.
Id at 1194-95.
830. Michelman's answer to this dilemma is to posit a special social service role for the states
that requires the courts to give preference to state and local policies on the provision of basic
social services and to limit national action that would threaten a reduction in these services. Id at
1194; see supra text accompanying notes 735-39. His argument that apart from state and local
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is no basis for preference between the political choices of two different
organizations of the electorate, there is a rule of preference for national
political decisions that is consistent with the states' role as political
communities in the federal system. The explanation of Congress'
power to intervene against the states rests, not simply on the represen-
tation of the national electorate in Congress as urged by Marshall,
Stone, and Wechsler, but on a concept of political checks derived from
Marshall's and Stone's justification of state power to affect the interests
of the nation and other states. Political checks on Congress' power over
the states are inherent in the national political process. These checks
make Congress politically accountable for legislation that diminishes
state autonomy. Congress' political accountability in turn provides the
warrant for its authority to control the allocation of political authority
between the nation and the states.
Political accountability is a concept that is uniformly applauded by
political scientists,83' legal scholars,8 32 and the Court, 33 but it is rarely
discussed in the context of federalism.134 Political accountability is de-
fined as the "answerability" of representatives to the represented. 35
governments' special social service function there is no rule for preference between the political
choices of the nation and the states is marred by a significant internal contradiction. He argues
that the states can intervene in local government determinations about public services because
there is an "accountability defect" in local political processes: parochial interests at the local level
may prevail at the expense of the general social obligation to provide adequate public services.
Id at 1190. The argument that the state, which is the larger political unit, should prevail over
local government because it is more broadly accountable would, of course, also support a conclu-
sion that the nation should prevail over the states, Thus, his argument suggests the basis for a rule
of preference that he denies.
831. Eg., R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3, 131 (1956); W. RIKER, supra note
778, at 25, 28-30; Benson, supra note 777, at 17; Pennock, Responsiveness, Responsibility and Major-
ily Rule, 56 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 790, 797-98, 803, 807 (1962). Cf. Livingston, Britain andA,,erica:
.7he Institutionalization of.4ccountability, 38 J. PoL. 879 (1976) (division of power more important
than accountability).
832. J. CHOPER, supra note 734, at 10; Permutations of Sovereignty, supra note 35, at 1174,
1189-90; Stewart, supra note 577, at 1240-41; Unraveling NLC, supra note 32, at 1093 n.109. For
Kaden's emphasis on the importance of accountability, see supra text accompanying note 775.
833. E.g., Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 531, 534 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 385 (1976) (Poivell, J., dissenting) (decisions holding political patronage prac-
tices contrary to first amendment interfere with political parties as a mechanism of accountability).
834. Assessments of political accountability in our federal system are limited for the most part
to lamentations that complicated intergovernmental relations confuse the electorate. 1 ACIR
STuDY,.4 Criss ofConfidence and Competence A-77, supra note 82, at 19-25; Gilbert, The Shaping
o0Public Policy, 426 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. 116, 122, 137 (1976); see supra text accom-
panying note 775.
835. Pennock, supra note 831, at 797. There is political accountability if there is a "workable
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The purpose of political accountability is to enable the electorate to
control policy and to provide for majority rule, 3 6 and it is generally
agreed that accountability is the core of democratic government. 37 No
representative system of government is perfectly representative, 38 and
the national, state, and local governments in our federal system are not
exceptions to this rule. There are significant antimajoritarian aspects in
the selection, organization, and processes of Congress839 and state and
local governments. 840 Although antimajoritarian aspects of the polit-
ical process may prevent the translation of the wishes of a simple nu-
merical majority into public policy, it does not necessarily follow that
the mechanisms of political accountability are ineffective or that major-
ity rule is frustrated. Majority rule in a democracy must be understood
as something more than a simple numerical majority. This limited def-
inition must be tempered by taking into consideration the relative in-
tensity of interest of various groups in particular social policies,
avoidance of automatic responses to ephemeral demands, the necessity
to devise rational responses to public demands, and maintenance of a
popular consensus about the fairness of representative government by
respecting important minority interests. 11 The mechanisms of political
accountability adequate for majority rule, understood in this sympa-
thetic and realistic fashion, may be quite diffuse and indirect. A spe-
cific mechanism of accountability to guarantee that a simple numerical
majority approves each and every decision of its representatives or,
conversely, can correct these decisions is not required as long as the
electorate retains control over policy in the aggregate.842 Nevertheless,
way for the voters to express ... disapproval and bring about a change" when "something is
done which the electorate disapproves." Id at 802.
836. Id at 802, 807.
837. Id at 797; J. CHOPER, supra note 734, at 10; R. DAHL, supra note 831, at 3.
838. Pennock, supra note 831, at 794.
839. For a succinct review of the antimajoritarian aspects of the national political process and
a conclusion that legislation enacted by Congress is still the product of a national majority, see J.
CHOPER, supra note 734, at 12-47.
840. See supra note 778.
841. For a thorough development of this concept of majority rule, see Pennock, supra note
831.
842. The standard analysis of political accountability is that competition between two political
parties allows the electorate to hold its representatives to account, at least in general and with
respect to major political issues. Given the lack of party discipline, many political scientists ques-
tion the effectiveness of this mechanism of accountability. 1 ACIR STUDY, A Crisis of Confidence
and Competence A-77,supra note 82, at 20-21; Pennock, supra note 831, at 797-806. One political
scientist has concluded that there may be political accountability notwithstanding weak political
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some measure of accountability is crucial to any determination that na-
tional or state legislation is the product of national or state majorities.
This summary of the concept of majority rule and political accounta-
bility is entirely conventional, but the application of these two concepts
to the resolution of federalism issues is novel, and perhaps controver-
sial. A conflict between state and national political decisions involves a
confrontation between two different organizations of the electorate.
Even if we assume that the state and national political processes are
equally accountable and, consequently, that state and national political
decisions are each supported by a majority, the political accountability
of Congress provides a basis for preference of the political choice of the
national majority over the political choice of a subnational majority.
The nation is the larger and more comprehensive political unit, and
national political choices have a broader base than state or local polit-
ical decisions. Preference for the decision of the national political ma-
jority is, then, consistent with Madison's argument that the national
political process would provide an escape from the parochial political
decisions of state governments. 43 Reliance on the national political
process to determine the extent of national authority over the states is
also consistent with the framers' general intention that the actual allo-
cation of political authority in the federal system would be determined
by the electorate." Moreover, even if there is some parity between
state and national political decisions because both are products of polit-
ical majorities, the supremacy clause dictates preference for the polit-
ical choice of the national majority. 45
The argument that a national political majority should prevail over a
state political majority when national and state political decisions con-
flict rests on the political accountability of Congress. Absent political
parties. Pennock, supra note 831, at 801 ("By permitting representatives to regroup themselves
from issue to issue, with relatively little regard for party affiliation, the very looseness of the Amer-
ican system fosters the maximum response to majority will.").
843. Scheiber, supra note 48, at 92-93; Diamond, supra note 30, at 56-62. Madison believed
that state political decisions would be parochial because the states are more subject to control by
factions than the national government and because each state would tend to disregard the interests
of citizens of the other states. Id
844. See supra text accompanying notes 51 & 53.
845. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Resort to the supremacy clause does not, of course, establish
the contention that the political accountability of Congress determines the scope of national polit-
ical authority, but it does undermine Professor Michelman's argument, see supra text accompany-





accountability, national legislation is not the product of a political ma-
jority and the basis for preference evaporates. The political accounta-
bility of Congress turns on political checks inherent in the national
political process. To the extent that political checks in the national
political process make Congress politically accountable, statutes that
diminish state autonomy are the product of a national political major-
ity, and there is no basis for judicial intervention in the political
process.
In postulating this broad justification of national political authority
over the states, there is some risk that two equally fundamental points
may be lost. First, the political checks in the national political process
limit the extent of national intrusions on the states and provide in prac-
tice a significant degree of protection for state interests in political deci-
sionmaking. Second, in the absence of a political check on a particular
exercise of national legislative authority, there is no warrant for Con-
gress' power to intrude on the states. Judicially imposed restrictions on
Congress' powers then may be necessary to protect the states' role as
political communities in the federal system.
The inquiries crucial to this rule of preference for the political deci-
sions of a national majority over state political decisions are: (1) the
identification of the political checks in the national political process
and the manner in which they provide for political accountability and
majority rule; (2) a demonstration of the capacity of these political
checks to protect the interests of states as political communities making
political decisions about the rules for private activity, the structure and
processes of government, the mix of public goods and services, and the
allocation of executive, legislative, and judicial resources; and (3) a de-
termination of the extent to which these political checks operate to pro-
vide for majority rule and to protect state interests when Congress
exercises national authority to regulate private activity, to regulate the
states, or to require the affirmative exercise of state authority over pri-
vate activity in the implementation of national regulatory programs.
On the basis of this final inquiry, we can determine when to invoke the
rule that the decisions of a national political majority should prevail
over state political decisions and when there may be some justification
for judicial protection of state interests in political decisionmaking.
The political checks that both limit and justify Congress' power to
intrude on state interests in political decisionmaking are quite elemen-
tary and remarkably simple. Viewed from the perspective of the na-
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tional electorate, political checks are the burdens imposed on them by
congressional political decisions. Viewed from Congress' perspective,
political checks are the burdens imposed on its constituents-the
"costs" of policy decisions. The first political check is the application
of nationally determined substantive policy to private activity. Individ-
uals, groups, associations, and corporations directly affected by particu-
lar national policies assign the credit or blame to their representatives
in Congress. The second political check is the requirement of financial
and executive resources to administer and enforce national policy. To
provide for the implementation of national policy, Congress must levy
taxes and establish a bureaucracy. Voters are aware of national poli-
cies that directly affect interests they deem important, and they are in-
directly aware of national policies that affect less important interests or
the interests of others because the costs, in terms of the expenditure of
funds and the establishment of a bureaucracy, are assessed against
them in the form of taxes.
In our pluralistic society the composition of the majority shifts with
the issues. By approving or disapproving their representatives, the vot-
ers retain control over social policy according to their overall level of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with policies that affect them directly and
with the level of government spending and regulation. Although the
effects on the voters of any particular national policy decision seen in
isolation may be de minimus, regulation of private activity, the expen-
diture of funds, and the creation of a bureaucracy to administer these
policies add to the total burden on the national electorate. Since these
burdens of nationally established policies are traceable in the aggregate
to Congress, the voters can hold their representatives in Congress an-
swerable in broad terms for national policies. It is fair to conclude,
then, that where these political checks are present, congressional poli-
cies are the product of a national majority.
Given our democratic theory, we tend both to assume that congres-
sional policy decisions are made in accordance with the principle of
majority rule and to overlook any explanation of the means of provid-
ing for majority rule. Political checks are, nonetheless, the essential
means of creating political accountability and majority rule, and their
crucial function is highlighted by considering congressional action
taken in the absence of political checks. For example, if someone other
than Congress has the responsibility for raising revenues or for ad-




spend or to regulate a private activity is one made in the absence of
some of the political checks that are normally part of the national polit-
ical process. There is a limited political check on such a decision be-
cause some individuals and groups are directly affected by spending
and regulatory programs; however, the political check inherent in the
requirement of financial and executive resources to implement national
policy is missing. The absence of this political check may have a signif-
icant impact on the political calculus: the decision to spend or to regu-
late might not be made if Congress' action added to the total burden on
the national electorate of funding and enforcing national policy. Those
who would be affected by the necessity for tax revenues and for admin-
istrative resources might well object, if not to the particular decision, at
least to a general increase in the level of expenditures and regulation.
More importantly, in the absence of the political check inherent in
the requirement to provide financial and administrative resources to
enforce national policies, a congressional determination to spend or to
regulate is not the product of a national political majority. If no bur-
den is placed on the national electorate to provide financial and admin-
istrative resources to implement congressional policies, the national
electorate is deprived of a significant means of holding Congress an-
swerable for national policies-it cannot check national policies by re-
sisting or approving the levy of taxes or the establishment of a
bureaucracy. Conversely, Congress' freedom to act in ways not ap-
proved by the electorate is increased because some of the "costs" of its
political decisions are eliminated. Those who would be burdened, at
least indirectly, by the costs of enforcing national policies are in effect
excluded from the political process. In short, to the extent that the bur-
dens of congressional policies-the application of regulations to private
activity and the requirement of financial and administrative resources
to implement these policies-are not imposed on the national electo-
rate, the political checks of the national political process are frustrated.
As these political checks are reduced or eliminated, the basis for a
conclusion that congressional policies are the product of majority rule
is undermined because the electorate might well prefer a different deci-
sion if it had to bear the full burdens of its representatives' decisions.
The difference between the operation of political checks and their ab-
sence is the difference between Congress acting responsibly by impos-
ing the burdens of its policy decisions on the national electorate and
Congress acting irresponsibly by evading some or all of the costs of its
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political decisions. When the political checks are present, congres-
sional political decisions are consistent with the fundamental principle
that those with the power to make a decision should bear to the fullest
extent possible the costs and benefits and the credit and blame for their
decisions.8 46
Having identified the political checks in the national political process
and their function of providing for political accountability and major-
ity rule, two crucial inquiries remain: a demonstration of the capacity
of the political checks to protect state interests in political decisionmak-
ing and a determination of the extent to which these checks operate
when Congress exercises its powers to regulate private activity, to regu-
late the states, and to employ the states as the nation's agents. Before
turning to a detailed analysis of the operation of these political checks,
it should be noted that since the political checks inherent in the na-
tional political process are more effective as a limit in the aggregate on
the exercise of Congress' powers than as limits on discrete exercises of
national authority, the theory advanced here admits, in Professor
Tribe's apt phrase, a "tyranny of small decisions" '47 that diminish state
autonomy. Nonetheless, consistent with the framers' intention that the
electorate would determine the actual allocation of political power be-
tween the states and the nation, the theory leaves to the national polit-
ical process, not to the subjective judgments of the courts, the
responsibility of determining which particular exercises of national au-
thority, among many that have similar effects on state autonomy,
should be rejected.
It is also perhaps helpful as a preliminary matter to consider the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which was used to demonstrate the ef-
fects of national legislation on state autonomy, 48 as an illustration of
how the political checks of the national political process both limit and
justify Congress' powers over the states. The application of the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour requirements of the FLSA to private
employers has one significant impact on the states' interest in political
decisionmaking-it displaces the states' power to determine the sub-
stantive policies governing the employer-employee relationship. The
political checks on this exercise of national authority over private activ-
846. See Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 840-42 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977)
(decisions to spend and to tax should not be separated).
847. L. TRIBE, supra note 717, § 5-20, at 302.




ity are the application of the wage and hour requirements to employers
and the requirement of financial and administrative resources to en-
force the FLSA which are imposed on the national electorate. Since
both of these political checks are present, Congress is politically ac-
countable and the FLSA is consistent with the principle of majority
rule. Although these same political checks could make any state-deter-
mined policy that is displaced by the FLSA a majority rule, the deci-
sion of the national political majority should prevail over the decision
of a subnational majority for the reasons advanced above.849
If the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA are applied to state and
local governments in their capacities as employers, there is an addi-
tional effect on the states: the costs of providing public goods and serv-
ices are increased. Nonetheless, the same political checks operate and
Congress is politically accountable because the regulations also apply
to private employers, and state interests are vicariously protected by the
impact of the FLSA on private employers. Since national intrusion on
the states is limited by the application of the FLSA standards to both
private and public employers, judicial protection for the states in NL
was not warranted. If the FLSA applied solely to state and local gov-
ernment, then the political check inherent in the application of a na-
tional regulation to private activity would not be present.
Similarly, if a national regulation provided for state administration
and enforcement of national wage and hour standards for private em-
ployers, the mere application of these standards to private activity
would not constitute an adequate political check with respect to the
burdens of implementation assumed by the states. Although private
interests subject to the FLSA would act to protect their own interests,
they would not provide vicarious protection for the states' interests in
determining the use of their own governmental resources. In fact, pri-
vate employers might well prefer arguably more sympathetic state ad-
ministration to national administration. When a national regulation
applies solely to the states or requires the states to act as the nation's
agents in enforcing national regulations, another political check is re-
quired to support the conclusions that Congress has acted in a politi-
cally accountable fashion and that the determination of a national
majority should prevail over state interests. This political check-as
will be developed below-is that Congress has imposed on the national
849. See supra text accompanying notes 843-45.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
992 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
electorate the full financial and administrative costs of its policy
decision.
. Political Accountability and Congress' Power to Regulate Private
Activity
The explanation of Congress' power to regulate private activity and
to diminish state autonomy by displacing state power to prescribe sub-
stantive rules is very simple. There are two political checks on the ex-
ercise of national authority to regulate private activity that guarantee
Congress' political accountability and that protect the states' interests
in determining the rules governing private activity. The first political
check is the application of the regulation to private activity-those who
are directly affected will assign the blame or credit to CongressY50 For
Professor Wechsler, the basic political safeguard of federalism is that
all interests affected by national regulations are represented in Con-
gress."-" Nevertheless, the application of national regulations to pri-
vate activity, while certainly a check, is not always an adequate check
to make Congress accountable for the effects on the amorphous interest
of the state as a political community in retaining authority to control
private activity.
There are many situations in which the private interests affected by
national regulations may hold their representatives in Congress ac-
countable for the particular substantive policy adopted, but these pri-
vate interests will not protect the states' general interest in retaining
authority to prescribe the rules for private activity. Consider national
statutes proscribing crimes like loansharking 52 and firearms posses-
sion, 53 which are generally recognized as examples of a very broad
850. One possible objection to the effectiveness of this political check in the national political
process is that if a national regulation affects directly an entity like an electric utility, it will pass
the costs of complying with a pollution control standard (for example) on to its consumers. The
general voters who are affected by the increased costs of electricity may not have sufficient knowl-
edge to assign the blame or credit to Congress. The mediation of the electric utility in this exam-
ple may lead to some voter confusion, but the same voter confusion would exist if a state imposed
pollution control requirements. The objection then goes to the general adequacy of political
checks in both the national and the state political processes to provide for political accountability.
Given the concession that political accountability in representative government is by no means
perfect, seesupra text accompanying notes 838-42, the objection does not effect the thesis here that
preference should be given to the political decisions of a national majority over state majorities.
851. See supra text accompanying note 806.
852. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).




exercise of the commerce power to regulate local activity with a tenu-
ous connection to interstate commerce.85 4 In the case of these two
criminal statutes, the private interests affected (potential criminals) are
unlikely to have any effective voice in the national political process,
and the general public (as well as state and local government officials)
is unlikely to perceive an assault on state autonomy that is wrapped in
the promise of controlling crime. Moreover, private interests operating
on a national scale often seek national regulation as an alternative to
state regulation in order to avoid the problems of complying with dif-
ferent, perhaps conflicting, regulations in fifty states and thousands of
local jurisdictions. 55
A second political check is the requirement for financial and admin-
istrative resources to enforce national regulations and the imposition of
the burdens of providing these resources on the national electorate by
Congress. This second political check remedies the deficiencies inher-
ent in the limit of applying a national regulation to a private activity,
makes Congress politically accountable, and affords some measure of
protection to the states' interest in determining the rules for private
activity.
To continue the example of national criminal statutes, enforcement
requires a prosecutor, courts, and prisons. The costs of enforcement
are imposed on the national electorate in the form of taxes and alloca-
tion of these resources to one social goal among many competing
goals."5 6 Since each national regulation of private activity adds to the
total financial and administrative burden imposed on the national elec-
torate, there is some limit on the extent of national regulation of private
activity in general even if there is no definite limit on the nationaliza-
tion of intrastate crime. It is not surprising then that national regula-
854. See Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15
ARIz. L. REv. 271 (1973).
855. The cable television industry, for example, has long sought national regulation by the
Federal Communications Commission as an alternative to state and local controls. See La Pierre,
Cable Television and the Promise of Programming Diversiy, 42 FoRDHAM L. REV. 25, 73 & n.282
(1973); Holsendolph, Cable Bill Would Cut Cities Role, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1982, at 17, Col. 1
(national ed.) (bill reported by the Senate Commerce Committee and supported by the cable tele-
vision industry would limit municipal power to regulate cable television franchises).
856. Consider for example the proposals to eliminate the diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts as an effort, at least in part, to reduce the workload of the national judiciary and to permit
judicial resources to be reallocated to other matters. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
A GENERAL VIEW 140-42 (1973); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and
Potentialfor Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966 (1979).
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tion of private activity is extensive when it is understood that the two
political checks work most effectively as a limit on national authority in
the aggregate. Notwithstanding the extensive displacement of state
control of private activity by national regulations, the operation of the
two political checks inherent in the national political process ensures
that Congress is politically accountable and that national statutes con-
trolling private activity are the product of a national majority. It is
appropriate, then, for the courts to defer to the political decision of a
national majority.
When Congress regulates private activity,"57 both political checks are
usually present and the only effect on the states is to displace their
power to control private actions. There are, however, three special
types of national regulation of private activity that require separate
analysis under the theory of political accountability.
The first type is a national rule for private activity that is established
by prohibiting certain state regulations of private activity.858 National
legislation typically is addressed directly to the private activity regu-
lated. It establishes a rule to be enforced by the national government,
and it either displaces existing state regulations or fills a void in state
regulatory schemes. 5 9 Both the first political check inherent in pre-
scribing a rule for private activity and the second political check inher-
ent in the resources required to enforce national rules are present. In a
few situations, national legislation establishes a rule for private activity
by addressing a command to the state and prohibiting certain state reg-
ulations of private activity. The national rule is simply that private
activity shall not be subject to state regulation. Under the theory of
political accountability, a statute prohibiting state regulation of private
activity is a special example of national authority over private activity
because no national controls are imposed to fill the void created by the
prohibition of state regulation. In the absence of any national regula-
tion imposed as a substitute for state regulation, the second political
check is weak; there are no financial or administrative enforcement
costs to be borne by the national electorate when there is no national
regulation to be enforced.
857. See .supra text accompanying notes 460-63 and cases cited in note 464.
858. See supra text accompanying notes 482-88.
859. For an argument that Congress' power to regulate private activity is greater when the
national regulation fills a void in a state regulatory scheme than when it preempts an existing state




Consider for example a national statute that prohibits the state from
enforcing a "no right turn on red" policy."" This statute substitutes a
national policy (energy conservation) for a state policy (safety), and the
first political check applies because the contending private interests
favoring these two competing policies can assign the credit or blame to
Congress. Although the second political check is weak because no
financial or administrative costs are imposed on the national electorate
in establishing this national rule for private activity, there is some force
remaining in this check because there is a potential burden on the na-
tional electorate-enforcement of a rule that motorists must turn right
at a red light would require a national police force.8 6'
The concept here of a potential cost to the national electorate by
ousting a state regulation of private activity without imposing a na-
tional regulation as a substitute may be clearer if we consider as a sec-
ond example a national regulation that prohibits the states from
registering motor vehicles that fail national pollutant emission stan-
dards. 62 A national policy requiring motor vehicle emission controls
displaces a state policy that such controls are not required, but the na-
tional rule for the private activity of motor vehicle operation does not
impose any financial or administrative burdens on the national electo-
rate. There are no enforcement costs in a national regulation that
merely prohibits the states from granting a motor vehicle registration to
certain vehicles and that ousts a state rule permiting registration with-
out reference to pollutant emissions. Nonetheless, there are two poten-
tial burdens on the national electorate that make effective the political
check of imposing on the national electorate the financial and adminis-
trative costs of national policies. First, if the rule that vehicles failing to
comply with national environmental standards cannot be operated is to
be enforced, a national police force would be required to apprehend
individuals who operate vehicles without a valid registration. Second,
individuals who cannot obtain a state registration without complying
with the national environmental standards would probably demand the
860. There is no national regulation requiring drivers to turn right at a red light, but a condi-
tion of a national grant requires the states to permit such turns. 42 U.S.C. § 6322(c)(5) (1976).
861. State and local police could, of course, choose to enforce a national regulation requiring
drivers to turn right on a red light, but a requirement that these officers enforce the national law
would raise an additional and distinct issue of Congress' power to employ the states as the nation's
agents in enforcing national regulations.
862. Such a regulation has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. See supra text accompanying
notes 486-88.
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establishment of a testing and inspection program that would permit
them to obtain motor vehicle registrations. The costs of such a pro-
gram would be imposed on the national electorate. There is then a
potential check because the national regulation that displaces the state
rule creates political pressure for substitute national regulations that
entail the imposition of financial and administrative burdens on the
national electorate. 63
A second special example of national authority to regulate private
activity is regulations that not only displace state control of individual
conduct but also affect other political decisionmaking powers of the
states. Two examples of such national regulations are regulations of
private activity that limit the states' power to tax the regulated private
activity, thus impairing the states' revenue raising functions, 8 and the
application of national criminal statutes to state legislators, which may
interfere with the states' control over their legislative processes. 865
These exercises of national authority are valid notwithstanding the ad-
ditional effects on the states. Congress is politically accountable be-
cause both political checks are in effect. Those who are affected by
these national regulations can remonstrate with Congress, and the
financial and administrative resources to enforce these national regula-
tions are extracted by Congress from the national electorate. Since
Congress' determination of the policy for the regulated private activity
is the product of majority rule, the courts should not interpose their
judgments to protect contrary political decisions of subnational
majorities.
The use of conditions attached to national grants is a third and final
special example of Congress' power to regulate private activity.866
Here the political check on Congress' power to displace state regulation
of private activity is quite obvious. Congress must appropriate funds to
achieve its regulatory goals, and the imposition of national taxes on the
electorate permits control in the aggregate over such uses of the spend-
863. There would be no financial or administrative burdens on the national electorate if the
states enforced a ban on the operation of motor vehicles failing to comply with national pollution
standards and conducted tests to determine compliance. A national requirement imposing those
obligations on states would, however, raise a separate and distinct question of Congress' power to
compel the states to exercise affimative authority over private activity.
864. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49 & note 476.
865. See supra text accompanying notes 478-81.
866. The conditions of national grants to private recipients often establish rules governing the





The Supreme Court and the lower courts have all uniformly held
that national authority to regulate private activity, at least under the
commerce power, is not constrained by NLC or the tenth amend-
ment. 68 This holding is correct because there are political checks on
Congress' power to regulate private activity and Congress is politically
accountable for its decisions to regulate private activity. Since national
statutes regulating private activity are the product of a national major-
ity, there is no basis for judicial intervention to protect the political
choice of subnational majorities.8 69 Although the scope of national au-
thority over private activity has expanded tremendously since 1937, the
growth of national authority is the choice of the national electorate.
Since the national political process is at least as potentially accountable
as state political processes, deference to the national majority is
warranted.
The political checks that justify the expansive exercise of national
authority over private activity also impose some limits on Congress'
power to displace state regulation. Admittedly, the political checks im-
pose a limit on national regulations primarily in the aggregate, but the
determination that a particular national regulation goes too far, or that
the total amount of national control over private activity goes too far, is
left to correction by the political process, much as the framers intended.
The operation of the political checks of the national political process,
867. Collier, Judicial Bootstraps and the General Welfare Clause, 4 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 211,
230-31, 236 (1936) (conditions of grants regulating private activity are "checked in large part by
the consideration of expense" and "regulation by the method of purchase . . . constitutes a
financial burden on taxpayers which presents an automatic political correction"); Corwin, The
Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the Maternio Act, 36 HARV. L. REv. 548, 577 (1923) (Con-
gress' power to stipulate conditions on grants is nearly unlimited save the political check); Ribble,
National and State Cooperation Under the Commerce Clause. 37 COLuM. L. REv. 43, 45 (1937)
("The warrant to spend has obvious practical limitations even though it should escape constitu-
tional objections. A compelling one lies in the fact that the public purse is not bottomless and the
task of refilling it is likely to be disagreeable to those who must seek the voters' good will."). Cf.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (determination whether an expenditure is for the "general
welfare" is a political decision for Congress). Some evidence that the national purse is not without
limits is provided by the massive spending and tax cuts made by Congress at the end of the first
year of the Reagan Administration. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 reduced
expenditures for various national programs by $35 billion. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357. See
Budget Conferees Near Appro val of Big Spending Cuts, Giving Reagan a Major Victory in Economic
Program, Wall St. J., July 29, 1981, p. 3, col. I (facsimile ed.). Substantial tax reductions were
provided by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
868. See supra text accompanying notes 458-59 & note 464.
869. Cowen, What is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C.L. REv. 154, 183 (1961).
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even as a limit solely in the aggregate, is an adequate response to fears
that expansion of national authority over private activity will destroy
state autonomy by emasculating the states' authority to make political
choices about the rules for private activity. The fear, for example, that
Congress might amend the Sherman Act and preempt all state regula-
tions that require private parties to engage in anticompetitive conduct
is probably unrealistic.17 1 Such a wholesale displacement of state regu-
lation of private activity would in all likelihood be prevented by the
groups that benefit from the state rules. Moreover, even if Congress
were to amend the Sherman Act, the political checks of the national
political process would ensure that its decision would be the product of
majority rule. Judicial intervention, albeit in the name of preservation
of state autonomy, would be nothing more than a judgment that Con-
gress' economic policy was misguided.87 '
Although the Court has held flatly that neither NLC nor the tenth
amendment limits Congress' power under the commerce clause to regu-
late private activity, there is some risk, in the absence of any judicial
theory to support this holding, that the Court will impose federalism
restraints on national authority over private activity in an indirect fash-
ion by construing Congress' powers narrowly. Hodel directly raises
this specter.8 72 A narrow reading of Congress' powers to protect state
autonomy is not only disingenuous, it is completely without warrant.
The political checks of the national political process provide an ade-
quate justification of national authority to regulate private activity. As
Chief Justice Marshall counseled at the beginning in Gibbons v. Ogden,
restraints on Congress' powers to regulate private activity are
political.873
2. Political Accountabiliy and Congress' Power to Regulate the
States
In contrast to national regulation of private activity that displaces the
states' substantive policies, national regulation of state government and
activity affects a different state interest-the delivery of a particular
package of public goods and services that the state as a political com-
munity has chosen to provide and to finance through taxes. In almost
870. See supra text accompanying note 465-73.
871. See supra note 470.
872. See supra notes 474-75 and accompanying text.




all cases, these regulations also apply to similar private activity. The
political checks on national authority to regulate private activity make
Congress politically accountable for the effects on the states and limit
the extent of national intrusion on the states' function of providing
public goods and services to their residents. There are, however, some
national regulations that apply solely to state government and activity.
The principal examples are a few statutes enacted under Congress'
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments and conditions of na-
tional grants that control either the structure, organization, and
processes of state government or the allocation of political authority
within a state. In all cases that the courts have considered so far, Con-
gress is politically accountable for regulations that apply solely to the
states even though the political check inherent in the application of a
similar regulation to analogous private activity is absent. Nonetheless,
some statutes that apply solely to the states may exceed the bounds of
political accountability and may require judicial intervention to protect
the states' role as political communities in the federal system.
Reliance on the political checks of the national political process to
justify and to limit Congress' power to regulate state government and
activity avoids the pitfalls of tests of state autonomy derived from
NLC. There is no need to determine whether a state activity is integral
or traditional and no corresponding risk that protection of state inter-
ests will turn on history874 or on amorphous distinctions between gov-
874. Any historical approach to the definition of state functions is difficult because many ac-
tivities that were once the exclusive province of the private sector have now been assumed by state
and local government. For example, education and the construction and operation of highways,
now two major governmental functions, were once provided primarily by the private sector. See
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 n.4 (1954) (public education began to develop in
the North after 1830 and in the South after 1850); Brief for Petitioners-Intervenors, Washington
Area Bicyclist Association at 21-22, District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded sub. nom EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (most roads privately owned
and operated in early history of the United States). Indeed, any a priori judgments about the
importance of particular state functions and activities are inconsistent with the dynamic nature of
state political processes. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 596 (1946) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (expansion of state activity to matters previously conducted by private sector for a
profit). The history of state-operated lotteries provides an example of changing concepts about
appropriate governmental activity. State lotteries were a prominent feature in our early history
and survived up through the 1890's. In 1965 New Hampshire revived the state-operated lottery,
and as of January 1980, fourteen states operate lotteries. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1980-81, at 35 (1980); Blakey & Kurland, The Development of
the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 927-43 (1978); Note, The Lot is Cast into
the Lap: Federal Communications Mistreatment of State Lottery Broadcasts, 6 Loy. U. CI. L.J.
407, 409-10 (1975). Although this state activity may now seem novel, it is an important source of
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ernmental and proprietary functions.8 75 There is also no need to assess
the significance to a state of any particular function or activity or to
determine the extent of national authority by balancing the importance
of state and national political decisions. Thus, there is no risk that ad
hoc judicial assessments of the comparative merit of state and national
policies will determine the scope of state autonomy.876
Under the theory of political accountability, all state functions and
activities are deemed important on the basis of the best possible evi-
dence-the actual choice of a state political community to undertake
certain activities and to organize and conduct government in a particu-
lar fashion. There is no need to label as "integral", "traditional", or
"governmental" or to assess the importance of state political decisions
about such diverse matters as the conditions of public employment, the
organization of administrative agencies, the allocation of political au-
thority among the states, their political subdivisions, and private
groups, the provision of health, fire, police, recreational, medical, and
educational services, or the operation of mass transit systems, airports,
and sewage treatment plants. The appropriate inquiry in any case in
which a national regulation affects state government or activity is sim-
ply whether the political accountability of Congress provides a basis for
deference to the political decisions of a national majority.
a. Regulations that Apply Both to Private Activity and the
States
Deference to national political decisions to regulate state government
and activity is most clearly appropriate in the typical situation where
the rule applied to the states also applies to private activity. When a
regulation applies both to state and private activity, the political checks
on Congress' power to regulate private activity provide vicarious pro-
state revenues and should be regarded as a significant state political choice. By simply taking the
states' political decisions to operate lotteries as evidence of the importance of this activity to the
states, the problems of defining state interests that are sufficiently important to require a justifica-
tion for national intrusion are eliminated.
875. See supra notes 723-24 and accompanying text.
876. For an example of a decision about state autonomy that turns on a judicial assessment of
the comparative merits of state and national policies, see supra note 504. The problems ofjudicial
determinations about the importance of particular state political choices and the effects of national
regulations are suggested by disagreements among the states and state officials about these issues.
In NLC, for example, the states did not all agree that the application of the FLSA to state and
local governments in their capacities as employers was ill-advised or unconstitutional. See supra




tection for state interests and make Congress politically accountable.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical amendment to the FLSA estab-
lishing a minimum wage of fifty dollars per hour. If such a require-
ment was established for state and local governments as employers,
they would argue that it imposed a destructive burden on their function
of providing public services and that judicial intervention was required
to protect state autonomy. Nevertheless, there would be no need for
judicial action in these circumstances; the political process is entirely
adequate to deal with this threat to state interests. 77 No statute estab-
lishing a fifty dollars per hour minimum wage would be enacted be-
cause the FLSA also applies to private employers, and the affected
private interests would prevent the establishment of a minimum wage
that would destroy both private enterprise and state government.
The interests of state government are not protected because congress-
men are concerned about the abstract state interest in retaining political
authority to control the conditions of public employment or about the
more concrete matters of increased costs of employment and of provid-
ing governmental services. Instead, these state interests are protected
because they are included in the representation of private interests.
There is simply no practical danger that the minimum wage will ever
be set at a level high enough to impair significantly the conduct of state
and local government as long as the same requirements apply to pri-
vate activity.878 Since national authority is limited and Congress is po-
litically accountable by virtue of the application of the minimum wage
to private employers, the application of the minimum wage to state and
local government employers is the decision of a national majority.
There is then no need or justification for judicial intervention to protect
state autonomy. On this analysis, NLC is an unwarranted interference
877. In the course of the first argument in NLC, Solicitor General Bork conceded that a $50
per hour minimum wage would make the operation of state government impossible and that the
Court should hold it "unconstitutional as a destruction of Federalism." On reargument of the
case, however, he contended that the political process would check the imposition of most destruc-
tive minimum wage requirements because they would apply both to public and private employers.
86 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 860-
61, 903-04 (P. Kurland & G. Caspar eds. 1977).
878. Ely, To ward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode ofJudicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451,
468 n.67 (1978). See L. TRIBE, supra note 717, § 5-7, at 240 n.2; Stewart, supra note 577, at 1237
("federal controls on state-owned industrial facilities that are identical to those imposed on similar
privately owned facilities will not create the sort of incursions on state autonomy that trigger
federalism limitations on national power and the corresponding need for special justifications for
federal authority").
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with the national political process, and it should be overruled.
8 79
The initial inquiry, then, in each case of a national regulation that
applies to the states is whether the same rule applies to analogous pri-
vate activity.88 0 If a regulation that formally applies to both the states
and private activity does in fact apply to a substantial body of private
activity and does not in fact apply primarily or exclusively to the states,
then the political checks on national authority to regulate private activ-
ity are sufficient to ensure that Congress is politically accountable. The
determination whether a national regulation applies to both a substan-
tial body of private activity and the states may require a careful, empir-
ical assessment of its actual impact.881 Even if no fixed criteria for this
879. In addition to the minimum wage standards, the 1974 Amendments to the FLSA also
imposed maximum hour or overtime requirements on state and local governments as employers.
See supra text accompanying notes 85-86. The overtime requirements are valid for the same
reason that the minimum wage requirements are valid: they apply equally to public and private
employers. It is worth noting that to the extent the requirements imposed on public and private
employers are different, Congress acted to make the application of the FLSA less onerous for
public, than for private, employers. See supra note 86.
880. At first blush the inquiry whether a national regulation applies both to state and private
activity may seem to be a reincarnation of the problematical categorization of state activity as
governmental or proprietary. See supra note 724. The distinction between the inquiry here and
the governmental-proprietary test is the difference between an empirical determination of the ac-
tual incidence of a national regulation and the question whether a particular state activity should
be labelled governmental or proprietary on the basis of the absence or presence of a counterpart in
the private sector. This distinction may be illustrated by the court's decision in Amersbach v. City
of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). Seesupra note 115. Following, albeit without specifi-
cally invoking, a distinction between governmental and proprietary activity bottomed in part on
the fact that all but two of 475 airports are publicly owned, the court held that the application of
the FLSA minimum wage to employees of a municipal airport is unconstitutional under NLC.
598 F.2d at 1037, 1038 n.7. In contrast, the inquiry proposed here is whether the FLSA minimum
wage in fact applies to employees in the private sector who perform work analogous to that per-
formed by municipal airport employees. This inquiry would be satisfied if, for example, clerks at
the airport and clerks in the private trucking industry are both subject to the FLSA. The Amer.
sbach court did not consider this issue. See id at 1034 n. 1. In short, the inquiry proposed here is
a determination whether the FLSA applies to state and private activity (the payment of wages to
employees) and not a determination whether the state employees are engaged in a governmental
or private activity in operating an airport.
881. For example, the Court in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), upheld
the application of a national tax on liquor to a state-owned liquor sales monopoly. Although the
tax as applied in South Carolina applied only to a state activity, on a national level it applied to
both state and private activity. For modern examples of judicial scrutiny to determine if the
incidence of a state tax ensures a political check, see supra note 826.
Any determination in a particular case that a national regulation applies exclusively or primar-
ily to the states or, alternatively, that it applies to a substantial body of private activity as well as to
the states turns first on the extent to which an activity is performed by both the states and the
private sector and second'on the breadth of the analogy that is drawn between public and private
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determination can be stated and it is difficult to draw a line between
regulations that fall on both state and private activity and that fall pri-
marily or exclusively on the states, most national regulations fall rather
clearly on one side of the line or the other. The FLSA, for example,
applies to a very large group of private employers as well as to public
employers.88 2
Similarly, in most of the post-NLC challenges to national regulations
that apply formally to both private activity and the states, the regula-
tions apply in fact to a substantial body of private activity and Con-
gress is politically accountable.8 8 3 The courts have sustained all
regulations that apply to both state and private activity, but they have
approved the regulation of state activity on a wide variety of unpersua-
sive rationales including: the nature of the particular power invoked by
Congress; a determination whether the affected state activity is pro-
tected because it is either traditional or integral; and the balancing of
amorphous national and state interests.88 4 The theory of political ac-
countability substitutes a comprehensive explanation and justification
of national authority. Since there are political checks on Congress'
activity. For example, if only two of 475 airports are privately owned, requirements that airports
install expensive safety equipment fall primarily on the states and their political subdivisions. The
question becomes more clouded if the number of privately owned airports is increased from 2 to
10, 50, or 100. One might also conclude that regulations requiring safety equipment at airports do
not apply primarily to publicly owned airports if similar requirements are imposed on marine and
bus terminals that are predominately operated by the private sector and that are deemed analo-
gous to airports.
882. The FLSA applies to a very large percentage of private enterprises whose employees are
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Seesupra note 66 and accom-
panying text. As of September 1980, over 60 million nonsupervisory employees in the private
sector were covered by the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA. U.S. DETr OF LABOR, EM-
PLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOUR STANDARDS
UNDER F.L.S.A. 40 (1981).
883. National regulations that apply both to the states and a substantial body of private activ-
ity include: (1) the requirement of the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act enacted under the war
power that employers must reinstate former employees called to active military service, see supra
text accompanying notes 150-59; (2) conditions of national grants requiring employers to provide
unemployment compensation coverage, see supra text accompanying notes 186-216; (3) the
prohibitions of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, and the Equal Pay Act that were enacted under the commerce
power and the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments, see supra text accompanying notes
356-82; (4) the regulation of natural gas royalty holders, telephone companies, employers' pension
plans, and securities fraud under the commerce power, see supra text accompanying notes 493-95
& note 497; and (5) the assessment of an annual registration tax on civil aircraft, see supra text
accompanying notes 531-41.
884. See sources cited supra note 883.
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power to regulate private activity that make Congress politically ac-
countable and limit in the aggregate national incursions on the states,
the courts should defer to the political choices of a national majority.
b. Regulations that Apply Primarily or Exclusively to the
States
The chief practical significance of the theory of political accountabil-
ity is that it explains national authority to regulate the states in the
typical situation where the regulation also applies to a substantial body
of private activity. There are, however, some national regulations that
apply exclusively to the states and other regulations that apply primar-
ily to the states although as a formal matter they reach both state and
private activity. If a national regulation applies exclusively or primar-
ily to the states, then the political checks on national authority to regu-
late private activity obviously cannot make Congress politically
accountable or provide vicarious protection for the states. In these cir-
cumstances either another political check is required to ensure account-
ability or there must be an alternative justification of national
authority.
The principal example of national regulations that apply exclusively
to the states are conditions of national grants. These conditions may
regulate the organization and structure of state and local govern-
ments885 and the allocation of political authority either among the
states, their political subdivisions, and private groups or between the
Governor and the legislature.886 Although these conditions require the
states to make substantial changes in the structure of their government
and in their public decisionmaking processes, there is a political check
on Congress' authority under the spending power-the revenues re-
quired for national grants must be raised by taxes levied on the na-
tional electorate.88 7 Thus, even if a condition of a national grant
applies exclusively to the states, Congress is politically accountable be-
cause the national electorate can hold its representatives answerable for
the general level of national taxes and expenditures.8 8 By approving
885. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
886. See supra text accompanying notes 257-305.
887. See supra note 867 and accompanying text.
888. This justification of national authority under the spending power is the converse of the
justification advanced by Professor Tribe. He argues that as long as Congress pays the full costs of
regulations imposed on state government, there is no interference with the states' special role in




or resisting taxes, the national electorate can limit the extent to which
conditions of national grants are used to control the organization of
state government and its decisionmaking process and to establish
spending priorities under matching grants.8 9 In sum, the political
check in the imposition of the costs of national grants on the electorate
in the form of taxes both limits the extent to which conditions of na-
tional grants can be used to control the states and justifies, as a decision
of a national majority, Congress' power to regulate the states through
conditional expenditures.
Since the impact of taxes on the national electorate permits control
only in the aggregate of the use of conditional grants to regulate the
states and the deep national pocketbook provides extensive funds for
conditional grants, it is undoubtedly true that recognition of Congress'
power to attach conditions that apply exclusively to the states may re-
sult in a substantial diminution of state autonomy. Nonetheless, confi-
dence in the national political process is not misplaced; on two
occasions in the last ten years Congress restricted or reduced the condi-
tions attached to national grants. First, during the Nixon Administra-
tion Congress established the Revenue Sharing Program,8 90  which
provides grants to the states on substantially fewer conditions than are
normally imposed in categorical grants.89' Second, near the end of the
first year of the Reagan Administration, Congress converted some cate-
gorical grants to block grants and thereby reduced the conditions ap-
plied to the states.8 92 Moreover, since it is not possible to state criteria
to the extent the costs of national regulations are imposed by Congress on the national electorate,
Congress is politically accountable, and the decision to spend under certain conditions is the prod-
uct of a national majority.
889. Since national revenues increase automatically as the economy grows, national spending
can increase without any increase in the level of taxation. See M. REAGAN, supra note 320, at 39.
Nevertheless, those who are dissatisfied with conditional expenditures can still seek a tax
reduction.
890. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (current
version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1265 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). See generaly Brown, supra note 318;
Stolz, Revenue Sharing-New American Revolution or Trojan Horse, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1973).
891. For an explanation of categorical grants, block grants, and revenue sharing, see supra
note 319.
892. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357; see gener-
all) Herbers, Some States Lagging on Plans to Assume Block Grant Powers, N.Y. Times, Septem-
ber 29, 1981, at 1, col. 1 (national ed.); Herbers, Shft to Block Grant Raising Issue of States'
Compoetence. N.Y. Times, September 27, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (national ed.). One example of the
conversion of categorical grants to block grants and of the reduction of the conditions attached to
national expenditures is the Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services Block Grant.
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for permissible and impermissible conditions that apply exclusively to
the states, 93 it is entirely .appropriate to leave to a national majority the
inevitably ad hoc determination about the extent and nature of condi-
tions that apply exclusively to the states.
This justification of Congress' power to attach to national grants con-
ditions that apply exclusively to the states does not support, however,
national authority to invalidate or preempt state law provisions that
prohibit compliance with these conditions. Conditions that apply ex-
clusively to the states have one effect on state autonomy. To obtain a
grant, the state may be required to change either the structure and or-
ganization of government or the allocation of political authority among
the state and its political subdivisions and private groups and between
the Governor and the legislature. Preemption of state law provisions
that conflict with such conditions has a second, separate effect on the
states-interference with the procedures established under state law for
making the political decision whether to accept or reject a conditional
grant.
Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. IX, subtit. A, Part B, §§ 1911-1920, 95 Stat. 543-52. This new block grant
does not eliminate all conditions on the use of national funds. The grant must be used by the state
for alcohol and drug abuse programs, application plans on which public hearings have been held
must be submitted, certain facilities and treatments must be provided, annual reports are required,
and discrimination among recipients of the nationally funded services is prohibited. Id
§§ 1914(a), 1915(a), (b), (c), 1916(a), 1918. The conditions imposed on the states under the previ-
ous categorical grant were much more extensive however. To obtain a grant, the states were
required to submit a plan for alcohol and drug abuse prevention meeting 13 separate conditions,
including the designation of a particular agency to prepare and administer the plan, a demonstra-
tion of this agency's authority to implement the plan, establishment of an advisory council com-
posed of representatives of private groups and political subdivisions, and provision for
consideration of recommendations by the states' political subdivisions. 21 U.S.C. § 1176(e)(l)-
(13) (1976), repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. IX, subtit. H, § 969(a), 95 Stat. 595.
893. Some commentators have suggested as a criterion a judicially enforceable requirement
that conditions of a grant must be reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure. E.g.,
Stewart, supra note 577, at 1252; Comment, The Federal ConditionalSpending Power. A Searchfor
Limits, 70 Nw. U. L. Rav. 293, 303-09 (1975). With regard to conditions that apply exclusively to
the states, the criterion has two major flaws. First, it would not in itself provide any protection for
the states' interests in controlling the structure and organization of government or the allocation of
political authority within the state. For example, requirements governing the structure and
processes of state agencies may be reasonably related to the efficient expenditure of a grant, and a
condition requiring a role for private groups in state political decisions may be reasonably related
to a purpose of ensuring that the grant is spent to satisfy the needs of those whom Congress
intended to benefit. See supra notes 255 & 264-81 and accompanying text. The second flaw in a
requirement that conditions must be reasonably related to the purpose of an expenditure is the
danger of standardless, ad hoc judicial intervention in the political process. For an example of the
inherent flexibility of a requirement that conditions must be reasonably related to the purposes of
a grant, see Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406-11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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To recall a previous example, 94 a condition providing that the Gov-
ernor must exercise exclusive control over the disbursement of a grant
and the designation of the state agency to implement the'spending pro-
gram may have one distinct impact on the state. If the state constitu-
tion or a state statute requires that such determinations be made by
joint action of the executive and the legislature, then in order to obtain
the grant, the political community of the state by a constitutional
amendment or the legislature and the executive by statutory amend-
ment must expand the Governor's authority to act independently of the
legislature. If the condition also preempts the state constitutional or
statutory provisions requiring joint legislative and executive action and
provides independent gubernatorial authority to make the disburse-
ment and designation decisions, then there is a second effect on the
states. Congress has interfered with the state's political decisionmaking
process by circumventing the state's procedures for a constitutional or
statutory amendment necessary to expand the governor's authority.
Although there is a political check on Congress' power to make con-
ditional expenditures, there is no political check on the invalidation of
state law provisions in conflict with grant conditions that apply exclu-
sively to the states. There is a political check on Congress' power to
attach these conditions to grants because the expenditure is financed by
taxes levied on the national electorate. Even if the necessity of ob-
taining grants leaves the states with no practical choice except to
change state law to comply with grant conditions,895 the political check
means that Congress is politically accountable and that there is some
limit, at least in the aggregate, on conditions that apply exclusively to
the states. This political check, however, only goes as far as the use of
funds levied by national taxes to create pressure on the states to change
state law to comply with the conditions of a grant. If a provision of
state law is invalidated simply because it conflicts with a grant condi-
tion, the invalidation is completely independent of the pressure to ob-
tain the grant and the limitation on Congress' ability to raise the
revenues to create this pressure. In short, the political check on the use
of national tax revenues does not apply to preemption of state law pro-
visions in conflict with the condition of a grant to a state.
In the example above, there is no political check on invalidation of a
894. See supra text accompanying note 332.
895. See supra text accompanying notes 390-96.
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state constitutional or statutory provision requiring disbursement and
designation decisions to be made by joint legislative and executive ac-
tion. Congress then is not politically accountable for interference with
state political decisionmaking procedures that require a constitutional
or statutory amendment to expand gubernatorial powers. When Con-
gress is not politically accountable, there is no basis for judicial defer-
ence to exercises of national authority that intrude on state autonomy.
Thus, the rule followed by most courts that conditions of grants to the
states do not preempt conflicting provisions of state law is correct, and
the only sanction for a state's failure to change its law to permit compli-
ance with a grant condition that applies solely to the state is to withhold
or to cut off the grant. 96
Apart from national grant conditions that apply exclusively to the
states, the only other regulations applicable to the states for which there
are no counterparts applicable to private activity are statutes, like the
Voting Rights Act (VRA), enacted under Congress' powers to enforce
the Civil War Amendments. 897 The justification for national authority
to regulate state and local voting practices with respect to racial dis-
crimination cannot be supplied by the theory of political accountability
because the financial and administrative burden imposed on the na-
tional electorate to enforce the requirements of the VRA are miniscule
in comparison with the impact on the states' interests in controlling
896. See supra note 326 and accompanying text. If a condition of a grant applies to a private
recipient instead of to a state, it is appropriate to give preemptive effect to the condition. Preemp-
tion of a state law provision in conflict with a condition applicable to a private recipient has only
one effect on the states. Preemption displaces the states' rule for private activity with a national
rule, but there is no second effect on the states' political decisionmaking process because the states
do not have to decide whether to accept the grant and to comply with the conditions. Congress is
politically accountable for a condition of a grant that regulates private activity and displaces state
law because there is a political check on the use of national tax revenues to make conditional
expenditures. Thus, in City of Boston ;. Harris, discussed supra at notes 183-84 & 326, a condition
of a grant to a private recipient establishing certain rent levels was correctly held to preempt
conflicting local rent control regulations. The only effect of the condition and preemption of con-
flicting local law is to displace local rent control policy, and there is no additional effect on the
local decisionmaking process. Contra D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL
§ 4.03, at 75-76 (1974) (condition of grant to private person does not preempt state law prohibiting
compliance with the conditions).
897. Seesupra note 349 and accompanying text. Most statutes enacted under Congress' power
to enforce the Civil War Amendments apply to both the states and private activity and not solely
to the states. See supra text accompanying notes 356-82. In addition to regulations enacted under
the Civil War Amendments, other regulations that would probably apply exclusively to the states




their political processes. The justification is found, as the Court has
concluded, in the framers' intent to expand national authority over the
states in regard to racial matters.898 Although the VRA falls easily
within the historical warrant, there is some risk that other statutes en-
acted to enforce the Civil War Amendments may exceed the historical
justification for national intrusions on state autonomy. 99 When his-
tory fails to justify national authority, questions of state autonomy limi-
tations on Congress' powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments
must turn on some theory of individual rights. An individual rights
theory that justifies national authority to intrude on state autonomy is
beyond the scope of this Article, but Pennhurst State School and Hospi-
tal i;. Halderman suggests that the Court may have to reconsider its
seductive "black letter" rule that there are no federalism limits on the
Civil War Amendment powers.9°°
Although there are some grant conditions and a few statutes enacted
under Congress' powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments that ap-
ply exclusively to the states, post-NLC courts have not had an occasion
to consider Congress' authority under other national powers, like the
war, commerce, and tax powers, to impose regulations that apply exclu-
sively or primarily to the states. Identification of such regulations is not
easy because in most cases the rule applied to the states also applies to
private activity. 90' For example, even though the operation of sewage
treatment plants is a function performed almost exclusively by subna-
tional public entities, 90 2 the application of the FLSA minimum wage
and overtime standards to the states and their political subdivisions as
employers in this function is not an example of regulations that apply
exclusively or primarily to the states because these regulations also ap-
ply to a wide range of private employment.9 "3 Other regulations ap-
898. See supra text accompanying notes 343-53.
899. See supra text accompanying notes 397-400 & 418-22.
900. See supra text accompanying notes 418-22.
901. See supra text accompanying notes 883-84 & note 883.
902. There are approximately 15,000 publicly owned treatment works and only a relative
handful of privately financed sewage treatment facilities which serve chiefly small communities
and subdivisions. Telephone interview with James A. Chamblee, Chief of the Priority and Needs
Assessment Branch, Office of Water Program Operations, United States Environmental Protection
Agency (July 9, 1982); see ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIoN AGENCY, 1980 NEEDS SURVEY: COST
ESTIMATES FOR CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLICLY-OWNED WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITIES 19-
27 (FRD-19, 1981) (operations and maintenance costs for publicly owned sewage treatment plants
were $2.8 billion in 1978 and only $48 million for privately owned facilities.)
903. See supra note 880.
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plied to sewage treatment plants, however, might provide examples of
national requirements imposed exclusively or primarily on the states.
A regulation requiring sewage treatment plants to make extensive and
expensive capital improvements in order to control water pollution is a
good hypothetical example of a national rule that applies exclusively or
primarily to the states and their political subdivisions.9°
Congress would not be politically accountable if it enacted a statute
under the commerce power and established a regulation requiring sew-
age treatment plants to install pollution control devices. There are no
political checks because the regulation has little or no impact on private
activity and because the costs imposed on the states or their political
subdivisions to comply with the regulation are entirely disproportion-
ate to the minor financial and administrative burdens imposed on the
national electorate to enforce it. Since there are no political checks,
Congress is not politically accountable, and the decision to regulate
sewage treatment plants is not the product of a national political major-
ity. An alternative, politically accountable means for Congress to
achieve its regulatory goal of pollution control illustrates the reasons
why a regulation requiring sewage treatment authorities to undertake
expensive capital projects is not a decision of a national political major-
ity. Congress could appropriate funds and award grants to cover a high
percentage or the full costs of pollution controls. There would be a
political check on this spending decision because the revenues would
come from taxes levied on the national electorate. If, however, the full
costs of the decision to regulate sewage treatment plant pollution were
imposed on the national electorate, Congress might well reach a differ-
ent decision about the benefits of pollution control.
Since Congress is not politically accountable for this hypothetical
regulation, there is no reason to give a preference to national political
choices over state political choices, and judicial protection of the states'
role as political communities in the federal system is warranted. In a
contest between state and national political choices where the political
checks on Congress are not adequate to guarantee that national policies
are the product of a national majority, there is simply no justification
for national interference with the states' political choices. There is no
904. This hypothetical regulation applies almost exclusively or primarily to the states because
there are very few privately owned sewage treatment plants and because there does not seem to be
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reason to prefer national policy for clean water and to permit interfer-
ence with the states' political decisions about the provision of sewage
treatment plants adequate in their judgment to protect public health
and to accommodate the demands of residential growth.905
905. Professor Stewart argues that Congress' power to require sewage treatment plants, which
are almost exclusively owned and operated by municipalities, to abate water pollution is justified
because water pollution from one state spills over into and affects other states. He finds precedent
for this congressional authority in federal court orders requiring the states and their political sub-
divisions to control interstate pollution created by inadequate sewage treatment facilities. In
short, he argues that it is unfair for state X to impose the costs of its pollution on a sister state Y
and that because federal courts have exercised the authority to compel state X to abate pollution,
Congress has similar authority. Stewart, supra note 577, at 1226-30, 1237-38.
Stewart's spillover theory as a justification of Congress' power to impose regulations that fall
primarily on the states and their political subdivisions is at bottom an argument that Congress can
legislate in a politically nonaccountable fashion because the courts have acted in this fashion. In a
suit brought by state Y seeking relief under a judicially created federal common law rule of nui-
sance for the costs of pollution attributable to the operation of sewage treatment plants in state X,
a federal court could, at least in the absence of an applicable national statute, require state X and
its political subdivisions to make expensive improvements in their sewage treatment facilities in
order to abate the pollution of interstate waters. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (fed-
eral common law cause of action for interstate pollution created by sewage treatment facilities is
displaced by comprehensive national regulation under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
amendments of 1972). See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); New Jersey v.
City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925);
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). The courts, of course, can reach similar results in a suit
by state X against Y or in a suit by state Z against X and Y. The courts, however, are not
politically accountable for the determination to impose the costs of pollution abatement on the
states and their political subdivisions as owners of sewage treatment plants. See Monaghan, Fore-
word: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1975) ("when a federal court an-
nounces a federal rule of decision in an area of plenary congressional competence, it exercises an
initiative normally left to Congress, ousts state law, and yet acts without the political checks cre-
ated by state representation in Congress"). In the absence of political accountability, the net result
of a series of lawsuits seeking relief from the pollution of interstate waters may be at odds with the
results that would obtain under majority rule. Although the citizens of state Y would probably
applaud the results of a case imposing liability for pollution on X, they are less likely to be pleased
with the result of subsequent suits imposing on them the costs of abating interstate water pollution
caused by sewage treatment plants in state Y. Thus, it might well be true that no political majority
in states X, Y, or Z would favor restrictions on pollution causing activities in neighboring states if
they were also forced to bear the costs of the spillover caused by sewage treatment plants in their
states.
Although Stewart recognizes that Congress is a more appropriate institution for the resolution
of interstate pollution issues than the courts because it provides a national forum for comprehen-
sive consideration of multistate problems, he fails to recognize that Congress has a second institu-
tional advantage over the courts. Congress, unlike the courts, can act in a politically accountable
fashion. Congress is politically accountable for a decision requiring sewage treatment plants to
abate water pollution if it appropriates the funds for the necessary capital improvements. There is
a political check on this policy decision because the revenues to support the expenditure are ob-
tained from taxes levied on the national electorate, and it is, then, fair to say that the decision to
reduce the pollutants emitted by sewage treatment plants is the product of a national majority.
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The states' political decisions about the operation of sewage treat-
ment plants do not merit protection from national authority because
the impact of national controls is particularly devastating, or because
the states' functions are traditional or integral, or because the states'
interests are more important than national interests in controlling water
pollution. It is not any particular state political decision that merits
protection; rather it is the states' role as political communities with the
capacity to make political decisions that merits protection. Recognition
of national authority to displace state political choices in the absence of
political accountability would threaten unlimited national control of
the states' capacity to make political decisions.
As important as it may be to recognize that the theory of political
accountability restricts Congress' authority under the commerce
power 90 6 to impose regulations that apply exclusively or primarily to
the states, it is even more important that Congress has, on the whole,
acted in a politically accountable fashion rather than imposing such
Congress would not be politically accountable for the same decision if it simply enacted a statute
under the commerce power requiring sewage treatment plants, which are predominately publicly
owned, to meet national clean water standards. In this instance there are no political checks on
the exercise of national authority because the regulation has little impact on private activity and
because the national electorate does not bear the financial burdens of pollution abatement. Nev-
ertheless, because such a statute would be analogous to a court order under the federal common
law of nuisance requiring the states or their political subdivisions to abate pollution, Stewart ar-
gues that it is a valid exercise of national authority.
His argument stands the theory of democratic political decisionmaking on its head. It invokes
the authority of one branch of government-the judiciary-that is not and cannot be politically
accountable to justify nonaccountable actions by another branch-the legislature-that can act in
a politically accountable fashion. It is one thing to tolerate federal court power to fashion federal
common law as a "necessary expedient" in the absence of congressional action and as an excep-
tion to the legislature's fundamental responsibility to determine social policy; it is quite another
thing to invoke this expedient as a general warrant for Congress to legislate in a politically nonac-
countable fashion. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,314 (1981) ("Federal common law is a
'necessary expedient,' . . . and when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a
decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by
federal courts disappears.").
906. The theory of political accountability also limits Congress' power to levy taxes. Since
there are no political checks on Congress' power to levy taxes applying exclusively or primarily to
the states, such taxes are not valid exercises of national authority. Consider, for example, a na-
tional tax on the operation of sewage treatment plants. Neither of the two political checks on
national authority applies to this tax. There is no impact on a substantial body of private activity
because almost all sewage treatment plants are owned by the states and their political subdivi-
sions; thus, the effects of the tax on private activity cannot provide any vicarious protection for the
states' interests. The second political check, the imposition on the national electorate of the
financial and administrative costs of enforcing national political decisions, is also ineffective.
Whatever financial and administrative burdens are imposed on the national electorate to enforce
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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controls on the states. For example, under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972,97 Congress established a program
to control water pollution created by sewage treatment plants.90 8 In-
stead of requiring the public authorities that own these facilities to
make expensive improvements in order to comply with national clean
water standards, Congress made grants to cover up to seventy-five per-
these taxes, they are more than offset by the revenue generated and the incentive to raise revenue
without imposing any tax directly on the national electorate.
Although taxes that apply exclusively or primarily to the states are not valid, no examples of
such taxes have been discovered. Most national taxes that apply to the states also apply to private
activity. Since the imposition of a tax on the national electorate is a political check on national
authority that makes Congress politically accountable, national taxes that apply both to a substan-
tial body of private activity and to the states are valid. For example, an annual registration tax on
civil aircraft is valid as applied to a state-owned helicopter used for police functions because the
tax also applies to privately owned civil aircraft. See supra text accompanying notes 531-41.
This justification of national authority to levy taxes that apply to the states is broader than the
nondiscrimination principle advanced by both Justice Frankfurter and Chief Justice Stone in their
opinions in New York . United States upholding a national tax on the sale of mineral water. See
supra text accompanying notes 518-27. Both Justices generally agreed that a national tax applying
alike to state and private activity is valid because it is nondiscriminatory, but they each added
significant qualifications. Justice Frankfurter said that a national tax could not be levied on a
statehouse or a state tax revenue, and Chief Justice Stone stated that a national tax could not be
applied to "the State's capitol, its State-house, its public school houses, public parks, or revenues
from its taxes or school lands." See supra text accompanying note 520 & note 524. Under the
theory of political accountability, all of these hypothetical national taxes, except a tax on state tax
revenues, might be valid even if symbolically ill-advised. Apart from administrative difficulties,
see supra note 42, a national property tax would be valid as applied to a statehouse so long as it
also applied to private property with the same assessed valuation. There is simply no practical
danger that this tax would interfere with the operation of state government because the applica-
tion to private property would limit the tax rate. Cf Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp.
1359, 1368 (D. Conn. 1982) (requirement that Indian land grants be made with consent of national
government applies to state "only in its capacity as a landowner, not as a sovereign government").
In contrast, a national tax levied on state tax revenues would be invalid under the theory of
political accountability because there are no political checks on taxes that apply exclusively to the
states, and only governments can levy taxes.
It perhaps bears emphasis that national power to tax state revenues is limited not because the
national tax affects the states' revenue raising function but because Congress is not politically
accountable for taxes that apply exclusively to the states. Thus, some national taxes on state
revenue raising functions may be valid. About one-quarter of the states operate lotteries to raise
revenues, and apparently there are no longer any lotteries operated by private enterprise. See
supra note 874. A national tax on the profits of state-run lotteries would nonetheless be valid,
even if set at a destructive rate, if it also applied to other forms of legalized gambling like horse
and dog race tracks, casinos, jai alai, and sports betting operated predominately by the private
sector. The application of the tax to state-run gambling and to private gambling operations would
ensure that the decision to destroy gambling activity is a decision of a national political majority.
907. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1378 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
908. Id §§ 1281-1297 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amendedby Municipal Wastewater Treatment
Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623-30.
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cent of the costs of compliance. 90 9 National regulations that fall exclu-
sively or primarily on the states are as yet hypothetical, and the need
for judicial protection of the states in these circumstances is also hypo-
thetical as long as Congress continues to act in a politically accountable
fashion. 910
c. United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road
United Transportation Union9 t t provided the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to undo the confusion sown by its decision in NLC and to
begin an elaboration of a principled theory of state autonomy limita-
tions on national political authority. The issue in this case was whether
the authorization in the national Railway Labor Act (RLA) of strikes
by employees of a state-owned commuter railroad after the exhaustion
of dispute resolution procedures was an unconstitutional intrusion on
909. Id § 1282(a) (Supp. IV 1980); see Stewart, supra note 577, at 1238. The amount of na-
tional grants will be reduced to 55% of the costs of construction after Oct. 1, 1984. Municipal
Wastewater Treatment Construction Grants Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, §§ 7, 8(a),
(b), 95 Stat. 1625. One court has held that municipalities can be compelled, regardless whether
they receive national financial assistance, to comply with the national water pollution standards
for sewage treatment plants established under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972. State Water Pollution Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977). This
court, however, did not consider the question of Congress' power to impose a regulation that
applies primarily to the state or local governments, and in practice the EPA has not required
municipally owned sewage treatment plants to comply with national water pollution standards
except as a consequence of receipt of national funds. See Huneiker, The Clean Water Act of
1977-Modcaions of the Muniial Program, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1977);
James, The Municinal Program of the Clean Water Act: 1978 Administrative Imp/erentation, 3
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 326, 327-28 (1979).
910. All but two of the 475 airports in this country are publicly owned. See supra note 880. If
Congress wanted to improve airport safety and traffic capacity, it could achieve these goals in
either a politically nonaccountable or a politically accountable fashion. On the one hand, Con-
gress would be acting in a politically nonaccountable fashion if it imposed requirements on air-
ports to install safety devices and to expand runway capacity. There are no political checks on
such requirements because they apply to only two privately owned airports and because the costs
of making the required improvements is entirely disproportionate to the minor costs imposed on
the national elecorate of enforcing the requirements. On the other hand, Congress would be act-
ing in a politically accountable fashion if it were to appropriate funds to cover the costs of airport
improvements. The national electorate would then bear the costs in the form of taxes. As in the
case of regulation of sewage treatment plant pollution, see supra text accompanying note 909,
Congress has in fact acted in a politically accountable fashion. Congress has appropriated funds
to cover most of the costs of capital improvements at airports necessary to achieve national safety
and traffic capacity goals. Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, § 2,
84 Stat. 219 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1743 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The national
share of project costs ranges from 75% to 90%. Id § 1717(a).
911. 102 S.Ct. 1349 (1982). This case is discussed suspra at notes 498-511.
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state autonomy because it interfered with state policy prohibiting
strikes by public employees. Under the theory of political accountabil-
ity, this issue is easily resolved.
As in any case of a national regulation that applies to the states, the
initial inquiry is whether the regulation applies both to the states and a
substantial body of private activity or whether it applies exclusively or
primarily to the states. Here, the RLA applies to a substantial body of
private activity, and the states as employers are not singled out for spe-
cial treatment. There is a political check on Congress' power to pre-
scribe rules governing the states' bargaining relationships with their
railroad employees because the RLA applies to forty major and several
hundred small, private interstate railroads with approximately 450,000
employees. 91 2
Given this broad application of the RLA to the private railroads,
Congress is politically accountable for its labor policies, and the states'
interests in operating railroads are vicariously protected by the impact
of the national rules on private activity.9" 3 There is no practical danger
that the states' ability to operate railroads and to provide the benefits of
912. See AssoC IxioN OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, YEARBOOK OF RAILROAD FACTS 2, 57-58
(1981). The RLA also applies to the airline industry and an additional 300,000 employees. 45
U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1976). See NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, FORTY-SIXTH ANN. REP. 6 (1980).
For a similar argument that the RLA is constitutionally valid as applied to a state-owned railroad
because Congress is politically accountable, see Comment, Redefning the National League of Ci-
ties State Sovereignt) Doctrine, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1460, 1475-83 (1981).
It might be objected that the political check on Congress' power to control a state's bargaining
relationship with its railroad employees founds on an inapt analogy between freight and passenger
railroads. See supra note 881. If the operation of a passenger rail service and a freight rail system
are distinct activities, then the mere application of the RLA to a large number of private railroad
employees would not provide any vicarious protection for a state's interest in operating a passen-
ger rail service because most rail carriers subject to the RLA are freight railroads. See YEARBOOK
OF RAILROAD FACTS, supra, at 29, 31. Indeed, if the relevant analogy to the LIRR is either pas-
senger transit systems generally or perhaps only other commuter railroads, then there is little or no
political check in the application of the RLA and other national labor laws to private activity. As
of 1980, 94% of all transit systems (motor bus, heavy or light rail, and trolley coach) were publicly
owned, and "all commuter railroads are... either publicly owned or receive financial support
from public agencies." AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASS'N, TRANSIT FACT BOOK 13, 18,43 (Table
3) (1981 ed.).
913. The argument here that Congress has the authority to regulate the states' bargaining rela-
tionship with its railroad employees because the same regulations apply to private employers
would also support Congress' power to provide collective bargaining rights for most state govern-
ment employees similar to the collective bargaining rights of private employees under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. See supra note 22. But cf. United Steelworkers v. University of
Alabama, 430 F. Supp. 996, 998 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (NLC would preclude application of NLRA
to state employees).
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rail service will be frustrated by the RLA. At bottom, the case required
the Court to choose between two different social policies designed to
achieve the same end of uninterrupted rail service. The state's political
decision is that the appropriate policy is a prohibition of strikes; the
national political decision is that self-help after dispute resolution pro-
cedures is the appropriate policy. Since Congress is politically account-
able and the RLA is the product of a national majority, the Court held
correctly that the RLA is valid as applied to a state-owned railroad
whose operations affect interstate commerce.
In United Transportation Union the Court reached the right result for
the wrong reason. The Court held that a state-owned railroad was sub-
ject to national regulation because the operation of a railroad is not a
traditional state function.914 This holding reaffirms the basic point of
NLC that Congress' power to regulate the states is limited by federal-
ism principles, but it also perpetuates the problems created by NLC.
The Court has not provided any principled criteria for identifying state
functions immune from national control, and it has left open the possi-
bility that national authority to regulate the states will be determined
by an, as yet, indeterminate balancing of state and national interests.91'
In short, the Court has neither provided any justification for its holding
in NLC that Congress cannot regulate a state in its capacity as an em-
ployer by setting minimum wage and maximum hour standards for
most of their employees nor stated any principled basis for reconciling
this holding with its holding in United Transportation Union that Con-
gress can regulate a state in its capacity as an employer by authorizing
the employees of a state-owned railroad to strike.
Although the Court has not justified the power asserted in NLC to
set aside national political decisions affecting the states and has not
stated any reasoned criteria for the exercise of this power, the theory of
political accountability provides a principled, comprehensive, and judi-
cially manageable standard for resolving questions of national author-
ity to regulate the states. In the case of most national regulations
applicable to the states, Congress has applied the same rule both to the
states and to a substantial body of private activity. Since there is a
political check in the regulation of private activity and Congress is po-
litically accountable, such exercises of national authority are valid, and
914. Seesupra text accompanying notes 505-07 & 510.




claims of interference with state autonomy should be rejected.916 There
are also some national regulations-the conditions of national grants
and statutes enacted to enforce the Civil War Amendments-that apply
exclusively or primarily to the states. With respect to grant conditions,
Congress is politically accountable because the expenditure is sup-
ported by taxes levied on the national electorate,917 and history pro-
vides a warrant for national authority under the Civil War
Amendments over the states at least with respect to racial matters. 918
The only potential difficulty in the application of the theory of polit-
ical accountability to national regulation or taxation of the states is the
determination whether the regulation applies exclusively or primarily
to the states or whether it applies both to the states and a substantial
body of private activity.919 The absence of any fixed criteria for deter-
mining whether the impact of a national regulation on private activity
is sufficient to constitute a political check on national authority and to
provide vicarious protection for the states is not an important problem
in practice because most national regulations apply clearly either to
state and private activity or exclusively to the states. Although a court
may err on occasion in determining the actual incidence of a national
regulation, the important point is to insist on some mechanism of polit-
ical accountability, whether it be the effect of a national regulation on
private activity or the financial check inherent in the national electo-
rate's assumption of the costs of a state's compliance. Reliance on the
political accountability of Congress as the justification of national au-
thority and on the absence of political accountability as the justification
for judicial protection of the states' role as political communities will
ensure that decisions about the allocation of political authority between
the nation and the states in our federal system are made by the electo-
rate as the framers intended.
916. See supra text accompanying notes 877-84. If a regulation established under the com-
merce power applied exclusively or primarily to the states, the political checks of the national
political process would not make Congress politically accountable. Judicial intervention to pro-
tect the states would then be warranted. See supra text accompanying notes 901-10.
917. See supra text accompanying notes 885-96.
918. See supra text accompanying notes 897-900.
919. See supra note 881 and accompanying text.
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3. Political Accountability and Congress' Power to Require the
Affirmative Exercise of State Authority Over Private
Activity
The theory of political accountability explains and limits Congress'
power to employ the states as the nation's agents as well as Congress'
power to regulate private activity and to regulate the states. Congress
uses a variety of mechanisms to provide for state administration and
enforcement of national policies for private activity. Under the spend-
ing power, Congress makes grants both to private recipients920 and to
the states92 on conditions requiring the states to enforce national regu-
latory standards and to administer national social welfare programs.
Under the commerce power, Congress often delegates national author-
ity to state officers, agencies, and political subdivisions and supple-
ments their state law authority to regulate private activity.922 Congress
may also threaten to regulate private activity directly unless the states
agree to implement national regulatory programs. 923 To ensure state
cooperation, Congress frequently combines these mechanisms, 924 and
on a few occasions Congress has mandated state enforcement of na-
tional regulatory policies.925 Since the administration and enforcement
of national policy requires the affirmative exercise of state authority
over private activity, Congress' use of the states as its agents to imple-
ment national policy has a significant, distinct effect on state autonomy.
The states must allocate legislative, executive, judicial, and financial
resources to the effectuation of national policies and to the satisfaction
of national political demands at the expense of the implementation of
state policies and the fulfillment of the demands of the political com-
munity in each state.
Notwithstanding this impact on state autonomy, Congress has the
power to employ the states as its agents to the extent that the political
920. See supra text accompanying notes 186-97 & 217-46.
921. See supra text accompanying notes 306-22.
922. See supra text accompanying notes 544 & 705-13.
923. See supra text accompanying notes 545 & 559-80.
924. See supra text accompanying notes 570-75 & 693-704.
925. Most of the provisions mandating state enforcement of national regulations have been
enacted under the commerce power. Seesupra text accompanying notes 547-48 & 581-691. Con-
gress may also have exercised its defense powers to mandate state enforcement of national regula-
tions. See supra text accompanying notes 160-75. The Court has noted the possibility that
Congress might exercise its power to enforce the fourteenth amendment by requiring the states to




checks of the national political process guarantee political accountabil-
ity and protect the states' interests in controlling the allocation of their
governmental and financial resources. These political checks are the
application of national policy to private activity and the assumption by
the national electorate of the financial and administrative costs of en-
forcing national policies. The application of a nationally determined
substantive policy to private activity does make Congress accountable
for the policy itself and justifies national authority to diminish state
autonomy by displacing state rules for the same activity. This political
check, however, does not apply to the separate national political deci-
sion to employ the states to administer and enforce the substantive pol-
icy. Consider, for example, the provision for state administration of the
national environmental standards of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act.926 The application of these standards to the surface
mining industry makes Congress accountable for the particular regula-
tions, but the mere application of the SMCRA regulations to private
activity does not check Congress' power to provide for state administra-
tion and enforcement. In fact, the affected private interests, far from
providing vicarious protection for the states' interests in controlling the
allocation of state governmental and financial resources, may prefer
state administration over national administration on the entirely plau-
sible ground that state officials would be more sympathetic to the
problems of local industry. Since the impact on private interests does
not check national political decisions to employ the states as the na-
tion's agents, accountability must be a function of the second political
check-the imposition on the national electorate of the financial and
administrative costs of enforcing national policies.
a. Congress' Power to Employ the States as the Nation's
Agents: Grant Conditions and the Threat of Direct
National Regulation of Private Activity
The political check in the imposition on the national electorate of the
financial and administrative costs of enforcing national policies makes
Congress politically accountable for two of the mechanisms that it uses
to provide for state administration and enforcement of national policy.
When a grant, either to a private recipient or a state, is made on a
condition that the state exercise affirmative authority by regulating pri-
926. The SMCRA is discussed supra at notes 559-63.
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vate activity under national standards or by distributing social welfare
benefits, Congress is politically accountable because the expenditure of
national tax revenues limits the extent to which the states can be em-
ployed as the nation's agents. If Congress appropriates insufficient
funds to cover the states' financial and administrative costs, the states
will refuse to implement the national program. 927 Thus, conditions of
national grants to private recipients requiring the states to administer
unemployment compensation programs928 and to regulate land use
under national flood prevention and control standards, 929 and condi-
tions of national grants to the states requiring both state matching
funds and distribution of welfare benefits under national standards,930
are valid exercises of national authority. It may, of course, be argued
that the deep national pocketbook permits extensive national control
over the use of state governmental and financial resources to imple-
ment national policies. The answer is simply that the assumption about
the proper allocation of power in the federal system underlying the ar-
gument is not the choice of the national political majority. By reducing
national taxes and expenditures or by changing categorical grants to
block grants or revenue sharing, the extent to which grant conditions
are used to employ the states as the nation's agents can be reduced.93'
Congress is also politically accountable when it provides for state
regulation of private activity under national standards by threatening
to impose direct national regulation if the states fail to implement the
national regulatory program. Although no financial or administrative
costs are imposed on the national electorate if the states enforce the
national policies, a political check exists because the full costs of en-
forcement of the national standards governing private activity are po-
tentially imposed on the national electorate. If the threat of a national
takeover of the regulation of private activity is ineffective, the national
government must enforce directly its own regulatory program. Thus,
the Court reached the correct result in Hodel in approving the provi-
sion in the SMCRA for state administration and enforcement of na-
927. For example, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the Court insisted
that a condition of a grant requiring the states to make substantial expenditures must be stated
clearly so that the state can make a rational decision whether the costs of compliance with grant
conditions outweigh the benefits of national financial aid. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
928. See supra text accompanying notes 186-97.
929. See supra text accompanying notes 217-46.
930. See supra text accompanying notes 306-22.




tional environmental standards for surface mining under the threat of
direct national regulation if the states fail to implement the national
regulatory program.93z The result, however, is not correct on the basis
of the Court's reasoning that the SMCRA establishes a program of co-
operative federalism that allows the states to implement their own sur-
face mining regulations.933 Congress intended that the states would
serve as the nation's agents in enforcing national environmental stan-
dards; Congress designed the SMCRA to require the states to exercise
affirmative authority over private activity.9 34 Congress' power to em-
ploy the states as its agents under the threat of direct national regula-
tion is valid because there is a political check in the potential
assumption by the national electorate of the full financial and adminis-
trative costs of enforcing nationally determined regulatory policies.935
This political check makes Congress politically accountable for the de-
cision to employ the states as national agents and limits the extent to
which national authority can be exercised to require the states to allo-
cate their governmental and financial resources to the satisfaction of
national political priorities.
If one assumes that the Court's interpretation of Titles I and III of
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act is correct and that Congress
did not impose a duty on state agencies to implement national poli-
cies, 936 then the Court in FERC was correct in drawing an analogy9
3 7
to Hodel and in upholding the provision for state implementation of
national regulatory policies for electric and natural gas utilities. In
terms of Congress' political accountability, there is only one significant
difference between the provisions for state implementation of national
regulations upheld in Hodel and the means employed by Congress in
Titles I and III of the PURPA to use the states as the nation's agents.
Under the SMCRA, if the states fail to administer and enforce national
environmental standards for surface mining, direct national regulation
932. See supra text accompanying notes 559-80.
933. See supra text accompanying notes 566-69.
934. See supra text accompanying notes 574-77.
935. In addition to the threat of direct national regulation, Congress also makes grants to the
states on the condition that they administer and enforce the SMCRA. See supra text accompany-
mtg notes 570-71. This mechanism of obtaining state cooperation in enforcing national regulatory
programs is also valid. See supra text accompanying notes 927-3 1.
936. See supra text accompanying notes 615-23 & 655-64. The statute is best interpreted as
imposing a duty on state agencies to implement national law. Id For an argument that the
PURPA so interpreted is invalid, see infra text accompanying notes 989-92.
937. See supra text accompanying notes 666-67.
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is imposed. Congress is politically accountable because the national
electorate will bear the financial and administrative costs of enforcing
the national regulations if the states refuse to act. As the Court con-
strued Titles I and III, if the states fail to consider the adoption of
twelve national standards for electric utilities or two national standards
for natural gas utilities, all state regulation of one type of private activ-
ity-the operation of utilities-is prohibited. 938 Since the means em-
ployed by Congress to obtain state implementation of national
regulations is a threat of prohibiting all state regulation of a particular
private activity rather than a threat of displacing state regulation with
direct national regulation, the political check on Congress' power to use
the states as its agents is not as strong.
If Congress prohibits state regulation of private activity and does not
provide for a national regulation to fill the regulatory void, then no
administrative and financial costs are imposed on the national electo-
rate because there is no national rule directly applicable to private ac-
tivity that must be enforced. Nonetheless, just as Congress is politically
accountable for statutes establishing rules for private activity by
prohibiting state regulation, 93 9 it is also politically accountable when it
provides for state enforcement of national policies under a threat of
prohibiting all state control of private activity. Congress is politically
accountable for statutes prohibiting states from enforcing "no right
turn on red" laws and for statutes prohibiting the states from issuing
motor vehicle registrations for vehicles that have not complied with na-
tional air pollution control requirements. In both cases there is a po-
tential cost to the national electorate of ousting state regulation of
private activity without providing for the administration and enforce-
ment of national law as a substitute.940 Similarly, in the PURPA, as
construed by the Court, Congress is politically accountable for its rule
prohibiting all state utility regulation as a means of providing for state
implementation of national regulatory policies. Individuals who are
subject to unbridled rate increases by utilities freed from all state regu-
latory constraints would probably demand the establishment of a pro-
gram to regulate electric and natural gas utilities. The costs of such a
program would fall on the national electorate. Thus, there is a poten-
tial check on Congress' power because a national prohibition of state
938. See supra text accompanying notes 655-59.
939. See supra text accompanying notes 482-88 & 858-63.




regulation creates political pressure for substitute national regulations
that entail the imposition of financial and administrative burdens on
the national electorate.
Grant conditions and the threat of direct national regulation of pri-
vate activity are the principal mechanisms employed by Congress to
provide for state administration and enforcement of national regula-
tory and social welfare programs. Since there is a political check on
these exercises of national authority in the actual or potential imposi-
tion on the national electorate of the costs of administering and enforc-
ing national policies, Congress is politically accountable and these two
means of employing the states as the nation's agents are valid. Two
other mechanisms of obtaining state cooperation in the enforcement of
national law are not valid, however, because Congress is not politically
accountable. There are no political checks on Congress' power to pro-
vide for state implementation of national policies either (1) by delegat-
ing national authority to state officers, agencies, or political
subdivisions and supplementing their authority to act in excess of or
contrary to state law or (2) by mandating state enforcement of national
law.
b. Congress' Power to Delegate National Authority and to
Supplement State Law
From the earliest days of our Republic, Congress has provided for
state cooperation in the administration and enforcement of national
law by delegating national authority to the states. 94 1 Today, provisions
authorizing state enforcement of national laws are legion, and the na-
tional government relies heavily on state officers to implement national
regulations. 942 National statutes, for example, provide for the delega-
tion of authority to the states to regulate the use of certain low-level
941. See infra text accompanying notes 993-1032.
942. Delegation of national authority to the states is very similar to provision for state admin-
istration and enforcement of national regulations by threat of direct national enforcement if the
states fail to implement a national regulatory program. Indeed, no clear distinction between these
two means of employing the states as the nation's agents can be made. In both cases, the states
undertake enforcement of national regulations of private activity with the understanding that
otherwise the national government itself will regulate private activity directly. Nonetheless, there
is a significant, subtle distinction. On the one hand, Congress may establish a complete national
regulatory apparatus and also provide that the authority to regulate may be delegated to the states.
On the other hand, Congress may carefully structure the incentives for the states to assume the
responsibility for enforcing national regulation with a stated intent to avoid national enforcement.
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radioactive materials that would otherwise be controlled by the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission, 943 to issue permits for the discharge of
pollutants into the nation's waters that would otherwise be issued by
the Environmental Protection Agency, 9 " and to enforce treaty provi-
sions governing salmon fishing.945 The mere delegation of national au-
thority to the states normally does not raise any question of national
interference with state autonomy because Congress is, in effect, pre-
serving state authority to regulate private activity that it could other-
wise preempt. Indeed, delegation of authority to the states to enforce
national law is so well-accepted as a means of providing for state coop-
eration that it is little noted and rarely challenged.
The delegation of national authority may, nevertheless, raise a signif-
icant question of national intrusion on state autonomy if Congress pur-
ports to authorize its delegate to act in excess of or contrary to its state
law powers by supplementing the state law authority of state officers,
943. Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) may enter cooperative agreements with the states and authorize
state regulation of certain radioactive materials for the purpose of protecting public health and
safety. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 10 C.F.R. § 150 (1982); see Murphy & La Pierre,
s.upra note 55, at 398400. As of September 1981, the NRC had delegated regulatory authority to
26 states. NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 1 19,001.
944. Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the EPA has the
authority to establish effluent limitations on pollutant discharges into the nation's waters and to
issue permits for the discharge of any pollutant. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342(a) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), amended by Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-117, §§ 21-22, 95 Stat. 1631. The EPA may authorize the states to issue these
permits, and as of 1980, 31 states had assumed this responsibility. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980); COMPTROLLER GENERAL, FEDERAL-STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS-THE
STATE PERSPECTIVE 5 (1980).
945. The Sockeye or Pink Salmon Fishing Act of 1947, which was enacted to enforce a con-
vention between the United States and Canada, provides for the preservation of certain salmon
fisheries. 16 U.S.C. §§ 776-776f (1976). The Act provides that officers and employees of the State
of Washington may be authorized to enforce the convention, the Act, and regulations promul-
gated by an international commission and that these state officers and employees may function as
national law enforcement officers with national authority to make arrests and to conduct searches
and seizures. 16 U.S.C. § 776d(b), (d) (1976). The State of Washington initially enacted a statute
authorizing its Department of Fisheries to accept the delegated national authority and to enforce
the regulations of the international commission. When the state supreme court subsequently held
that the state agency did not have state law authority to enforce a regulation of the international
commission that had been modified by a federal district court order, the national government
assumed responsibility for enforcement and did not attempt to compel continued state enforce-
ment. Purse Seine Vessel Owners' Ass'n. v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d 799, 567 P.2d 205 (1977) (en bane).
See United States v. Washington, Dep't of Fisheries, 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978), a 'dsub nor,




agencies, or political subdivisions.946 In this circumstance, the delega-
tion of national authority alters the state's political decision about the
limits of the authority of its officers, agencies, or political subdivisions,
and it may also interfere with the state's control over its governmental
and financial resources. If the delegate exercises the supplemental au-
thority conferred by national law, the state's resources embodied in its
officers, agencies, and political subdivisions will be diverted from the
implementation of state policies to the administration and enforcement
of national regulations. This reallocation of state governmental re-
sources from the satisfaction of state policy to the fulfillment of na-
tional policy may be contrary to the decision that the state political
community would make if it had the opportunity to determine whether
the state law authority of its officers, agencies, or political subdivisions
should be expanded or altered.
Delegations of national authority that supplement state law and pur-
port to empower state officers, agencies, or political subdivisions to act
solely on the basis of the delegated national power and in excess of or
contrary to their state law authority are rare. In almost all cases in
which Congress provides for the delegation of national authority to the
states, an explicit condition of the delegation is a demonstration that
the delegate has adequate authority under state law to carry out the
delegated national regulatory powers. For example, the delegations of
national authority to the states to regulate radioactive materials and to
issue pollution discharge permits both require the states to demonstrate
adequate authority under state law to execute the national regulatory
powers.947 Similarly, the state of Washington accepted the delegation
946. If Congress delegates authority to enforce national regulations to a state as opposed to a
particular state officer, agency, or political subdivision, questions of national authority to supple-
ment state law will not normally arise because the states have broad, inherent regulatory powers.
Nevertheless, a problem of supplementing state law would arise if the delegated national authority
purported to empower state government to act in excess of or contrary to a state constitutional
restriction. Consider an example derived from the conditional grant at issue in North Carolina ex.
rel Morrow ;,. Calfano that required the states to regulate the construction of privately owned
hospitals under a certificate of need (CON) program. See supra text accompanying notes 306-12.
Since the state constitution as interpreted by the state's supreme court prohibited this type of
regulation, delegation of national authority to the state to administer and enforce a CON program
would expand the state's powers beyond the limits set by the state political community in its
constitution.
947. In the case of delegation of national authority to regulate certain radioactive materials,
the statute requires that the Governor must certify that the state has an adequate regulatory pro-
gram, and agreements between the NRC and the states recite the Governor's state law authority to
assume responsibility for enforcing the national regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(1) (1976); Nu-
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of national authority to enforce treaty provisions governing salmon
fishing by enacting a statute empowering a state agency to exercise
these delegated enforcement powers.948
The distinction between a simple delegation of national authority
and a delegation of national authority that supplements state law may
be illustrated by section 402 of the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978. 949 This statute empowers the Secretary of the Department
of Energy to delegate authority to state agencies to regulate the sale of
natural gas by natural gas companies for use in outdoor lighting
fixtures. If the state agency has existing authority under state law to
regulate natural gas companies in this fashion, then the delegation of
national authority has no effect on the allocation of political authority
by a state to its agencies. It preserves the authority of the state agency
to regulate natural gas companies, and at most the effect of the delega-
tion is to direct the state agency's regulatory resources to control the use
of natural gas in outdoor lights at the expense of other state law poli-
cies. If the state prohibits its agency from exercising the delegated au-
thority after the agency has decided to regulate the use of natural gas in
outdoor lights, or if existing state law either does not authorize or spe-
cifically prohibits the state agency from controlling the use of natural
gas in outdoor lights, then the delegation of national authority supple-
ments and expands the political power of the state agency. Recognition
of Congress' power to supplement an agency's powers would permit
Congress to alter the state's political decision about the extent of its
agency's powers and to divert the state's administrative and financial
resources (the agency) from implementation of state regulatory policies
to the enforcement of national regulatory policies.950
CLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 19,001. Delegation of national authority to issue pollution discharge
permits requires a demonstration that state law provides adequate authority to carry out the na-
tional regulations for issuance of permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
948. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 75.40.060 (1962).
949. See supra text accompanying notes 705-09. For a brief discussion of Congress' power
under the Clean Air Act to delegate national authority to a state agency and to supplement the
agency's state law authority, see Luneburg, supra note 577, at 421-25 & n.150.
950. Congress' power to delegate national authority to state agencies to regulate the sale of
natural gas by private utilities for use in outdoor lights has been challenged. See supra text ac-
companying notes 710-13. Unfortunately, the petitioners in this case missed the crucial question
of Congress' power to supplement the state law authority of state agencies and argued simply that
Congress cannot delegate national authority to state agencies. The petitioners asserted that the
state agencies were acting solely on the basis of national authority, but there was no demonstra-
tion that any state agency otherwise lacked the power under state law to regulate the use of natural




There are no political checks on Congress' power to delegate na-
tional authority and to supplement state law. The delegation of na-
tional authority alone has no impact on private activity, and there are
no administrative or financial costs imposed on the national electorate.
In fact, national authority is delegated to the states precisely for the
purpose of avoiding the costs of enforcing national policies; to the ex-
tent that the states exercise the delegated authority, the nation is spared
administrative and enforcement costs. The absence of a political check
on the mere delegation of national authority raises no problem because
there is no interference with state autonomy. The absence of any polit-
ical check, however, does mean that Congress is not politically account-
able for the decision to augment the state law authority of state officers,
agencies, or political subdivisions. In the absence of accountability,
Congress' power to supplement state law is not valid.95' This conclu-
sion that national authority is limited will not work any serious embar-
rassment to state cooperation in the administration and enforcement of
national regulations because a state is always free to amend its law to
Company, and American Gas Association at 4-11, 19, Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Department of
Energy, 666 F.2d 1359 (1 1th Cir. 1982). In the absence of proof that the delegated national au-
thority supplements state law, there is no interference with state autonomy, and such proof in this
case seems improbable. The absence of any complaint by any state, apart from suggesting a prob-
lem of the standing of the natural gas company petitioners, strongly indicates that the delegated
national authority has not expanded the state law authority of the state agencies or diverted state
administrative resources to regulatory tasks in excess of the state law authority of these state agen-
cies. Moreover, since the regulations of the Department of Energy (DOE) require, albeit indi-
rectly, a demonstration that the state agencies to which national authority is delegated must have
state law authority to regulate the use of natural gas in outdoor lights, there seems to be no at-
tempt to authorize the state agencies to act solely on the basis of the delegated national authority
and in excess of or contrary to their state law powers. See 10 C.F.R. § 516.31(c)(2)(iii) (1982). To
reach a proper resolution of the delegation issue, the court would have to go beyond the briefs and
determine whether the delegated national authority supplements state law or merely provides the
state agencies with an opportunity to exercise their existing state law authority to regulate the use
of natural gas in outdoor lights in conformity with national policies. The Eleventh Circuit did not
address this question whether the delegated national authority supplements state law. Instead, it
decided the case on the basis of the petitioners' second argument that the DOE's regulations man-
date state administration and enforcement of the national rules for the use of natural gas. See
supra text accompanying notes 710-13. This separate, distinct question of Congress' power to
mandate state enforcement of national regulations is addressed below. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 979-1055.
951. A condition of a national grant that requires a state officer or political subdivision to act
contrary to state law limitations could have the same effect as a delegation of national authority
that supplements state law. Under the theory of political accountability, Congress' power to aug-
ment state law by either means is treated consistently because such conditions do not preempt
state law restrictions on the authority of state officers and political subdivisions. See supra text
notes accompanying 894-96.
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provide the delegate of national authority with adequate state law
power to implement national regulations.
Under the theory of political accountability, the rule that Congress
has the power to delegate national authority but not to supplement
state law is consistent with the established understanding that national
law respects the states' allocation of political authority. Commentators,
for example, have long recognized that national authority cannot be
delegated to state officers if acceptance of the delegated authority
would violate either state constitutional limitations on the holding of
dual offices or common-law restrictions on the holding of incompatible
offices.952 Congress has respected the states' control over the allocation
of political authority to its political subdivisions by providing, for ex-
ample, that the states are liable for a judgment against a municipality
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 if
state law prevents the municipality from raising the revenues necessary
to comply with the judgment. 95
952. For example, President Coolidge issued an executive order authorizing the appointment
of state and local officers as prohibition officers of the Department of Treasury to enforce the
National Prohibition Act "except in those states having constitutional or statutory provision
against state officers holding office under the federal government." Exec. Order No. 4439, May 2,
1926, quoted in Note, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, andthe Executive Order ofMay 8,
1926, 21 ILL. L. REV. 142, 143 (1926). See Beard, Government by Special Consent, 25 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 61, 65 (1931); Hart, Some Legal Questions Growing Out of the President'r Executive
Orderfor Prohibition Enforcement, 13 VA. L. REv. 86, 99-107 (1926); Kauper, Utilization of State
Commissioners in the Administration of the Federal Motor Carrier Act, 34 MicH. L. REv. 37, 81-82
(1935).
953. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(e) (1976). See also United States v. Duracell Int'l, 510 F. Supp. 154
(M.D. Tenn. 1981). The rejection of the Sherman Amendment to the bill that became the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the precursor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, also illustrates congressional concern about
national interference with the states' power over their political subdivisions. The rejection of this
amendment was based in part on concern about imposing a duty on local governments to prevent
violence if they lacked the state law authority to perform the acts necessary to fulfill this duty.
The Sherman Amendment "would have made each citizen of every municipality, as well as the
municipality itself, strictly liable for violence perpetrated by other citizens regardless of whether or
not they acted under color of state law." Developments, supra note 351, at 1192. The Sherman
Amendment was attacked on the ground that since Congress has no power to impose a duty on the
states under Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) and Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861), it had no power to impose a duty on a municipality. It was also attacked
on the narrower ground that Congress had no power to impose a duty on local governments that
lacked the authority under state law to meet the duty of controlling violence, and the opponents of
the Sherman Amendment who invoked this narrow ground conceded that if state law authorized a
municipality to keep the peace, Congress could impose and federal courts could enforce the duty.
See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 754 (Sen. Edwards), 791 (Rep. Willard), 795 (Rep.
Burchard) (1871). In Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-83
(1978), the Court read the rejection of the Sherman Amendment to establish only that Congress
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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The Court also has construed narrowly a statute delegating authority
to state court clerks to naturalize persons as citizens of the United
States to avoid national interference with a state's control over its of-
ficers. Since 1802 Congress has delegated authority to the clerks of the
state courts to naturalize aliens,954 and it also has provided, beginning
in 1906, that one-half of naturalization fees would be retained by the
clerk and the other half would be paid over to the national govern-
ment.9" State courts were divided over the questions whether Con-
gress intended that the fees retained by the clerk were for his personal
use or were to be paid over to the state and whether Congress had the
power to provide that the fees were to be retained by the clerk person-
ally if state law required that the fees be paid over to the public treas-
ury.956 In Mulcrevy v. San Francisco ,95 the Court resolved these issues
by interpreting the statute to provide that state law governed the dispo-
sition of fees retained by the clerk. It based this interpretation in part
on the ground that national authority to confer power on a state officer
to act contrary to state law would raise a serious constitutional issue.958
The only authority that might be read to support Congress' power to
supplement the state law powers of state officers, agencies, or political
subdivisions is a series of cases that comprise the Cowlitz River dam
litigation.95 9 The first case was a direct challenge to the issuance of a
did not intend to impose strict liability on a municipality for acts of private citizens and concluded
that the rejection of the Sherman Amendment did not preclude holding a municipality liable for
it! own constitutional violations. The Court also cast some doubt on the continued vitality of the
principle that Congress has no power to impose a duty on state governments. Id at 676-81. See
mfra note 1030.
954. The question of Congress' power to delegate authority to naturalize and to compel the
states to exercise this authority is addressed infra at notes 1006-07.
955. Act of June 19, 1906, ch. 3592, § 13, 34 Stat. 600-01. The current provision governing the
disposition of naturalization fees provides simply that one-half of the fees up to $40,000 and all
fees in excess of that figure must be paid over to the national government, and it does not provide
for the disposition of the remainder of the naturalization fees collected by state court clerks. 8
U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1976), amendedb, Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-116, § 16, 95 Stat 1619.
956. For a summary of the split in state court authority, see Hennepin County v. Ryberg, 168
Minn. 385, 210 N.W. 105 (1926).
957. 231 U.S. 669 (1914).
958. Id at 674.
959. As part of his testimony in support of Congress' power to mandate state enforcement of
national no-fault motor vehicle insurance standards, see infra note 982, Dean Griswold submitted
a written statement in which he contended that these cases hold that Congress has "the authority
to confer power on state officials not given in state law." Hearings on S. 354 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciar; 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 743, 819-23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
Washington University Open Scholarship
1030 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
license by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to the City of Ta-
coma, Washington, to construct two hydroelectric power dams on the
Cowlitz River. The challenge was based on the grounds that the city
had not obtained state approval of its plans for water diversion and fish
protection and that the dams would exceed a height limitation estab-
lished by state law. On the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission96
that a private association licensee did not have to comply with state law
requirements that would prevent construction of a dam, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held in Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Commis-
sion96' that the city licensee did not have to comply with similar state
law restrictions. The contention that "Tacoma, as a creature of the
State of Washington, cannot act in opposition to the policy of the State
or in derogation of its laws" 962 was also answered by First Iowa. The
private association in First Iowa was also a creature of the state, and
state laws could not prohibit a licensee from constructing a dam on the
navigable waters of the United States. 963 The Ninth Circuit did not
hold that Congress has the authority to augment the state law powers of
the city; it did not, for example, hold that Congress could authorize a
state's political subdivision to operate a public utility if state law pro-
hibited municipalities from engaging in this activity. The court held
simply that when a political subdivision has the authority under state
law to build dams, to operate an electric utility, and to be an FPC licen-
see, state laws that conflict with national law and prevent the construc-
tion of a dam by a private or a public utility are invalid.
Subsequent cases in the tortured history of the Cowlitz River dams
do not extend the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit. In a bond vali-
dation action brought by the city to establish its right to sell bonds to
finance construction of the dams, the Washington Supreme Court,
notwithstanding claims that dam construction was illegal under state
law, initially reversed a trial court judgment dismissing the city's com-
plaint.9 4 The court held that the city's complaint stated a cause of
S.354]. For a narrower reading of these cases consistent with the interpretation below, see Brown,
.rupra note 282, at 300-02.
960. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
961. 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953) (en banc), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
962. Id at 396.
963. Id




action, that its FPC license was valid, and that the bonds were valid.9 6 5
Since the state supreme court expressly found that the city had state
law authority "to engage in the business of developing, transmitting
and distributing power" and that the city as a licensee was "in the same
position as any other licensee" of the FPC,9 66 its decision, like that of
the Ninth Circuit, establishes only a limited proposition: state law re-
strictions on an activity that conflict with national law are invalid re-
gardless whether the activity is performed by a private or a public
entity.
Although the state supreme court majority never suggested that the
case raised any question of Congress' power to delegate national au-
thority to a state's political subdivision and to augment its powers, 967 a
majority addressed this issue when the bond validation case returned
after remand.968 In its second decision in the bond validation case, the
state supreme court found that state law prohibited the condemnation
of state-owned lands, which were required for the construction of the
dams, and that the city had no express state law power to condemn
state-owned lands.969 Over the vigorous objection of the dissenters that
consideration of the validity of the bonds and of state law limitations
on the city's power to construct the dam were barred by the law of the
case and res judicata,970 the Washington Supreme Court then held that
Congress could not confer power on the city to condemn state-owned
lands because the city did not have adequate state law authority and
that the Federal Power Act did not purport to confer this power.971
Since the state-owned lands were necessary to the construction of the
dam and the city lacked the authority to condemn them, construction
of the dam was enjoined.
Although this second opinion of the state supreme court clearly
states that Congress cannot confer power on a municipality to act in
965. Id at 493-94, 262 P.2d at 225.
966. Id at 492, 262 P.2d at 224.
967. In noting that the state legislature could curtail or abolish the city's state law authority to
engage in the production and distribution of electric energy, the court directly recognized that
Congress lacks the authority to supplement the state law power of a municipality to apply for an
FPC license and to operate a hydroelectric plant if state law prohibits the municipality from en-
gaging in this activity. Id
968. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P.2d 567 (1957) (en banc),
rev'd and remanded, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
969. 49 Wash. 2d at 796-98, 307 P.2d at 575-76.
970. Id at 802-14, 307 P.2d at 578-85.
971. Id at 800, 307 P.2d at 577.
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excess of its state law authority, the Supreme Court's reversal of this
judgment does not establish the contrary proposition that Congress can
supplement the state law authority of state political subdivisions.972
The Supreme Court's judgment rested entirely on procedural grounds.
It held only that consideration of the question whether the FPC license
delegated to the city "federal eminent domain power" to take the state-
owned lands was foreclosed by the final judgment of the Ninth Circuit
and that the arguments in the bond validation case were an impermissi-
ble collateral attack.973 The result of the Supreme Court's decision is
that the city could exercise a national eminent domain power over
state-owned lands, but this result is entirely consistent with the original
narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit. The state law prohibition on con-
dennation of state-owned lands applied equally to public and private
FPC licensees,974 and the courts in effect recognized only that state law
restrictions on private licensees of the FPC, which are invalid because
they conflict with national law, are also invalid as applied to a munici-
pal licensee of the FPC when the municipality has the authority under
state law to construct hydroelectric dams.975
The Cowlitz litigation is, thus, best interpreted as confined to the
question of the validity of state law restrictions that apply equally to
public and private licensees of the FPC and national authority to pre-
empt these restrictions. Contrary to the unwarranted expansive read-
ings of some commentators,976 these cases do not address, much less
answer, the question of Congress' power to delegate national authority
that augments the state law power of state officers, agencies, or political
subdivisions.977 The only FPC case that reaches this issue supports the
972. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
973. Id at 333, 339-41. After the Supreme Court's decision, the voters enacted an initiative
establishing the same height limitation on dams that the Ninth Circuit had held invalid in its
original decision on Tacoma's license. The Washington Supreme Court held that this initiative
had no effect on Tacoma's authority to construct the dam because the Ninth Circuit's judgment
was res judicata. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 60 Wash. 2d 66, 371 P.2d 938 (1962)
(en banc).
974. See 49 Wash. 2d at 797-98, 307 P.2d at 575-76.
975. The Supreme Court expressly recognized that Tacoma had state law authority to con-
struct and operate public utilities. 357 U.S. at 323 n.4.
976. See supra note 959.
977. Ironically, the Washington state courts' insistence that the issuance of a FPC license to a
municipality raises the question of Congress' power to augment the state law powers of the state's
political subdivisions is partly responsible for the broad reading of the FPC license cases as hold-
ing that Congress does have this power. After the completion of the Cowlitz litigation, federal and
state courts again addressed questions about the power of a municipal licensee to disregard state
[Vol. 60:779
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principle established by the theory of political accountability that Con-
gress can delegate national authority but that Congress cannot expand
the political authority of a state's officers, agencies or political subdivi-
sions. In Washington Public Power Supply System v. Pacfc Northwest
Power Co., a federal district court held that where state law did not
authorize a municipal corporation to construct hydroelectric facilities
outside of the state, an FPC license could not confer such authority.978
c. Congress' Power to Mandate State Enforcement of National
Regulations
In addition to grant conditions, threats of national regulation, and
delegation of national authority, Congress has also employed the states
as its agents to regulate private activity by mandating state enforcement
of national regulations. Congress has mandated state enforcement
both by augmenting state law and ordering state enforcement and by
requiring the states to enact and enforce state laws that meet national
standards.979 Such exercises of national political power are rare. The
only modem examples are the EPA's attempt to compel state enforce-
ment of transportation control plans,98° the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978,91 and a proposal for national no-fault motor ve-
law restrictions. The question in this second round of cases was the power of a municipal licensee
of the FPC to condemn lands owned by a state Public Utility District (PUD) where state law
expressly denied municipalities the power of eminent domain over PUD lands. The federal court
treated the state law restriction as analogous to a state prohibition on condemnation of PUD lands
by a private licensee of the FPC; that is, it viewed the state law restriction as providing substantive
protection for PUD's and not as a limit on municipal political powers. Since the state law restric-
tion would have prevented construction of a dam, it confficted with national law and was pre-
empted, and the same result would have been reached regardless whether the FPC licensee was a
public or private entity. See Public Utility District No. I v. FPC, 308 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963). The state courts, nonetheless, insisted that the case involved a
delegation of federal eminent domain power that was invalid because it expanded the political
authority of the municipality. Beezer v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 569, 383 P.2d 895 (1963) (en
banc), rev d, 376 U.S. 224 (1964); Beezer v. City of Seattle, 60 Wash. 2d 652, 375 P.2d 256 (1962);
Beezer v. City of Seattle, 60 Wash. 2d 239, 373 P.2d 796 (1962). At most, however, the federal
court held only that where state law authorizes a municipality to construct hydroelectric dams and
to be an FPC licensee, national authority can be delegated to the same extent to public and private
entities.
978. 217 F. Supp. 481 (D. Or. 1963), vacated, 332 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1964). Accord Latinette v.
City of St. Louis, 201 F. 676 (7th Cir. 1912) (city with state law authority to build a bridge and to
buy lands in a neighboring state delegated national eminent domain power over lands in the
neighboring state).
979. See supra text accompanying notes 547-48 & 581-691.
980. See supra text accompanying notes 581-609.
981. See supra text accompanying notes 610-91.
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hide insurance.982 Under the theory of political accountability, Con-
gress has no power to mandate state enforcement of national
regulations. This limitation on national power is consistent with the
lessons of history. The only argument in support of Congress' power to
impose an enforceable duty on the states to administer national regula-
tory programs is extravagant, unfounded, impractical, and unnecessary
for effective implementation of national policies.
Statutes that mandate state enforcement of national standards for
private activity are not a valid exercise of national political power be-
cause Congress is not politically accountable, and judicial protection of
state autonomy is warranted. Congress is not politically accountable
because there are no political checks on its power to impose a duty on
the states to regulate private activity. Although the application of the
national standards to a particular private activity checks Congress'
power with respect to the substantive policy governing private activity,
it does not check Congress' power to use the states as its administrative
agents. Moreover, since the states bear the administrative and financial
costs of enforcing the national regulations, there are no costs imposed
on the national electorate to limit the extent to which Congress can use
the states.
In the absence of a political check, decisions to regulate private activ-
ity are not the product of a national majority. Judicial deference to
national decisions to mandate state enforcement of national policies
would permit Congress to achieve a result (the administration and en-
forcement of national policy) that a majority of the national electorate
might well disapprove if it was required to bear the costs of implement-
982. As originally introduced in 1973 and 1974, the proposed national no-fault legislation
would have mandated state enforcement of national standards governing private insurance com-
panies and state administration of a no-fault insurance benefits plan, and it made no provision for
national administration or enforcement. As amended, the bills introduced in 1975 and 1977 elimi-
nated the mandate and provided for state enforcement by threatening direct national regulation if
the states failed to adopt and enforce the national standards. This threat of national enforcement
probably would have been very effective because the national standards to be enforced by the
states were less onerous than an alternative set of national standards to be enforced by the na-
tional government if a state refused to implement the national regulatory program. See generalgy
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, FEDERAL NO-FAULT INSURANCE LEGISLATION (1978); Dor-
sen, The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: A Problem in Federalism, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 45 (1974); Note, The National Standards for No-Fault Insurance Act. Good Intentions and
Bad Federalism, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 575 (1976); Note, Is Federalism Dead? A Constitutional





ing national policy. Another result of judicial deference to mandatory
state enforcement of national regulations would be unlimited national
power to divert state administrative and financial resources to the im-
plementation of nationally determined policies at the expense of en-
forcement of state policies. The application of the theory of political
accountability to statutes that impose a duty on the states to regulate
private activity and the justification for judicial protection of the states
may be illustrated by consideration of the EPA's transportation control
plan regulations, which required the states to enact and enforce state
laws governing private activity in conformity with national stan-
dards,9" 3 and the PURPA requirement that the states enforce state law
as augmented by a delegation of national authority.
984
In considering the EPA regulations mandating state enforcement of
transportation control plans, the courts of appeals focused almost ex-
clusively on the effects of these regulations on the states. The require-
ment that the states enact legislation and adopt regulations in
conformity with national standards for the reduction of motor vehicle
air pollution was held to interfere impermissibly with the sovereign
state function of legislating. Similarly, the requirement that the states
enforce these laws and regulations governing private use of
automobiles was characterized as commandeering state administrative
agencies. 98- Although the EPA regulations did have these effects, the
impact on the states is not in itself a reason for holding this exercise of
national political authority invalid. Other, valid means of employing
the states as the nation's agents have exactly the same effect on the
states. The states may be required to enact legislation, to adopt regula-
tions, and to enforce them as a condition of a national grant,986 as an
alternative to threatened direct national regulation of private activ-
ity,987 or as a prerequisite to the delegation of national authority.988
The focus in these cases, which distinguishes other means of employ-
ing the states as national agents, should have been the absence of any
political checks and the consequent lack of political accountability. Al-
though the transportation control plans affected private activity by re-
983. See supra text accompanying notes 581-609.
984. See supra text accompanying notes 610-30.
985. See supra note 600 and text accompanying notes 600-01.
986. See supra text accompanying notes 217-36.
987. See supra text accompanying notes 559-62.
988. See supra text accompanying notes 947-48.
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stricting the use of automobiles, the effect on private activity and
resistance to these unpopular controls did not provide any check on
Congress' power to employ the states to enforce them. In fact, the im-
position of a duty on the states to administer and enforce transportation
control plans was all the more attractive to the EPA and Congress to
the extent that it confused the line of responsibility for the political
decision to restrict automobile use. The ineffectiveness of the impact
on private activity as a political check on Congress' power to employ
the states as its agents is matched by the complete inapplicability of the
second potential political check on national authority. The costs to the
national electorate of administering and enforcing national policies for
private activity are completely avoided if state implementation is man-
dated. If the full administrative and enforcement costs of the transpor-
tation control plans had been imposed on the national electorate, and
the blame for restrictions on automobile use more easily assigned to
Congress through the presence of national enforcement officers, Con-
gress might well have decided either to impose no controls or to impose
less stringent ones. There is simply no basis for judicial deference to
congressional political decisions when there are no political checks to
guarantee that the decision is the product of a national ridajority. Judi-
cial protection of the states' interests in controlling their state govern-
mental resources is warranted where there are no political checks on
the diversion of the states' administrative resources to the satisfaction
of national political demands.
In contrast to the mandate of the transportation control plan regula-
tions that the states must enact and enforce national standards as state
law to control automobile air pollution, the PURPA mandates state
enforcement of existing state law as augmented by national authority to
regulate electric utilities.98 9 This second, alternative means of imposing
989. In FERC the Court concluded that the PURPA was, for the most part, not mandatory.
Contrary to Congress' intention, the Court found that the provisions of Titles I and III for consid-
eration of national utility standards by state agencies were not mandatory. See supra text accom-
panying notes 654-64. The Court did recognize the duty imposed on the states under section 210
to enforce national rules for cogeneration and small power production facilities, but it upheld
section 210 on the narrow ground that state agencies, like state courts, have a duty to adjudicate
claims arising under national law. See supra text accompanying notes 632-53. Given the Court's
interpretation of the PURPA, evaluation of the statute as drafted to impose a duty on state agen-
cies to enforce national law may seem superfluous. Nevertheless, evaluation of the PURPA on its
actual terms is important for several reasons. First, because Congress intended in the PURPA to
impose a duty on state agencies, it may do so again and in a way that cannot be avoided even by




a duty on the states to enforce national policies for private activity is as
invalid under the theory of political accountability as the first. There
are no political checks on the PURPA requirement that the states must
consider and determine whether to adopt national rate design and serv-
ice standards for electric utilities.
The PURPA has two effects on the states. First, national rate design
and service standards may displace state regulatory policies for electric
utilities. This effect, however, may not be substantial because the states
are free to refuse to adopt the national standards. The second, more
substantial, effect is interference with the states' control over their ad-
ministrative and financial resources. State administrative agencies
must conduct proceedings to determine whether national rate design
and service standards should be adopted and enforced, and these pro-
ceedings will be conducted at the expense of the implementation of
state law policies. Although the political checks of the national polit-
ical process limit Congress' power to displace state policies for utility
regulation, they do not check Congress' control over the allocation of
state governmental resources. The first political check is the applica-
tion of national regulations to private activity. Since the national rate
design and service standards are to be applied to private electric utili-
ties, Congress is politically accountable for these substantive rules. The
impact of the national standards on private activity does not check,
however, Congress' power to compel state agencies to conduct adminis-
trative proceedings in order to consider and determine whether to
adopt these standards. Electric utilities may in fact prefer state to na-
tional administration on the ground that state agencies will be more
sympathetic to an important local interest, and state administrative offi-
cials, acting in their self-interest, will probably prefer state to national
enforcement. The other political check in the national political process
is the imposition on the national electorate of the costs of administering
and enforcing national policies. This check also is completely, and per-
haps intentionally, avoided when a duty is imposed on the states to act
at the nation's agents.
national law. See supra text accompanying notes 686-91. Finally, the Court's rationale upholding
the duty imposed on the states under section 210 is not convincing. See supra text accompanying
notes 644-53. Contrary to the Court's conclusion that section 210 involved solely a duty of adjudi-
cation, this section in fact imposed a broader duty to enforce national rules for private activity.
Nevertheless, in upholding section 210, the Court did not address the fundamental question of
federalism limits on Congress' power to mandate state enforcement of national law.
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In the absence of any political check on Congress' power to mandate
state administrative proceedings to consider the adoption of national
rate design and service standards for electric utilities, Congress is not
politically accountable. There is no basis for judicial deference to this
congressional decision because there is no reason to believe that it is a
product of a national majority. Congress might well have been reluc-
tant to impose the rate design and service standards if it had to fund
and staff a regulatory agency to administer and enforce these policies
for utility regulation. 990 The costs of applying national policies to
every electric utility in the nation are substantial, and these costs would
then have been part of the aggregate burden of enforcing national regu-
lations imposed on the national electorate.
Not only is there no basis for judicial deference to the congressional
determination, there is a justification for judicial intervention in the
national political process to protect the states. Recognition in principle
of Congress' power to mandate state enforcement of national policies
for private activity would permit unlimited diversion of state govern-
mental resources from satisfaction of the demands of the political com-
munity in each state to fulfillment of national policy.
Although the Court in FERC avoided the question of Congress'
power to impose a duty on the states by an artful construction of Titles
I and III and by construing the duty imposed under section 210 as a
limited duty to adjudicate claims arising under national law,99' the
PURPA provided the Court with the occasion to set a principled limit
on Congress' power to employ the states as the nation's agents. The
Court should have recognized Congress' intention in both Titles I and
III and section 210 to impose a duty on the states, and the Court should
have held that mandatory state enforcement of national regulations
governing private activity is an unconstitutional intrusion on state au-
tonomy because Congress is not politically accountable. Instead, the
Court left open the possibility that Congress may act in a politically
nonaccountable fashion by suggesting that the states have a duty to
enforce national law.992
990. See Dorsen, supra note 982, at 61 (Congress is more likely to pass a no-fault motor vehi-
cle insurance law if it can rely on state enforcement at state expense than if it must rely on na-
tional enforcement).
991. See supra text accompanying notes 632-64.
992. See supra text accompanying notes 686-91. There is one possible explanation of the
Court's conflicting statements on the states' duty to enforce national law. Congress has attempted
to impose a duty on the states to enforce national regulations of private activity in two ways. See
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The argument that mandatory state enforcement of national regula-
tory programs is unconstitutional is completely consistent with the les-
sons of history. Although the framers intended that the national
government would be able to act directly through its own officers and
that it would not have to rely on the states for the execution of national
policies, they also anticipated state cooperation.9 93 From the first ad-
ministration of President Washington to today, Congress has relied on
state assistance in the implementation of national law.99 4
For the most part, early statutes were limited to delegation of na-
tional authority to state judicial officers, usually to perform quasi-judi-
cial functions, but also occasionally to perform functions that were
clearly executive in nature. This practice of delegating national author-
ity chiefly to state judicial officers to perform quasi-judicial functions is
in part explained by the famous Madisonian Compromise and the ex-
pectation that state courts would exercise jurisdiction over cases within
the article III judicial power of the nation.995 Given this expectation, it
was an easy step to delegating national authority to state judicial of-
supra text accompanying notes 547-48. First, as in the transportation control plan cases, Congress
may require the states to enact and enforce state laws that establish national standards for private
activity. See supra text accompanying notes 581-609 & 985-88. Second, as in the case of the
PURPA, Congress may supplement state law and require the states to enforce national regula-
tions. See supra text accompanying notes 611-23 & 625 and text following note 989. The Court's
statement that it has "never. . . sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promul-
gate and enforce laws and regulations" was supported by a reference to its inconclusive resolution
of the transportation control plan cases in EPA . Brown. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2138 (1982). It may be possible to reconcile this statement with other
statements suggesting the states' have a duty to enforce national law, see supra text at notes 686-89,
if one sees a distinction between requiring the states to enact laws providing for enforcement of
national regulations and requiring the states to enforce national regulations. The distinction, if
any, is not one of constitutional dimension. See supra note 602.
993. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 (1883); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 312-13 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (collection of national tax by state or national officers).
994. For a consideration of state cooperation in the administration of national law in the early
years of the republic, see L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
387-405 (1948). Modem practice of delegation of national authority is discussed supra at notes
94348.
995. At the Constitutional Convention the question whether the trial of article III cases should
be by inferior federal courts or by state courts subject to Supreme Court review was settled by
giving Congress the power to create inferior federal courts. It was understood that state courts
would be the primary forum for vindication of claims within article III. C. WARREN, THE MAK-
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION 325-36, 531-48 (1928); Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial
System. 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 3, 10 (1948). See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 844 (2d
ed. 1973) (Judiciary Act of 1789 confirmed understanding the state courts would hear article III
cases).
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ficers to perform quasi-judicial functions related to the trial of an arti-
cle III case in a federal court.996 This use of state judicial officers to
perform quasi-judicial functions laid the foundation for delegation of
authority to perform executive functions and, somewhat later, for the
delegation of national authority to state executive officers. With few
exceptions, the early statutes merely authorized state judicial and exec-
utive officers to enforce national law and did not impose any duty to
act. The courts, in reviewing these statutes, almost invariably main-
tained that the delegation of national authority could not expand the
powers of the delegate and that the delegate must have adequate au-
thority under state law to exercise the delegated authority. The courts
also held uniformly that Congress could not impose a duty on state
officers to enforce national law.
The practice of delegating national authority to state judicial officers
to perform quasi-judicial functions related to the trial of an article III
case in a federal court began with the Judiciary Act of 1789. Congress
authorized state justices of the peace and magistrates at the expense of
the United States to arrest, imprison, and to admit to bail offenders of
the criminal laws of the United States.997 Congress also authorized dep-
ositions de bene esse to be taken by state court judges and mayors.998
Although the courts never considered the validity of the latter delega-
tion, they consistently upheld Congress' power to delegate authority to
arrest, imprison, and bail offenders of national law.999 Congress subse-
quently delegated similar authority to state judicial officers to arrest
deserting seamen" ° and fishermen,1001 to grant bail to persons ar-
996. Questions about Congress' power to delegate authority to or impose a duty on state judi-
cial officers are intertwined with questions about Congress' power to use state courts to hear article
III cases. A distinction between these two questions is important because the historical justifica-
tion for Congress' power to use state courts to try article III cases is stronger than the justification
for using state judicial officers to perform quasi-judicial tasks.
997. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91-92. This provision remains in force,
and the power of state officers to arrest federal offenders is generally accepted. 18 U.S.C. § 3041
(1976). See, e.g., United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1977).
998. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 88-90.
999. Exparle Gist, 26 Ala. 156 (1855); Harris v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 15, 196 P. 895
(1921); Goulis v. Stone, 246 Mass. 1, 140 N.E. 294 (1923); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 5 Binn.
512 (Pa. 1813); Exparte Rhodes, 12 Niles' Weekly Register 264 (S. C. 1817). Contra Maryland v.
Rutter (Almeida's Case), 12 Nile's Weekly Register 115, 231 (Baltimore County Court 1817); Ex
parte Pool, 4 Va. 276, 284-91 (2 Va. Cas. 1821) (Semple, J., dissenting) (dictum).
1000. Act of June 7, 1872, ch. 322, § 53, 17 Stat. 274 (REv. STAT. § 4599 (1878)); Act of July 20,
1790, ch. 29, §§ 3, 7, 1 Stat. 132, 134 (REv. STAT. § 4598 (1878)). See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275 (1897) (upholding Congress' power to authorize state justices of the peace to arrest de-
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rested for violating national laws regulating trade with the Indians, 1002
to issue search warrants, 10 0 3 to take depositions in claims against the
United States,'" and to take testimony in cases of disputed congres-
sional elections for submission to the clerk of the House of
Representatives.°1005
In addition to these statutes delegating authority to perform quasi-
judicial functions, other statutes delegated authority to state judicial
officers to perform functions that seem to be more executive or admin-
istrative in nature, like the naturalization of aliens as citizens of the
United States.' 6 All the courts that considered the question of Con-
gress' power to delegate authority to state courts to naturalize aliens
upheld this power, but the opinions usually noted that the state courts
had authority under state law to perform this function for the national
government and frequently added that Congress could not compel per-
formance of this task.1
00 7
serting seamen); Ex parte Pool, 4 Va. 276 (2 Va. Cas. 1821) (same). See also Dallemagne v.
Moisan, 197 U.S. 169 (1905) (treaty conferred power on local officers to arrest deserting seamen
but statute implementing treaty provided for arrest solely by national officers).
1001. Act of June 19, 1813, ch. 2, § 1, 3 Stat. 2.
1002. Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 16, 2 Stat. 144-45;see Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 100, § 20,
3 Stat. 243-44.
1003. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, § 1, 40 Stat. 228; Act of March 3, 1815, ch.
100, § 10, 3 Stat. 241; Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 68, 1 Stat. 677-78.
1004. See United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238, 254 (1835) (collection of statutes).
1005. Act of January 23, 1798, ch. 7, §§ 5, 6, 1 Stat. 538. Subsequent acts authorized state
judges and certain local officials to issue subpoenas for attendance at depositions. 2 U.S.C.
§ 388(a)(2),(3) (1976); see Act of February 19, 1851, ch. 11, 9 Stat. 568, as amended, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 201-226 (1964), repealed b, Federal Contested Election Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-138, § 18,
83 Stat. 290.
1006. Congress has authorized state courts to admit persons to citizenship continuously from
1795. Compare Act of January 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 with 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a),(b) (1976). In
addition to naturalization, there are at least two other examples of delegation of national authority
to state judicial officers to perform administrative functions for the national government. State
court judges were authorized to take proof of the circumstances that would entitle refugees from
Canada and Nova Scotia to a bounty paid by the Department of War. Act of April 7, 1798, ch. 26,
§ 3, 1 Stat. 548. Congress also authorized judges of "a county court of the State of Oklahoma" to
supervise land conveyances by Indians, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court approved this delega-
tion of power where the state legislature had authorized the county courts to act in the capacity
provided by national law. Marcy v. Board of Commissioners, 45 Okla. 1, 144 P. 611 (1914). See
Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235, 239 (1919) (state court acts as an agency of national government
in approving conveyances of Indian lands); Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apartments, 622 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1980) (use of state courts to approve conveyances of Indian lands not questioned).
1007. Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910); Levin v. United States, 128 F. 826 (8th
Cir. 1904); State v. Penney, 10 Ark. 621 (1850); In re Martin Conner, 39 Cal. 98 (1870); Morgan v.
Dudley, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 693 (1857); In re Ramsden, 13 How. Pr. 429 (Spec. Term 1857); State
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In contrast to those statutes that delegated authority to state judicial
officers, a few statutes imposed a duty on these officers to perform
quasi-judicial or executive functions.'00 8 The most celebrated provi-
sion imposing a duty on state judicial officers was section 3 of the Fugi-
tives from Justice and Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,1°°9 which required
federal judges and state magistrates to grant a warrant for the removal
of recaptured fugitive slaves. Although the Court addressed the ques-
tion of Congress' power to impose this duty in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 1 °0
the actual holding of the case is quite narrow. The case was specifically
designed to test the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute gov-
erning the return of fugitive slaves, "'1 and the Court, albeit in six sepa-
rate opinions, held only that this state statute was invalid under the
supremacy clause.'10 2 Nonetheless, three Justices-Justice Story, Chief
v. Libby, 47 Wash. 481, 92 P. 350 (1907). A few state courts denied applications for citizenship on
the ground that the court in which the petition for naturalization was filed either lacked state law
authority or was prohibited by state law from admitting persons to citizenship, but in each case
other courts in the state were open to administer oaths of citizenship because they had the requi-
site state law authority. Exparte Knowles, 5 Cal. 301 (1855); Stephens, Petitioner, 70 Mass. (4
Gray) 559 (1855); Ex parle McKenzie, 51 S. C. 244, 28 S.E. 468 (1897). See State ex rel.
Rushworth v. Judges of Inferior Court, 58 N.J.L. 97, 32 A. 743, 30 L.R.A. 761 (Sup. Ct. 1895)
(upholding New Jersey statute prohibiting state courts from admitting aliens to citizenship within
a 30 day period preceding an election). These decisions support the conclusion that the delegation
of national authority to admit aliens to citizenship is valid only if the delegate has state law au-
thority to exercise the delegated power.
1008. Beginning in 1790, Congress required justices of the peace to determine the fitness of a
ship bound on a voyage to a foreign port upon a complaint that the vessel was not seaworthy. Act
of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 3, 1 Stat. 132; Act of December 21, 1898, ch. 28, §§ 7, 8, 30 Stat. 757.
For many years, state court clerks had a duty to forward the record of a case removed to a federal
court and were subject to fine and imprisonment for failure to perform this duty. Act of February
28, 1871, ch. 99, § 17, 16 Stat. 439-40; Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 7, 18 Stat. 472. National
law no longer imposes this duty. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447, 1449 (1976). Apart from these two stat-
utes, the only other example of a statute imposing a duty on state judicial officers that has been
discovered is an 1829 provision imposing a duty on courts and judges to arrest deserting foreign
seamen, but this provision by its terms did not directly apply to state judicial officers. Act of
March 2, 1829, ch. 41, 4 Stat. 359.
1009. Act of February 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302-05. Section I of the Act imposed a duty
on state executives to extradite fugitives from justice, and the Court considered Congress' power to
impose this duty in Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 1026-31. Sections 2 and 4 of the Act prohibited interference with persons returning
fugitives from justice and fugitive slaves.
1010, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). See generally 5 C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, 535-547 (1974).
1011. 5 C. SWISHER, supra note 1010, at 537-38.
1012. Justice Story, who wrote for a plurality of three, argued that Congress' power to control
fugitive slaves was exclusive. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622-25. Justices Wayne and McLean concurred
specially and agreed that Congress' power was exclusive. Id at 638-44 (Wayne, J., concurring),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
Justice Taney, and Justice McLean-commented extensively on the
question of Congress' power to impose a duty on state magistrates and
on the question whether article IV, section 2, of the Constitution,
0 1 3
which by its terms established a duty to deliver up fugitive slaves, sup-
ported Congress' power to compel state magistrates to enforce national
law.
Justice Story, together with Justices Catron and McKinley, con-
cluded that the constitutional duty to provide for the delivery of fugi-
tive slaves applied solely to the national government and not to the
states. 4 He then sidestepped the question whether Congress could
impose a duty on state magistrates to assist in the rendition of fugitive
slaves and found that state magistrates could exercise national author-
ity unless prohibited by state law. 1 5 Although Chief Justice Taney
disagreed with Story about the effect of article IV, section 2, he ulti-
mately reached the same conclusion about Congress' power to impose a
duty on state magistrates. The Chief Justice argued that the constitu-
tional duty to provide for the delivery of fugitive slaves applied to the
states as well as the nation, but the state's duty was to be met by state,
not national, legislation. 1 6 In Taney's view, the state's duty was cru-
cial to the protection of the property interests of slaveowners because
there were too few federal judges to grant the warrants for removal of
fugitive slaves and because Congress could not compel state magis-
trates to execute the duties imposed by the 1793 Act if state law prohib-
ited them from acting.10 1 7 Thus, four, and possibly five,10 18 justices
861 (McLean, J., concurring). Justice Wayne also explained that the brief notation of Justice
Baldwin's concurrence rested on a similar ground. Id at 637. Chief Justice Taney, Justice
Thompson, and Justice Daniel argued that the states had concurrent legislative power, but they
concluded that the Pennsylvania statute was invalid because it conflicted with the 1793 Act. Id at
632-33 (Taney, C.J., concurring), 633-35 (Thompson, J., concurring), 651-57 (Daniel, J.,
concurring).
1013. No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulations therein, be discharged
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the party to whom
such Service or labour may be due.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
1014. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615-16.
1015. Id at 622.
1016. Id at 627-28.
1017. Id at 630-31.
1018. In his concurring opinion, Justice Wayne argued that national legislation was exclusive,
and he did not discuss directly the question of Congress' power to impose a duty on state officers.
Nevertheless, his approval of state legislation authorizing state magistrates to execute national
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expressly took the view that Congress could not compel state magis-
trates to issue warrants for the rendition of fugitive slaves contrary to a
state law prohibition. 019 Only Justice McLean took a broader view of
Congress' power to impose a duty on state judicial officers. He argued
that article IV, section 2, gave Congress power over state officers
notwithstanding the general rule that Congress has no power to impose
duties on state officers. Since the Constitution imposed a duty on the
states. to surrender fugitive slaves, Congress could enforce this duty by
statute. He then admitted, however, that the states could resist and that
there was no means to enforce the duty.10 20
Thus, as the Court noted in United States v. Jones, Congress' practice
of using state judicial officers and courts as the nation's agents to per-
form both quasi-judicial and administrative functions began with the
establishment of our federal system. 10 21 This practice was common-
place in 1883 when the Jones Court approved delegation of authority to
state officers to determine the compensation due for private property
taken for the use of the national government. 022 Although the Court
occasionally noted that state court officers could exercise powers con-
ferred by Congress unless prohibited by state law, a narrower statement
of Congress' power to delegate national authority is more accurate. 10 23
The courts recognized Congress' power to delegate authority to state
judicial officers to the extent that those officers had existing state law
power to exercise the delegated national authority. 10 24 They almost in-
laws governing fugitive slaves may support the inference that Congress has no power to impose a
duty on state judicial officers. Id at 644.
1019. The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Prigg expressly prohibited state magistrates from
complying with the 1793 Act. Id at 554-555.
1020. Id at 664-66. In 1850, Congress enacted a more stringent fugitive slave law. Act of
September 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. This Act abandoned the effort to use state officers and
provided for enforcement exclusively by national officers. Holcombe, supra note 5, at 314.
1021. 109 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1883). The Court did not specifically confine its summary of the
states' role as national agents to state judicial officers and courts, but this qualification is implicit
in the Court's examples.
1022. Id at 520-21.
1023. For example, in Hlmgren v. United States the Court upheld Congress' power to delegate
authority to state courts to naturalize aliens and stated that "[u]nless prohibited by state legisla-
tion, state courts and magistrates may exercise the power conferred by Congress. .. ." 217 U.S.
509, 517 (1910). This statement that delegation was valid unless barred by state law goes farther
than the facts of the case. A narrow reading of Congress' power to delegate naturalization author-
ity is proper because state law in fact expressly authorized state courts to conduct naturalization
proceedings. Id
1024. This rule governing the delegation of national authority appears clearly in the naturaliza-
tion cases. See supra note 1007.
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variably cautioned in dictum that Congress could not compel state ju-
dicial officers to act.'0 25
This general rule governing Congress' power to use state judicial of-
ficers as the nation's agents applies with equal force to Congress' power
over state executive officers. In the leading case of Kentucky v. Denni-
son,0 26 the Court considered the effect of section 1 of the Fugitives
from Justice and Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which imposed a duty on
the executive authority of each state to arrest and deliver fugitives from
justice in other states. 1027 Notwithstanding the constitutional provision
requiring the extradition of fugitives from justice, 0 28 the Court held
that Congress could only "authorize a particular State officer to per-
1025. The Supreme Court usually assumed that the delegation of national authority and the use
of state judicial officers as the nation's agents was done "with the consent of the States" and that
state magistrates could not be compelled to exercise the delegated authority. United States v.
Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 (1883); United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238, 253 (1835). See
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 39-40 (1825).
1026. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
1027. Act of Feburary 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302. Although the current provision gov-
erning extradition omits the word "duty," it still appears to be mandatory because it states that the
executive authority "shall cause" the fugitive to be arrested and delivered for rendition. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3182 (1976).
1028. A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee
from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority
of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. Although the court never expressly stated that article IV, section 2,
clause 2, imposed a duty on the national government as opposed to the states, it subsequently took
this position. Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 391 (1880). In Pigg v. Pennsylvania, Justice Mc-
Lean argued that article IV, section 2, clause 2, gave Congress the power to impose a duty on state
governors to extradite fugitives from justice just as article IV, section 2, clause 3, gave Congress
the power to impose a duty on state magistrates to assist in the rendition of fugitive slaves. 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 539, 664-66 (1842) (McLean, J., concurring). See supra text preceding note 1020.
In addition to the article IV provisions governing fugitives, there is at least one other constitu-
tional provision that could be construed as imposing a duty on the states. Article I, section 4,
clause 1, provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."
In Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 388 (1880), the Court suggested that this provision might be
interpreted to impose a duty on the states to elect representatives to Congress. Nonetheless, the
Court stopped short of stating that Congress has the power to compel the states to conduct elec-
tions, and the case holds only that when a state has decided to conduct elections for Congress,
state officers who supervise elections to national office must conform to national law and can be
punished for violations of both state and national laws governing elections. See Exparte Clarke,
100 U.S. 399 (1880) (companion case).
Reading Pigg, Dennison, and Siebold together, it appears that even where the Constitution
could be interpreted to impose a duty directly on state officers, the Court has never approved
Congress' power to implement these constitutional provisions by imposing a statutory duty.
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form a particular duty"'102 9 and that Congress "has no power to impose
on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to per-
form it.' 0 30 The duty to extradite fugitives from justice imposed by
the 1793 Act was at most a "moral duty" because recognition of Con-
gress' power to impose duties on state officers would impair their ability
to perform the obligations imposed on them by state law.'0 3' Although
other statutes and regulations have occasionally imposed a duty on
state executive officers, actual practice has been consistent with the rule
announced in Dennison; that is, the national government has sought
voluntary state cooperation instead of attempting to enforce the states'
duties. 1032
In light of this history, any argument that Congress has the power to
require the affirmative exercise of state authority over private activity
would seem to be extravagant. So far, only Professor Stewart has ven-
tured such an argument. 0 33  His contention that Congress has the
power to mandate state enforcement of national environmental policies
rests on two propositions. First, since the courts have the power to
require states to regulate private pollution-causing activity that spills
pollution over into neighboring states, Congress should have the same
power to resolve interstate disputes by mandating state restrictions on
private activity that generate pollution spillovers. Second, mandatory
1029. 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 108.
1030. Id at 107. The continued validity of the broad proposition that Congress has no power
to impose a duty on state officers is subject to question. In Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
v. Missisipi, the Court quoted and criticized this statement. See supra text accompanying notes
686-89. Although the criticism may give rise to an inference that Congress has the power to im-
pose duties on state officers, the FERC Court also reinforced Dennison by several statements deny-
ing Congress' power to impose a duty on the states to enforce national law. See sipra text
accompanying notes 690-91. In two other recent decisions the Court has suggested that in enforc-
ing the fourteenth amendment Congress may be able to impose a duty on state officers. See
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 n.14, 358 n.15 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 676 & 682 n.44 (1978). On
the question of Congress' power in enacting legislation to enforce the Civil War Amendments to
use the states as agents of the nation, see supra note 342.
1031. 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 107-08.
1032. For example, during World War I, Congress authorized the President to use the services
of any state officer in raising military forces and required these officers to perform any duty di-
rected by the President. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 6, 40 Stat. 80-81. The President did not
actually exercise this power to give orders to state officers; instead, the governors agreed to cooper-
ate and the President's orders were in fact issued by the governors. CLARK, Supra note 65, at 90-
92; Note, supra note 952, at 144. See Koenig, supra note 57, at 780-81.
1033. Stewart, supra note 577. See Hearings on S.354, supra note 959, at 819-23 (statement of
Dean Griswold).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/3
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state enforcement of national environmental regulations is necessary
because there are no other means to achieve important environmental
goals. His argument is not only extravagant when measured against
the lessons of history; it is also unfounded. Moreover, national power
to impose a duty on state officers to enforce national pollution stan-
dards is not, contrary to his assertion, necessary to achieve national
goals, and in any event, mandatory state enforcement of national regu-
lations is quite impractical.
Stewart's first proposition rests on an as yet unproven assertion about
federal court power and an invalid analogy between the powers of fed-
eral courts and congressional powers. He begins by noting that the
Court has held that a state as parens patriae may sue for a remedy for
damages caused by pollution from neighboring states. 10 34 In Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co. ,"35 Georgia, as parens patriae, brought an ac-
1034. Stewart cites two cases, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) and Mis-
,ouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), in support of the states' power as parens patriae to bring suit
for damages from spillover pollution and as a basis for his argument that federal courts may
require the states to regulate private activity that generates spillover pollution. Stewart, supra note
577, at 1248 n.188. The first case provides a basis for an argument about judicial power to compel
a state to regulate private activity because the polluter in that case was a corporation. The second
case does not speak to his argument about judicial power to compel a state to regulate private
activity because the sources of pollution in that case were sewage treatment systems owned and
operated by a state and its political subdivisions. Stewart advances a separate, but related, argu-
ment for congressional power to regulate activities, like sewage treatment, that are performed
exclusively by the states or their political subdivisions, and this argument is stated and criticized
supra at note 905.
Given Stewart's distinct arguments for congressional power to regulate activities like sewage
treatment plants that are almost exclusively a state function and for congressional power to com-
pel state regulation of private activity, his analysis of the EPA's power to compel the states to
implement the controversial transportation control plan regulations should be noted. Contrary to
the argument above that the EPA transportation control plan regulations are an example of
mandatory state regulation of private activity, see supra text accompanying notes 581-609, Stewart
argues that these regulations are an example of national regulation of an activity that is performed
exclusively by the states; that is, he sees an analogy between municipally owned and operated
sewage treatment plants and state owned and operated highways. See supra text accompanying
notes 588-89. He then argues that his justification of Congress' power to regulate municipal sew-
age treatment plants supports Congress' power to regulate state-owned highways under the trans-
portation control plan regulations. Stewart, supra note 577, at 1234-43. If one accepts the dubious
proposition that the EPA's transportation control plans regulated state activity, the explanation of
the reasons why Congress lacks the power to regulate state operation of its highways is set forth in
supra note 905. If one characterizes the EPA transportation control plan regulations as imposing a
duty on the states to regulate the use of automobiles by private citizens, the explanation of the
reasons why Congress lacks the power to impose a duty on the states to regulate private activity is
set forth in the text supra following note 988.
1035. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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tion against a corporation whose activity in Tennessee generated pollu-
tion that spilled over into Georgia, and the Court held that Georgia
was entitled to an order enjoining the corporation from discharging
noxious gases into the atmosphere. Although the states' action as
parens patriae was brought against a corporation, Stewart argues that
this case also justifies imposition of liability on Tennessee, the state in
which the private pollution-causing activities were conducted. Liabil-
ity of a state defendant is warranted, in his view, because if a state is
entitled to a remedy for damages suffered by its own citizens, it should
in turn be liable for damages to citizens in other states from spillover
pollution created by the activities of its own citizens. 10 36 Thus, because
Georgia can seek a remedy for spillover pollution generated in Tennes-
see, Georgia should be liable for spillover pollution generated by its
own citizens. If Georgia is liable for spillover pollution, then Tennes-
see and all other states are also liable, and the action in Georgia v. Ten-
nessee Copper Co. could have been maintained against both the
corporation and Tennessee. On this theory of the states' liability for
spillover pollution, the remedy would be a court order enjoining the
state in which the spillover pollution originates to regulate and restrict
the pollution-causing activities of its citizens.10 37
Stewart's argument is, in short, that in an action by a state as parens
patriae for damages caused by spillover pollution generated in another
state, a federal court can order the private source of pollution to reduce
its air pollutant emissions, and it can also order the state in which the
pollution originated to regulate the private pollution-causing activity.
It is one thing for a court to order a private party to restrict its pollu-
tion-causing activities-the effect on the state is at most to displace its
substantive policy that tolerates the emission of air pollutants. It is
quite another thing for a court to order a state to regulate private pollu-
tion-causing activity because the effect of such an order is to require the
state to allocate its governmental resources to satisfy a national pollu-
tion control policy established by the court. Stewart never identifies
this impact on state autonomy of a court order requiring a state to regu-
late private activity, and no case has ever held that states must regulate
private activity that generates spillover pollution.
Even if we were to accept Stewart's assumption that a court could





order a state to regulate private pollution-causing activity, it does not
follow, as he argues, 0 38 that Congress has the same power as a court to
mandate state enforcement of national environmental policy. Any
mandate that the states must regulate private activity is an order made
without political accountability, 1039 regardless whether the mandate is a
court order or a national statute. In our democratic system, we tolerate
court orders even though the court is not politically accountable. It
stands democratic theory on its head, however, to argue as Stewart does
that because a court may act in a politically nonaccountable fashion,
Congress can also act in a politically nonaccountable fashion. Stew-
art's first proposition fails. The courts have never ordered the states to
regulate private activity that generates spillover pollution, and even if
courts did impose a duty on the states to regulate this type of private
activity, judicial power does not provide a warrant for Congress to act
in a politically nonaccountable fashion.
Stewart's second proposition that congressional power to mandate
state enforcement of national environmental regulations is necessary to
achieve important environmental goals' °4° is at bottom simply an argu-
ment that the ends justify the means. This proposition rests on his
conclusion that neither grants made on a condition that the states en-
force national environmental policies' 14 nor direct national enforce-
ment, 10 2 is a satisfactory alternative to mandatory state enforcement as
a means of achieving national environmental goals. The conditional
spending power is not a satisfactory alternative because there are both
"practical and constitutional limitations" on its use as a means of re-
quiring state administration and enforcement of national environmen-
tal regulations. 1°43 The primary practical limitation is the risk that a
state might refuse a national grant to avoid complying with a condition
requiring state enforcement of unpopular environmental standards.
044
State recalcitrance cannot be overborne simply by increasing the
number of grants subject to the condition of state enforcement of na-
1038. Id
1039. See supra text accompanying notes 982-84.
1040. Stewart, supra note 577, at 1263 ("effective implementation of national environmental
policies will depend to a material degree on Congress' authority to requisition the enforcement
resources of state and local governments").
1041. Id at 1250-62.
1042. Id at 1240-41.
1043. Id at 1251.
1044. Id
Number 3] 1049
Washington University Open Scholarship
1050 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tional environmental regulations. NLC teaches that there is a constitu-
tional limitation on the spending power: conditions "must be quite
closely related" to the purpose of the expenditure. 10 45
Regardless whether Stewart's reading of the NLC-based constitu-
tional limitation on the spending power is correct, or whether such a
judicial restraint on the spending power is warranted, 1046 his invocation
of a NLC limitation on the spending power is, to say the very least,
selective. Grant conditions that require state enforcement of national
environment regulations have exactly the same effect on the states as a
statute that mandates state enforcement. Nonetheless, Stewart never
considers NLC or state autonomy as a limitation on Congress' author-
ity to mandate state enforcement under the commerce power or the
power to resolve interstate conflicts derived from federal courts' power
over interstate pollution spillovers. His recognition of a judicially en-
forceable NLC or state autonomy limitation on Congress' authority to
require state enforcement of national regulations as a grant condition
but not on Congress' authority to impose the same requirement under a
power to resolve interstate disputes is not only selective, it is anoma-
lous. There is a political check on Congress' authority under the
spending power because the revenues to support a conditional expendi-
ture are obtained from taxes levied on the national electorate, but there
is no political check on a mandate that states regulate private activ-
ity. °47 The constitutional limitation on the spending power that Stew-
art asserts, at least in the absence of any consideration of a state
autonomy restriction on mandatory state enforcement, is a contrivance
designed to support the conclusion that the spending power is not an
adequate means for Congress to accomplish its environmental goals.
In addition to rejecting conditional grants that require state enforce-
ment of national environmental policies, Stewart also rejects direct na-
tional administration and enforcement as a means of achieving
important environmental goals. Direct national implementation of en-
vironmental standards is not, in many cases, a feasible alternative be-
1045. Id at 1261-62.
1046. Under the theory of political accountability, no judicial check on Congress' power to
condition a grant on state enforcement of national regulations is necessary. See supra text accom-
panying notes 927-31. A judicial requirement that the condition must be reasonably related to the
purpose of a grant is, in any event, an unprincipled and an unworkable standard. See supra note
893 and accompanying text.




cause there are "political obstacles.'l48 Congress, in Stewart's view,
would be unlikely to vote in favor of rigorous environmental standards
if it had to establish and fund a bureaucracy large enough to administer
and enforce the standards in all fifty states."° 9 By imposing these costs
on the states, however, Congress is free to establish environmental stan-
dards that otherwise it could not enact.1050
Having rejected two means of enforcing national environmental pol-
icy, Stewart then claims that there is only one alternative: mandatory
state enforcement of national environmental regulations. In claiming
that mandatory state enforcement is the only means to ensure achieve-
ment of national environmental goals, Stewart completely overlooks
the principal means that Congress has employed to obtain state assist-
ance in the administration and enforcement of national regulatory pro-
grams. Congress provides for state implementation of environmental
regulations both by delegating authority to the states °10 5 and by threat-
ening direct national regulation of private activity. 10 52 Given these two
additional alternatives, Stewart is far from establishing his proposition
that mandatory state enforcement is necessary to accomplish national
environmental goals. Ironcially, mandatory state enforcement of na-
tional environmental regulations is impractical. As Stewart himself
notes, state officers will resist enforcing politically unpopular environ-
mental regulations regardless whether they have a duty to enforce
them,0 5 3 and judicial efforts to compel these officers to enforce na-
tional policy are likely to be unavailing.10
54
Stewart's second proposition that mandatory state enforcement of
national regulations is necessary is based on his conclusion that Con-
gress will not be able to achieve either important environmental goals
or "national moral ideals1 055 if it is restricted to obtaining state imple-
mentation as a grant condition and to direct national enforcement. If
Congress provides for state enforcement of national policy as a grant
1048. Stewart, supra note 577, at 1200-01.
1049. Id at 1241.
1050. See id
1051. See supra text accompanying notes 941-51.
1052. See supra text accompanying notes 932-35.
1053. Stewart, supra note 577, at 1198, 1204.
1054. See Washingtion v. Washingtion State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 689-92 (1979) (state officers' refusals to comply with federal court orders requiring them
to protect Indians" rights under a treaty to a share of salmon fisheries).
1055. Stewart, supra note 577, at 1263-66.
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condition or for direct national enforcement, Congress is politically ac-
countable because the costs of the policy are borne by the national elec-
torate. Nonetheless, Stewart deems these two means of enforcing
national policy inadequate, and their inadequacy follows from the
political accountability of Congress. A national political majority
might not support a congressional decision to restrict motor vehicle air
pollution if it had to bear the financial and administrative costs of this
national policy. To overcome these political checks and to permit Con-
gress to accomplish ends that it could not obtain if it was politically
accountable, Stewart champions Congress' power to impose a duty on
the states to enforce national regulations. If Congress can avoid impos-
ing the costs of its policy decisions directly on the national electorate, it
is more likely to enact legislation protecting important enviromental
goals and promoting national moral ideals. For Stewart, these ends
justify the means regardless of the impact on state autonomy and re-
gardless whether a national political majority in fact supports the goals
and ideals that it is the states' duty to implement.
CONCLUSION
Questions of national power to intervene against the states involve
conflicts between the political decisions of two different political com-
munities-the nation and the states. A rule of preference for the polit-
ical choices of the nation that is consistent with the states' role in the
federal system as political decisionmaking units can be found in the
operation of the national political process. When national political de-
cisions are the product of a national majority, preference for the polit-
ical choice of the nation over the political choices of subnational
majorities serves the framers' intentions that the national political pro-
cess would be an alternative to parochial state political processes and
that the actual allocation of political authority in the federal system
would be determined by the electorate. National political decisions are
the product of a national majority when Congress is politically ac-
countable or answerable to the national electorate, and the political ac-
countability of Congress turns on political checks inherent in the
national political process. These political checks are simply the impact
of national policy on private activity and the imposition on the national
electorate of the administrative and financial costs of enforcing na-
tional policies.




accountable, they ensure that national political decisions to regulate
private activity, to regulate the states and their political subdivisions, or
to require the affirmative exercise of state authority over private activ-
ity in the implementation of national programs are the product of a
national majority. These political checks also limit, at least in the ag-
gregate, national interference with state autonomy in making political
decisions about the rules for private activity, the structure and
processes of government, the mix of public goods and services, and the
allocation of executive, legislative, and judicial resources. Thus, the
political checks and Congress' political accountability both justify judi-
cial deference to the decisions of the national political process and pro-
tect the states' role as political communities in the federal system.
When these political checks make Congress politically accountable, in-
trusion on the independence of state political decisionmaking is per-
missible; that is, the political safeguards of federalism are sufficient.
Conversely, when Congress is not politically accountable, the courts
should protect state interests in political decisionmaking.
In most cases, the political checks of the national political process
make Congress politically accountable for statutes that diminish state
autonomy, and there is no basis for judicial intervention in the political
process. National regulation of private activity diminishes state auton-
omy by displacing the states' power to set substantive policy, but Con-
gress is politically accountable because the private parties subject to the
national rules will assign the blame or credit to their national repre-
sentatives and because the national electorate must bear the actual and
potential costs of enforcing the national policy. Since Congress is polit-
ically accountable for national regulation of private activity, there is no
warrant for judicially imposed federalism restraints, and the Court
should not honor its suggestion 0 5 6 in Hodel that national political
powers will be read narrowly to protect the states' interests in prescrib-
ing substantive rules for private activity.
National regulations that apply to the states affect the choice and
delivery of public goods and services that the political community of
each state chooses to provide and to finance through taxes. Since these
regulations usually apply to analogous private activity, the political
checks on national authority to regulate private activity make Congress
politically accountable and state interests are vicariously protected by
1056. See supra text accompanying notes 474-75 & note 475.
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the impact of the regulations on private activity. Thus, in NLC judicial
protection of the states as employers was not necessary because the
FLSA applies to both public and private employers. NLC should be
overruled. Unfortunately, the Court in United Transportation Union
reaffirmed NLC's amorphous concept of federalism limits on Congress'
power to regulate the states. The Court did reach the correct result in
this case by upholding Congress' power to apply the Railway Labor
Act (RLA) to a state-owned commuter railroad. This result, however,
rests on an unworkable distinction between traditional and nontradi-
tional state functions, and the decision leaves open the door to ad hoc
judicial restraints on national political authority. The Court should
have upheld the RLA on a different ground. Congress is politically
accountable for the national rules governing the resolution of labor dis-
putes in the railroad industry because the Act applies to both privately
and publicly owned railroads, and the state's interests in operating a
commuter rail service are protected by the application of the RLA to
private railroads.10 57
Although most national regulations that apply to the states also ap-
ply to private activity, there are a few national regulations that apply
exclusively or primarily to the states. Conditions of national grants
that control either the structure, organization, and processes of state
government or the allocation of political authority within a state are
examples of national regulations that apply exclusively to the states,
but there is a political check and Congress is politically accountable
because the revenues for these conditional grants must be raised by
taxes levied on the national electorate. 05 8
When Congress employs the states as its agents in administering and
enforcing national regulations, state autonomy is affected because the
states must allocate legislative, executive, judicial, and financial re-
sources to effect national policies and to satisfy national political de-
mands at the expense of implementing state policies and fulfilling the
demands of the political community in each state. If Congress dele-
gates authority to regulate private activity, threatens direct national
regulation of private activity unless the states administer and enforce
national standards, or makes a grant to the states or private recipients
on the condition that the states regulate private activity, these provi-
1057. See supra text accompanying notes 911-15.




sions for state enforcement of national regulations are valid because the
national electorate bears, at least potentially, the full financial and ad-
ministrative costs of the national policy decision and Congress is thus
politically accountable." 59 In FERC, on the basis of strained statutory
interpretation, and in Hodel, the Court reached the correct result in
upholding Congress' power to use the states as the nation's agents. The
Court did not justify Congress' power to provide for the affirmative
exercise of state authority over private activity. The results, however,
in these two cases are correct because Congress is politically accounta-
ble for its decisions to employ the states in implementing national poli-
cies and standards.1°60
Although the theory of political accountability justifies broad na-
tional authority over the states, it also protects the states' role as polit-
ical communities in the federal system. First, the political checks that
justify national authority to intervene against the states also protect the
states' interests in political decisionmaking. Congress' political respon-
sibility for regulations that apply to private activity and for raising the
revenues necessary to administer and enforce national regulations lim-
its, at least in the aggregate, the exercise of national political authority.
Second, in the absence of a political check on a particular exercise of
national political authority, there is no justification for Congress' power
to intrude on the states, and judicially imposed restrictions on Con-
gress' powers are necessary to protect the states. If Congress were to
enact regulations or to impose a tax that applies exclusively or primar-
ily to the states, there would be no political check, and the regulation or
tax should be held invalid.' °6 Statutes that delegate national authority
to the states and supplement the state law authority of state officers,
agencies or political subdivisions to act in excess of or contrary to their
state law authority, and statutes that mandate state enforcement of na-
tional regulations, are also invalid because there are no political checks
and Congress is not politically accountable."'6 2 If the Court in FERC
had recognized Congress' intention in the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 to impose a duty on the states to administer na-
tional regulations for private electric utilities, then it should have held
this Act unconstitutional.
1059. See supra text accompanying notes 927-45.
1060. See supra text accompanying notes 932-40.
1061. See supra text accompanying notes 901-10 & note 906.
1062. See supra text accompanying notes 946-51 & 979-92.
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The theory of political accountability provides a comprehensive,
principled explanation of Congress' power to diminish state autonomy
by regulating private activity, by regulating the states and their political
subdivisions, and by requiring the affirmative exercise of state author-
ity over private activity in the administration and enforcement of na-
tional regulatory and benefit programs. It also answers the immediate
questions raised by Hodel, United Transportation Union, and FEC of
Congress' authority under the commerce power to regulate private ac-
tivity, to establish labor dispute settlement procedures for employees of
a state-owned commuter railroad, and to mandate state consideration
of national rate design and service standards for electric utilities. If the
Court is conservative, in terms of the judicial role and not solely in
terms of social policy, the theory of political accountability should be
appealing because it establishes a principled basis for deference to the
political branches of the national government and a narrow basis for
judicial intervention. Under the theory of political accountability,
there are no federalism restraints on Congress' power to regulate pri-
vate activity. Judicial restraints on Congress' power to regulate the
states are warranted only if a national regulation or tax applies exclu-
sively or primarily to the states, and the courts should refuse to hold
that provisions of state law are preempted when in conflict with condi-
tions of national grants. Congress has broad power to employ the
states as the nation's agents, but there are two limits. Congress cannot
supplement state law, and Congress cannot mandate state enforcement
of national regulations.
It may, of course, be argued that these judicially enforceable federal-
ism restraints are inadequate and that greater judicial protection of
state interests in political decisionmaking are required. Those who ad-
vocate states' rights limitations on national political authority, however,
must shoulder two difficult burdens. In conflicts between two political
communities, judicial intervention is extraordinary, and the inade-
quacy of the national political process to resolve these conflicts and to
protect the states' interests must be demonstrated and not simply as-
sumed. If the courts are to intervene in the national political process to
protect the states, limitations on national political authority must be
principled. As yet, neither the courts nor the commentators have met
these burdens.10 63
1063. In the October 1982 Term, the Court will have one opportunity to formulate a principled
theory of state autonomy limitations on national political authority. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F.
Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 198 1),prob. juris noted, 102 S.Ct. 996 (1982) (No. 81-554). See supra text at
notes 372-74 & note 374.
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